The Historical Ontology of Environment:From the Unity of Nature to the Birth of Geopolitics by Conway, Philip
  
 
 
 
 
 
The Historical Ontology of Environment: 
From the Unity of Nature to the Birth of Geopolitics 
 
 
Philip R. Conway 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Department of International Politics 
Aberystwyth University  
  2 
Contents 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................................................. 3 
ORTHOGRAPHY AND REFERENCING ........................................................................................................................... 5 
PART 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 6 
1: MATTERS OF SIGNIFICANCE ...................................................................................................................................... 7 
1.1: Starting points and parameters .............................................................................................................................. 7 
1.2: Constraints and complications ............................................................................................................................ 15 
1.3: Chapter précises ................................................................................................................................................ 21 
2: THE META-HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENT ............................................................................................................... 27 
3: RETHINKING HISTORICAL ONTOLOGY ................................................................................................................. 48 
PART 2: THE MAKING OF MILIEU .......................................................................................................... 68 
4: “THIS ÆTHERIAL MEDIUM”: MEDIATION FROM NEWTON TO LAMARCK ..................................................... 69 
4.1: From whirlpools to sensoria: Newton and his inheritors ......................................................................................... 69 
4.2: From fluids to lizards: Lamarck and his detractors ............................................................................................... 83 
4.3: Destitute of the means: Denunciations and reclamations ......................................................................................... 93 
EXCURSUS A: ONTONOMIC: THE ASSEMBLY OF OBLIGATION .............................................................................. 97 
5: “THE TOTAL ENSEMBLE”: ASSOCIATION FROM COMTE TO TARDE .............................................................. 106 
5.1: From order to animation: Comte’s positivism ...................................................................................................... 106 
5.2: From romance to experiment: Balzac, Taine, Bernard, and Zola .......................................................................... 117 
5.3: The phantom milieu: Science against metaphysics ............................................................................................... 126 
EXCURSUS B: ONTOTURGIC: THE MANIFOLD OF WORLDS .................................................................................. 137 
PART 3: CLIMATE AND COSMOS .......................................................................................................... 145 
6: “UNDER A SINGLE SKY”: INCLINATION FROM HIPPOCRATES TO CABANIS ................................................. 146 
6.1: From Ouranós to interrelation: Climatic traditions over two millennia ................................................................... 147 
6.2: From art to instruction: The climate of Montesquieu ........................................................................................... 163 
6.3: This ensemble itself: The demands of the whole .................................................................................................. 176 
EXCURSUS C: ONTODESIC: THE PARTAGE OF POSSIBILITY ................................................................................. 181 
7: “VEINS OF THE MACROCOSM”: CIRCULATION FROM HALLEY TO HUMBOLDT .......................................... 189 
7.1: From Helena to Pennsylvania: The enrolments of naturalism ............................................................................... 190 
7.2: From critique to chaos: Herder’s ideas of history ................................................................................................. 197 
7.3: Making cosmically comparable: Humboldt’s terrestrial physics ............................................................................. 205 
EXCURSUS D: ONTOGRAPHIC: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COSMOS .............................................................. 225 
PART 4: ENVIRONMENT’S EMPIRE ....................................................................................................... 233 
8: “THE CIRCUM-AMBIENT LIFE-ELEMENT”: VISUALISATION FROM CARLYLE TO SPENCER ........................ 234 
8.1: From obscurity to heroarchy: Carlyle’s drama of visuality .................................................................................... 234 
8.2: From economy to ethics: Spencer’s philosophy of correspondence ............................................................................ 246 
8.3: The imaginary environment: Victorian commonplaces .......................................................................................... 260 
EXCURSUS E: ONTOMESIC: THE SITUATION OF CONTRADICTION .................................................................... 262 
9: “A DEEP BIOLOGICAL JOY”: DETERMINATION FROM DARWIN TO DU BOIS .............................................. 271 
9.1: From selection to cosmism: Darwinian defenders and appropriators ....................................................................... 275 
9.2: From specialism to commonplace: A ground of spatial relation .............................................................................. 285 
9.3: Satire and possibility: Environment circa 1900 .................................................................................................. 292 
EXCURSUS F: ONTOCHRONIC: THE COMPLICATION OF CONDEMNATION ...................................................... 302 
10: CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................................... 311 
SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................. 315 
Figures .................................................................................................................................................................. 316 
Works .................................................................................................................................................................. 319 
  
  3 
Acknowledgements 
I’m tempted to say that “it takes a village” to have written something like this—to have made 
one’s way though the thickets of life and academic protocol to the point of needing to 
acknowledge that which has made this passage possible. However, the better image might 
instead be a whole series of villages, bundled by bonds of various kinds, stretching away into the 
deepest groves of remembered and unremembered time, each in their own ways and byways 
ushering, however haphazardly, the bewildered thread of a given wanderer towards the peculiar 
improbability of their present moment. Such reflections upon abyssal contingencies of the 
personal past are wont to induce vertigo. However, I can say, simply enough, that I have been 
lucky to have been amongst the villages that I have. 
 The village of the Aberystwyth University Department of International Politics has been 
particularly kind to me. I therefore owe a first round of thanks to my friends, comrades, and 
peers, including Amal Abu-Bakare, Christine Andrä, Renato Sabbagh Bahia, Talwyn Baudu, 
Karijn van den Berg, Paul Blamire, Ira Bliatka, Charlotte Botfield, Bleddyn Bowen, Matthew 
Campbell, Quincy Cloet, Lydia Cole, Florian Edelmann, Prithvi Hirani, Katharina Höne, Justa 
Hopma, Alex Hoseason, Danielle House, Jittipat Poonkham, Sorana Jude, Emma Kast, Mary 
Keogh, Anna Rolewska, Suzanne Klein Schaarsberg, Marcello de Souza Freitas, Chyatat 
Supachalasai, Katarina Kušić, Alex Mack, Alistair Markland, Dylan Marshall, Adhemar 
Mercado Auf der Maur, Krishna Monthathip, Nick Morgan, Desiree Poets, Doug Pryer, Devon 
Simons, Tom Vaughan, Jana Wattenberg, John Wood, Hon-Min Yau, Danielle Young. These 
are some of the people who have made this place home over the past few years. 
 As well as the academic faculty of InterPol, and other departments too, I also owe thanks 
to the support staff, especially Vicki Jones, Donia Richards, Sarah Whitehead, Elaine Lowe, 
and Sali Hopkins, without whom all sorts of wheels would have long since fallen off. 
 I have benefitted greatly, during my time here, from the wise and benevolent supervision 
of Inanna Hamati-Ataya, Mark Whitehead, Andrew Linklater, and Iwan Morus. I am 
particularly grateful to Mark, who saw the project through from beginning to end, and to 
Inanna, without whom it might not have gotten started in the first place. 
 Countless conversations, comments, prompts, and provocations at various conferences 
and other events over the past several years have helped me to arrive at my present situation. 
In particular, I am grateful to those who served as discussants on various draft portions of what 
became the present text. Audra Mitchell, at the 2016 European Workshops in International 
Studies in Tübingen, provoked me to work out what I meant by “world.” Louiza Odysseus, at 
the 2016 Aber–LSE–Sussex Theory Colloquium, also gave me valuable feedback. In 2018, I 
also benefitted from being able, at the invitation of Ian Klinke, to present my overall thesis at 
the St. John’s College, Oxford, Geography Society. 
  4 
 Then, to the friends who have visited, had me visit, or otherwise made for good times, 
over the past three years and previously, long may it continue. 
 I owe particular thanks to Xymena Kurowska, without whose care and support some 
dark and difficult times might have been unbearable. 
 Then, to all those over the years whose kindnesses I may never have been aware of, or 
have forgotten, I am grateful. 
 Finally, I want to thank my family for giving me life, and giving me the means to live it. 
 I dedicate this text to the memory of my sister, Beth, and my father, Peter. I know that 
you would both have been very proud of what I have accomplished. My darling Beth, no 
daylight will ever be quite as bright without your warmth and kindness to shine down on. 
  
  
  5 
Orthography and Referencing 
Reference information is given in the body text where appropriate to the argument. Details 
such as subtitles are often given in footnotes if they are relevant but not essential. 
Double quotation marks are generally used. Single quotation marks are sometimes used 
for clarity, indicating emphasis without reference. 
The section symbol (§) is used to refer to both chapters and sub-sections (e.g. Chapter 5, 
Section 3 becomes §5.3). An exception to this comes with the six “Excurses,” which follow each 
chapter, and are referred to by letter (i.e. §A–§F). This system allows a simple means of referring 
back and forth, parenthetically, to other sections. 
All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. Published translations have 
usually been used where available. Where these translations have been modified, this has been 
indicated. Transliterated was performed using tools available at www.lexilogos.com. 
 References to Figures are given on pp.316–318. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 1: Introduction 
  
  7 
1: Matters of significance 
Where are we? What time are we in? What is our shared reality? 
 Integrally, this thesis concerns matters of spatial relation, epochal differentiation, and 
ontological association. Substantively, it constructs a history of three concepts—milieu, climate, 
and environment—tracing their distinct but interrelated development up to the start of the 
twentieth century. Analytically, it identifies differences between specific instances of conception, 
emphasising their contemporaneous (i.e. at their time) rather than contemporary (at this time) 
significance. Diagnostically, it understands these differentiable conceptions of spatial relation to 
be formative, in however minor a fashion, of collectively particular and historically variable 
ontologies. Conceptually, it formulates a distinct understanding of what “ontology” should 
mean with respect to such matters. Speculatively, it begins to reformulate certain strands of this 
inherited, and conflicted, legacy of conception, with a view towards present problems. In short, 
this thesis undertakes a historical and philosophical study of these three concepts in order to 
pose questions regarding our prevailing modes of thought. 
1.1: Starting points and parameters 
By the start of the twentieth century, the concept “environment” had become both 
commonplace and contested. It had been popularised from the 1850s onwards as a translation 
of the French “milieu.” However, it also bore a crucial relation to its precursor and parallel 
“climate.” This thesis undertakes to explicate the complicated historical pathways by which 
these three concepts came to be matters of significance—that is, both commonplace and 
contested—within Euro-American scientific, literary, and political parlance. It begins with 
conceptions of physical media in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century physics, before 
investigating the longer development of climate since antiquity, and concluding with the 
proliferation of environment by the turn of the century. However, and moreover, in addition to 
tracing and reconstructing such relations, it also asks: What can we learn from this history? That 
is, how can the problems of the past be related to those of the present? 
Of course, the present has many problems and there are surely many things that can be 
learned in this respect. However, it is important to recognise from the beginning that 
“environment” of 1899 was not that of 1969, nor was “climate” of 1748 that of 1988. Indeed, 
taken in their contemporaneous significance—in terms of both their historically particular 
meaning and relative importance—these concepts are found to have performed rather different 
roles in comparison to those with which we are now familiar. To “learn from this history” 
therefore requires more than searching for anticipations or filiations of present realities. 
As such, in addition to the historical reconstruction to which the majority of this text is 
given, a conceptual argument is also articulated: The conflicted significance of environmental 
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concepts, as developed through the period known as modern, derives from conflicted 
conceptions of existence. In particular, this conflict can be diagnosed as becoming manifest in 
positivist, phenomenalist understandings of knowledge that hierarchically and teleologically 
elevate naturalistic conceptions of the world above all others, while simultaneously rendering 
the existential commitments of such relations obscure. This process of learning therefore 
requires a distinct understanding of ontology—an understanding to be both historically and 
philosophically developed herein. 
Exemplary as regards this connection is the case of milieu. As a physical medium, 
“milieu” was first understood as a definite (albeit, for many, conjectural) physical substance. In 
1838, Auguste Comte rearticulated the concept in terms of the philosophy of Positivism and, 
after his example, milieu became an abstract placeholder for all those things surrounding a 
thing—an undifferentiated, unified externality consisting of any surrounding entity whatsoever; 
a circumambient sphere of influences, defined by its centre. Thus, the concept underwent a 
transformation: From signifying that substance which undergirds all physical relations, to 
signifying that which is nothing but the relations it encapsulates. However, physical 
connotations remained attached to the term. Indeed, today, one also speaks of “the 
environment” as a thing “out there”—something with its own dynamics and requirements that 
imparts imperative obligations and forms the conceptual ground of political contestation. 
The crucial claim of this thesis is, therefore, that the history of environmental concepts 
pertains to problems of ontology—problems no less relevant in 1838 or 1899 than in 1969, 
1988, or 2019. That is, it pertains to conflicted understandings of what must be “received as 
real” (as I put it in §3) and how a world disunified with regard to the obligations of this reception 
must be negotiated. In order to adequately address this problem, through the course of this 
thesis I develop an original understanding of ontology, conceived as consisting of six dimensions: 
ontonomic, ontoturgic, ontodesic, ontographic, ontomesic, and ontochronic. These concepts 
are both developed from and analytical of the historical narrative that they intersperse. 
Taken altogether, this thesis therefore constitutes a contribution to conceptual history, 
to practical conceptions of historiography, and to contemporary speculative philosophy as it 
engages with issues of science, politics, and the transformation of terrestrial existence. 
Disciplinarily, the conceptual-historical literature that it assembles, reconstructs, and goes 
beyond is constrained to no one field of knowledge. As §2 will show, a number of histories of 
the concepts in question have been written over the past century or so. However, these 
investigations have been undertaken in a wide variety of fields—from philology to 
environmental history, and beyond—, often being disconnected from one another. 
This thesis is, therefore, interdisciplinary in that it draws together and seeks to contribute 
to a variety of fields at once. In particular, it draws on work in the history of science, intellectual 
history, and philosophy. However, this thesis is also transdisciplinary in that it seeks to create 
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something that would not be possible from within any single disciplinary precinct. As will be 
particularly returned to in the concluding sections of the thesis, it is influenced by debates 
concerning decolonisation, which are particularly active within such fields as international 
relations, anthropology, and political geography.1 Moreover, it ultimately seeks to contribute to 
related debates concerning ‘worlding’ and ‘pluriversality’2—and, in particular, to questions 
concerning what it means to inhabit ‘multiple worlds,’ and to construct a politics between these 
worlds—, although, due to constraints of word count and complexity, it does not address these 
debates at length, instead deferring these more comprehensive discussions to post-doctoral 
work. 
Thus, rather than being a ‘disciplined’ text, this thesis attempts to identify, and to open 
up, new fields of knowledge and new possibilities for collaboration, coordination, and 
contestation. Rather than being organised around pre-existing disciplinary boundaries, it is 
organised around its problematique. However, despite this domainally transversal approach, 
the text does nevertheless prioritise particular kinds of issues. 
As its subtitle—‘From the Unity of Nature to the Birth of Geopolitics’—indicates, the 
thesis takes as its historical endpoint the moment just before the First World War when the 
concept of ‘geopolitics’ first became established and popularised.3 Although it has more recently 
taken on a much wider range of connotations,4 ‘geopolitics,’ at this time, entailed a loosely 
affiliated school of conservative thought that undertook to construct imperialist grand strategy 
on the basis of apparently comprehensive global geographical knowledge of the relatively 
immutable structures of terrestrial nature. It can thus be associated with broader movements 
concerning both ‘environmental determinism’ and eugenics. Later, it became closely linked to 
Nazism, via the association of the geographer Karl Haushofer with his student Rudolf Hess,5 
leading to a widespread abandonment of the expression for a large part of the twentieth century, 
for instance by the field of international relations, which came to define its emergence in some 
measure against the leadenly geographical-materialist pretensions of the geopoliticians.6 
It is the beginnings of this moment that this thesis takes as its point of historical 
conclusion—a moment at which certain highly reductive forms of naturalism (‘social 
Darwinism’ being foremost among them) had suffused a pervasive ontology of vicious 
competition into the very conception of reality itself, thus markedly departing from the 
                                               
1 E.g. Bhambra, Gebrial, and Nişancıoğlu 2018; Capan 2017; Esson et al. 2017; Tuck and Yang 2012; Tucker 
2018; Whyte 2018. 
2 E.g. de la Cadena and Blaser 2018a; Ling 2014; Blaser 2013; Lugones 2003; Agathangelou and Ling 2009; 
Prozorov 2013b; Blaney and Tickner 2017; Mitchell 2019. 
3 See Dodds and Atkinson 2000. 
4 E.g. Dalby 1991; Tuathail 1996; Dowler and Sharp 2001; Conway 2016a. 
5 Murphy 1997. 
6 Ashworth 2011; Ashworth 2013; Wittfogel 1985. 
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previously prevalent ontology of the ‘unity of nature,’ which emphasised the divine harmony of 
Creation. Although perhaps more allusive than strictly denotative, the title is thus intended to 
encapsulate the span and direction of the thesis with respect to its intellectual and political 
objectives. 
With this in mind, then, the distinct and original contribution of this thesis can be more 
precisely specified: Besides a large number of specific contributions to various literatures across 
a variety of fields, its more wide-ranging contribution is that it immanently explicates the 
historical-conceptual relations by which concepts of milieu, climate, and environment have 
constituted elements of ‘world-making’ practices—in particular, making worlds of national, 
planetary, and imperial dimensions. As such, this precise explication makes possible—and, 
indeed, the philosophical portions of the thesis begin to think through—, the ways in which 
these concepts might be remade as part of a more comprehensively reconstructed kind of ‘world 
politics.’ The thesis does not take this thinking-through to anything like a point of completeness. 
However, it provides the historical and conceptual materials for such an endeavour. 
The distinction between historical, philosophical, and political practice, the conception 
of conceptual history, as well as that of ontology, will be further elaborated in §3. However, this 
being, first of all, a history, its introduction should be historical. 
~~~~~~ 
On 5th June 1799 aboard the corvette Pizarro, immediately before departing from La Coruña 
for the Americas, Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859) wrote to one of his many 
correspondents, the statesman and naturalist Karl von Moll (1760–1838): 
“In a few hours, we sail around Cape Finisterre. I shall collect plants and fossils and 
make astronomic observations, but that is not the main purpose of my expedition. I 
shall try to find out how the forces of nature interact upon one another and how the 
geographic environment influences both plant and animal life. In other words, I must 
find out about the unity of nature.” 
Humboldt would spend the next five years traversing South and Central America, exploring 
rainforests and climbing mountains, collecting specimens and plotting maps, excavating 
colonial archives and ingratiating colonial dignitaries. It was a life-defining voyage that would 
make him world-famous, rivalling even the newly-crowned Emperor Napoleon in notoriety.  
Understandable, then, that Humboldt’s gleeful letter from La Coruña, vividly describing 
the grand, romantic intentions of his epic expedition, is among his most quoted.7 The passage 
appears in French, the Prussian’s preferred language, in various recent commentaries:8 
                                               
7 E.g. Egerton 2012, 121. 
8 E.g. Godin 1997, 527; Deléage 2010, 39; Singer 2015, 168.  
  11 
“Je collecterai des plantes et des fossiles et me livrerai à des observations d’astronomie. Mais là est pas 
le but premier de mon expédition: je m’efforcerai de découvrir l’interaction des forces de la nature et les 
influences qu’exerce l’environnement géographique sur la vie végétale et animale. En d’autres termes, il 
faut explorer l’unité de la nature…” 
However, these are not words that Humboldt ever wrote. In his posthumously published Lettres 
américaines,9 we find instead (my translation): 
“I shall collect plants and fossils, and I will be able to make astronomical observations 
with superior instruments; I will analyse the air with the help of chemistry… But all this 
is not the principal purpose of my voyage. My attention must never waver from viewing 
the harmony of the contending forces [l’harmonie des forces concurrentes], the influence of 
the inanimate universe on the animal and vegetable kingdom ...” 
The version including the phrase “l’environnement géographique” is a translation back to French 
from a rather loose English rendering of 1955.10 Forgivable, and even forgettable, though such 
anachronism may be for the average reader, for present purposes it is crucial. This minor feat 
of philology suffices to illustrate that although, in the numerous and voluminous works he 
produced over his long life, Humboldt demonstrated and developed a sophisticated spatial 
vocabulary, l’environnement could play no part in it. Nor, despite every opportunity, did he ever 
adopt the French milieu in the sense that was familiar to naturalists and literati alike by the end 
of his life.11 His conceptual lexicon was atmospheric, climatic, and cosmic, but not, strictly 
speaking, “environmental.” 
By the mid-twentieth century, by contrast, environmental concepts had become 
quotidian.12 For instance, in 1962, the marine biologist, conservationist, and popular science 
author Rachel Carson (1907–1964) wrote in her soon-to-be bestselling Silent Spring: 
“THE HISTORY OF LIFE on earth has been a history of interaction between living things 
and their surroundings. To a large extent, the physical form and the habits of the earth’s 
vegetation and its animal life have been molded by the environment. Considering the 
whole span of earthly time, the opposite effect, in which life actually modifies its 
surroundings, has been relatively slight. Only within the moment of time represented 
by the present century has one species—man—acquired significant power to alter the 
nature of his world.” 
“During the past quarter century,” she continued, this power had been increased in both 
“magnitude” and “character.” Man had unleashed “assaults upon the environment,” 
                                               
9 Humboldt 1906, 18. 
10 De Terra 1955; quoted in Botting 1973, 65. These texts also mistake the addressee of Humboldt’s letter, 
attributing it to Freiesleben rather than von Moll (another letter to the former is on the same page of the Lettres 
américaines). 
11 At least not in his major published works (see §7). 
12 Warde, Robin, and Sörlin 2018. 
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contaminating “air, earth, rivers, and sea with dangerous and even lethal materials.” A largely 
“irrecoverable” and “irreversible” adulteration, this “chain of evil,” with its “sinister and little-
recognized” combinations of chemicals and radiation, was “changing the very nature of the 
world—the very nature of its life.”13 
In 1970, the ornithologist, conservationist, and co-founder of the World Wide Fund for 
Nature, Edward Max Nicholson (1904–2003), wrote in The Environmental Revolution: A Guide for 
the New Masters of the World that a “revolution in human affairs” was taking place “for which the 
obvious descriptive label is the term, once so infrequent and now becoming so universal, 
‘environmental.’”14 It was around this time that “the environment” became a concept crucial 
to Anglophone publics. Moreover, it was during the same period that l’environnement found a 
cognate role in French—and many other linguistic communities, in the Euro-American world 
and beyond, experienced a similar alteration in their conceptual conventions. However, this 
was by no means the time that “environment” (sans definite article) first became an intellectually 
and politically contested concept. For that, we must look further back than the “past quarter 
century” to which Carson referred—back, indeed, to the decades just before both Carson and 
Nicholson were born. 
A century after Humboldt’s 1799 letter from La Coruña, the concepts in question may 
not have yet taken on their mid-twentieth century significance. Nevertheless, no one in 
Humboldt’s position could, by then, have avoided them. By around 1899, both milieu and 
environment were conceptual commonplaces of Euro-American biological and sociological 
science; politicians invoked the concepts so as to bolster their rhetoric; theologians pronounced 
upon the moral environments of the faithful; hygienists scolded housewives as to the salubrity 
of their homely environments; literati both wrote and read their fictions in terms of all-pervasive 
mesological influences. Indeed, in 1899, (probably) the first monograph concerning the 
conceptual history of milieu was published: Die Theorie des Milieu, an inaugural dissertation by 
Eugénie Dutoit (1867–1933), written and defended at the University of Bern, Switzerland.15  
The dissertation began by examining the author whose work had, by this time, become 
almost synonymous with milieu theory: the literary theorist Hippolyte Taine (1828–1893). 
Seeking to set textual interpretation on firm, naturalistic foundations, in 1863, Taine had 
propounded an interpretive formula consisting of three primordial forces: “race, milieu, et 
moment.” In formulating this theory, Dutoit argued, Taine had been “pioneering,” anticipating 
“the drive and ferment [das Drängen und Gähren]” of his time. However, Dutoit not only appraised 
Taine’s conceptions but, furthermore, turned them back on themselves. Indeed, she continued, 
in announcing his discovery of “the secret motivating force of development,” had not Taine, 
                                               
13 Carson [1962] 2002, 5–6. 
14 Nicholson 1970, 5. 
15 Dutoit 1899. Defended 28th October 1898. 
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exempting himself from these very same principles, contradicted his own theory? Indeed, such 
a “positivistic and deterministic” conception could only be understood “in connection 
[Zusammenhang] with its own milieu, with its own time, and with the history [Geschichte] of 
philosophy in general.” Milieu theory was, thus, to be understood as “a necessary transitional 
phase in the continually progressive evolution of thought.”16 Accordingly, Dutoit then set about 
tracing this longer unfolding of milieu-thinking, beginning with Hippocrates of Kos (c.460–
c.370 BCE), said to be the first to have established “a direct relationship between climate and 
psyche.”17 
The first woman in Bern to study philosophy and obtain a Ph.D., Dutoit subsequently 
worked as a school teacher, journalist, and activist. Founding and leading various educational 
and women’s rights organisations, she led an active public life in Bern and beyond—though her 
dissertation remained her only published work. In contrast to Humboldt, whose fame continues 
to be reclaimed, Dutoit has received little notice from history. However, both these figures 
punctuate crucial moments within the narrative to follow: Humboldt as a waypoint, Dutoit as 
an endpoint (or, rather, as a hiatus). 
By taking 1899 as an (approximate) point of conclusion, the parameters of the study are 
thus configured rather differently to how they might be if 1962 or 1970 were chosen instead. 
Taking this earlier point permits a more intensive investigation of eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century developments, while also allowing for attention to periods dating back to the time of 
Hippocrates. The challenge, then, is to understand the significance of these earlier conceptions 
for what came later, without reducing their contemporaneous significance to what came later, 
in the manner of a teleology. 
 In this regard, the year 1899 must be recognised as significant in itself. As we have 
already seen, it was around this time that environment and milieu became sufficiently significant 
for their historical development to become an interesting intellectual problem—and, then, for 
the first histories of these concepts, as concepts, to be written.  
Indeed, in the same year as Dutoit’s dissertation, (at least) two other texts were published 
that offered shorter histories of the development of environmental concepts. In the first volume 
of the second, revised edition of his Anthropogeographie, Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904) added a 
chapter on “The development of views on the influence of natural conditions [Naturbedingungen] 
on mankind.” Beginning from “Older Views,” starting with Hippocrates, Ratzel then outlined 
the tenets of the Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755), Voltaire (1694–1778), the Comte de 
Buffon (1707–1788), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Reinhold Forster (1729–1798), Peter Simon 
Pallas (1741–1811), Eberhard August Wilhelm von Zimmermann (1743–1815), Johann 
                                               
16 Ibid., 5–6. 
17 Ibid., 52. 
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Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), and Carl Ritter (1779–1859). Furthermore, the chapter 
discussed “Die Umwelt”—that still obscure concept that would, in a few years, become the 
German equivalent of environment—relating this concept to “das ‘Milieu’” of Lamarck and 
Comte.18 
In the same year, the introductory chapter of The Races of Europe: A Sociological Study by 
William Zebina Ripley (1867–1941), previously published as a standalone article in 1895, 
reported and appraised a somewhat parallel line of intellectual descent as regards 
“environment,” including Ratzel’s Anthropogeographie (first ed. 1882), as well as Humboldt’s 
cosmography, and the sociology of Herbert Spencer (1820–1903)—principal populariser of the 
concept from 1855 onwards.19 Moreover, his chapter began by quoting (marginally modified) 
Taine’s famous statement of “environment, race and epoch,” which Ripley criticised for being 
only “superficially comprehensive,” and failing to distinguish physical and social 
environments.20 
In 1899, also, the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922) published an 
article in which he coined the term “Geopolitik.”21 Two years later in 1901, Ratzel’s essay Der 
Lebensraum: Eine biogeographische Studie22 would make no mention of Umwelt or Milieu. However, 
his concept of Lebensraum would prove consequential indeed, becoming crucially associated with 
the imperialist political geographies soon gathered under the term “geopolitics.” Most 
notoriously, Lebensraum—literally, living-space—became a prominent motif of Nazi 
expansionism. This later Lebensraum was not equivalent to Ratzel’s conception, nor was the latter 
equivalent to the “environment” of Ripley et al. Nevertheless, whether under the flag of 
“geopolitics,” “sociology,” or any other disciplinary designation, “environmental determinism” 
(a term coined in 189223) was, by the start of the twentieth century, of no small significance. 
To put it perhaps too simply, this was indeed a moment of “race, milieu, et moment.” And 
so, it should be clear that the question of what we might “learn from this history” must be posed 
rather differently in comparison to the manner in which we might address the time of Carson 
and Nicholson. 
                                               
18 Ratzel 1899, 13–31. 
19 Ripley 1895; Ripley 1899. 
20 Ripley 1899, 1. 
21 Studier ofver Sveriges politiska granser [Studies of Sweden’s political boundaries]. Kjellén 1899. 
22 Lebensraum: a biogeographical study, Ratzel 1901; Ratzel 2018. 
23 Patrick 1892, 428. Though it was only popularised after the 1920s and was most prevalent in the late 1970s. 
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1.2: Constraints and complications 
For the reasons addressed so far, this study is circumscribed with regard to the matters that 
concern it both temporally and thematically. However, these are by no means the most 
constrictive of the constraints, nor the most confounding of the complications, that thus apply. 
 First, to approach the history of “environment,” or of the positivist “milieu,” is, in a 
sense, to approach the history of a shadow. That is, these concepts conceive an undifferentiated, 
unified externality requiring that the things they unify have only one thing in common: relation 
to the thing environed. Initially, the relevant internality was conventionally a living being or 
organism. However, it could also be a human individual, or perceiving subject more abstractly; 
a race; a species; a nation; a state; later, a gene, cell, chemical reaction, and so on. The 
internality could also be differentiated over time relative to concepts of heredity, homology, or 
series.  
To tell the history of a shadow, then, would also be to tell the history of the things by 
which this shadow is thrown. However, the peculiar thing is that, upon closer inspection, this 
seems very much to be a shadow with substance. Since the mid-twentieth century, we have 
become familiar with “the environment” being reified as though it were a definite, actually 
existing thing, and this was by no means the first instantiation of such a reality-effect.24 As such, 
while attention must indeed be paid to the kinds of environed internalities relative to which 
environmental concepts are composed, it is neither feasible nor necessary for this to be a history 
of those internalities as such. Rather, this is a history of environmental concepts and the reality-
effects they impart. 
 Second, one might rejoinder: environment (or milieu, or climate) is just a word. Or, more 
precisely: telling a history of the ‘signifier’ fails to grasp the reality of the underlying ‘signified’ 
that may be represented by many other signs.25 This is, indeed, an illustrious objection. For 
instance, in his lecture at the Collège de France for 11th January 1978, Michel Foucault noted: 
“The space in which a series of uncertain [aléatoires] elements unfold is, I think, roughly 
what one can call the milieu. As you well know [vous ne le savez que trop], the milieu is a 
notion that only appears in biology with Lamarck. However, it is a notion that already 
existed in physics and was employed by Newton and the Newtonians. What is the 
milieu? It is what is needed to account for action at a distance of one body on another. 
It is therefore the medium [le support] of an action and the element in which it 
circulates.”26 
                                               
24 Or “world-effect,” these expressions, hereafter, being taken interchangeably. 
25 N.B. in structural linguistics, the ‘signified’ does not mean the material thing ‘out there’ but, rather, the concept 
of the thing, existing apart from the utterance. 
26 Foucault 2009, 20–21. 
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This “vous ne le savez que trop” (more literally: you know it only too well) suggested that Foucault 
was paraphrasing, and then embellishing upon, the well-known essay Le vivant et son milieu by his 
predecessor and mentor Georges Canguilhem (1904–1995)—an essay itself given as a lecture 
at the Collège philosophique in 1946–1947 (and published in 1952).27 Foucault continued: 
“It is therefore the problem of circulation and causality that is at stake in this notion of 
milieu. So, I think the architects, the town planners, the first town planners of the 
eighteenth century, did not actually employ the notion of milieu, since, as far as I have 
been able to see, it is never employed to designate towns or planned spaces. On the 
other hand, if the notion does not exist, I would say that the technical schema of this 
notion of milieu, the kind of—how to put it?—pragmatic structure which marks it out 
[qui la dessine] in advance is present in the way in which the town planners try to reflect 
and modify urban space. The apparatuses [dispositifs] of security work, fabricate, 
organize, and plan a milieu even before the notion was formed and isolated. The milieu, 
then, will be that in which circulation is carried out.”28 
Thus, Foucault accords himself the structuralist prerogative of discerning where and when an 
underlying schema, or “pragmatic structure,” can be said to have emerged, regardless of the 
conceptual conventions available to those active in that situation—the structure comes first and 
the significations follow.  
This is certainly not a prerogative to be revoked; however, nor is it one, herein, one to 
be followed. As we shall see in the next chapter, Canguilhem’s essay is undoubtedly the most 
influential text concerning the conceptual history of milieu. However, it is a relatively short 
essay, and, upon a close reading, rather flawed. Moreover, in Foucault’s iteration, any possibility 
of conceptually differentiating, for example, the mediums and milieux of seventeenth-century 
physicists from nineteenth-century sociologists are expunged. One conception alone becomes 
relevant and all specificities of iteration are subordinated to the overriding requirement of 
theoretical abstraction.  
While this is a powerful entitlement, it is also, from a certain perspective, rather 
arbitrary. As such, and as §3 shall specify further, it will be preferred, herein, to maintain 
attention to the specificities of situated conceptual articulation. Thus, here is a constraint that is 
also a reprieve: the following will not presume the structuralist prerogative, and, hence, not 
principally concern itself with where or when an underlying schema could have been said to 
have emerged, instead concentrating on the specific diversity of concepts available in an 
extended series of connected situations. 
Third, this then raises another constraint: these are but a few concepts among many. Indeed, 
to take only the English environment, there are a multitude of terms that could either be 
substitutable, depending on the circumstances (which is one of them), or maintain a close 
                                               
27 Canguilhem 2008a, chap. 5. 
28 Foucault 2009, 21. 
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enough proximity that environment can only be understood as part of their broader semantic 
context (there’s another). At a minimum, aside from circumstance, context, climate, and milieu 
or medium, one could list: ambience, atmosphere, background, biome, biosphere, biotope, 
circumambience, clime, condition, cosmos, earth, Earth, ecosystem, ecotope, element, 
environs, field, habitat, landscape, locality, macrocosm, microcosm, nature, niche, place, 
society, space, station, structure, surroundings, system, world.  
In more technical terms, insofar as it takes Comte’s milieu of 1838 as an organising 
statement, this text practices onomasiology—that is, it takes a concept or thing and explores its 
possible significations. However, in refusing to take that statement as a telos (in the manner that 
Foucault’s practice/notion differentiation effectively made “milieu”), it also practices 
semasiology—that is, it takes words and explores their possible meanings. 
However, and fourth, one might add: these are just English expressions (with French and a 
little German mixed in). Taking, again for the sake of argument, the English environment: 
Today, selves are identified in its terms, bureaucracies busied for its administration, and political 
fault lines carved in its name—and this far and wide. However, environment remains, all things 
considered, a provincial expression. Just as French has milieu, environnement, alentours 
[surroundings], and others, translation seldom yields direct or singular equivalents. 
Nevertheless, in Norwegian we may find miljø; Estonian, keskkond;29 German, Umwelt; Greek, 
περιβάλλοντος [perivállontos]; Arabic, بیئة  [biya]; Italian and Spanish, ambiente; Portuguese, meio 
ambiente; Catalan, medi ambient; Polish, środowisko;30 Japanese, 環境 [kankyō];31 Mandarin Chinese, 
环境 [huánjìng];32 Welsh, amgylchedd, and so on. The cognates, antecedents, derivatives, and 
parallels of the anglo-provincial “environment” are, therefore, considerable. Likewise, even a 
comprehensive comparative semantics from Germany to Japan would be but a drop in the 
ocean of human experience. To depart from what, for the most part, have been major centres 
of cultural power we might consider, the Inuktitut sila, which, as Keavy Martin writes, most 
commonly “refers to the environment, such as in the phrases silami qanuippa? (how’s the weather) 
                                               
29 Sutrop 2001, 455. 
30 Related to “środkowy” meaning middle or centre. 
31 A case in point regarding translation: Environment is usually translated as kankyō 環境 (ring or circle/border or 
boundary)—e.g. 環境省 signifies Ministry of Environment. 風土 (wind/soil) is translated as environment/milieu 
by Berque 1996. However, this is more typically translated as climate. 
32 Xu 2017. 
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or silaup asijjipallianinga (climate change)” but also indicates “wisdom, or cleverness, as in silatujuq 
(he/she/it is intelligent, sensible, or wise).”33 
Everywhere we look, if we do look, there are relations of translation profoundly 
irreducible to whichever conception we deem crucial and thus privilege. The further constraint, 
then, is that this text does not attempt to characterise environmental conceptions in any general, 
‘global,’ or anthropological sense. However, by coming to better understand the formative 
specificities of these evidently hegemonic conceptions, further such investigations may become 
possible.34 
As will be shown further in §2, this making-possible of conceptual rearticulations via 
detailed historical explication does not start from scratch. Rather, it initiates its constructions 
via the gathering together of a somewhat disparate inter-text, within which there has been 
something of a boom in recent years.35 For example, being published too late to be significantly 
incorporated into this thesis (but nevertheless demonstrating the ‘state of the art’ with respect to 
such debates), Paul Warde, Libby Robin, and Sverker Sörlin’s The Environment: A History of the 
Idea provides a notable recent contribution to the literatures that this thesis concerns.36 While 
self-evidently overlapping in thematic and substantive terms, the following chapters depart from 
this work in three principal ways: First, Warde et al. concentrate primarily on developments 
during the twentieth century.37 Second, they focus, very valuably, on how environment became 
formally institutionalised as a concept serving to organise scientific and political work across a 
variety of domains, whereas this thesis reconstructs a time period where this transfer of ideas 
was largely informal. Third, in contrast to what follows, and despite this substantive concern 
with concepts that cross domains, their text does not connect literatures in a comparably wide-
ranging inter- or trans-disciplinary fashion, in order to form a more comprehensive and 
conceptually sophisticated debate, beyond professional boundaries. 
The formative constraints permissive of this study’s loci of concentration should now be 
clear. However, while the three concepts under investigation—milieu, climate, environment—
are, in what follows, given equal attention with regard to their respective historical significance, 
the latter has been singled out for particular attention (not least in the title of this text itself). 
This decision reflects environment’s current state of contestation. The political contestability of 
                                               
33 Martin 2012. See also: Wright 2014. The Inuktitut Living Dictionary records 217 instances of sila combined with 
other roots—for example, Silasaaqsiaq, meaning “darken or change in outside air” and Silarqiqpuq, “calm without 
wind.” Leduc 2010, 29. 
34 This is a possibility particularly explored in the subsequent discussion of the “ontomesic.” See also: Conway 
2017d. 
35 E.g. Taylan 2018a; Taylan 2018b. 
36 Warde, Robin, and Sörlin 2018. 
37 For a more precise delineation of this difference, see: Conway 2019b. 
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milieu has long since subsided. Moreover, while climate is, of course, one of the fundamental 
issues of our present epoch, even deniers of climatic change do not deny the existence of climate 
as such. Environment, by contrast, has been called into question rather more fundamentally. 
In 1987, seventeen years after The Environmental Revolution had found the word 
environmental “becoming so universal,” Max Nicholson wrote in The New Environmental Age that 
“[t]he term environment itself, in its current sense, is still a novelty, and is steadily broadening 
its meaning.”38 Over the previous two decades, the word had gone from being a somewhat 
technical term to being a commonplace of everyday conversation. However, its usage would 
again surge in the early 1990s and, by the turn of the century, the biologist Edward O. Wilson 
could declare in openly millennial terms in the pages of Foreign Policy that “we have entered the 
Age of the Environment.”39 
The intervening decades altered not only the prevalence of “environment,” 
“environmental” and “the environment” but also their connotations. In 1970, Nicholson spoke 
to “the decisive importance” and “the disturbing vulnerability of man’s natural environment” 
but by 1987 was emphasising the necessity of conservation to the “welfare, happiness and 
indeed survival of mankind on this planet.”40 In 2000, in terms similar to but stronger than 
those of Carson in 1962, Wilson affirmed that, in this Age, “humanity has become a geophysical 
force, the first species in the history of the planet to attain that dubious distinction.”41 In the 
same year, the atmospheric scientist Paul Crutzen would, rather more famously, assert that this 
anthropic force had inaugurated a new geological epoch: “the Anthropocene.”42 
In February 2015, before the Groupe de travail sur l’avenir des institutions in the Assemblée 
Nationale (the lower house of the French Parliament), the sociologist and philosopher Bruno 
Latour argued that: 
“The notion of the environment [d’environnement], which dates back to the 1980s and 
1990s, corresponds to an outdated impression [une vision ancienne] of the issues facing us. 
Today, the environment no longer surrounds [environne] us but is embedded [se niche] in 
all the decisions we make—on unemployment, business, or energy. It hardly makes 
sense anymore. Rather than talking about environmental democracy, it is better to talk 
about democracy altogether.”43 
                                               
38 Nicholson 1987, xi. 
39 Wilson 2000, 35. 
40 Nicholson 1987, xii. 
41 Wilson 2000, 35. 
42 Crutzen 2002. 
43 Bartolone, Winock, and groupe de travail sur l’avenir des institutions 2015, 412; Groupe de travail sur l’avenir 
des institutions 2015. 
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In the same year, the ethicist-polemicist Clive Hamilton argued that “environment,” as utilised 
in contemporary earth science, must be understood as a concept pertaining to the ecology of 
organisms and their localities, and that, in terms of planetary science, it stands superseded by 
the “Earth system”—a complex, dynamic totality encompassing everything from tectonic plates 
to trade winds to the earthward drift of space dust.44 The gaping chasm of a “paradigm shift” 
separates the two and effacing this difference, accordingly, constitutes an egregious geo-
ontological category error. 
As early as 2004, Simon Dalby, similarly, wrote that, due to the complexity, synergy and 
sheer scale of concerns in this new geological epoch, “environment as a simple category of 
concern” has been “transcended,” with its “preservationist and romantic premises” altogether 
undercut.45 Likewise, Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz write that “environment” 
in the sense of “that which surrounds us, the place where humans went to extract resources, 
deposit waste” has become redundant.46 Latour, meanwhile, in his Facing Gaia of 2017, adds 
that to talk of “the environment” is to frame an exterior nature as though “through the shelter 
of bay windows.”47 All four authors, with Hamilton, find in favour of the Earth system 
conception.  
Similar sentiments are easily located.48 Jane Bennett, for example, writes that 
“compared to ‘environment,’” understood as “the substrate of human culture,” the concept of 
“‘vital materiality’” is to be preferred.49 Meanwhile, those who do not declaim the term as such 
may nevertheless note its obscurity. As Evelyn Fox Keller writes, no matter how knottily 
nebulous “nature,” “nurture,” and “gene” may be: “Even more troublesome is the ambiguity 
of the term environment.”50 
Similar sentiments are also nothing necessarily academic.51 In a speech from 1991 
(published 1993),52 David Harvey recalls, around the time of the first “‘Earthday’ [in] 1970,” 
reading a Fortune magazine article celebrating the coming of “the environmental” as a “non-
class issue.” President Nixon’s embracing of public pressure to sign anti-pollution legislation 
provided the occasion. Harvey then contrasted this frenzy of consumerist self-congratulation 
                                               
44 Hamilton and Grinevald 2015; Hamilton 2015; Hamilton 2016; cf. Lewis and Maslin 2015. 
45 Dalby 2004, 3. 
46 Bonneuil and Fressoz [2013] 2016, 20. 
47 Latour 2017, 8. 
48 E.g. Jankovic 2010b, 10; Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2007, 7, 17. 
49 Bennett 2009, 111–112. 
50 Keller 2010, 2. 
51 E.g. Monbiot 2017. 
52 Titled The Nature of Environment: The Dialectics of Social and Environmental Change, Harvey 1993; reprinted in Harvey 
1997. 
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with his experience the following day at the Left Bank Jazz Club, a popular venue in Baltimore 
for African-American families.  
“The musicians interspersed their music with interactive commentary over the 
deteriorating state of the environment. They talked about lack of jobs, poor housing, 
racial discrimination, crumbling cities, culminating in the claim, which sent the whole 
place into paroxysms of cheering, that their main environmental problem was President 
Richard Nixon.”53 
Half a century on, and long after the demise of environmental bipartisanship, the present US 
Republican Administration seeks to dismantle seemingly anything associated with the 
expression “environment.” 
 Such conflagrations are far from what the concepts environment, milieu, and climate 
were associated with by around the year 1899. Nevertheless, nor is the moment of “race, milieu 
et moment” all that distant from ours. Indeed, the resurgence of far right ethno-nationalism, today 
cheek-to-cheek with fossil-fuelled capital fantasists, attests to an important truth: it is always 
risky to assume that anything has become ‘a thing of the past.’ As such, the gambit of this text 
is that by understanding the formative specificities of the concepts in question, it will become 
possible to better understand the issues of our present moment, by both epochal contrast and 
problematic commonality. 
1.3: Chapter précises 
The introductory portion of this thesis consists of two further chapters.  
§2 assembles the conceptual histories of environment and its cognates to date, following 
Dutoit, Ripley, and Ratzel. It thereby (a) explicates the principal literatures that this text is 
building on, (b) identifies their particular concerns, concentrations, methodological 
presumptions, and empirical limitations, while also (c) constructing a brief history of how the 
attention given to these concepts has changed over the past century, and (d) demonstrating 
where this text departs from its precursors. 
§3 then explicates the formative conceptual principles of this study, including what it is 
to write a conceptual history, the difference between historical and philosophical practice, and 
the meaning of historical ontology. Thus, it does not fully articulate the philosophical arguments 
of the thesis, which can only be made as the historical narrative proceeds, but rather facilitates 
and foreshadows these further developments. 
The premise of §3, and of the philosophical sections that follow it, is that existing 
conceptual vocabularies are not adequate to achieve the objective herein delineated: that is, to 
establish the possibility of rethinking the concepts of milieu, climate, and environment in such 
a way that they could be reclaimed from the malignant complicities that have often been 
                                               
53 Harvey 1993, 1. See also: Bullard 1993; Taylor 2016. 
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formative of them. In short, if the task is to reimagine Euro-naturalist ontologies in such a 
fashion that they might no longer bear a necessarily imperial, antagonistic relation to other modes 
of being—if, that is, Euro-naturalist ontologies may come to ‘diplomatically’ coexist with other 
kinds of world54—then it is not sufficient only to historically explicate the nuances of the relevant 
histories. Rather, it is also necessary to creatively reconstitute what has been explicated in a 
manner that (a) cannot be predetermined by the modes of thought thus reconstructed but (b) 
must nevertheless in some sense be drawn from these modes. This must be achieved in such a 
way that that we can say, in the end (the end, that is, not so much of this thesis but of the process 
that this thesis attempts to initiate), that whatever was of value in these concepts and modes of 
thought is retained, while, at the same time, regaining the possibility of departing from the 
complicities that have hitherto been the story of these histories. A distinct and hitherto 
unavailable conceptual apparatus is required in order to articulate and facilitate this process; an 
apparatus that I conceptualise primarily around the concept of ontology. 
After these introductory chapters, the principal part of the thesis is then organised into 
six historical chapters (e.g. §4), each of which is concluded by a shorter philosophical excursus 
(e.g. §A). These latter sections both analytically conclude the chapters they follow and undertake 
speculative digressions that further develop their respective concepts beyond what was possible 
in the introductory chapters. They are interrelated and mutually referencing, producing a 
through-running process of reconceptualisation that attempts to establish what this history 
might mean for those who inherit it. 
 §4 initiates the historical investigation, establishing the significance of “medium” and 
“milieu” in the natural philosophies of the late seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries. It 
begins with the conjectures regarding physical and immaterial media of the famously 
hypothesis-averse Isaac Newton, paying particular attention to how this conceptual lexicon was 
received in France against the prevailing tradition of Cartesian plenism.55 The second part then 
investigates the transferral of this lexicon into early biological theories of transformism,56 
particularly in the case of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck. Crucially, although later readers would 
interpret Lamarck’s use of “milieu” in its post-Comtean sense (see §9), his meaning was 
resolutely Newtonian. 
§A, initiating the philosophical argumentation, begins from issues raised in the foregoing 
chapter concerning the extension of the laboratorial model of knowledge to issues of public 
order, particularly in the case of the healer-mystic Franz Anton Mesmer. Understanding, then, 
that such processes not only issue epistemological edicts on legitimate knowledge as such but 
also establish ontological—or, rather, ontonomic—obligations on what is to be received as real, 
                                               
54 Conway 2019a; Conway 2019c. 
55 I.e. the principle that all existence is replete with matter and a true vacuum is therefore impossible. 
56 I.e. theories maintaining the mutability of species. 
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these obligations are understood as collectively constituted, in terms of modes of attention that 
are necessarily partial. Specifically, the relation of collective modes of attention is conceptualised 
in terms of the trivium, meaning crossroads, or common-place: a designation that ensures 
ontologies must be understood as particular, localised, and related. 
§5 continues the investigation of milieu, particularly concentrating on the conceptual 
adaptations of Auguste Comte. Crucially, as well as redefining milieu as an undifferentiated, 
unified externality, Comte also retained its aetherial and physical connotations when 
formulating his positivist religion. Likewise, in the novels of Honoré de Balzac, the older 
connotations were retained. However, a decisive shift from the Newtonian to the post-Comtean 
understanding can be found in the works of Balzac’s subsequent admirers, such as the literary 
theorist Hippolyte Taine and the novelist Émile Zola, the latter of whom drew extensively on 
the anatomist Claude Bernard’s concept of the “milieu intérieur.” The chapter then concludes 
with the competing sociologies, and ontological orientations, of Gabriel Tarde and Émile 
Durkheim, the former of whom declaimed the explanatory-circumambient “milieu” as 
metaphysical and meaningless. 
§B begins from Comte’s derision of “ontology” as what positive knowledge must 
overcome. It then considers Tarde and Durkheim’s equally, if oppositely, disavowed ontological 
commitments. Whereas the ontonomic concerns the formation of collective obligations with 
regard to ‘reception as real,’ the ontoturgic concerns how these relations are performed—made 
into palpable and “patent” worlds that are, as per the trivium, manifold. An attempt to 
systematise such reality-effects can be found in the catechisms Comte propounded for his 
secular religion. The “conflicted conceptions of existence” referred to above can thus be 
understood with regard to the desire, typified by Comte but by no means unique to him, of 
wishing to reduce ontology to epistemology—a reduction continually undoing itself. 
§6 shifts to considering climate, beginning with the medical conception thereof prevalent 
in post-Revolutionary France. In particular, for Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis, climate was 
understood similarly to how Comte would subsequently define milieu. The chapter then 
investigates the long series of authors and events from Greek antiquity onwards that led to the 
significance of climate circa 1800, starting with the astronomic and astrologic conceptions from 
which the word derives, as well as the still-earlier medical works attributed to Hippocrates. 
Particular attention is paid to the contestation of the concept of climate in mid-eighteenth-
century controversies surrounding the jurist and political philosopher Montesquieu. It is around 
this time that climate became a “matter of significance” in its own right. 
§C begins from the recurrent association of climatic concepts with relative distributions 
of agency—people from the icy north being hostile, those from the tropical south being idle, 
and so on. This is understood not just in terms of differing characteristics of peoples but in terms 
of differing presumptions regarding the possibilities of action. The ontodesic, then, addresses a 
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serious problem raised by the ontonomic and ontoturgic: If ontology, as formulated herein, is a 
matter of collectively-relative ‘obligations’ that are ‘performed’ into palpability then can reality, 
as such, be made whatever collective perceptions would like it to be? Against this important 
accusation, a reformulated conception of ‘realism’ is argued for that divests this disposition of 
its power to disqualify forms of existence but, at the same time, insists upon the fundamental 
non-arbitrariness of any given distribution with regard to its relevant beings. 
§7 continues the investigation of climate, particularly concentrating on the intensifying 
role of state and capital interests in facilitating and directing exploration and natural 
philosophical research. Beginning from Edmund Halley, the first section concludes with 
understandings of deforestation in relation to climate in the early United States. The second 
section then considers Johann Gottfried Herder, whose philosophical conception of climate 
synthesised the works of the most prominent naturalists of the preceding decades. Finally, the 
chapter returns to the career of Alexander von Humboldt, bringing together both the Romantic 
aestheticism of his desire to bring tropical landscapes to European readers, and the technical 
endeavours he undertook in order to bring about a unified understanding of nature—an 
undertaking for which the more precise measurement and delineation of climatic differences 
was crucial. 
§D begins with some of the new beings made familiar to Euro-American collectives 
through the later decades of the nineteenth century: microbes, the telegraph, radiation, and so 
on. Between the times of, for example, David Hume and Gabriel Tarde, who both employed 
conceptions of social contagion, the constitution of these collectives had been transformed—
and hence “contagion” itself became a rather different concept. Thus, against the philosophy 
of Martin Heidegger, which is premised upon a privileged relationship between being, time, 
and human subjectivity, presupposing the fundamental transcendence of the “ontological” from 
the “ontic,” the ontographic relates beings to being through the media of “paradigmatically 
existing things”—that is, things that are taken to typify things in general. 
§8 shifts to considering environment, beginning with Thomas Carlyle, the first 
populariser of the concept, who understood it less as a principle of causal imposition than as 
one of Romantic scenography for heroic individuality. From the 1820s until the 1850s, 
environment was largely disseminated through networks familiar with Carlyle’s works. Crucial 
among early adopters was Harriet Martineau whose translation of Comte related 
“environment” to the positivist, Comtean conception of milieu qua undifferentiated, unified 
externality for the first time. This specific articulation was then taken up and popularised by 
Herbert Spencer. The final part of the chapter then investigates the place of environment within 
Spencer’s holistic socio-biological works, in particular as it involved a hierarchical, teleological, 
progressively individuated understanding of life based upon the organism as a bounded unit—
a conception that rationalised imperialism and genocide. 
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§E begins from the recognition by classical sociologists such as Spencer, Durkheim, and 
Marcel Mauss of the relative importance of inter-collective relations—what Mauss called the 
“milieu of milieus.” Ontological collectives, as understood herein, do not necessarily correspond 
to traditional designations of nation or society. Nevertheless, if, as per the trivium, the existence 
of a collective always presupposes other collectives, then questions of coexistence become 
imperative. This relation of difference is explored through the concept of mana, common to 
many of the peoples of the Pacific islands, and often related to the aetherial conception of 
milieu—a concept also analysed by Mauss in his sociology of religion. Against the so-called 
“ontological turn” recently propounded in in academic anthropology, the ontomesic is 
understood as a necessarily politicised operation, conceptualised here through the philosophy 
of Isabelle Stengers in terms of “diplomacy” between common-places. 
§9 continues, and concludes, the investigation of environment, beginning from William 
James’ defence of Charles Darwin against Spencer and his acolytes. After the detailed 
investigations of Carlyle, Martineau, and Spencer in §8, this chapter concerns how environment 
became detached from attribution to any given author, becoming a marked matter of 
significance—both commonplace and contested—by the turn of the century. While Darwin 
largely eschewed the concept due to its associations with Lamarck and Spencer, his younger 
proponents and propagators made use of the term’s connotations of holism and 
comprehensiveness. Environment initially entered political discourse as an explicitly scientific 
expression; however, by around 1900 it had become commonplace, if still technical. In the first 
decade of the new century, it could even be satirised as something of a cliché. 
§F returns to questions of epochal difference (first outlined in §3). One of the fundaments 
of modern ontology has been the understanding of historical time as consisting of periodic 
revolutionary ruptures that sweep away that which does not belong to each new era. That is, 
the ontology most common to those describing themselves as modern has presupposed a strong 
commitment to anachronism: Certain things can only meaningfully be said to exist within their 
allotted time-frame. This principle is integral to the writing of history; however, it is never 
innocent. Beyond the prosaic admission that ontologies are historically changeable, the 
ontochronic is intended to pose the question of epochal decision—that is, the situated 
determination of which aspects of the past are still able to have a hold on the present (and in 
what way). This question then must be related to this text itself: In articulating the preceding 
history, and then attempting to “learn from” it in the register of speculative philosophy, a 
political relation of inheritance is established that must be engaged with all due responsibility. 
This thesis, then, attempts to formulate an empirical and conceptual apparatus for addressing 
such a relation of responsibility with regard to the case of environmental concepts up to around 
the start of the twentieth century. 
  26 
§10 then concludes by returning to the issues raised in this introduction, briefly 
summarising the overall historical narrative, and philosophical propositions. 
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2: The meta-history of environment 
The historicisation of environment and its cognates has already been specified as occurring 
sometime around 1899, and several of the most significant contributors thereto identified. 
However, it remains to specify the works from which this text takes its lead, and to identify 
where, relative to its objectives, they are found to be empirically and theoretically unsatisfactory. 
Depending on how narrowly or broadly the parameters are defined, both temporally 
and typologically, this review could be almost endless. Thinking somewhat broadly, one might 
begin with the second volume of Humboldt’s Kosmos, published in 1847, which examined 
“Incitements to the Study of Nature,” and the “History of the physical contemplation of the 
universe,” narrating the development of poetry, landscape painting, and the cultivation of exotic 
plants, as well as that of naturalistic knowledge.1 Or, as a supplement to strictly historical 
accounts, one might consider, from the 1950s onwards, the technical literature that developed 
across a number of fields, attempting to establish a singular definition of “environment” for the 
purposes of engineering or scientific standards.2 Furthermore, now-classic accounts of the 
history of environmental thought, such as Donald Worster’s Nature’s Economy: A History of 
Ecological Ideas (1977),3 and Richard Grove’s Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island 
Edens and the Origins of Environmentalism, 1600–1860 (1996),4 are undoubtedly invaluable as 
regards the construction of any such history as this one.5 
However, for the purposes of both (a) establishing the originality of this thesis, and (b) 
demonstrating the provenance of the most important problems and questions with which the 
rest of this text must engage, I will constrain the review to concentrate, for the most part, only 
on those works that engage directly with the history of environment and its cognates as specific 
concepts. 
~~~~~~ 
When Ratzel’s student, translator, and foremost Anglophone advocate Ellen Churchill Semple 
(1863–1932) published her Influences of Geographic Environment: on the Basis of Ratzel’s System of 
Anthropo-Geography in 1911, she did not reproduce her mentor’s potted history of environmental-
geographical thinkers. Nevertheless, in her preface, she placed his work in the tradition of 
Montesquieu, Humboldt, Ritter, and Ripley, while censuring his acceptance of Spencer’s 
                                               
1 Humboldt 1848, vol. 2. 
2 E.g. Figure 1: Weichhart 1979. 
3 Worster 1977. 
4 Grove 1996. 
5 E.g. further, White 1967; Leiss 1994; McIntosh 1985; Nash 1989; Hagen 1992; Plumwood 2002; Pepper 1996; 
Foster 2002; Taylor 2016; Saito 2017; Forrester and Smith 2018; Warde 2018. 
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organismic theory of the state, “now generally abandoned by sociologists,” duly excising it from 
her self-consciously scientific, and “Anglo-American,” rendering.6 
In 1918, Armin Koller submitted a Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Illinois under 
the title The Theory of Environment: Part I: An Outline of the History of the Idea of Milieu, and its Present 
Status.7 This topic, he noted prefatorily, had been suggested to him in 1907 by Professor Martin 
Schütze (1866–1950), and an earlier paper prepared in 1912. “As guide-posts were lacking,” 
Koller writes, “at least I knew of none, I was bound to seek by accident and for a number of 
years” until he “chanced upon the Herder-Taine problem”—that is, regarding the filiation of 
6 Semple 1911, v–vii. 
7 Koller 1918. 
Figure 1—“Partial dimensions of the concept of ecology”; Weichhart, 1979 
[Removed for online publication.]
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Herder’s climate and Taine’s milieu.8 Though bearing “Environment” in its title, it was the 
subtitle’s “Milieu” that Koller’s Part I generally preferred, taking these terms interchangeably. 
Beginning from a short “Introductory Remark” on the word milieu itself, the text then 
proceeded to “sketch” the history of “the Idea of Milieu,” beginning with “the ancient Jewish 
Prophets,” before continuing through the nineteenth century, covering everything from 
“Anthopo-geography” to “Climatic Control of Food and Drink,” citing Dutoit’s work in 
passing.  
In 1922, in the fourth part of a long essay on The Fundamental Ideas in Herder’s Thought, 
Schütze himself noted Dutoit’s Die Theorie des Milieu as an “exhaustive and well-written 
dissertation.”9 He also mentioned his former student Koller, into whose hands he had placed 
this existing account for the purposes of preliminary orientation and instruction. However, 
Schütze added: 
“In the Preface, in which he gives an account of the development of his study, Mr. 
Koller fails to mention Miss Dutoit’s work, and gives a misleading description of the 
state of the problem confronting him. The subject, at the time that Mr. Koller was 
introduced to it, was not, as appears from his description, a primeval wilderness without 
paths and ‘guide posts,’ but an inviting district with its main lines of topography clearly 
traced and with the points of the compass plainly indicated.”10 
This was among both the first and the last citations that Dutoit’s work would receive. Despite 
such professorial reproof, in 1924, Koller himself published a two-part essay on Herder’s conception 
of milieu,11 and, in 1937, a book on The Abbé Du Bos: His Advocacy of the Theory of Climate.12 
 Thus, in the early decades of the twentieth century, there was significant interest in the 
histories of environment and its cognates, frequently investigated in order to establish such 
concepts as part of a legitimately scientific lexicon.  
So it was for perhaps the most extensive contribution to this budding genre through 
these years, The Environmental Basis Of Society published by Franklin Thomas in 1925.13 By 
“environment” Thomas meant “the geographical factor in social causation,” and aimed not 
only to present and assess the major authors on the subject from antiquity, through the early 
and late modern periods, up to contemporary theories concerning natural resources, 
                                               
8 Ibid., chap. Preface. 
9 Schütze 1922, 361. 
10 Ibid., 361–362. Koller cited Dutoit’s text in five endnotes but not in the body text. 
11 Koller 1924a; Koller 1924b. Unless these texts were considered to be “Part II” of The Theory of Environment, it 
seems that the complete project was never realised. In the first (1924, 217), Koller does note that the titular “‘Part 
I’ should not precede the sub-title but follow it”; however, he does not make clear if this is supposed to be ‘Part II.’ 
12 Referring to Jean-Baptiste Dubos (1670–1742), whose Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture of 1719 
(analysed in §6) was an influential text concerning the relation of climate and culture. 
13 Thomas 1925, reprinted 1965. Dates of birth, etc. unknown. 
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psychological influence, and the geographical determination of history but, furthermore, to 
demonstrate the importance of such modes of causation for social science. However, in contrast 
to haphazard historical doctrines, from Hippocrates and Herodotus onwards, “the 
environment,” now scientific, was now to be understood as what “furnishes the [external] 
stimuli,” to which “social groups react.”14 
Nevertheless, not all were so impressed with such developments. In 1929, the Marxist 
critic and political geographer Karl Wittfogel published an essay titled Geopolitik, Geographischer 
Materialismus und Marxismus,15 in which he systematically attacked what he described as the 
lineage of bourgeois materialism associated with such concepts, beginning with Montesquieu 
and Herder, and ending with the likes of Haushofer. The bourgeois doctrine, Wittfogel argued, 
had served its historical purpose but a fully scientific, that is dialectical, materialism would duly 
succeed it.  
It was during the subsequent decade that what would become by far the two most widely 
read and influential essays on the conceptual history of milieu were both written. 
First, in 1942, Leo Spitzer (1887–1960) published Milieu and Ambiance: An Essay in 
Historical Semantics.16 “Milieu,” he began, “is now associated in every one’s mind with the 
deterministic theories of Taine”;17 however, this was not the original—or, indeed, the 
authentic—meaning. Rather, Spitzer placed such latter-day milieus in longitudinal relation to 
the Greek τὸ περιέχον [tò periékhon]. Already ancient by Aristotle’s time,18 this concept is often 
translated as “the environment” but, implies, rather, “the all-embracing air, space, sky, 
atmosphere, climate: the cosmic ‘milieu’ of man.”19 That is, periékhon did not simply environ but 
was that which sympathetically encompassed the earth and the cosmos; cossetting, protecting, 
embracing, and enveloping; “a kind of loving milieu round about” human being.20 The second 
part of Spitzer’s essay then traced in detail the development of the modern, mechanical milieu 
from Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), Newton, Émilie du Châtelet (1706–1749), Comte, Honoré de 
Balzac (1799–1850), Spencer, Claude Bernard (1813–1878), and Edmond de Goncourt (1822–
1896), noting also the caustic Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) who commented in 1885: “the 
‘milieu-theory’ is now the most satisfying; everything exerts influence and the result is man 
himself.”21  
                                               
14 Ibid., 6–7. 
15 Wittfogel 1932; Wittfogel 1985. 
16 Published in two parts: Spitzer 1942a; Spitzer 1942b. 
17 Spitzer 1942a, 2. 
18 Aristotle 1999, 111. 
19 Spitzer 1942a, 2. 
20 Ibid., 5. 
21 Quoted and translated by Spitzer 1942b, 184. See: Nietzsche 2003, 1; also: 94–95, 131–132, 169, 201. 
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In conclusion, Spitzer discerned an echo of the “spiritual περιέχον” in the Latinate 
“ambiance,” and a “more concrete, more earthy, more bounden” sort in certain varieties of 
“milieu.” The original conception “perhaps is forever lost.” Nevertheless, it was an aspect of 
“human nature” to desire “a projection of the feeling of the child within its shell, protected as it 
is in its mother’s womb,” even if, “in this chaotic and complex modern world,” this nature today 
contented itself with “a more modest receptacle,” being not “all-protective” but rather allowing 
man to feel he can “‘belong’ somewhere.”22 
Second, when Foucault remarked to his packed audience “vous ne le savez que trop [you 
know it only too well]” (§1.2), he may have been indulging in some degree of rhetorical flattery. 
However, it would have been clear to most to what he alluded: Canguilhem’s Le vivant et son 
milieu (first published 1952).23 Even more than Spitzer, this essay would subsequently become 
an authoritative account. It began: 
“The notion of milieu is becoming a universal and obligatory mode of apprehending 
the experience and existence of living beings; one could almost say it is now being 
constituted as a category of contemporary thought.”24 
However, if Canguilhem was aware of any of the accounts detailed above, he did not cite them. 
Indeed, while his body text makes numerous references to specific authors—his second 
paragraph alone mentions Newton, Buffon, Lamarck, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, Balzac, and 
Taine, as well as Jean le Rond d’Alembert (1717–1783) and Denis Diderot (1713–1784), Henri 
de Blainville (1777–1850), Alfred Giard (1846–1908), Félix de Dantec (1869–1917), Frédéric 
Houssay (1860–1920), Gaston Bonnier (1853–1922), and Louis Roule (1861–1942)25—his notes 
are rather short on specific citations, and even shorter on details such as page numbers.26 
Nevertheless, Canguilhem continues, the purpose of his essay is not merely historical. It having 
proved difficult to ascertain the “synthetic unity” of the concept of milieu in terms of its 
“historical stages” of formation, its forms of “utilization,” and “the successive inversions” it is 
involved with in relation to other terms, and in various fields, the task then fell to 
“philosophy”—that is, to epistemology—to “take the initiative in synoptically investigating the 
meaning and value of this concept.”27 
 The evaluative synopsis begins by noting that “[t]he mechanical notion (though not the 
term) appeared with Newton,” this meaning then being enshrined in d’Alembert and Diderot’s 
                                               
22 Spitzer 1942b, 199–200. 
23 Canguilhem 1992, chap. 3; Canguilhem 2008a, chap. 5. 
24 2008a, 98. 
25 Canguilhem also mentions “Costantin,” author of work on the “arrowhead leaf [la feuille de sagittaire],” identified 
in the English translation as “Johann Costantin,” author of Recherches Sur La Sagittaire (1885). 
26 Though in the English edition some citations have been added by the translator. 
27 2008a, 99. 
 
  32 
Encyclopédie before Buffon inspired Lamarck to bring it to biology, though the latter “used it only 
in the plural” (that is, as milieux).28 This account is already, at best, simplistic. First, as Spitzer 
had already demonstrated, Newton wrote of “medium” regularly, and it was Émilie du Châtelet 
whose French translation of his Principia in 1749 maintained “milieu” as its equivalent, though 
this translation was already conventional. Moreover, while Lamarck was undoubtedly a 
follower of Buffon, and while he indeed only wrote of milieux-plural in the major works he 
produced after 1800 (that is, after the announcement of his evolutionary theory, and after he 
coined the term biologie), before this date he had written elsewhere of milieu in the singular in 
relation to living bodies, albeit living bodies considered as physical objects (§4).  
Rather than attempting to historically reconstruct the concept as such, Canguilhem 
instead prefers to philosophically delineate its proper range of meaning and work from there. 
The main problem of mechanics in Newton’s day, he continued, was that of “the action of 
distinct physical bodies at a distance.” Thus, the milieu—the mi-lieu, the middle-place—was 
the principle resolving this quandary, providing the missing link between dispersed centres of 
force. When this “essentially relative” quality is forgotten, “milieu tends to lose its relative 
meaning” and to become “a reality in itself.”29 Thus, not unlike Spitzer, Canguilhem historicises 
the concept only by maintaining the prerogative of an epistemological judgement as to its 
authentic meaning. This, moreover, is not only a heuristic convenience but provides the very 
purpose of the essay. 
 Nevertheless, while Le vivant displays various other problems of nuance and fact, while 
its analysis is consistently evaluative, and while it largely ignores Anglophone authors prior to 
the twentieth century (such as Spencer), Canguilhem also articulates a more sophisticated 
historical account of Francocentric conceptual developments, particularly as regards the 
relation of milieu to mechanical philosophy, than any of his apparently unread precursors. After 
considering Lamarck and Comte in some detail, Darwin, Ritter, and Humboldt are 
introduced—the latter of whose Kosmos is described as “a synthesis of knowledge concerning life 
on earth and the relations of life to the physical milieu.” Humboldt and Ritter, in particular, 
are said to have laid the foundations that gave rise to the Anthropogeographie of Ratzel, while not 
only Taine but Jules Michelet (1798–1874) mesologised the writing of history, such conceptions 
becoming “more and more deterministic or, rather, mechanistic” the further they departed 
from their “founders.”30 
However, around the turn of the century, milieu conceptions saw a “reversal” as French 
geographers such as Paul Vidal de la Blache (1845–1918), Jean Brunhes (1869–1930), Albert 
Demangeon (1872–1940), and Lucien Febvre (1878–1956) emphasised the status of “man” as 
                                               
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 100. 
30 Ibid., 106–107. 
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“a geographical factor.” Particular attention was then given to the ethnological semiotics of 
Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944), populariser of Umwelt, and the neurologist Kurt Goldstein 
(1874–1965), who criticised the mechanical theory of reflexes. Together, these authors effected 
a further “reversal” by making organisms not merely subject to external influences but active 
evaluators of what is important for themselves (most famously, with Uexküll’s example of the 
tick).31 
 Finally, and again not unlike Spitzer, Canguilhem relates milieu conceptions to matters 
of cosmology, differentiating “a centered, qualified space, where the mi-lieu is a center”—the 
cosmos of the pre-Galilean, Greco-classical, enclosed periékhon—from “a decentered, 
homogeneous space, where the mi-lieu is an intermediary field”—the universe typified by 
Pascal’s famous fright for an “infinite sphere whose center is everywhere and circumference 
nowhere.”32 With the philosophical initiative thus taken, and synoptic overview duly 
constructed, Canguilhem concludes by admonishing those who would place humanity in a 
milieu transcendent to all other species, and stipulating “the insufficiency of any biology” that 
submits so unconditionally to the physico-chemical sciences that it endeavours “to eliminate all 
consideration of sense from its domain.”33 Thus, in his authority as epistemologist, he counsels 
a corrective: to take seriously the “reversal,” as set out by Uexküll and Goldstein in particular, 
and to resist the biologically inauthentic allure of mesologic mechanism. 
 A decade and a half before his Collège de France lectures that touched on the subject, 
in Folie et déraison: histoire de la folie à l’âge classique of 196134 Foucault had already discussed 
milieu.35 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, he noted, medical thought had accepted 
“an almost immediate link [relation] between madness and the world”—belief in lunar influence 
coupled with “the widespread conviction that climate had a direct influence on the nature and 
quality of the animal spirits.” Thus, as far as “the classical mind [l’esprit classique],” was 
concerned, “madness could easily be the effect of an external ‘milieu’, or more exactly the 
stigmata of a certain solidarity with the world.” It was then, in a sense, a natural theological 
renovation of the Renaissance connection of madness to various “dramas and cosmic cycles”—
to the stars, the seasons, and so on. 
“From the macrocosm, taken as the place where all mechanisms were complicitous, 
and as the general concept of their laws, something resembling that which the 
nineteenth century was later to term a ‘milieu’ starts to emerge. 
                                               
31 Ibid., 109–113. 
32 Ibid., quoted 117. 
33 Ibid., 120. 
34 Foucault 1961. 
35 This section was, however, excised from Madness and Civilization, the abridged English translation of 1964. A 
complete translation was published as History of Madness in 2006. 
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Perhaps we should [Sans doute faut-il] allow this notion, which had not yet found its 
equilibrium or its final denomination, to retain its unfinished [inachevé] nature, and 
speak instead, like Buffon, of ‘penetrating forces,’ which allowed not only for the 
formation of an individual, but also the appearance of the different varieties of the 
human species: the influences of climate, of nutrition and of the way of life.”36 
At this time, then, Foucault recognised the historical specificity of milieu as a concept. 
Nevertheless, he continued to employ it as an analytical term. Neither Histoire de la folie nor 
subsequent works added a great deal to the specifics of how milieu was formulated or 
promulgated. However, since the 1970s, and particularly in the English-speaking world, it is to 
a large extent via Foucault that Canguilhem’s work have been received, with much of the latter’s 
claims accordingly being attributed to the former. 
Nevertheless, all such works, up to and including Spitzer and Canguilhem, were 
diminutive in comparison to the nearly 800-page treatise published by Clarence Glacken (1909–
1989) in 1967: Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in Western Thought from Ancient Times to 
the End of the Eighteenth Century.37 Therein, Glacken traced the history of three “ideas”: that of the 
earth as designed for human habitation; of environment as influencing human being; and of 
human agency in affecting the geographical environment. In a grand narrative arc from the 
antiquity of Stoic cosmoses and Hippocratic climates, to early Christian teleologies of divine 
creation and human fallenness, to early Modern physico-theology and mechanical 
determinisms, to Enlightenment self-assurances regarding the perfectibility of man and the 
domination of nature, Glacken was not principally concerned with conceptual semantics. 
However, his preface noted that “‘Nature,’ ‘physical environment,’ ‘design,’ ‘final causes,’ 
‘climate,’” and such terms “have a long history, accumulating different and often vague 
meanings in the course of time.” Moreover, in surveying the existing literature, he had found 
that while “natural” and “physical” environment, as corresponding to Umwelt and milieu, were 
often used interchangeably, these terms were generally clearly distinguished from the social 
scientific sense of environment—“that is, the cultural milieu.”38 
Original terms in translation are sometimes noted; however, this is rarely of analytical 
consequence.39 For example, by way of introducing the medical theory of humours, Glacken 
quotes the compiler Aëtius of Antioch (fl. 350 BCE) commenting on Alcmaeon of Croton (5th 
century BCE): 
“Illness comes about directly through excess of heat or cold, indirectly through surfeit 
or deficiency of nourishment; and its centre is either the blood or the marrow or the 
                                               
36 Ibid., 365; Foucault 1972, 385. 
37 Glacken 1967. 
38 Ibid., xiv. 
39 Cf. Glacken 2017; Conway 2018b. 
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brain. It sometimes arises in these centres from external causes, moisture of some sort 
or environment or exhaustion or hardship or similar causes.”40 
He notes that the translation by G.S. Kirk and G.E. Raven of 195741 renders as “environment” 
the Greek χώρα [khôra]; however, no further remark is made upon this fact. Originally meaning 
the arable area surrounding a city in the sense of hinterland, environs or territory,42 khôra is the 
root of the geographical terms chorography (study of regions), choropleth (cartographic 
visualisation of data through shaded or coloured regions), and of the embryological term 
chorion (the membrane surrounding a foetus during gestation). It is also the term used in Plato’s 
Timaeus to designate the “receptacle” or “third kind” that mediates being and becoming, 
harbouring the eternal forms.43 Such connections go beyond Glacken’s vast but necessarily 
circumscribed itinerary. Nevertheless, his history does not shy away from the cosmological. 
Indeed, such texts as the Tetrabiblos of Claudius Ptolemy (c. AD 100–170) were taken to 
constitute an antique “science of cosmic environmentalism,” as the shifting of seasons, stars, 
and other meteors formed circumambient referents for terrestrial existence.44 
Thus, through the middle decades of the twentieth century, environment as a term of 
art no longer required historical validation. However, its mechanistic orthodoxies met with 
increasing resistance. Moreover, by the time that Traces was published in 1967 (having been at 
least a decade in the making), the terms of discussion had changed markedly. The third of 
Glacken’s longitudinally traced ideas—that of human agency affecting its geographical 
environment—was now the unambiguously predominant concern. “Environment,” with 
regard to human being, was no longer so much a matter of influences of but, rather, influences 
on; no longer something impinging or forcing from the exterior inwards but an exterior at the 
mercy of an elevated inside; not a formative imposition on human being so much as a fragile 
protectorate subject to human sovereignty. Glacken himself later wrote: “Environmental 
determinism in fact has been so strong that only with the greatest difficulty have systematic 
studies of man’s role in changing the physical environment been made.”45 This phrase 
“environmental determinism,” usually pejorative, was popularised through the 1960s and 
1970s.46 Duly, historical investigations further to the works detailed above, in the coming years, 
                                               
40 Glacken 1967, quoted 11. 
41 Kirk and Raven 1957, 234. 
42 Elden 2013, chap. 1. 
43 See also e.g. Derrida 1993. 
44 Glacken 1967, 15. 
45 Glacken 2017, 183. From a long-unpublished collection of manuscripts, unclear when written exactly. 
46 Déterminisme environnemental and Umweltdeterminismus following from the 1970s to the 1990s, though déterminisme 
géographique was common from the 1940s. 
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were few and far between, while more general works on the history of environmental ideas, 
such as Worster’s aforementioned Nature’s Economy (1977), became more common. 
In 1980, volume 5 of the Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (published 1971–2007), a 
philosophical lexicon based upon the methodology of Joachim Ritter (1903–1974), included an 
entry on “Milieu.”47 However, such studies remained unusual through the years in which Max 
Nicholson (1987) wrote that the term environment “is still a novelty, and is steadily broadening 
its meaning.”48 
 In 1991,49 Niklas Luhmann (1927–1998) wrote of the historical specificity of “the 
concept ‘subject,’” which he noted not to have emerged in its familiar, modern form until the 
late eighteenth century. The effects of this subjectivation, he adds, “were enormous.” 
“One consequence, for example, was that a concept of an opposite, relative to the 
subject, had to be invented. This was called Umwelt, and then later ‘environment,’ 
environnement. Before this time there had been no environment. Instead, the world was 
understood as the totality of things or as the support (periéchon, literally, ‘envelope’) of all 
their particulars. The schema subject/environment dissolved the compactness of this 
conception of the world. One began to think in terms of differences […].”50 
In historical terms, Luhmann gets the order of Umwelt (coined around 1800, rare until after 
1900) and environment (found before 1700, in use by Carlyle and associates from 1828, rare 
until the 1850s) mixed up—even more so the French environnement, which was not in popular 
usage until the 1960s. Moreover, the periéchon seems to cover all of history until around about 
the time of Kant. No citations are given for these assertions; however, in the fifth chapter of the 
same work, “System and Environment [Umwelt],” Luhmann references Canguilhem’s well-
known essay, adding by way of endnote that “[t]he ontology of substance and essences” is 
without any “concept of environment [Begriff fu ̈r Umwelt],” an issue that the eighteenth century 
began to rethink via “reflections on the significance of ‘milieus’ for the specification of genuinely 
indeterminate forms (e.g., human beings).” 
 “The length of time required to learn this testifies to the difficulty of the idea 
[Gedankens]. Ever since the sixteenth century, word compounds [Wortbildungen] 
containing ‘self’ and ‘Selbst’ have proliferated in Europe. Yet a good two hundred years 
were needed before anyone noticed that this presupposes an environment [Umwelt].”51 
                                               
47 Ritter and Gründer 1980, 129–154. 
48 Nicholson 1987, xi. Though see e.g.: McGrath 1983. 
49 “Instead of a Preface to the English Edition: On the Concepts Subject and Action,” prepended to the English 
edition of Social Systems, Luhmann 1995. First published as Luhmann 1984. 
50 Luhmann 1995, xxxix. 
51 Ibid., 538; Luhmann 1984, 242–243. 
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While perhaps historiographically careless, Luhmann thus places his own work in the tradition 
of those who would insist upon environmental distinction as an ontologically fundamental 
development. 
Over the next three decades, the history of environmental concepts would come to 
receive greater—indeed, ever greater—attention. Moreover, such studies did so with an 
expanded range of concerns, methods, and theoretical means. 
In 1995, Timothy Luke’s essay On Environmentality: Geo-Power and Eco-Knowledge in the 
Discourses of Contemporary Environmentalism undertook to construct a critical genealogy of 
“environment” and, more particularly, “the environment,” noting “a fundamental lack of 
clarity” as to what this term, despite its still-ballooning popularity, actually means.52 Without 
citing any of the above-mentioned studies (aside from Worster’s Nature’s Economy), Luke largely 
engages in a theoretical analysis of the conceptions in question, channelling Foucault so as to 
tie environment to a managerial discourse of global governance. However, he also uses 
newspaper indices to chart a very brief (one paragraph) course of the historical development of 
“the environment,” starting with Rachel Carson’s New Yorker essays from 1960.53 
From the mid-1990s onwards, Augustin Berque has published a large number of essays 
on the concept of milieu,54 especially in relation to the work of the Japanese philosopher Tetsurô 
Watsuji (1889–1960),55 and the French statistician Louis-Adolphe Bertillon (1821–1883). In 
particular, Berque propounds the concept of médiance as a translation of Watsuji’s 風土性 
[fûdosei], which he defines as “the meaning or idiosyncrasy of a certain milieu, that is, the 
relationship of a society to its environment [environnement].”56 Moreover, he promotes mésologie 
(i.e. the logic of the milieu), a concept initially popularised by Bertillon (see §5), as the study of 
meso-logics that work to “break with the mental framework of modernity.”57 
 However, it was after the year 2000—into “the Age of the Environment”58—that such 
works proliferated most conspicuously. In 2001, Urmas Sutrop published an essay that briefly 
traces the history of Umwelt, largely concentrating on von Uexküll’s reformulation thereof.59 
Indeed, in the years since, something of a cottage industry developed around von Uexküll and 
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his proto-biosemiotics.60 Among the more incisive of such efforts, the linguist Jui-Pi Chien’s 
2007 essay Umwelt, milieu(x), and environment submits the analyses of Spitzer and Canguilhem, 
among others, to cross-cultural critique by way of the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de 
Saussure (1857–1913).61 She argues that Spitzer’s philology overvalues and essentialises the 
prototypical periékhon, while Canguilhem, similarly, elides differences between milieu and Umwelt. 
Both authors are, therefore, said to ignore the inextricability of signifier from cultural-linguistic 
context and historical specificity. The conceptual confrontation between the phenomeno-
Germanic Umwelt and mechano-Gallic milieu, again typified by Taine, was further dramatised 
by Wolf Feuerhahn in essays of 2009 and 2015, the latter arguing Uexküll to have been making 
a pointed “political criticism” by his adoption of the term, with “the anti-French connotation 
of Umwelt” having been largely forgotten.62 
 Explications of, and elucidations upon, the history of milieu have also increasingly 
become partial elements of longer works. For example, the third chapter of Ed Cohen’s A Body 
Worth Defending of 200963 investigates the emergence of “public hygiene” in France after 1789, 
particularly focusing on how a revival of holistic Hippocratic medicine was brought into medical 
practice, legislation, and theory.64 The final part of the chapter, after the fashion of Foucault, 
utilises the accounts of Spitzer and Canguilhem to retrospectively relate the conceptual history 
of milieu, especially as regards Comte and Bernard, to the earlier history that was analysed in 
terms of this same concept.65  
On a similar subject, in Confronting the Climate of 2010,66 Vladimir Janković comments:  
“Today, ‘environment’ is so ubiquitous that it rarely receives closer inspection. […] Yet 
if ‘environment’—as Einstein once quipped—is everything ‘that is not me,’ then it must 
refer to something that is at once anywhere and nowhere in particular. One may ask: 
the environment as opposed to what?” 
Being mindful of the “presentism” that comes with taking such terms for granted, Janković 
resists the “temptation” to speak of medical practitioners in the eighteenth century “as somehow 
introducing an ‘environmental paradigm.’” Rather, “following the French philosopher Georges 
Canguilhem,” he prefers “to emphasize the relational character of ‘milieu’”—that is, the being-
between that insists on the “relational” over the “absolute” conception. However, unlike 
Canguilhem, Foucault, Cohen, and others, Janković does not adopt milieu as a generic, 
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backwardly-projectable term. Instead, he proposes “replacing ‘environment’ with ‘exposure’” 
for the purposes of historical reconstruction,67 thus articulating an onomasiological (as opposed 
to a semasiological) approach.68 
 Against commonplace judgements concerning the inherently anti-technological and 
proto-reactionary tendencies of the Romantic era of the first half of the nineteenth century, in 
The Romantic Machine of 2012,69 John Tresch conducts a series of investigations into the active 
and productive confluence of romanticism and machinery in Paris between Napoleons I and 
III. Focusing on the interlinked careers of Humboldt, Balzac, and Comte, as well as Henri de 
Saint-Simon (1760–1825), André-Marie Ampère (1775–1836), François Arago (1786–1853), 
Pierre Leroux (1797–1871), and others, the text also prominently features the concept of milieu 
as a historical and conceptual motif. The fundaments of milieu are drawn once again from 
Canguilhem;70 however, beyond this now-orthodox and much-mined account, Tresch also 
draws out the significance of the concept for specific authors such as Ampère, Balzac, Geoffroy 
Saint-Hilaire, and Comte.71 In particular, Leroux’s declaration that “[s]ociety is a milieu, which 
we organize from generation to generation to live there” is discussed at length.72  
 With a similarly revisionist bearing, in their 2013 book L’événement anthropocène: La Terre, 
l’histoire et nous,73 Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz assert the need to “abandon 
the official narrative of awakening” on which environmental and Anthropocene politics has, 
they argue, hitherto been based.74 This traditional story tells that, through the process of 
modern imperial, industrial, and capital transformation, there was a gradual coming-to-
awareness as pollution and degradation became ever more acute, and scientific knowledge of 
such environmental changes became ever more precise, with public and political awareness as 
such only taking hold in the past half-century. Academically encapsulated in such taglines as 
“we have never been modern,” and “reflexive modernity,”75 the problem with such grand 
narratives, Bonneuil and Fressoz argue, “is that they are historically wrong.”76  
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By way of elaboration, in their eighth chapter,77 the authors propose six “grammars of 
environmental reflexivity”: “Circumfusa, climate, metabolism, economy of nature, 
thermodynamics, exhaustion.”78 Developed long before the so-called environmental revolution, 
deep in the era when “moderns” were supposed to be purifying and separating society and 
nature, of particular relevance herein is the first grammar. The word environnement, they note, 
was imported from English, and only became institutionalised in the 1970s. Deriving from 
Spencer’s sociology, it was thus absent in the 1855 La Fin du monde par la science of Eugène Huzar 
(1820–1890),79 which they claim to be “the first catastrophist philosophy of technology.” 
However, the word circumfusa was, they write, “a fundamental concept of French public health 
studies from the late eighteenth century.” Thus, we were never unenvironmental.80 
The genealogical connection between circumfusa, milieu, and environment is rather more 
declared than demonstrated. Indeed, in L’événement anthropocène, the authors give not one 
reference to any contemporaneous text making use of circumfusa. In an article published on the 
subject in 2009,81 Fressoz references only one text before 1800 (indeed, only one before 1844): 
volume four of the medical section of the Encyclopédie méthodique published in 1792, written by 
Louis Charle Henri Macquart (1745–1808), which classes “Climat” under an overall schema of 
hygiene that comprises “circumfusa” as signifying “surroundings things [choses environnantes].”82 
In his Ph.D. thesis of 2010, and subsequent articles and chapters, Trevor Pearce has 
investigated the development of environment as regards its application in psychology, sociology, 
and biology. In particular, his article From ‘circumstances’ to ‘environment’83 considers how, with 
Spencer’s repurposing of Martineau’s translation of Comte, “a singular, abstract entity—the 
organism—interacting with another singular, abstract entity—the environment”84 came to be 
understood. This conceptual innovation he articulates in terms of recovering “the work of 
metaphysical abstraction” that produced this conception; recovered, that is, from the 
“ubiquity,” and hence quotidity, with which such an abstraction is, today, habitually regarded.85 
With similar attention to specificities, in Coinage of the Term Environment (2012),86 Ralph Jessop 
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examines Carlyle’s early usages of “environment,” in particular his translation of Goethe’s 
“Umgebung.” Jessop emphasises its Romantic and anti-mechanistic connotations, defending 
Carlyle against his detractors, especially Spitzer. 
However, as well as case-based studies, general resources and works of summation have 
also been under construction. For example, in the third volume of the Historisches Wörterbuch der 
Biologie (2011) by Georg Toepfer, a substantial entry reconstructs the development of Umwelt,87 
relating the concept to its English and French cognates. Toepfer has also produced BioConcepts, 
an extensive, online English-language dictionary for biological concepts.88 Moreover, this topic 
continues to compel theses.  
In Re-Imagining a Politics of Life: From Governance of Order to Politics of Movement (2014),89 a 
book based upon her Ph.D. thesis, Leonie Ansems de Vries uses the conceptual development of 
milieu in order to construct a political theory subversive of mesologic modes of modern 
biopolitical governance. Although reconstructing in some detail major thinkers such as Hobbes 
and Kant, placing their work in relation to mesologic conceptual history, it is a principally 
conceptually creative, rather than narrowly historical, work. As per convention, de Vries draws 
on Spitzer, Canguilhem, and Foucault. However, her principal inspiration derives from the 
philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) and Félix Guattari (1930–1992), and their 
reconception of “milieu” in Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus.90  
Finally, by far the most substantial work on the concept of milieu to date comes from 
Rationalité Mésologique: Connaissance et gouvernement des milieux de vie (1750–1900), the thesis defended 
by Ferhat Taylan at the University of Bordeaux Montaigne in 2014.91 Taking the concepts of 
“milieu, surrounding circumstances, and conditions of existence” as “the guiding thread [le fil 
directeur],” the study thus sets aside “environnement” as such, being interested, rather, in the 
development of “mesologic” rationality as a mode of governance.92 In three parts, the first 
examines the development of historical epistemology as a conceptual-historical methodology, 
particularly relating Canguilhem’s works to those of Foucault.93 The second part, titled “The 
Emergence of a Rationality (1750–1820),”94 then investigates: the revival and transformation 
of Hippocratic medicine in the mid-eighteenth century; the development of the principle of 
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organic irritability by the likes of Albrecht von Haller (1708–1777); the production of new 
regimes of urban planning and land-use; the development of hygiene as both science and 
ordinance; and the conceptual demands that were produced for geographical knowledge by 
colonial expansion. This, the middle portion of the thesis, thus establishes the conditions of 
possibility for the emergence of “milieu” in its nineteenth-century sense. The third part, “The 
Rise [L’Essor] of Mesology (1820–1900)”95 then documents: the intellectual conflicts between 
Cuvier and Lamarck; what Taylan calls “The grand synthesis” of “The positivist rupture” 
occurring with Comte; the development of mesology and ecology; the relation of such 
conceptions to issues of acclimation, colonisation, and criminology; and, finally, the role of 
Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) in isolating the social milieu from the natural, thus effectively 
founding the social sciences.96 Thus, Taylan’s work locates itself unambiguously, though not 
uncritically, within the lineage of Canguilhem and Foucault, following through with greater 
breadth and rigour on what their earlier efforts had suggested and circumscribed. 
It would seem, then, that while the history of these conceptual histories is long, research 
in this vein is fast-increasing—and not always in relation to the green-political environment per 
se. However, the ever deepening political bite of climatic crisis, worldwide capitalist 
bacchanalia, and associated “reflexivity,” undoubtedly bears a strong relation to these 
augmenting interests. For example, Bentley Allen has traced the emergence of the climate as an 
object of governance through the twentieth century.97 At greater length, in The Environment: A 
History of the Idea, Paul Warde, Libby Robin, and Sverker Sörlin describe the emergence of “the 
environment” as a term of interdisciplinary collaboration and international agenda-setting from 
the 1940s onwards, particularly as it leads towards the development of Earth system science and 
“Big Ecology” in the 1980s.98 
Such works build on, when they are aware of them (which is frequently not the case), an 
extensive catalogue of texts that themselves demonstrate the shifting significance of the concepts 
they are concerned with. However, another history might also be told of surprising absences—
that is, where “environment” might be expected to appear but is found missing. In the 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (1972–1997), a large historical dictionary of German-language 
concepts, edited and instigated by Reinhart Koselleck (1923–2006), there is an entry for Natur 
but no Umwelt.99 Raymond Williams’ Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, first published 
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1976,100 makes passing reference to environment only within entries on “Ecology” and 
“Naturalism.” The Dictionary of Untranslatables, edited by Barbara Cassin,101 accords 
environmental concepts no independent presence, besides a short subsection on Umwelt within 
the entry for Welt. Similarly, Peter Burke’s 2002 article Context in context provides a detailed 
history of humanist-hermeneutic contexts, situations, circumstances, and so on, but partitions 
this from equivalent, and co-developed, naturalistic concepts—a disciplinary separation that, 
quite evidently, is of relatively recent genesis.102 
 Nevertheless, it now remains to explicate where the following departs from the 
preceding. 
First of all, as has been shown above (and could have been shown rather more), there 
are numerous details, large and small, that can be quibbled or disputed (Luhmann’s prefatory 
misarticulation being only the most succinct). For one further instance, take the aphorism cited 
by Janković: “‘environment’—as Einstein once quipped—is everything ‘that is not me.’” This 
is, indeed, one of the most-quoted bon mots on the subject. This precise phrase is not evident 
within Albert Einstein’s lifetime (1879–1955). In 1969, Buckminster Fuller (1895–1983) made 
use of the witticism.103 However, it is unlikely to owe its first expression to either author. 
‘Fact-checking’ is not, of course, the principal purpose of this thesis, nor will the 
following engage in sustained critical discussion of other accounts. Its purpose, rather, is to 
produce an account of its own. Nevertheless, it is by the incremental explication of such layers 
of misattributed or forgotten meaning that the historical strata to be reconstructed will be 
addressed. Likewise, while the following is certainly concerned with the manner in which 
environmental or mesological conceptions may, or may not, facilitate such affections as those 
of cosmic enclosure and “‘belong[ing]’ somewhere,”104 it is not, in contrast to Spitzer, 
concerned with adjudicating the authenticity or fallenness of modern modes of being in contrast 
to those of the geo-centred Ancients. 
Moreover, while the above has demonstrated an expansive existing literature 
concerning the concepts in question, the major works discussed also show significant differences 
of focus to what is addressed herein. For example, Taylan’s Rationalité Mésologique, being nearly 
2.5 times the length of the current text, ranges considerably more widely than the following is 
able to. Nevertheless, his work does not mention Spitzer, nor does it address, for example, 
Balzac or Émile Zola (1840–1902), prominent figures in the popularisation of milieu through 
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the nineteenth century. Moreover, it is largely focused on the French language, while the 
following is particularly concerned with issues of conceptual travel and translation. 
However, beyond differences of empirical priority and selection, more serious 
methodological and theoretical issues also arise. 
It has been understood that environmental concepts have played a part in the 
development of humanistic modes of interpretation, and therefore in the development of 
historiography as such. This situation can be understood in terms of what Isabelle Stengers 
defines as “humour”: “the capacity to recognize oneself as a product of the history whose 
construction one is trying to follow.”105 Speaking of humour in this technical sense does not 
necessarily require that something is funny. Rather, it is distinguished from “irony.” In classical 
literary terms, humour performs in a mode of “discovery” to an audience defined by 
“sympathy”; irony, by contrast, performs “exclusivity” to an “inner circle.”106 Thus, history 
constructed in a modality of “humour” requires the ability to sympathetically recognise those 
aspects of the past one receives as an inheritance, rather than reducing the past, insofar as it is 
of any analytical significance, to being something to be overcome.  
It is with a certain ironism, then, that Foucault declares: 
“My problem is essentially the definition of the implicit systems in which we find 
ourselves prisoners; what I would like to grasp is the system of limits and exclusion 
which we practice without knowing it; I would like to make the cultural unconscious 
apparent.”107 
In this understanding, the past, a priori, is a prison. Such a prison is occasionally broken by 
ruptures in its “system.” As such, it is legitimate to backward-project certain concepts, beyond 
the time that they are accorded the definite recognition of precise signification, if these concepts 
are thereby applied to periods between points of rupture (since to share a period is to share an 
underlying structural identity). However, beyond such points, one inhabits another system, and 
hence, in a sense, another world. 
This is not an example followed herein. Of course, a conceptual history must be more 
than a semantic history. However, the way that this abstraction is enacted matters a great deal. 
Taylan asks: Is the purpose of a conceptual history “to trace the history of a word,” following 
“the multiplicity of its occurrences over time”? Does not this reduce “philosophical work to the 
operation of computer software,” merely “searching for words in an archive?” 
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“If, on the contrary, the history of a concept is in excess of the history of the word, and 
the field of a rationality, in turn, overflows [déborde] the limits of a concept, how could 
we seize, question, formulate such a difference?”108 
The question is certainly fair. However, it presumes a particular relationship between 
philosophical and historical “work”—a relationship that is herein understood rather differently, 
thus leading to quite another mode of abstraction with respect to word and concept. It is this 
that will be explored in the next chapter. 
 However, having now historically summarised and combined the historiography of 
environmental concepts in a more complete manner than, I believe, has been attempted 
previously, the precise ways in which the following historical chapters both build on and depart 
from this existing literature can now be stated. 
With regard to the history of milieu, general orientation is taken especially from Spitzer 
and Canguilhem, by far the two most influential authors on this topic. It is from these authors 
that the most significant points of focus are identified in §4 and §5. However, my text also goes 
well beyond this received wisdom. For example, Canguilhem, as noted above, provides a very 
sketchy account of the works of Newton. §4, by contrast, precisely explicates the significance of 
material and immaterial media in Newton’s works, as well as the process by which his 
“Medium” became the French milieu. Such interpretations and reconstructions are extensively 
informed by the specialist literature on Newton’s works.109 Likewise, general contextualisation 
and orientation with regard to Lamarck’s works is taken from the relevant literature,110 while 
the account of Cuvier’s debate with Geoffroy is based upon Toby Appel’s telling thereof.111 
Nevertheless, here, too, primary texts have been read and are used as much as possible. 
It has been well-known ever since Positivist concepts were first brought to an 
Anglophone audience that Comte’s definition of ‘milieu’ was an important and distinctive 
conception (although, as §9 will show, the distinction of Comte’s conception from Lamarck’s 
was not always made clear). §5 is particularly informed by Mary Pickering’s monumental three-
volume intellectual biography of Comte,112 while the analyses of Balzac’s novelistic uses of 
milieu, and the ‘Romantic’ proclivities of Parisian intellectuals during the first half of the 
nineteenth century more generally, follow the narrative of Tresch.113 The significance of Taine’s 
“race, milieu, et moment,” as shown above, has been well-known since the very first analyses of 
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environmental concepts.114 However, my account connects Taine’s conceptions to the likes of 
Balzac, Zola, and Bernard in a more significant fashion than I believe has been attempted 
previously. 
The secondary literatures on conceptions of climate, both generally and with regard to 
particular issues and authors, are extensive. For example, Roger Fleming provides a broad 
overview of the most significant points of focus,115 while accounts of the life and works of 
Humboldt are legion.116 In §6 and §7, however, while relying extensively upon Glacken’s 
magnum opus for orientation,117 I have gone beyond existing accounts by drawing together 
disparate specialist literatures on Ancient and Medieval conceptions of climate.118 In the 
Renaissance and Modern eras, I have also relied upon Glacken, among others, but have also 
extensively investigated primary texts. 
I have frequently used the methodology of comparing English translations to original 
texts. I have taken this approach not only for the sake of rigour and accuracy but also because 
instances of translation, particularly when the same text has been translated multiple times, are 
highly informative with regard to the conceptual conditions of the moment. Going into 
particular detail in the cases of Herder, Humboldt, and Catherine II of Russia, I believe that I 
go further than any currently available account in explicating these relations of translation as 
they unfolded over the centuries. 
Similarly, while the basic contours of §8 and §9 are informed by existing analyses of 
Carlyle and Spencer,119 I go into considerably greater detail than existing accounts, at least with 
regard to the areas in which my text concentrates. For example, Pearce scrupulously 
reconstructs the relations of transferral and translation between Comte, Martineau, and 
Spencer;120 however, building on this, I also demonstrate the wider dissemination of Comtean 
and Spencerian influences, including the relation between Carlyle’s conception of environment 
and these later versions that came to overtake it. 
In general, then, the approach of this thesis with regard to the substantive history has 
been to assemble as much literature from as diverse a set of sources as possible; to take the map 
of authors and issues that these existing texts provide as preliminary guidance; then, where 
primary sources are materially and linguistically accessible, to thoroughly investigate both their 
internal specificities and their situational influences; or, where they are not thus available, to 
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recombine as detailed an account as possible from secondary sources, always paying attention 
to the specificities of translation (which are often well-elicited by contemporary specialist 
literatures, informed by contextualist modes of historiography). 
 It remains now, therefore, to explicate the preliminary conceptual apparatus, before 
getting to the first historical chapter. 
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3: Rethinking historical ontology 
In order to understand how environmental concepts relate to “conflicted conceptions of 
existence” (§1), it is necessary to formulate an understanding of ontology—and, indeed, 
historical ontology. Moreover, in order to make distinct contributions to conceptual history, 
historiography, and speculative philosophy, it is necessary to distinguish historical and 
philosophical practices. This has been further demonstrated in the previous chapter, showing 
that existing relevant works already combine historical and philosophical dispositions, though 
in a manner that this text seeks to depart from. 
The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to (a) produce a distinct and original 
understanding of historical and philosophical (as well as, in briefer terms, fictive and political) 
practice, (b) establish what it is to write a conceptual history, and (c) establish an initial formulation 
of the speculative-analytical ontological conceptions that will be further constructed in the 
subsequent pages. Its method is to reciprocate between explicating the propositions of certain 
relevant thinkers, and creatively stating original propositions, drawing on but also departing 
from these thinkers. It does not, therefore, begin to understand the history of environmental 
concepts in terms of ontology but it formulates the conceptual apparatus for doing so. 
~~~~~~ 
In his essay “Historical Ontology,” Ian Hacking writes: “It is the philosopher’s privilege to stand 
on the extreme margin.”1 That is, a philosopher has a greater prerogative for speculation than 
does a historian. By way of example, Hacking poses a somewhat droll historical transcendental: 
How did David Hume become possible? That is, how was Hume, at that moment, able to arrive 
at his conception of experience as being fragmentary, granular, and disjointed—a pattern of 
particulates for which the mind must draw all relations; things themselves granting no ground 
for causal attribution? Hacking derives his answer from Mary Poovey’s History of the Modern Fact.2 
“A striking thesis arises: the problem of induction requires for its formulation a particular 
conception of the world.” In particular, it requires the ascendant world of bourgeois commerce, 
with its ledgers, accountants, and bone-dry contractual matter-of-factness. Bookkeeping begets 
empiricism. Hacking is quick to point out that Poovey, as a historian, would not deign to pose 
such speculations—but that is the “privilege” of historical ontology.3 
 However, this differentiation entails a commonality: that philosophers and historians 
are fundamentally engaged in the same kind of practice, they simply go about it with different 
degrees of rigour and supposition. In this, Hacking stands very much within the tradition of 
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Gaston Bachelard, Canguilhem, and Foucault—a filiation he acknowledges. As both the 
previous pages and the following will demonstrate, I will also relate my conceptions to aspects 
of this tradition. However, rather than following Hacking’s philosopher-historian out onto “the 
extreme margin”—that is, granting philosophical and historical practice a fundamentally 
common goal, differentiating the hyphenated hybrid only in terms of relative degrees of 
interpretive freedom—I would prefer, instead, to maintain the distinctiveness of philosophical 
and historical practice, and yet to combine their interactions within one text.  
To be sure, a philosopher can legitimately take greater leeway in their interpretations 
than a historian. But, then, so can a fictionist. What, in that case, differentiates philosophy and 
fiction? My response: Each share common techniques and concerns but possess fundamentally 
distinct obligations—the historian to establishing evidence, the philosopher to conceptual 
creation, the fictionist to worldly manifestation. To be clear, it is not that such modes of action 
can or should be separated. However, they can be concentrated, even while they are combined. 
Thus, they must not be conflated. 
~~~~~~ 
In 1991, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari concluded both their collaborations and their careers 
by asking Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?4 It is, they announced, “the art of forming, inventing, and 
fabricating concepts.” However, this statement involved rather more than might be 
immediately apparent. Perturbed by the increasing reduction of philosophical practice to 
science, art, or even dialogue—“pleasant or aggressive dinner conversations at Mr. Rorty’s,”5 
as they put it—the authors sought to articulate for philosophy its legitimate mode of existence. 
As art performs affects, and science constructs functions, to philosophy pertains the creation of 
concepts.  
I do not share Deleuze and Guattari’s problem and, hence, do not follow their example. 
Indeed, the very possibility of conceptual history presupposes conceptual creativity to be a 
widely distributed capacity. However, I will adopt their identification of philosophy as 
conceptual creation as a formative, speculative principle.  
It may, thus, be further speculated that there are at least four ways to engage in 
conceptual creation: definition, distinction, description, and design. Definition, surely need not itself 
be defined; however, it can be further specified. Definitions presume the relative stability of the 
terms constituting them. When such stability can be assumed, definition is merely a matter of 
filling in a space within an already existing frame. However, such simplicity is rare. Distinction 
is much like definition, except that it makes the relational structure of meaning explicit—this 
can only be understood through that. Description, by contrast, cannot rely on any particular 
                                               
4 What is philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari [1991] 2005; Deleuze and Guattari 1994. 
5 Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 144. 
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points of contrast and comparison but must circumlocute, talking around the thing, explicating 
not just what it is but what it does. Design, finally, enters a field where little is prepared for it. 
This is the mode of the conceptual prose poem, of allusion, artifice and, some would say, 
indulgence. One does not argue a design but rather paints with it—sets a trap for thought, a 
“lure for feeling,”6 a maze of subtly suggestive implications. 
~~~~~~ 
“[O]nly something which has no history can be defined,” wrote Friedrich Nietzsche in 1887.7 
Few philosophers have been more influential in their disruption of the conceits of 
historiographical tradition. However, it is not conceit with which I am, here, concerned but, 
rather, conception. That is, having provisionally identified philosophy’s mode of existence—
that is, what is fundamentally and specifically necessary for that thing to exist8—the same must 
be done for historiography. 
In the same year as Deleuze and Guattari’s Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, Isabelle Stengers 
wrote: 
“‘Science is different from all other practices!’ 
For many scientists, this is a heartfelt cry, a cry that needs to be heard, even if we 
remain free not to understand it exactly in the way that those who utter it would like.”9 
Stengers’ philosophy of science begins from this commitment: to articulate the singularity of 
scientific practice (as all other practices possess their singularity) but without permitting it 
transcendence from all other practices (such that it would loom over them, apart).10 In this 
attempted mediation, she anticipated the coming quarrels between self-declared “critical” and 
“realist” partisans that became something of an intellectual scandal in the next few years11—a 
confrontation matched, too, in debates regarding historical objectivity.12 
Not unrelatedly, in 1998, the literary theorist Lubomír Doležel wrote:  
“In order to construct stories that ‘might be true,’ the historian has to respect certain 
constraints which are not operative in the construction of fictional stories.”13 
                                               
6 This phrase from Whitehead 1929, passim. 
7 Nietzsche 2006, 53. 
8 This understanding of “mode of existence” relating to but differing from, e.g.: Latour 2013a; Latour 2011; 
Souriau 2015; Souriau 1943. 
9 Stengers [1991] 1997, 133. 
10 That is, the sciences must not be practices ‘like any other’; however, nor must their singularity make all other 
practices homogenous in relation to scientific exceptionalism. See particularly: Stengers 2010a; Stengers 2011a. 
11 Ross 1996. 
12 Ermarth 1992; Jenkins 1997; Evans 1997. 
13 Doležel 1998b, 793; Doležel 1998a. 
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That is, the historian is obligated to the ‘facts’ of what the fictionist may freely invent. However, 
in maintaining this genre distinction, Doležel (b.1922, Czechoslovakia) had in mind more than 
intellectual disputes. Having left Czechoslovakia for Canada after the Soviet invasion of 1968, 
he further makes reference to the infamous photograph of Kliment Voroshilov, Vyacheslav 
Molotov, Joseph Stalin, and Nikolai Yezhov at the Moscow-Volga Canal—infamous due to the 
latter figure having been airbrushed out after his murder.14 
“Totalitarian power creates gaps in historical worlds by erasing facts of the actual past. 
It is like fiction making in that it gives its gaps ontological status, projects them into the 
actual world.”15 
This, I would suggest, far more than any teeth-gnashing indignation over “post-modernism,” 
should be the initial “cry” in relation to which the historical mode of existence is understood—
though, of course, “we remain free not to understand it exactly in the way that those who utter 
it would like.” 
~~~~~~ 
When Nietzsche wrote of historicity being, as such, indefinable, he was elaborating, 
parenthetically, upon the morals of punishment: 
“(Today it is impossible to say precisely why people are actually punished: all concepts 
in which an entire process is semiotically concentrated defy definition […].)”16 
But what is a concept? 
 In an essay published posthumously in 1910, William James described “The Import of 
Concepts” in a manner at once empirical, mythological, and evolutionary.17 In the beginning, 
                                               
14 Taken 1937. his name thus becoming an effective metonym for Stalinist disappearance (Ежовщина 
[Yezhovshchina, or ‘Yezhov phenomenon’]) 
15 Doležel 1998b, 799. 
16 Nietzsche 2006, 53. 
17 James 1987, 1007–1020. 
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there was “feeling.”18 To feel is to go along with the flow of experience, to take each moment 
as it comes. To think, by contrast, is to ideate, to decide—that is, to make incisions in the flow. 
Whereas, therefore, a “percept” is continuous, a “concept” is discrete. Conception is, 
accordingly, the abstraction of experience and the formulation of things. It makes present the 
possible and gives rise to pluralistic “universes” of experience:19 
“Had we no concepts we should live simply ‘getting’ each successive moment of 
experience, as the sessile sea-anemone on its rock receives whatever nourishment the 
wash of the waves may bring. With concepts we go in quest of the absent, meet the 
remote, actively turn this way or that, bend our experience, and make it tell us whither 
it is bound.”20 
However, in contrast to both the rationalist concept, which becomes “a self-sufficing 
revelation,” and to the empiricist scheme that grants concepts significance only insofar as they 
format “perceptual particulars,” James adopts a “mediating attitude”—a “radical empiricism” 
that places relation and conception within experience. Neither “flocking with their abstract and 
motionless companions” nor packed in an optician’s lens case, concepts intervene not upon 
experience from a higher outside but between its moments and elements, supplementing the 
perceptual with a proliferation of abstract possibles, forming “a topographic system, a system of 
the distribution of things.” This conceptual complex: 
“tells us what’s what, and where’s where. In so far forth it merely prolongs that opening 
up of the perspective of practical consequences which we found to be the primordial 
utility of the conceiving faculty: it adapts us to an immense environment.”21 
This statement can be taken as premisory as regards the conceptualisation of “concept.” 
However, in so doing it becomes clear why a history of environmental concepts must be 
attentive to its “humour” (§2): it may, in at least some respect, be telling the history of itself. 
~~~~~~ 
Philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari continue, bears a rigorous relationship to its past. 
“Concepts,” as they put it, “are and remain signed: Aristotle’s substance, Descartes’s cogito, 
Leibniz’s monad, Kant’s condition, Schelling’s power, Bergson’s durée.”22 However, such 
relations are formed in a philosophical mode. Taken historically, these proper names might 
invoke authors. However, this is not the role of Aristotle et al. for Deleuze and Guattari. Rather, 
these proper names invoke “conceptual personae”—not figures of authority in relation to which 
statements can be authenticated but complexes of conceptual possibility with which one may 
experiment. Historical authors, then, are to be interpreted in terms of their situated intentions—
                                               
18 Taking ‘concept’ interchangeably with ‘idea,’ ‘thought’ and ‘intellection.’ 
19 James 1987, 1007–1009. 
20 Ibid., 1015. 
21 Ibid., 1012–1016. 
22 Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 7. 
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to be reconstructed. Philosophical personae, by contrast, are to be ‘thought with’ in terms of 
their conceptual possibilities—to be reconceived. 
Nevertheless, philosophical practice is by no means insensitive to the specificities of 
history. How else could concepts be created? 
“Some concepts call for archaisms, and others for neologisms, shot through with almost 
crazy etymological exercises: etymology is like a specifically philosophical athleticism. 
In each case there must be a strange necessity for these words and for their choice, like 
an element of style.” 
Thus, philosophy as such is exquisitely sensitive to past meanings—but sensitive, again, in a 
philosophical mode. It is a matter of “taste [goût]”—of finding the “strange necessity” in nuances 
of conceptual design.23 
 The historical disposition is altogether different. 
~~~~~~ 
In order to make scientific concepts historically traceable, Canguilhem defines “concept” as 
comprising three components: denomination, phenomenon, and definition.24 For example, when 
Descartes describes the involuntary shutting of the eye in relation to an object moving towards 
it, this is “without any doubt a reflex.”25 However, absent a definition—an explanatory statement 
binding word and phenomenon—there is no concept. Thus, it was not Descartes but the 
physician Thomas Willis who achieved this landmark around 1681, writing: 
“the motion […] is reflected, to wit, which depending on a previous sense more 
immediately, as an evident cause or occasion, is presently retorted; so gentle titillation 
of the Skin causes a rubbing of it […].”26 
However, the appearance of such a concept, in the first blush of positivity, is significant not only 
for its propositional exactitude. By making reflex a concept, Willis enabled “the possibility of a 
judgment”—that is, an “identification and classification” of experiences.27 Produced by, and 
productive of, formations of percepts, instruments, and techniques, a concept allows the 
progressive direction of attention towards distinct phenomena. 
However, by contrast, in Koselleck’s Begriffsgeschichte [conceptual history], Begriffe are 
identified not so much by their direction of attention as by their complex polyvalence: 
“In use a word can become unambiguous. By contrast, a concept [Begriff] must remain 
ambiguous in order to be a concept. The concept is connected to a word, but is at the 
same time more than a word: a word becomes a concept only when the entirety of 
                                               
23 Ibid., 8; Deleuze and Guattari 2005, 13. 
24 Schmidgen 2014, 245. 
25 Canguilhem 1955, 42. 
26 Ibid., quoted 34. 
27 Ibid., 69. 
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meaning and experience within a sociopolitical context [politism-sozialen Bedeutungs- und 
Erfahrungszusammenhanges] within which and for which a word is used can be condensed 
into one word.”28 
Or, in short (and effectively paraphrasing Nietzsche): “The meaning of words can be defined 
more exactly, concepts can only be interpreted.”29 The compendium Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe 
(1972–1997) is thus structured upon a series of words (e.g. “state”) that condense various other 
meanings (“territory,” “border,” “citizenship,” etc.) within themselves. In their changing 
historical configuration, concepts become “indices [Indikatoren]”30 of broader socio-political 
movements and transformations. If and when such concepts become “irreplaceable and 
inexchangeable,” they become Grundbegriffe—that is, literally, ground-concepts (usually 
translated as key- or basic-concepts). Though not always consistent, elsewhere Koselleck 
clarifies that a Begriff becomes a Grundbegriff once it comes to be that, within a given situation, 
diverse parties have no choice but to interpretatively engage with the concept in order to 
establish “their respective conditions, and to achieve the capacity for action,” thus registering 
“those minimal commonalities without which no experience is possible, and without which 
there could be neither conflict nor consensus.”31 In other words, a Grundbegriff provides the 
provisional and transitory grounds for mutual communicability. 
 Having thus explicated the field of intervention as regards conceptual historiography, 
an original idiolect, derivative of but divergent from this field, can now be proposed. 
~~~~~~ 
Conception is that which both develops from and intervenes through experience, enabling a 
diversion of attention away from the immediacy of sensation simply received, towards the 
proliferation of possibles, and the exploration of worlds. Formed from and through habits, 
conception concentrates, condenses, connects, and encapsulates experience, dynamic with 
respect to the shifting of situation. Radically empirical, it is at once: a taking-in and holding; a 
marking-out and characterising; a negotiation between complexes, and a negotiation of 
problems. When conception—that is, conceptional creation—meets semiosis, we have expression. 
Moreover, with expressive articulation, we can have not only conception but concepts. 
Concepts may be identified by paradigmatic (that is, exemplary) statements. Such 
statements may, in turn, be related to personae, by whom the concepts in question are “signed,” 
or to authors, with whose iterative authority they are ‘stamped.’ A statement is both a trace of a 
conception and a lure for reconception. The act of conceptual creation is always a process of 
statement and restatement; in expressive terms, a conceptual articulation. There can be 
                                               
28 Koselleck 2005, 85; Koselleck [1979] 1995, 119. 
29 Koselleck 2011, 20. 
30 Koselleck 2005, 84; Koselleck 1995, 112. 
31 Koselleck 2011, 30. 
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philosophies of concepts and personae but histories, strictly speaking, only of statements and 
authors. 
It is apparent, then, that conception is not an unmarked continuum. Conception is 
distinguished from concept by its differing relation to expression (a concept as such must be 
related to the capacity for expression). The concept may, then, be further distinguished from 
the notion: an articulable but highly unstable conception with uncertain frontiers; something not, 
therefore, inexpressible but, rather, inexact; something that may be described or designed but 
not (or not yet) distinguished or defined. A conception is a concept to the degree that it is 
distinguished, bounded, named, arranged, noted, and translated; a notion is to the contrary. 
Habits of conception may well be common across collectives that do not share a closely 
related language—this is indeterminable in the abstract. However, being dependent upon 
conventions of expression, concepts are necessarily relative to their semiotic articulation. That 
a concept is translated means not so much that it is functionally equivalent between collective 
semiotic orders but rather that, since equivalence must be achieved, and usually at a cost, its 
untranslatability has been made sufficiently imposing a problem for institutional relations of 
translation to be established.32 Translation is therefore indicative of significance. When all 
parties to a collective event can presume a concept to be common to them, this concept is 
syndoxic.33 Concepts are often widely translated—and, hence, widely syndoxic. However, one 
does not translate a notion except into a concept. A Grundbegriff, or groundconcept, by contrast, 
is that which is sufficiently syndoxic to provide provisional and transitory communicability as 
regards an issue-situation. 
The passage from notion to concept to groundconcept—from the somewhat 
inexpressible to the complexly articulable to the more or less lexically obligatory—is not, to be 
clear, a developmental one. There is no necessity that a trajectory begin from α and pass through 
ω. However, it is in relation to this possibility that the following historical account is oriented: 
The incremental reconstruction of concepts that, at certain moments, ‘ground’ particular 
communicative relations, whether in a situation of conflict or coordination. 
~~~~~~ 
From the Proto-Indo-European *kap-, “to grasp,” derives the Latin capere, “to seize or grab,” 
and concipere “to take in, hold, become pregnant.” Both the Germanic Begriff and the Latinate 
concept thus connote “grasping,” “seizing,” or “apprehending.” This is also the root of 
“capture.” It is in relation to this conceptual fragment that the specificity of political practice, 
besides the historical and philosophical, can now be articulated.  
                                               
32 Cassin 2016; Cassin et al. 2014. 
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In taking James’ parable of the sea-anemone as formative of my conceptual apparatus, 
I have affirmed the necessity of “humour” with respect to the fact that it was expressed in terms 
of the evolutionary “environment.” However, this is not the last, nor the least, of the difficulties 
involved in adopting this conception. 
What “we” have, in contrast to the sea-anemone, James continued, is “a faculty 
superadded to our barely perceptual consciousness for its use in practically adapting us to a 
larger environment than that of which brutes take account.” This going “in quest of the absent” 
was, therefore, a freedom not afforded that of the brutus—the heavy, dull, insensible, stupid, or 
animal. Nor, moreover, was conception to be found fully formed in the human as such. 
“The thought of very primitive men has hardly any tincture of philosophy. Nature can 
have little unity for savages. It is a Walpurgis-nacht [Witches’ Night] procession, a 
checkered play of light and shadow, a medley of impish and elfish friendly and inimical 
powers. ‘Close to nature’ though they live, they are anything but Wordsworthians. If a 
bit of cosmic emotion ever thrills them, it is likely to be at midnight, when the camp 
smoke rises straight to the wicked full moon in the zenith, and the forest is all whispering 
with witchery and danger.”34 
Thus, “the intellect awoke” only in the time of cultural evolution; such “passion for generalizing, 
simplifying, and subordinating” was a product of historical time; wonder at the unity of nature, 
and adaptation to the “immense environment” was, it seems, a purview of the kind of advanced 
civilisation that could afford itself philosophers. 
We are, then, presented with a problem of critical judgement: The anthropology of 
teleologically ascendential developmental stages is, unambiguously, an implement of racist 
supremacy, very much still with us, though we may wish that it were not. Such ideas, clearly, 
must be renounced; indeed, actively countervailed. How far, then, does simply extricating, and 
moderately transforming, James’ concept-myths take us from the precepts to which they were 
attached? 
From the Greek κριτικός [kritikós], “capable of making judgements,” and κρίνειν [krínein], 
“to separate, decide,” from the PIE etymon *krei-, “to sieve” and hence “to discriminate” or 
“distinguish,” the act of criticism implies a position of judgement and discernment. It may also 
connote a situation of “crisis” or instability, such as the turning point of an illness. 
In electing to engage James as a conceptual persona—that is, to ‘think-with’ him as a 
complex of conceptual possibility—I have indeed made a critical decision. This has entailed the 
active acceptance of a constraint and a risk. The constraint: To repose within the thought of 
another and think from there. The risk: To thus induce the possibility of capture—that is, being 
made a dupe, a lackie, a shill, an agent for what you think you are leaving behind. This risk is, 
moreover, a double one: In your own reconceptions, you may, through limited faculties of 
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discernment or imagination, be made the agent of that which you seek to betray. However, and 
moreover, since every text is, in the end, more ‘designed’ than ‘defined,’ and since every text is 
always received with respect to existing relations of conception, when your statements have 
been made—and you yourself thus made an author or persona for others—it may be that 
precisely what you set out to leave behind reaches back to grasp you, despite your every effort. 
This is not a lament but a problem. 
No doubt, James’ commonsensically chauvinistic hierarchy of civilisation could be 
excused on the grounds of its being a ‘product of its time.’ Or, these dimensions of the 
conceptual complex named ‘James’ could be argued an integral failing and altogether 
condemned (in the sense that one would condemn a house). However, whichever decision one 
makes, hermeneutic immanence has been suspended, indicating a most crucial shift. No longer 
either a persona (to be thought-with) or an author (to be situated-interpreted), ‘James’ is now a 
perpetrator and a symptom—that is, insofar as he has acted, he has erred; insofar as he has 
replicated a doxa, he demonstrates a deeper malady. 
In judging, one is no longer ‘reposing,’ either historically or philosophically; one has 
adopted another position, a step apart, and another modality of action—a modality best termed 
political.  
~~~~~~ 
We now have partial and provisional means of modally distinguishing not only the historical 
and philosophical but, moreover, the political. We have also discerned experience (or feeling) 
from conception (or ideation), and then distinguished the latter into notion, concept (by 
expression), and groundconcept (by relative syndoxy). Thus, we must now understand what is 
at stake in adopting the concept “ontology.” 
From the Greek ὄντος [óntos], meaning “being, what is,” ontology in the philosophical 
sense of “discourse concerning being” is at least as old as philosophy. Thales of Miletus (c.624–
546 BCE), for example, identified water as the ἀρχή [arkhḗ], the beginning, origin, or source of 
existence. The word ontology, however, was a product of seventeenth-century Europe, 
generally being a synonym for metaphysics. In the Critique of Pure Reason of 1781, Kant identified 
“Ontology” as being that which “presumptuously claims to supply, in systematic doctrinal form, 
synthetic a priori knowledge of things in general.”35 Thus, in the Kantian tradition, ontology was 
identified with the very dogmatism that was to be ‘critically’ undone. However, in 1927, Martin 
Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit introduced to the critical philosophy Fundamentalontologie: 
“The question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions not only 
for the possibility of the sciences which examine beings as beings of such and such a 
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type, and, in doing so, already operate with an understanding of Being, but also for the 
possibility of those ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and 
which provide their foundations.”36 
Thus, Heidegger defined philosophy as that by which being-there (Dasein, human being) 
responds to the Being (Sein, being qua being) of beings (Seiende, ontic beings)—a quite literal 
‘responsibility’ to which no other practice could suffice.37 This fundamental distinction of ontic 
and ontological, he described as the “ontological difference.” 
 It was also in this tradition, though generally divested of the pretention to “foundations,” 
that Foucault developed his methodologies of “archaeology” and, after Nietzsche, “genealogy.” 
However, in an interview in April 1983, he described this, what would be the final, version of 
his thought in terms of “historical ontology”: 
“Three domains of genealogy are possible. First, a historical ontology of ourselves in 
relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; 
second, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of power through which 
we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; third, a historical ontology in 
relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents.”38  
Following, but also extending, the trajectory traversed by Heidegger, ontology was now 
divested, apparently a priori, of any hint of its metaphysical or scientific sense, entailing instead 
the historical, socio-linguistic conditions by which various forms of subjectivation are made 
possible. If knowledge is the principle means by which such subjectivation occurs then any 
meaningful distinction between ontology and epistemology is thus effaced. 
Although, by consequence of his prominence, the phrase historical ontology is generally 
attributed to Foucault, as Hacking writes, he did not “seem to attach much weight to the 
phrase.”39 Indeed, it was the latter author, in his aforementioned essay, who adopted and 
developed this concept most fully: 
“Historical ontology is about the ways in which the possibilities for choice, and for 
being, arise in history. […] Historical ontology is not so much about the formation of 
character as about the space of possibilities for the character formation that surround a 
person, and create the potentials for ‘individual experience.’”40 
Thus, after the fashion of Heidegger and Foucault, the epistemological and ontological are 
amalgamated. The “historical meta-epistemology” of the likes of Bachelard, Hacking writes, 
are incorporated within a “generalized concept of historical ontology.”41 No longer concerned 
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with the arkhḗ, with Being or with beings per se, there seems to be ontology only of “ourselves.”42 
Ontology becomes autology. 
However, in the two decades since Hacking’s essay, ‘ontology’ has taken on rather 
another intellectual role, with ontological ‘turns’ being declared and debated, particularly in 
fields such as Science and Technology Studies (STS), and anthropology.43 It is neither possible 
nor necessary to review such discussions here.44 However, aspects of such developments are 
relevant to the reconception herein attempted. 
As Annemarie Mol puts it, the significance of the word “ontology” for scholars of STS 
has been that it “evokes ‘reality’”—that is, it entails not only ourselves but also the heterogeneous 
beings that scientists and engineers discover, conceive, and fabricate.45 In 1996, Bruno Latour 
wrote, in reference to the work of Mol and John Law (as well as, implicitly, himself), that actor-
network theory is “as much an ontology or a metaphysics as a sociology.”46 As is well known, 
the conceptual lexicon “ANT” consists of concepts that incorporate the social being of 
nonhuman things.47 In Hacking’s estimation, such authors “assign too much agency to 
nature.”48 For his self-declared “old-fashioned humanism,” nonhumans may enter the 
laboratory but the social fabric, “the space of possibilities”—one might impute: the social 
milieu—is, as it was for Durkheim, sui generis.  
However, it is by now quite evident that ANT has overflowed into ever more regions of 
the humanities and social sciences, becoming an orthodoxy in many areas. Speaking to the 
Association of American Anthropologists in 2013, Latour declared that “the philosophy of 
science” had become, over the preceding decades, “the main knot for the settlement of 
legitimate ontologies: that is, for what should be expected from agencies.”49 In other words, it 
was with respect to the beings of science, cast out by Heidegger as merely ontic, that an 
ontological politics had been achieved, bringing into question the ways in which certain reality-
effecting networks are granted ascendency while others are condemned to destruction and 
resistance. 
Such reappropriations of “onto-logy”—against both dogmatic metaphysics and 
narcissistic phenomenology—are, however, conceptually troubled. If attention to evocations of 
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“reality” and to “what should be expected from agencies” satisfy the conceptual heritage of óntos 
(from εἶναι [eĩnai]: to be, to exist, to happen), they relate less obviously to that of λόγος [lόgos]. 
 In translations from Ancient texts, lόgos is often rendered, quite straightforwardly, as 
“word.” Thus, we speak of philology (love of words), as opposed to philosophy (love of wisdom). 
However, in Aristotle’s rhetoric, logos, as distinct from pathos and ethos, was the reason behind 
the words. Moreover, for the Stoics, the λόγος σπερματικός [lόgos spermatikόs] entailed the 
generative, germinal principle of the cosmos. So it was with the famous opening lines of the 
Gospel of John: “In the beginning was the Word [Lógos], and the Word was with God, and the 
Word was God.”50 Similarly metaphysical meanings are also found in Plotinus (203–270 AD) 
and, later, in the thinkers of Islam.51 
 Thus, the conceptual heritage of lόgos, even before it is matched with óntos, implies the 
logic, the way, the workings of things. Accordingly, ontology, for Heidegger, concerned the 
conditions for the authentic disclosure of Sein to Dasein. Likewise for Foucault or Hacking, who 
dispense with authenticity and dissolve Dasein into sociolinguistic relations. Ontology and the 
ontic are, in either case, fundamentally distinguished, placed in a hierarchy, with the former 
being the purview of the philosopher. Such is anathema for Mol or Latour, who prioritise the 
concrete and distrust the transcendental. Their “ontology” is not, therefore, so much a matter 
of structural, systemic logics as that of ongoing, creative, contested collective achievements.52 
 It is from this point of disagreement that the ontological can now be reformulated. 
~~~~~~ 
In its presently commonplace deployment, ontology is an amalgam—a conceptual confusion 
that must be disaggregated. Ontology may be understood as the point at which several 
dimensions of activity intersect. This intersection is irreducible to a singular, identifiable ‘logic’ 
(historically contingent or not). However, it is nevertheless productive of reality-effects—that is, 
situated determinations of “what should be expected from agencies.” Such effects shape, for any 
given occasion, what is encountered as possible. 
As such, the ontological is best understood, first and foremost, in relation—that is to say, 
as an action, an occurrence. The ontological occurs when an entity is received as real by a collective 
whose practices cultivate that reception. To be ‘real,’ it should be added, is not in contradistinction to 
the unreal, ideal, or unactual. To receive an entity as real is to receive it in accordance with its 
characteristic mode of existence—that is, in accordance with what is fundamentally and specifically 
necessary for that thing to be what it is. 
                                               
50 John 1:1, King James Edition. 
51 Williams 2016. 
52 Latour’s “modes of existence” project (2013) complicates this diagnosis. However, he leaves unexplored the 
problem of the relation of the ontic and ontological.  
  61 
However, the point must be made unambiguous: Ontology, as here defined and 
described, must not entail the existential foundation that all uncritical (that is, unthinking), 
practices merely presuppose. Nor, for that matter, should it entail a deductive, dogmatic theory 
of reality as such. Rather, one must emphasise the terms practice and cultivation—activities to be 
understood and described rather than explained in terms of something more fundamental. 
The concept of ontology, herein, gathers and coordinates six pragmatic dimensions: the 
ontonomic, ontoturgic, ontodesic, ontographic, ontomesic, and ontochronic. Being neither essentially 
exclusive nor exhaustive, these concepts are a radically empirical means of formulating 
problems of existence as problems of action. They will be explicated further through the course 
of the thesis, with each of the six historical chapters being concluded by a philosophical excursus 
that reprises and recomposes each concept in turn. However, they can be introduced as follows. 
Ontonomic: From νόμος [nόmos], law. ‘Reception as real’ is a collective obligation. 
Whether or not there can be a ‘private language,’ there can be no private reality. Any collective 
identifiable as such can be understood in terms of the rules, norms, or laws by which that 
collectivity discerns what kinds of beings can be received, and in what mode. Certain collectives, 
in particular those styling themselves as ‘modern,’ maintain that their obligations to ‘reception 
as real’ are reducible to the established record of scientific knowledge. However, even if or 
where this is the case, ontology cannot be reduced to epistemology. 
Ontoturgic: From ἔργον [érgon], work. This aforementioned ‘collective obligation’ is not 
merely formal or statutory. Rather, to say that it is ‘cultivated’ is to say that it is ‘performative.’53 
That is, the ontoturgic (like the dramaturgic) concerns the labour by which existential reception 
is immersively and aesthetically enacted, becoming manifestly formative of something like an 
architecture or, less magisterially, a style of experience. However, if ‘reality’ as such is therefore 
both collective-specific and ‘performed,’ it does not follow that worlds are the arbitrary products 
of assertion and caprice. 
 Ontodesic: From δαίω [daíō], divide. Such cultivations or performances do not simply 
‘make manifest.’ This very manifestation distributes, apportions, and partitions—it puts into relation, 
and hence into difference, what is, what can be, and what can come to be. In other words, it 
designates both agency and possibility. Any such distribution is, of course, always subject to a 
certain partiality. That is, to speak of a ‘collective’ in no way entails that all constituents thereof 
necessarily bear identical ontological disposition towards, or as a result of, its practices of 
cultivation. However, such a division has collective consequences: it enables particular forms of 
action, while disinclining others. ‘Realism’ is a quality inherent to collective existence. 
 Ontographic: From γράφω [gráphō], write. An ‘ontology,’ understood in the terms 
explicated above, can therefore be understood, in one sense, as a collection or compendium of 
                                               
53 Bell 1999. 
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entities that have relevance to a collective—“a system of the distribution of things,” as James 
might have put it—as well as the correlative, practical conditions of their reception. The 
accomplishment of reception is, indeed, only possible from within a relevant world of beings—
and not only beings of ‘thought’ or ‘conception’ as such. The means by which such entities are 
recorded, catalogued, registered as requisite and, rendered exemplary, can, then, be understood 
as ontographic. Collectives are built upon their constituents. 
 Ontomesic: From μέσος [mésos], amidst. Once again, to speak of collectively cultivated 
relations of reality is not to suggest that every member of any given collective will relate to such 
practices in the same way. Indeed, very many collectives may be constructed upon the 
recognition that this is not the case. Correlatively, and crucially, to speak of ‘a collective’ in this 
sense must not imply a ‘multiverse’ of bounded, enclosed, and mutually exterior bubbles of 
mandatorily monological experience, inconceivable to their others, and absorptive of their 
constituents. Moreover, it is by no means necessary that anyone inhabit only one ‘collective.’ 
Thus, it is perfectly meaningful—indeed, utterly necessary—to speak of relations between 
ontologically-differentiated collectives. Indeed, without the possibility of such coordination, 
nothing like ‘a world’ could be meaningfully invoked. 
 Ontochronic: From χρόνος [khrόnos], time. Finally, obligations, manifestations, 
distributions, exemplifications, and mediations are susceptible to change. Thus, they are 
historical. However, as is apropos of a historical ontology that must, preliminarily, explicate its 
methodology, this element will require investigation in more detail. 
~~~~~~ 
In the preface to Le problème de l’incroyance au XVIe siècle: La religion de Rabelais of 1942,54 Lucien 
Febvre wrote: 
“the problem is to determine what set of precautions to take and what rules to follow in 
order to avoid the sin of all sins [le péché des péchés], the sin that cannot be forgiven—
anachronism.”55 
Such is a classic encapsulation of the historian’s code—to the past, as it was. Similarly, in an 
influential essay published in 1969, arguing against the then-dominant trans-epochal history of 
ideas practiced by followers of A.O. Lovejoy, Quentin Skinner articulated what would become 
known as a contextualist model of historical interpretation. Context is not, Skinner made clear, 
to be taken as “the determinant of what is said.” Rather, it is “a means of decoding the actual 
intention of the given writer”—something like a “court of appeal for assessing the relative 
plausibility of incompatible ascriptions of intentionality.”56 In these terms, the ‘longitudinal’ 
                                               
54 The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais. 
55 Febvre 1982, 5; Febvre 1942, 8. 
56 Skinner 1969, 49. 
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historiography of self-reproducing “unit-ideas,” in Lovejoyan terms,57 was, thus, preposterously 
anachronistic and, in the coming decades, it would decisively fall from fashion. More recently, 
Skinner, too, has acknowledged anachronism as a “sin.”58 This, then, is the second “cry” we 
might hear concerning the discernment of historical modality. However, it is a cry to be heard 
cautiously. 
From ἀνά [aná], ‘against’ and χρόνος [chrónos], ‘time,’ to be anachronistic is to be against 
time or in the wrong time. Such a distinction is, as we have seen, integral to the writing of 
history. However, this hamartiology59 of the historical has a crucial corollary. As Dipesh 
Chakrabarty has argued, the demarcation of anachronistic disjunctures may be further 
understood as a “desire to be free of the past”—that is, not only an attempt to place the present 
in contradistinction but to erase what came before; to “reduce the past to a nullity.”60 In other 
words, anachronism-as-sin might be interpreted as a kind of ancestral disavowal—that is, as a 
symptom of the desire to be free not just from the ways of the past but, moreover, from the 
responsibility for the present that this past has produced. This is, as Chakrabarty points out, a 
quintessentially “modern” orientation. Here, “humour” therefore takes on a more obviously 
political quality. 
Thus, the pertinent question—indeed, the ontochronic question—then becomes: How 
does one decide which time one is within? This is the question of epochal decision.  
The Parisian tradition of historical epistemology, after Bachelard and Canguilhem, 
takes as a fundamental principle and task the discernment of “ruptures épistémologiques”—that is, 
of ruptures or breaks in the structure of epistemic possibility.61 It was much in this lineage, by 
way of Heidegger, that Foucault, around the same time as Skinner’s aforementioned essay, 
came to his concept of the épistème: “the epistemological field” in which knowledge manifests “its 
conditions of possibility.”62 Crucially, this “field” pertained to specific cultural and temporal 
boundaries: 
“In any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one episteme that 
defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or 
silently invested in a practice.”63 
Here, two principal differentiations can be discerned: First, “moment”—there can be only one 
épistème crosscutting each period, and successive slabs of time will each have their own iteration. 
                                               
57 Lovejoy [1936] 1964, chap. 1. 
58 Skinner, Koikkalainen, and Syrjämäki 2001, 57. 
59 The study of sin. 
60 Chakrabarty 2008, 244. 
61 Taylan 2014, 148. 
62 Foucault [1966] 2005, xxiii–xxiv. 
63 Ibid., 183. 
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Second, “culture”—there can be only one épistème pertaining to any one culture at a time and 
such strictures impose upon all those involved in that culture.64 Of course, Foucault would later 
nuance—and abandon—such simplistic, macroscopic stipulations (though the same cannot be 
said of his followers). Nevertheless, the point to be made is that, being constructed upon such 
‘slabs of time’ and ‘spheres of difference,’ this statement is symptomatic of everything that must 
be avoided. 
 To return again to the “strange necessity” of etymology: The Greek ἐποχή [epochí] meant 
“stoppage, station, position (of a planet), fixed point of time,” and ἐπέχειν [epéchein], “to arrest, 
stop, take up a position,” from ἔχειν [échein], “to hold” or to have. The concept of historical 
epoch thus entails a certain ambiguity: both holding and being torn away; stopping and 
departing; deceleration and acceleration. It implies, that is, critical decision—a crisis or turning 
point requiring the operation of incisive discernment. In short, epochal decision entails the 
situated determination of which aspects of the past it is that are still able to have a hold the 
present (and in what way).  
There is no need, therefore, for either slabs of time or spheres of difference in making 
such decisions. In cartography, the meeting point of latitude and longitude is the confluence. The 
historiographical approach assembled herein is, then, confluential in this precise sense: Rather 
than presuming particular periods, by virtue of an underlying collective-cognitive rupture, to 
be discrete by definition, the question of immanence and repose—that is, of sharing a common 
world from which one may inherit, and for which one may be responsible—must be made an 
obligatorily recurrent problem.  
History is made by ‘making things history.’ Anachronism, then, is not the right that one 
assumes in order to formulate a generally valid timeline but the risk one takes in distributing 
relations of heritage and renunciation. It is a situated decision, relative to the entities concerning 
it. Establishing an epochal differentiation entails attributing relations of responsibility. It is, 
therefore, a political decision. However, it may also be a historical one. 
~~~~~~ 
It remains, then, to recapitulate what is distinctive about historical and philosophical statements. 
In 1933, Michael Oakeshott wrote: 
                                               
64 With regard to ‘culture,’ at least eleven times in this work, Foucault refers to the “Western episteme” or the “episteme 
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“‘What really happened’65 (a fixed and finished course of events, immune from change) 
as the end in history must, if history is to be rescued from nonentity, be replaced by 
‘what the evidence obliges us to believe.’”66 
This was, for Oakeshott, a definitive principle of the historical mode of experience. Like all 
modes besides philosophy, history lacked the ability to think “critically” about its own 
preconditions. Thus, it was the role of the philosopher to provide them. Once again, I do not 
mean to follow Oakeshott’s example. Nevertheless, taking this statement as a historiographical 
principle, it is possible, finally, to make decisive distinctions as regards the “differentia”67—that 
is, the modally distinguishing characteristics—of the practices in question. 
To put it somewhat schematically: The ‘objectivity’ of a philosophical statement is 
relative to the creative satisfaction (which is not to say ‘solution’) of the problem of thought that 
it addresses. A philosopher qua philosopher is not, therefore, obligated to the authority of 
‘evidence.’ However, the situation of historical objectivity is quite different. The historian is an 
agent bound to the authority of the archive—that is, to the inherited collection of traces of the 
past maintained through and for present experience. Thus, while a philosopher must always be 
constructive, a historian must be reconstructive. To conflate or confound the differentia of these 
regimens is, at best, a category error and, at worst, destructive of their respective modes of 
existence. Understood in these terms, objectivity, in a historical mode, is relative to the possible 
objections of a hypothetical ‘court.’ This figure of authority presides in virtual judgement over 
the fidelity of the historian’s translational and reconstructive articulations of the evidence with 
respect to a given historical problem. 
It is now possible to explicate a historiological process: Trace becomes evidence becomes 
historiography. To become a trace, something must stand for something past; it must be a sign. 
To become evidence, it must mean something for a present problem in relation to this past; it 
must be significant. None of this is of concern to the philosopher, whose mode of inheritance 
relates not to an archive but to a repertoire—that is, to an inherited collection of possibilities for 
conceptual creativity. However, while conflations and category errors are to be avoided, it 
would be a mistake to imagine that philosophical and historical practices can be altogether 
separated. 
Beyond becoming trace and becoming evidence, in order to become historiography, the 
expressive concatenation of signs and significances must itself become meaningful. That is, 
something must ‘follow from’ it. This process of incremental connection must lead from 
                                               
65 Alluding to the famous statement of Leopold von Ranke (1824), that his work “merely wants to show how it 
actually was [wie es eigentlich gewesen ist].” Or, by another translation: “how, essentially, things happened.” See 
Breisach 2008, 233. 
66 Oakeshott 1985, 107. Emphasis added. 
67 The classical term employed by Oakeshott with regard to modes of experience. 
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somewhere to somewhere else. In simpler terms, it must construct a narrative. In this way, 
historiography opens out onto history. More precisely, it ‘makes history’ by contributing 
(however consequentially) to the repository of collective narrative possibilities. However, and 
moreover, in this same moment, it opens out onto philosophy. More precisely, as evidence 
becomes historiography becomes history, it raises the question of what is to be made from this 
complex, conflicted inheritance—and this is a quintessentially philosophical question. 
~~~~~~ 
This chapter began by stating that there are at least four ways to ways to philosophise: definition, 
distinction, description, and design. These terms are also crucially important for the writing of 
history; however, they operate in fundamentally different ways. 
If only that which has no history can be defined then the objective of conceptual 
historiography, cannot be to arrive at a final, definitive definition. Nevertheless, as historical 
evidence, definitions are crucial to the identification of concepts. In any case, description is, 
undoubtedly, altogether historical. Likewise, as we have discussed, the practice of distinction is 
fundamental in several dimensions, though not without certain complications. 
As descriptions and distinctions are detailed, with authors and statements being related 
to and thus explicating one another, rendering trace into evidence into meaning, these situated 
perspectives begin to stitch together a portrayal of a wider world—a past world, the critical 
complexities and unrealised possibilities of which can, thereby, begin to be understood. There 
is also, therefore, an irreducible element of design in the act of historiographical composition. 
That is, whereas a philosophical design creates a lure for thought, a historiographical design 
effects an evocative process of world-implication that cannot be precisely described or 
distinguished, much less defined, but the manifest impression of which is fundamental to any 
text claiming the title ‘history.’ The writing of history is itself, therefore, in the end, a process of 
conceptional manifestation. 
However, having said all of that, is necessary to return to the subject of constraints. The 
following historical chapters do not get to the point of constructing a cohesive narrative; much 
less do they ‘make history,’ in the strong sense identified above. Instead, the following chapters 
are principally evidential. That is, they work primarily between trace and evidence, 
reconstructing the knots and sinews of the events claimed to be most significant, as 
comprehensively and comprehensibly as possible. Its achievement of historiography, in the 
strong, manifestational sense, must therefore be acknowledged as limited. Moreover, only 
around one-sixth of the following is written in an overtly philosophical mode. Thus, this work 
is by no means a complete realisation of the diagnoses and speculations ventured in the pages 
previous. Nevertheless, a succinct series of practical historiographical procedures can be 
articulated. 
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First (in logical rather than chronological order), each historical chapter will identify key 
moments, and hence crucial authors and statements, along the threads to be traced. Indeed, the 
narrative threads in question will, by and large, consist of situated, reconstructive interpretations 
of these moments. Second, it will understand the significance (i.e. both meaning and 
importance) of these statements in relation to both the text in which it appears and, where 
possible, the rest of the author’s oeuvre. Third, it will understand the significance of these 
statements in relation to the problems, debates and standards of the situation (i.e. the time, 
place, and other distinguishing circumstances), with the amount of detail accorded any given 
statement or author proportional to their relative significance for the overall narrative. Fourth, 
by connecting authors and statements in this fashion, a relational complex will be incrementally 
constructed through which each becomes the ‘context’—that is, the formative situation—of the 
other. Thus, situated perspectives come to (or, at least, begin to) reconstruct wider worlds, 
without shifting frames of reference from the particular to the general. Fifth, by accounting for 
the reception of specific concepts in later situations, relations of contradistinction lead to the 
formulation of epochal distinctions. Sixth, through the course of each episode, a variety of 
conceptions, variably expressed, are thereby historicised and articulated. This process of 
pluralisation and specification, then, provides the impetus for philosophical reconception, 
undertaken in chapter-concluding excurses. 
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4: “This Ætherial Medium”: Mediation from Newton to Lamarck 
To say that a history of physical media must begin in medias res—in the middle of things—is to 
say at least three things: First, like most histories, it does not lend itself to origin stories. Second, 
though given this limitation, it is a history that could very well be extended to Classical Latin 
and beyond. Third, it must begin quite literally in the middle of things—since this is precisely 
this conception that is at issue.  
This, the first of two historical chapters concentrating on the concept of milieu, is 
structured upon the example of two thinkers in particular: Isaac Newton and Jean-Baptiste 
Lamarck.1 The former, during his life, and even more so after, became the paradigmatic natural 
philosopher of modernity, not only, but especially, due to his mathematical physics, and the law 
of gravity formulated therefrom. The latter died in poverty, his career threatened with 
obscurity, though has been, and continues to be, reclaimed for the insights that are attributed 
to him concerning the inheritability of effects experienced by a living being through the course 
of its life. Both these figures thought their thoughts within a universe understood in terms of 
matter solid, fluid, and aetherial. Newton also was committed to immaterial existents—from 
angelic agents to the godliness of space itself. Lamarck, a century later, was rather more 
thoroughgoing in his materialism. 
It was in the middle of these developments in physical cosmology, then, that medium 
and milieu, as they would be known in the nineteenth century and after, emerged, and it is in 
relation to such developments that, in this chapter, they will be understood. 
4.1: From whirlpools to sensoria: Newton and his inheritors 
In a prefatory poem to his Éléments de la philosophie de Newton of 1738, dedicated to the Marquisse 
Émilie du Châtelet (1706–1749), François-Marie Arouet (1694–1778), better known by his nom 
de plume Voltaire, wrote: 
 
Déja ces tourbillons, l’un par l’autre pressés, 
Se mouvant sans espace, & sans règles entassés, 
Ces fantômes sçavans à mes yeux disparoissent. 
Un jour plus pur me luit; les mouvemens renaissent; 
L’espace, qui de Dieu contient l’immensité, 
Voit rouler dans son sein l’Univers limité […]2 
The massy whirlpools heaving still for place, 
Heap’d without rule, and moving without space, 
Those learned phantoms vanish from my sight, 
And day comes on me with her genuine light! 
That vast expanse, of being the abode, 
Space that contains th’ immensity of God […]3 
 
                                               
1 Drawing on e.g. McGuire 1968; Ducheyne 2014 and Appel 1987; Burkhardt 1995. 
2 Voltaire 1738, 4. 
3 Voltaire 1780, 77. 
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The tourbillons—whirlpools or vortices—to which he referred were those of the Cartesian 
cosmology: swirling, interlocking masses of corpuscular matter that explained the circulation of 
sidereal bodies, and the instantaneous action of light, linking all creation into a rigorously 
mechanical plenum, without vacuum or void. 
In the very first paragraph of Book I of Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica, first 
published in 1687, Isaac Newton (1643–1727) pointedly declared: 
“Medii interea, si quod fuerit, interstitia partium libere pervadentis, hic nullam rationem 
habeo.”4 
In the English translation of 1729 by Andrew Motte (1696–1734), this became: 
“I have no regard in this place to a medium, if any such there is, that freely pervades the 
interstices between the parts of bodies.”5 
Then, in the French translation by du Châtelet, completed in 1749 (published in 1756):  
“Je ne fais point attention ici au milieu qui passe entre les parties des corps, supposé 
qu’un tel milieu éxiste.”6 
This interstitial medii, medium, or milieu was not a direct reference to the doctrine of René 
Descartes (1596–1650). However, it implied the same problem: how to account for the 
ostensibly empty spaces severing the material masses of a mechanical cosmos—voids inducing 
sundry and serious questions of causation. Such an oft-hypothesised substance—aetherial or 
otherwise—was not, then, ‘metaphysical’ in the sense of being above or beyond physics. 
However, it was a question of cosmological causation rather than mathematical formalisation. 
As such, the Principia was not, at least initially, required to address such hypotheses. Thus, when 
it did speak of “mediums,” these were localised, fluid, and physical. 
Book I (of III) set out to expound the physico-mathematical principles of dynamic 
motion in the absence of resisting mediums, thus in a condition of rational abstraction. 
However, Book II considered at length such issues as air resistance and the speed of waves in 
diverse fluids, culminating in a repudiation of the “corporeal vortices,”7 as would continue to 
be propounded, in modified form, by the likes of Christiaan Huygens (1629–1695) and 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716). Book III, titled “De mundi systemate,”8 then propounded 
the famous law of gravity, defined by the inverse square of the distance between two masses. 
It was via the popularisation of du Châtelet, Voltaire, and the likes of Pierre Louis 
Maupertuis (1698–1759), that the French “milieu,” encapsulated in the famous Encyclopédie 
                                               
4 Newton 1687, 3. Emphasis added. 
5 Newton 1729, vol. 1, 2. Emphasis added. 
6 Newton 1759, 1. Emphasis added. 
7 Newton 1729, vol. 2, 197. 
8 On the system of the world, Ibid., vol. 2, 200. 
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(1751–1772) of Denis Diderot (1713–1784) and Jean le Rond d’Alembert (1717–1783),9 came 
to be an accepted, even celebrated, concept amongst philosophes and le public. However, matters 
physical and metaphysical could not, and cannot, be kept so neatly compartmentalised. 
Newton’s famous dictum “hypotheses non fingo [I feign no hypotheses]” only appeared in 
the 1713 second edition of Principia.10 However, such sentiments pervaded his works from much 
earlier. In a draft of a letter of 1671/1672 to the Royal Society “containing his New Theory 
about Light and Colors”—a passage excised from the published version—Newton declared: 
“A naturalist would scarce beleive expect to see ye science of those become 
mathematicall, & yet I dare affirm that there is as much certainty in it as in any other 
part of Opticks. ffor what I shall tell concerning them is not an Hypoth{esis} but most 
rigid consequence, not conjectured by barely infer{ring} ’tis thus because not otherwise 
or because it satisfies all phænomena (the Philosophers universall Topick,) but 
evinced by ye mediation of experiments concluding directly & wthout any suspicion of 
doubt.”11 
In 1713, a hypothesis was defined as “whatever is not deduced from the phenomena.” Any such 
conjectures “whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult qualities, or mechanical,” 
Newton made clear, “have no place in experimental philosophy.”12 The inverse square law of 
gravity described the workings of divine creation. Explanation was thus a superfluity.  
It might have been enough for the orbs to sail on their way, marvellously 
mathematised.13 However, Newton’s theories were vulnerable not only to the demands of 
mechanistic rigour, as Huygens, Leibniz, and others would continue to maintain, but, 
furthermore, to issues of religious propriety. To understand the emergence of milieu, it is 
therefore necessary to understand the significance of Newton’s medium—both physically and 
metaphysically. 
~~~~~~ 
The Greek μέσου [mésou]—middle, midst, among, between—is found from Homer onwards 
(c.750–c.650 BCE).14 In Classical Latin, the substantive (i.e. noun-form) medium, as the midpoint 
of an object or between two objects, is found, usually in combination with a preposition.15 For 
Augustine (354–430 AD), the medius locus was the position occupied by Christ, the “True 
                                               
9 D’Alembert’s co-editorship ended in 1759. 
10 “I frame no hypotheses” in 1723 English, Newton 1729, vol. 2, 392. 
11 Newton 1671a. Newton 1671b. 
12 Newton 1729, vol. 2, 392. 
13 “And to us it is enough, that gravity does really exist […],” Ibid. 
14 Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance, available: Strong 2011.  
15 Spitzer 1942a, 36. 
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Mediator.”16 In the simple sense of ‘middle-place,’ mi-lieu can be found in Old French (as miliu) 
from at least the twelfth century. The English ‘medium’ as the middle term of a logical syllogism 
is found from at least 1584, as an intermediate state between two kinds from 1593, and as a 
medium for sight from around the same time.17 In 1664, the physician and experimenter Henry 
Power (1623–1668) wrote of “[t]he aetherial Medium (wherein all the Stars and Planets do 
swim)”18—a sense then specialised but not uncommon. 
The dictionary Thresor de la langue françoyse of 1606, compiled by the diplomat Jean Nicot 
(1530–1600), notes the Latin derivation of milieu, “Medius et locus,” and gives thirteen examples 
of usage, all variants on ‘middle,’ such as: “The milieu of the town.” The Dictionnaire françois, 
contenant les mots et les choses (1680) gives two examples: being in the middle of two extremes and 
reaching an accommodation.19 The Dictionnaire universel françois et latin (1690) lists the now-
familiar range and adds a variant “said figuratively of things spiritual and moral,”20 paraphrased 
as: “Virtue consists of the middle between two extremities.”21 The fourth volume of the Spanish 
Diccionario de la lengua castellana (1734), likewise, gives a range of logical, intermediary and 
philosophical definitions, some of which are equated with the Latin Medium.22 
When Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) wrote in his Pensées23 that “man in nature” is “un milieu 
entre rien et tout [a middle between nothing and everything],”24 his meaning was evidently 
familiar. He discourses at length on this terrifying intermediate existence, utterly unlike that 
medius locus honoured by Augustine. However, by way of poeticising such dwelling betwixt 
divinity and non-entity, he adds: “We sail on a vast milieu, ever uncertain and floating, driven 
from one end to the other,”25 thus slipping from the intermediary to the elementary. Similarly, 
René Descartes (1596–1650) almost invariably used milieu as ‘middle.’26 However, while 
discoursing on rays of light in his Traité du monde et de la lumière (written 1629–1633 but published 
1664), he wrote of “the milieu through which they pass”—milieu thus standing in for the “second 
                                               
16 Pilkington 1876, 285. 
17 OED Online 2008b. 
18 Power 1664, chap. Preface. 
19 Richelet 1680. 
20 Furetière 1690, vol. 2. 
21 This sense foreshadows the term juste milieu (golden mean or happy medium), found half a century later. 
22 Real Academia Española 1734, 527–529. 
23 Written over many years but published posthumously in 1670. 
24 Pascal 1854, 120. 
25 “Nous voguons sur un milieu vaste, toujours incertains et flottants, poussés d’un bout vers l’autre.” Ibid., 124. The English 
translation of 1910 has it: “We sail within a vast sphere […],” Pascal 1910, 29. cf. Canguilhem 2008b, 117. 
26 Descartes’ La dioptrique of 1637 only used milieu straightforwardly as ‘middle.’ Descartes 1902, vol. 6, 79–228. 
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Elémet,” one of three forms of matter from which the universe is constituted.27 If drawn to remark 
on the air surrounding something, Descartes could speak, in Latin, of the “aère ambiente”28 or 
“ae ̈ris ambientis.”29 However, the French ambiant was not part of his vocabulary.30 Instead, he 
would speak of “l’aer d’alentour.”31 
Such enigmatic entities as the “aetherial Medium” of Power and the “matière subtile 
[subtle matter]” of Descartes comprised the major point of contention between Thomas Hobbes 
(1588–1679) and Robert Boyle (1627–1691) in their quarrel regarding the possibility of a 
vacuum.32 While steadfastly refusing the relevance of any metaphysical aether to experimental 
philosophy, Boyle’s writings on pneumatics were replete with ambient airs and aerial mediums 
of varying diffuseness.33 In his The General History of the Air, published posthumously on his behalf 
by John Locke (1632–1704) in 1692, Boyle defined the subject of his treatise: 
“By the Air I commonly understand that thin, fluid, diaphanous, compressible and 
dilatable Body which we breath, and wherein we move, which envelops the Earth on 
all sides to a great height above the highest Mountains; but yet is so different from the 
Æther [or Vacuum]34 in the intermundane or interplanetary Spaces, that it refracts the 
Rays of the Moon and other remoter Luminaries.”35 
However, such media were not yet enshrined by the formal authorities of European languages. 
Both the first (1694)36 and second (1718)37 editions of Le Dictionnaire de l’Académie française accord 
with their precursors in recording milieu in its intermediary sense. However, the third edition 
(1740)38 added: “In the terms of Physics, Milieux are the Diaphanous bodies through which pass 
rays of light.” Then, in the fourth edition (1762):39 “We also call a Milieu,40 the fluid that 
                                               
27 Descartes 1909, vol. 11, 100. 
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surrounds [environne] bodies. Air is the milieu in which we live. Water is the milieu that the fish inhabits.”41 
The fifth and sixth editions (1798; 1835) endured unmodified.42 
The 1755 first edition of A dictionary of the English language, compiled by Samuel Johnson 
(1709–1784),43 admits no dedicated entries for either ‘Medium’ or ‘Ambient.’ However, the 
entry for “Filament” quotes the physician Gideon Harvey (c.1640–c.1700) on the lungs of 
consumptives having “nothing remaining but the ambient membrane […].” “Abjection” is 
explicated, in part, by the 1699 translation of the Fables of Æsop by Roger L’Estrange (1616–
1704): “Now the just medium of this case lies betwixt the pride and the abjection, the two 
extremes,” while “Adjacent” quotes from Newton’s Opticks: “Uniform pellucid mediums, such 
as water, [that] have no sensible reflection but in their external superficies, where they 
are adjacent to other mediums of a different density.” However, in the third edition of Johnson’s 
dictionary in 1768, we find a dedicated entry for “Medium”: “1. Any thing intervening. Bacon. 
2. Any thing used in ratiocination, in order to a conclusion. Baker. 3. The middle place or degree; 
the just temperature between extremes. L’estrange.” Meanwhile, a short but significant entry for 
“Ambient” reads: “Surrounding; encompassing. Newton.”44 
~~~~~~ 
If not all paths led to gravity’s anointed genius then this was a road made royal in retrospect. It 
was the later editions of Newton’s Opticks: Or, a Treatise of the Reflexions, Refractions, Inflexions and 
Colours of Light (1st ed. 1704) that established “medium”—and thus “milieu’—as a term of art for 
natural philosophers in later decades. However, his use of such terms was complicated. 
Newton’s work on optical issues began as a student in the mid-1660s, and his first 
published work, the aforementioned letter of 1671/1672 to the Royal Society, already 
propounded his principal thesis: “Light it self is a Heterogeneous mixture of differently refrangible 
Rays.”45 Descartes’ corpuscular cosmology had understood light as consisting of a pulse or 
change of pressure occurring instantaneously through a medium of small spherical particles—
the “second Elémet.” Colour was the result of these particles being moved to rotate—red when 
spinning faster, blue when slower—as they passed through matter of differing densities. Being 
of infinite velocity and essentially homogenous, refrangibility as such was quite irrelevant. 
                                               
41 This same edition also modifies the physical definition: “En termes de Physique, on appelle Milieu, Tout corps, soit solide, 
soit fluide, traversé par la lumière ou par un autre corps.” 
42 Académie française 1798, vol. 1; Académie française 1798, vol. 2; Académie française 1835, vol. 1; Académie 
française 1835, vol. 2. 
43 Johnson 1755, vol. 1. 
44 Johnson 1768. 
45 Newton 1671a, 3079. 
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In his letter, with a duly rhetorically austere disposition, Newton thus entertained the 
Cartesian proposition. How to explain the well-observed rainbow-effect that a prism imparts? 
Take “a Tennis ball, struck with an oblique Racket”—it moves in a curved direction. Might, 
then, a ray of light, in exiting a prism, be induced into different rates of spin, thus producing a 
divergence of such particles relative to one another? If this were the case, then the “globular 
bodies” constitutive of light “ought to feel the greater resistance from the ambient Æther, on 
that side, where the motions conspire, and thence be continually bowed to the other.”46 Newton 
then denied that this could explain the extent of the effect, leading to his self-proclaimed 
“Experimentum crucis,” using a second prism to verify the effects of the first.  
Around the same time, Newton wrote a text later titled De ære et æthere in which he 
developed a theory of matter based upon intrinsic powers of repulsion, with æthere being that 
finest sort of matter than can infiltrate even glass or crystal.47 He continued to discuss the aether 
with Boyle, among others, and published another letter on the subject in 1675,48 and again in 
1679 when he wrote “there is diffused through all places an æthereal substance capable of 
contraction & dilatation, strongly elastick, & in a word much like air in all respects, but far more 
subtile”49—a substance that would, therefore, necessarily be present in Boyle’s leaky vacuum 
pumps. However, during the 1880s, around the time of writing and publishing Principia, he set 
aside such matters as regards his research. Nevertheless, in February 1692/1693, in 
correspondence with the theologian Richard Bentley (1662–1742), who was to deliver the first 
of the Boyle Lectures intended to combat atheism, Newton wrote: 
“Tis inconceivable, that inanimate brute Matter, should (without ye mediation of 
something else wch is not material), operate upon & affect other matter wthout mutual 
contact; as it must if gravitation in the sense of Epicurus, be essential & inherent in it. 
[…] Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws, 
but whether this agent be material or immaterial is a question I left to ye consideration 
of my readers.”50 
Such thoughts would remain private for another decade and a half. 
Although couched in all obligatory matter-of-factness, Newton’s letter of 1671/1672 
failed to convince his peers and it was not until after the death of Robert Hooke (1635–1703), 
Curator of Experiments at the Royal Society from 1662, that he published Opticks.51 The first 
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48 Newton 1675. 
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51 The Society being founded in 1660. Hooke disagreed that colour arose from light affecting a medium but rather 
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edition of thereof (1704), written in English, set out “not to explain the Properties of Light by 
Hypotheses” but, rather, “to propose and prove them by Reason and Experiments.”52 Duly, it 
continued to eschew issues aetherial. However, subsequent editions of the long technical treatise 
were concluded by a series of short “Queries,” which Newton later described as “hints to be 
examined & improved by the further experiments & observations of such as are inquisitive.”53  
In contrast to the main text, the Queries were openly speculative, and introduced in the 
interrogative: “Qu.9. Is not Fire a Body heated so hot as to emit Light copiously? For what else 
is a red hot Iron than Fire?”54 Crucially, the 1706 Latin translation by Samuel Clarke (1675–
1729), Optice, added seven Queries (or rather Quaestiones) on mediums of various sorts. These 
posited entities were wide-ranging in their physical consequence, underpinning theories of heat, 
gravity, and refraction: 
“Qu.19. Doth not the Refraction of Light proceed from the different density of this 
Æthereal Medium in different places, the Light receding always from the denser parts 
of the Medium?”55 
Moreover, they were ventured to explain sense perception, the passage of nervous fluids, and 
bodily motion: 
“Qu.24. Is not Animal Motion perform’d by the Vibrations of this Medium, excited in 
the Brain by the power of the Will, and propagated from thence through the solid, 
pellucid and uniform Capillamenta of the Nerves into the Muscles, for contracting and 
dilating them?”56 
These statements were often ambiguous as regards their author’s commitment to them; 
however, they irreversibly installed mediums of various sorts within the Newtonian conceptual 
lexicon. 
~~~~~~ 
The aura of dogged, austere, metaphysically abstentious rationality would henceforth form a 
large portion of the Newtonian mythos. It also, therefore, lent legitimacy to all manner of 
Opticks-style mediums that plumed from the pens and quills of proponents and impersonators.57 
In Query 28, the sober sage had warned against “filling the Heavens with fluid Mediums, unless 
they be exceeding rare”—a plenum, à la Descartes, would render the movements of 
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astronomical bodies little less than a miracle due to the resistance that even a diffuse material 
ether would engender. However, Newton’s long-standing emphasis on the necessary porousness 
and subtlety of matter was redolent of convictions not simply physical. Just after warning against 
“filling the Heavens,” Newton pondered: 
“does it not appear from Phænomena that there is a Being incorporeal, living, 
intelligent, omnipresent, who in infinite Space, as it were in his Sensory, sees the things 
themselves intimately, and throughly perceives them, and comprehends them wholly 
by their immediate presence to himself […].”58 
Was not space, in short, the Sensorium of God? 
The section appended to Principia from the second edition of 1713 onwards—that which 
included “hypotheses non fingo”—was a concluding section, titled “General Scholium.” Further to his 
famous statement of relinquishing speculation, Newton wrote that, being “always and every 
where” the same, God is surely unaffected by “the motion of bodies,” and such bodies therefore 
“find no resistance” from His omnipresence. The final paragraph then performed something of 
an invocation: 
“And now we might add something concerning a certain most subtle Spirit, which 
pervades and lies hid in all gross bodies; by the force and action of which Spirit, the 
particles of bodies mutually attract one another at near distances, and cohere, if 
contiguous; and electric bodies operate to greater distances, as well repelling as 
attracting the neighbouring corpuscles; and light is emitted, reflected, refracted, 
inflected, and heats bodies; and all sensation is excited, and the members of animal 
bodies move at the command of the will, namely, by the vibrations of this Spirit, 
mutually propogated along the solid filaments of the nerves, from the outward organs 
of sense to the brain, and from the brain into the muscles. But these are things that 
cannot be explain’d in few words, nor are we furnish’d with that sufficiency of 
experiments which is required to an accurate determination and demonstration of the 
laws by which this electric and elastic spirit operates.”59 
A half-hearted invocation, perhaps. The conspicuously deductive ideal precluded a wholly 
confident affirmation. Nevertheless, if this statement marked a departure from Newton’s self-
conscious self-presentation, it was in no way an aberration as regards his long-standing, 
formative intellectual, political, and religious concerns. 
John Maynard Keynes famously remarked in 1946 that “Newton was not the first of the 
age of reason. He was the last of the magicians […].”60 In July of 1936 at Sotheby’s in New 
York, Keynes had acquired a number of manuscripts hitherto unpublished by Newton’s 
estate—his manuscripts on alchemy.61 Revisionist histories establishing not only the coexistence 
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but the necessity of alchemy, theology, and biblical chronology to Newton, and other of the 
scientific saints of modernity, are no longer revisionist. Nevertheless, this is not how Newton 
was received as he came to be the paradigmatic mind of the new age of reason. 
The second edition of Newton’s Opticks was translated into French in 1722 by the 
theologian Pierre Coste (1668–1747),62 with “Æthereal Medium” becoming “Milieu étherée”—
the translational convention already established.63 However, this concept would not 
immediately become an integral concern of French Newtonians. 
In 1765, the tenth volume of the Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et 
des métiers (1751–1772) included entries for “Milieu (Méchan.)” and “Milieu éthéré,” both written 
by d’Alembert. Milieu was understood as per “la Philosophie méchanique,” and, in accordance with 
the dictionary of l’Académie, described as “a material space through which a body passes in its 
motion; or in general, a material space within which a body is located, whether it moves or 
not.” For example, the air was milieu to bodies near the earth’s surface; water, likewise to a fish; 
glass, meanwhile, may be milieu to light since it “allows passage through its pores.”64 The 
adjoining entry for Milieu éthéré was related directly to Newton, being said to exist alongside “the 
particular aerial milieu in which we live and breathe.” It is a medium “more widespread [répandu] 
and universal […] much rarer and more subtle than air.” As per the Queries, it pertained to 
issues of reflection, refraction and diffraction, the transmission of sound and nerve impulses, 
and the motions of celestial bodies. Moreover, it stood in contrast to the “matière subtile” of the 
Cartesians—the Heavens-filling substance supposed “to traverse and freely penetrate the pores 
of all bodies […] leaving no voids or interstices between them.”65  
 In 1751, the first volume of the Encyclopédie included a Discours préliminaire, also written 
by d’Alembert. As well as setting out the agenda and scope of the work to be undertaken, the 
Discours narrated the role of Newton relative to this intellectual and political moment.66 The 
“vortices” of the Cartesians had come to seem “almost ridiculous” in light of his legacy. Some, 
to be sure, had found fit to accuse Newton of “reviving the ‘occult qualities’ of the scholastics” 
but these were mere expressions of ignorance. However, the transformation had taken time. 
Indeed, it was only within the last two decades that “we began to renounce Cartesianism in 
France.” The first openly Newtonian Frenchman, d’Alembert declared, “was the author of the 
Discours sur la figure des Astres” (1732)—that is, Maupertuis. This text was, of course, far from 
being the first work in French to engage with Newton’s philosophy. More or less private disputes 
                                               
62 Newton 1722. 
63 Ibid., 518. 
64 Diderot et al. 2017. 
65 Ibid. 
66 d’Alembert 1995. 
 
  79 
over doctrine had been occurring since the 1690s.67 Nevertheless, Maupertuis’ Astres, carrying 
the subtitle “WITH an abbreviated exposition of the systems of Descartes and Newton,” bestowed authority 
and accessibility. Nevertheless, neither milieu nor the considerations that gave rise to Newton’s 
aetherial medium were given attention. 
It was in 1738 that Voltaire had mocked the over-massed “tourbillons” of the Cartesians. 
The main part of his Éléments de la philosophie de Newton, moreover, spoke regularly of physical 
milieux, particularly in and after Chapter VII, on the causes of refraction by prisms and other 
media.68 Later the same year, in response to a critic of his Éléments who had impugned Newton’s 
anti-plenism, Voltaire wrote: 
“It is not true that Mr. Newton has attributed marvellous properties to the void [le vide]. 
Rather, he has demonstrated that bodies, and not the void, act at immense distances 
from one another in a non-resistant milieu.” 
Acidly, he continued that such critics passed comment on works “they had neither read nor 
would be able to read.”69 
Though exiled to England from 1726–1729, it was with du Châtelet that Voltaire had 
studied Newton’s works (the two having met and begun an openly unmarried relationship in 
1733). Nevertheless, also in 1738, du Châtelet published a not wholly positive review of her 
lover’s apparently limited tome in the Journal des sçavans.70 Initially written around the same 
time,71 her own introductory text, Institutions de physique, was published in 1740.72 As had 
Voltaire, this text explicated the physics of optical milieux, alongside the other fundamental 
points of the Newtonian philosophy, more or less perfunctorily.73 However, going rather 
further, it also adopted Leibnizian tenets—particularly, the principle sufficient reason, the 
difference of indiscernibles, and the best of all possible worlds—providing original metaphysical 
and moral foundations, whereas Voltaire had simply reproduced Newtonian orthodoxy.74 
In the commentary accompanying her posthumous translation, du Châtelet wrote that 
the second book of Principia—dealing with air resistance, the speed of waves, and so on—had 
been composed “to destroy the system of vortices.75 Though the narratives of her fellow 
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philosophes, such as d’Alembert, to that effect may have been self-serving, they were also self-
fulfilling. Thus, it was particularly with regard to this supersession of Cartesian physics by 
Newtonian that milieux came to be accepted terms of natural philosophy. 
~~~~~~ 
In the Encyclopædia Britannica of 1878, on the subject of “Attraction,” the physicist James Clerk 
Maxwell (1831–1879) wrote: 
“Aethers were invented for the planets to swim in, to constitute electric atmospheres 
and magnetic effluvia, to convey sensations from one part of our bodies to another, and 
so on, till all space had been filled three or four times over with aethers.” 
Such heedless “hypotheses about aethers” had, in the previous century, exerted an “extensive 
and mischievous influence on science.” The lone survivor, “the luminiferous aether” of 
Huygens, had accumulated evidence “as additional phenomena of light and other radiations” 
had been discovered.76 Indeed, by Maxwell’s own energies, the electromagnetic theory of light, 
presented to the Royal Society in 1864 (and published the following year),77 had secured the 
luminiferous aether as a mathematically precise constituent of the cosmos. The 1911 edition of 
Britannica quoted Maxwell’s 1878 entry, adding that it “represents the historical position of the 
subject up till about 1860,” after which Maxwell, Michael Faraday (1791–1867), and Lord 
Kelvin78 (1824–1907) had “largely transformed theoretical physics into the science of the 
aether.” 
Six years earlier, in September 1905, Albert Einstein (1879–1955) had published his 
paper on what, a decade later,79 became known as the theory of special relativity, reconciling 
Maxwell’s equations with Newtonian mechanics, making the luminiferous aether effectively 
redundant.80 By around 1911, the theory was widely accepted among theoretical physicists but, 
evidently, without popular recognition of the event necessarily following suit. 
For d’Alembert circa 1750, French pride as regards Descartes’ redundancy was consoled 
only by the epochal judgement that: “Nothing was more natural [at that time] than to postulate 
a fluid which carried the planets.”81 For Maxwell circa 1880, however, Newton’s “disciples” 
had failed to exercise the master’s most vital lesson: hypothetic restraint. Nevertheless, it was 
not only among natural philosophers that the effects of the Newtonian cosmology had been felt. 
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By the time that Franz Anton Mesmer (1734–1815) left Vienna for Paris in 1777, having 
the psyches and physiologies of European elites swim in aethers and mediums of various sorts 
was a most plausible endeavour. Mesmer’s healing power was premised upon his ability to 
channel an all-pervasive cosmic fluid. It was the obstruction or circulatory hinderance of such 
fluid that was the cause of all ailment and, therefore, it was by the therapeutic manipulation 
thereof, by the hands or specialised apparatus, that all disease would be cured.  
Such techniques pertaining to “animal magnetism” were, moreover, powers deriving 
from a profound (if secretive) philosophy, explicated as formal propositions. 
 “1: There is a mutual influence between the celestial bodies, the earth and the 
animated bodies. 
2: A universally distributed fluid, which proceeds in such a way as to suffer no void, 
whose subtlety is without compare, and which, by its nature, is capable of receiving, 
propagating, and communicating all impressions of movement, is the means of this 
influence.”82 
Such terms were carefully chosen. While Mesmer’s practices were occult in the sense of being 
hidden to all but his followers, they made claim to the most prestigious principles of natural 
philosophy. Speaking principally of the “Fluidum,” milieu was not a key part of the terminology 
developed in Mesmer’s few published writings. However, his followers would expand upon 
these principles rather more voluminously. 
For example, in Nouveaux principes de physique (1781–1783), Jean-Louis Carra (1742–
1793), declared that “in order to effect all possible motions & to modify matter in every way, 
nature has established on our planet three very distinct, though connected [liés], milieus; 
namely, earth, water, & air.” However, these three planetary milieus were, in turn, “immersed” 
in another—the “universal elemental fluid” productive of “the transparency of space.”83 In his 
Examen physique du magnetisme animal (1785), Carra declared Mesmer either “the greatest 
Philosopher [Physicien] who ever existed, & who will ever exist” or, otherwise, “he is the greatest 
Magician of all possible worlds,” since, under his tutelage, one will “see & touch the universal 
fluid,” feeling its “filaments” emanating from the fingers.84 In similar terms, Mesmer later wrote 
in his Mémoire sur ses découvertes (1799): 
“Placed amidst [au milieu de] these different fluids, man is endowed with organs to which 
ends of the nerves terminate in greater or lesser quantity; these nerves are more or less 
exposed to contact with the different orders of the fluids from which they receive 
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impressions. Some of these organs, such as those of touch [tact], taste, and smell, receive 
these impressions by an immediate application of matter or movement to others, as 
sight and hearing are affected by the excitement [commotion] of the milieus whose cause 
may be at any distance.”85 
 
Figure 3—Animal magnetism in practice, c.1845 
However, by this time Mesmer had long since departed the French capital, returning to Vienna 
in 1793, and then to Frauenfeld in Switzerland, where he spent the rest of his life. 
Having in equal parts enraptured and outraged the grand persons of Paris, in 1784 King 
Louis XVI appointed a Commission, including such luminaries as Antoine Lavoisier (1743–
1794) and Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790), to investigate the validity of Mesmer’s supposed 
magnetic fluid. In preparation for rigorously controlled experiments, the basic tenets of the 
doctrine in question were summarised: 
“There exists in Nature a universal fluid; it is perhaps better felt than described; Newton 
called it the ethereal medium; Descartes the universal mover; the hermetic philosophers, the 
universal principle, etc. 
 Light, sound, odours communicate by this medium [milieu] or fluid. […] This fluid, 
however it may be demonstrated, forms the action-space that there is between all 
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bodies. One man can communicate to another the fluid which permeates him and gives 
him existence. Such is animal magnetism.”86 
However, the Commission’s conclusions were conclusive, and around 80,000 copies of its 
Report were printed. No such physical cause existed; its effects were, rather, exclusively moral. 
Animal magnetism was, thus, exclusively an agent of the “imagination”—and therein lay not 
only its folly but its danger. 
~~~~~~ 
The conceptual slippage from mid-point to medium-as-element, found most palpably and 
poetically in Pascal’s voyage “sur un milieu vaste,” may have occurred on various occasions, 
though obvious instances of this are rare. The convention already established, it was not difficult 
for du Châtelet and Voltaire to render medium as milieu; however, this, for them, remained a 
largely technical expression concerning optics and resistance. In terms of general usage, by the 
time of Diderot and d’Alembert, and du Châtelet’s translation, the iteratively variable but 
basically generic sense of milieu qua ‘middle’ was distinguished from the physical sense of a 
‘medium for’ something, often but not always light. This latter medium may be further 
distinguished from the bio-elemental sense of a ‘surrounding fluid’; however, this meaning 
remained closely attached to la philosophie méchanique. At this point, milieu was therefore, for the 
most part, a technical term. The locus of controversy for Newton certainly concerned what 
came to be known as media—be they material aethers or immaterial sensoria. However, 
foremost as regards his relations of disputation was that of physical theories to established 
authority—both secular and divine. Mediums were not, therefore, centre stage in his concerns, 
remaining more notional propositions than confidently articulated concepts (as per §3). 
However, as seen in the Commission assigned to the Mesmerists, this would not always be the 
case. 
4.2: From fluids to lizards: Lamarck and his detractors 
When Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744–1829) spoke, in his Discours d’Ouverture for students of 
Zoology at the Muséum National d’Histoire Naturelle in 1800 (year 8 de la République),87 of the 
“circumstances,” “climates” and “all the surrounding [environnans] milieus” affecting “living 
bodies,” he was certainly not the first to concern himself with the surroundings or localities of 
such beings.88 The Latin habitat was already well-known to botany when William Withering 
(1741–1799) wrote in 1796: “Habitatio, the natural place of growth of a plant in its wild state. 
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This is now generally expressed by the word Habitat.”89 However, this classificatory 
designation90 rarely appears outside of Latin except as a loanword until the 1830s and was 
absent from many dictionaries until well into the twentieth century.91 The Old French 
circonstance became the English circumstance by the early thirteenth century. However, habitat 
qua place of habitation was simply where a thing is to be found, bore no suggestion as to how 
it comes to be. Likewise, circumstance. 
Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (1707–1788), authoritative naturalist, 
intendant of the Jardin du Roi, and Lamarck’s mentor and patron, wrote often of circonstances of 
various sorts. For instance, in his influential essay De la dégénération des animaux (1766), he wrote 
that domestic dogs and wild wolves and foxes should properly belong to their same genus, their 
differences being attributable to “some external circumstances” or “particular circumstances.” 
However, such external differentiations were not fundamental to his thinking. When employing 
the phrase “milieu ambiant,” Buffon was concerned not with his anatomical collections but with 
deducing the age of the Earth from the rate at which it must have cooled from its original 
incandescence. The main cause of cooling, he argued, was not contact with the cold 
surrounding the object but the “expansive force” producing the heat and fire, pushing it from 
the centre outwards.92 Indeed, both this phrase—“milieu ambient”—and style of argument were 
straight from the Latin of Newton’s Principia.93 When drawn to generalise about the 
geographical distribution of species, Buffon would talk, quite conventionally, of “climat” (see 
§7.1). 
By the time of his Discours d’Ouverture, Lamarck had been a notable savant for more than 
two decades, a period of his career generally glossed over if not altogether ignored. By around 
1900, the name Lamarck would be almost indelibly associated with “milieu,” and, hence, 
“environment.” However, the world of his intellectual formation shared more with Newton and 
Mesmer than Darwin and Spencer. 
After publishing multi-volume works on botanical classification,94 and being admitted 
to the Académie des sciences (both 1779), Lamarck oversaw the botanical portion of the 
Encyclopédie méthodique par ordre des matières (1782–1832),95 and published other works in the same 
area. Appointed to the Chair of Botany at the Jardin du Roi from 1788 (having the name 
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changed to the Jardin des Plantes), he endured the revolutionary transition was appointed 
Professor of Zoology at the Muséum National d’Histoire Naturelle in 1793. Thus ensconced, 
he was at last able to indulge another side to his science, attacking the doctrines of the ‘new 
chemistry,’ and of Antoine Lavoisier (1743–1794) in particular.96 
Although Carl Wilhelm Scheele (1742–1786) had identified “Feuerluft [fire air]” in the 
early 1770s and Joseph Priestley (1733–1804) had similarly isolated “dephlogisticated air” in 
1774, it was Lavoisier, in 1777, who gave this substance its now-familiar name, “oxygène.”97 
Lamarck regarded both phlogistic chemistry and the new system with scepticism; however, it 
was the poly-elementary postulates of Lavoisier, and his associates, that drew his fervent 
disapproval. In another lengthy publication,98 he insisted that “hydrogen, carbon and nitrogen” are, 
contrary to recent claims, composed of “the same matter.” Thus, so-called oxygène was nothing 
other than “fixed fire,” “carbonic fire” or the “inflammable principle” of the chemists after Georg 
Ernst Stahl (1659–1734) who had named it “phlogiston.”99 
Unashamedly unexperimental, Lamarck adhered to the classical elements—earth, 
water, air, fire—and two foundational principles: life and Newtonian attraction.100 By contrast, 
the existentially unruly new chemistry denied the elementarity of water but insisted upon that 
of mere “charbon [carbon or coal],”101 being thus bereft of fundamental, systemically satisfactory 
physical principles. Moreover, treating chemical compounds in abstraction from living beings 
was, for Lamarck, practically a category error.  
“The entire surface of the globe, the bosom of the waters, and all of the atmosphere, 
are the vast field wherein nature ceaselessly destroys every compound substance that 
the principal of life [le principe de la vie] does not defend or that it ceases to maintain.”102 
Chemical complexity, for Lamarck, presupposed organic existence and, consequently, the 
spatial remit relevant to chemistry was not the laboratory but the planet. 
“The atmosphere is a vast laboratory where nature carries out immense analyses, 
dissolutions, precipitations and combinations. It is a great receptacle [un grand recipient], 
where all the attenuated and volatilised products of terrestrial bodies are received, 
mixed, agitated, combined, separated. From this point of view, atmospheric air is a 
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99 Ibid., 395. 
100 Corsi 2011, 9–13. 
101 Lamarck 1793, vol. 1, 8. 
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chaos, an indeterminate mixture of mineral vapours, of molecules vegetal and animal, 
of seeds, of eggs [de graines, d’oeufs], which ceaselessly travel and traverse the luminous 
fluid, the caloric fluid, the electrical fluid.” 
Moreover, such atmospheric air was, in turn, submerged in “an immense sea” comprised of 
“the ethereal fire,” which “surrounds the earth, penetrating everything.”103 Only from such an 
expansive world-view, from such a “logique physico-chymique,”104 could a genuine science be 
founded. 
In 1797, Lamarck also wrote of the reptiles and fishes whose blood releases the “feu fixé” 
more slowly than other animals, producing a lower quantity of “feu calorique” in the process.105 
The blood of such animals is, therefore, only found “at the temperature of the milieu that they 
inhabit.”106 When animal bodies decompose and putrefy, moreover, this occurs by “a series [une 
suite] of particular attractions that are modified in many different ways by all external 
circumstances, such as the temperature, the milieu occupied by the animal matter,” as well as 
concentration of water, and so on.107 In a 1799 article, Lamarck argued that sound, too, was 
attributable to “a fluid, which surrounds us everywhere [nous environne partout]”—not, that is, the 
air as such but, rather, the “ethereal fire.” Moreover, it was not “by hypothesis or some vague 
supposition” that such a conclusion had been arrived at but rather by careful examination of 
the “caloric fire” by which heat and light is communicated from the sun to the earth. Indeed, no 
less than Newton’s Traité d’Optique had proposed such a fluid.108 
 Such cosmological dispositions were hardly uncommon. Electricity was, indeed, a 
“fluid,” as was heat (calorique being coined in 1787).109 The luminous fluid, meanwhile, 
designated that incandescent substance of which the sun was composed. Likewise, for Lamarck 
the ethereal fire was only “the most ancient name”110 given to a fundamental physical property. 
Although such phrases as “principe de la vie” and “pouvoir de la vie” have had Lamarck presumed 
a vitalist,111 his generous estimation of the cosmological role of life remained mechanical. Only 
beings that are “essentially material,” he wrote in 1794, can make an impression upon our 
senses and, hence, be objects of knowledge.112 Moreover, the immutability of matter accorded 
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with a deist theology, assuming a radically non-interventionist God and an effectively or 
absolutely eternal universe. Nothing could be said of beginnings, only of the workings of things 
seen presently. 
These works were, however, received rather less favourably than his botanical efforts. 
Likewise, a series of yearly meteorological publications (1799–1810), which proudly announced 
weather “probabilities” over a year in advance, were popular but roundly ridiculed (not least, 
it is said, by Bonaparte).113 When his Hydrogéologie114 emerged in 1802, it found no publisher and 
Lamarck had the 1,025 copies printed at his own expense.115 This book, in some respects, picked 
up where his previous provocations had left off, advocating a “terrestrial physics” premised 
upon the triad of “Meteorology,” on the fluid dynamics of the atmosphere, “Hydrogeology,” 
on the fluid dynamics shaping the earth, and “Biology,” on the fluid dynamics flowing within 
living beings.116 However, Lamarck’s thought had also changed in several significant ways. First, 
he had relinquished his philosophical critique of chemistry, at least openly. Second, he was now 
willing to engage with fashionable questions of geogeny. Third, having softened his insistence 
upon the physical precedence of life, he was then able to contemplate spontaneous generation 
(i.e. the unprompted appearance of life from non-life). 
In his Recherches sur l’organisation des corps vivants of 1802 (also featuring the Discours 
d’Ouverture), Lamarck wrote of the simplest possible kinds of vital organisation, requiring no 
internal differentiation of organs—bodies consisting of variable, “gelatinous” containers. 
“In such a mass of matter, the subtle and expansive fluids, always in movement in the 
surrounding milieus [les milieux qui l’environnent], ceaselessly penetrating and dissipating 
in the same way, passing through the mass and regulating the interior disposition of its 
parts, cleaning it so that it can absorb and exhale the other surrounding fluids [fluides 
environnans] that may penetrate into its interior, and are susceptible of being 
contained.”117 
Because such “subtle fluids” that “no known body can contain”—“caloric, electrical matter, 
etc.”—are in ceaseless motion, the interior fluids cannot remain stationary either. 
“Thus the uncontainable fluids initially trace the first features of the most simple 
organisation and, then, the containable fluids, by their movements and other influences, 
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develop it, and with time and all favourable circumstances, complicate and perfect 
it.”118 
If Newton’s celestial mechanics could physico-mathematically suspend “a medium, if any such 
there is,” Lamarck’s mechanical biology was unambiguously committed to a universe replete 
with all manner of existence-lubricating media, “rare” and otherwise. 
When appointed to the Muséum in 1793, Lamarck had been put in charge of the study 
of invertebrates (a term that he coined for the purpose). It was on his speciality, then, that he 
was to address the assembled students on 21 Floréal VIII (11th May 1800). The lack of attention 
given to this rather unsung branch of living beings, diminutive and ubiquitous though they are, 
was declared unjust and unwise.119 Were not these “most imperfect” animals, those “most 
scarcely endowed with animality,” the likely origins of life itself—“those by which nature began 
and, with the aid of much time and favourable circumstances, she formed all the others”?120 In 
other words, were these not the corps vivans most proximate to the proto-animalcules given first 
gasps of existence by the ceaseless washing of cosmic tides? 
 If we consider the sheer variety of living things, he continued, we might conclude that 
“all that can be imagined takes place.” In other words, given endless aeons, might not the 
marvellous complexity dissected and distributed by zoologists derive from primordial simplicity 
by just the simple laws that had rendered the chemists’ elemental reductions so obviously 
absurd? 
“It appears, as I have already said, that time and favourable circumstances are the two 
principal means that nature employs to give existence to all its productions. We know 
that time has no limit for it, and, consequently, that it always has time at its disposal.”121 
Such plumbless depths of time were not uncontroversial; however, nor were they 
uncommon. The well-known Theory of the Earth (1788) of James Hutton (1726–1797), for 
example, had promoted similarly eternalist views as regards geology.122 Moreover, ten years 
earlier, in his Epoques de la Nature (1778), Buffon had derived from experiments with heated metal 
spheres a figure of between 75,000 and 168,000 years since the earth’s initial incandescent 
agglomeration.123  
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 “As for the circumstances that [nature] has required,” Lamarck continued, and that it 
continually employs in order “to vary its productions,” these are “in a certain measure 
inexhaustible.” 
“The principal circumstances are born of the influence of climates, the variations in the 
temperature of the atmosphere, and of all the surrounding milieus [milieux environnans]; 
of the diversity of places, habits, movements, actions; lastly, that of the means of living, 
of conserving, moving, multiplying, etc.”124 
Thus, in contrast to his works of the 1790s and earlier, Lamarck now embraced temporal 
profundity as a cause for, rather than obstacle to, the consideration of origins, and articulated, 
as a consequence, a quasi-Newtonian understanding of spontaneous generation. Then followed 
the consequence of this elaborate cosmology for the development of life itself. 
“Now, as a result of these diverse influences, the faculties [of the living being] extend 
and fortify themselves with usage, and diversify themselves through new habits 
preserved over great amounts of time [par les nouvelles habitudes long-temps conserves]; and, 
insensibly, the conformation, the consistency, in short the nature and the state of the 
parts as well as that of the organs, partake in the consequences of all these influences, 
conserving and propagating themselves through generation.” 
A bird drawn to water in order to find its prey “spreads the fingers of its feet,” wanting to move 
along the surface of the water. Its skin is thereby stretched. “Thus, with time, the large 
membranes that unite the fingers of ducks, geese, etc.” were formed. Likewise, an animal with 
the habit of living in the trees must extend its fingers to grip the branches, and so, over 
generations, they “lengthen, sharpen, and curve themselves [s’alongent, s’aiguisent et se courbent].”125 
Of course, the basic fact of generational variation was known to any animal breeder. 
The Hippocratic tradition, likewise, understood humoral constitutions (see §6) to be 
generationally transmissible. Maupertuis, for one, had undertaken investigations into hereditary 
hexadactylism (having six fingers or toes) with a view to refuting the doctrine of embryonic 
preformation.126 Moreover, he, like so many others, mobilised climatic explanations of racial 
difference on the presumption of the inheritability of solar exposure. In 1794 Erasmus Darwin 
(1731–1802), wrote: “All animals undergo perpetual transformations; which are in part 
produced by their own exertions […] and many of these acquired forms or propensities are 
transmitted to their posterity.”127 
 Thus, the inheritance of acquired characters may have been, in 1800, something closer 
to common sense than a novel insight. The mutability of species was, however, another matter. 
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Maupertuis had maintained this possibility;128 however, his was a rather isolated voice. 
Although, in 1753, Buffon identified “a certain primitive and general design,” an “original 
pattern,” a “single plan of structure”—a “single main idea” of the Creator—that could be found 
in various species (even man), he nevertheless concluded that species were created whole and 
permanent.129 Thus, when Of the degeneration of animals (1766) told of the “external circumstances” 
and “particular circumstances” accounting for the divergence of domestic dogs from wild 
wolves, and of the varieties of goats and antelopes that were “prodigiously varied by the 
influence of the climate, the difference of the food, and by the state of slavery to which man has 
reduced most animals,”130 circumstances and climates were taken to induce alterations only 
within the boundaries of species being. For Buffon, as for the likes of Carl Linnaeus (1707–
1778),131 the whereabouts—that is, the Habitat—of each species was accounted for by 
Providence, both in furnishing each species with an appropriate set of needs, and then in placing 
them on earth in a suitable location for them to interestedly relocate.132  
At the time of Buffon and Linnaeus, this was not a paramount matter of dispute. In the 
years after Lamarck; however, this would have changed.  
~~~~~~ 
When Lamarck was appointed to the Muséum in 1793 at the age of fifty-five, the other chair in 
zoology had gone to a twenty-one year old Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (1772–1844). Two 
years later, with Geoffroy’s aid, Georges Cuvier (1769–1832) arrived in Paris at the age of 26 
to become the suppléant (substitute lecturer) of Jean-Claude Mertrud (1728–1802), chair of 
comparative anatomy at the Jardin des Plantes, the younger men becoming friends and 
collaborators. However, by 1830 things had rather changed. For two months in front of the 
Académie des sciences, Cuvier and Geoffroy contested their respective biological convictions.133 
The main issue at stake was what the latter called “unity of plan” or “unity of composition.” 
Lamarck had died blind and impoverished the year before—a fate not unrelated to that of his 
ideas. However, his ghost rather lingered about the cornices. 
The controversy concerned how to interpret the lately much-expanded fossil record—
and particularly the by-now inescapable evidence of periodic extinction it presented. Unity of 
plan (or of composition), as set out in Geoffroy’s Philosophie anatomique (1818),134 like the 
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contemporaneous work of Lorenz Oken (1779–1851), followed Buffon’s primordial “original 
pattern” and “single main idea” of 1753 in taking similarities in animal forms to be not only 
coincidental resemblances but intrinsic commonalities.135 However, this formal unity did not 
entail the branching of something like a Darwinian ‘tree of life.’ Rather, the variety of animal 
forms indicated the working-out of the possibilities inherent to a given type. 
Such “transformism” was anathema to Cuvier. It abased the dignity of God to suppose 
that living beings might be somehow incomplete or wanting of design. Moreover, such feigned 
“hypotheses” were injurious to the technocratic elite whose duty it was to stave off any hint of 
a return to mob rule.136 However, while the Baron Cuvier did not hesitate to use all the powers 
at his disposal to secure his convictions, the terms of the debate were fundamentally intellectual. 
What, in 1821, he had called “revolutions”137 entailed colossal, catastrophic upheavals in the 
planet’s past—mass extinctions of species, replaced by God with hereditarily unrelated varieties. 
In other words, the evident fact of extinction indicated a distinct and discontinuous sequence of 
living Creations.  
Where Geoffrey spoke of “unity of plan,” Cuvier asserted “plans of organisation,” 
meaning something at once similar and completely different. For the latter, an organism’s every 
functional aspect is so finely attuned to every other aspect that any kind of functional change, 
however gradual, is impossible. 
“Every organized being forms a whole, a unique and closed system, whose parts 
mutually correspond and concur to the same definite action by a reciprocal reaction. 
None of its parts can change without the others also changing; and consequently each 
of them taken separately, indicates and determines all the others.” 
What Cuvier called “conditions of existence” were such that “if one of its functions was modified 
in a manner incompatible with the modifications of the others, that being could not exist.” 
Species change meant species death—and this entailed divine agency. 
“Natural history […] has a rational principle which is peculiar to it, and which it 
employs with advantage on many occasions. It is that of the conditions of existence, 
vulgarly named final causes. Since nothing can exist if it does not unite the conditions 
that render its existence possible, the different parts of each being must be coordinated 
in such a manner as to render the total being possible not only in itself but in its relations 
with those that surround it [qui l’entourent] […].138 
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Thus, the “condition” was neither an internal structure alone nor an external milieu or 
habitat—it was the totality, inside and out. The fish was made for the water and the water for 
the fish—and it was the complete relation that was of relevance to each God-given epoch of the 
earth. 
Conditions of existence were not, therefore, the formative-mechanical milieu that came 
later. Indeed, in Geoffroy’s published contributions to the Cuvier debate, “milieu” was 
mentioned only as middle.139 Likewise, in his Philosophie anatomique of 1818, Geoffroy had written 
of milieu only in relation to fluid mediums, in particular the proverbial fish–water pairing.140 
However, by the next year, in a book on “grands sauriens [big lizards],”141 Geoffroy had 
developed his terminology further, albeit without explicit definition. On the subject of the 
physiognomy of the (also aqueous) Teleosaurus, he wrote that the “ambient milieu” consisted 
of the liquids draw into the lungs, or equivalent organs, of such ancient beasts.142 The “monde 
ambiant,” or “ambient world,” then, referred to other “physical agents and milieus”143 more 
generally, though making particular reference to atmospheric gases, and the manner in which 
the living body is constituted from the molecules by which it is thus immersed. A fruit farmer, 
for instance, knows well the “concurrence [concours] of circumstances” that agitate the 
atmosphere and thus affect the harvest. The trees of an orchard, being of like species, may be 
organised, in themselves, to provide identical fruit; however, this consistency is “spoiled 
[contrarie ́e] by the influence of the variables of the exterior world.” 
“Just this example is sufficient not only to give an idea of what the ambient world is in 
relation to its capacity for resistance, but also to show in what multiplied sources of 
secondary influences it draws a principle to oppose the primitive influences of the 
essence of each type.”144 
Thus, milieu remained fluid, and even the “monde” consisted principally of atmospheric 
envelopings.145 
In an essay two years later, Geoffroy divided the history of zoology into seven eras. After 
the fourth era of descriptive classification, the fifth of comparative anatomy, and the sixth of 
unity of composition came a seventh—structural differences must now be understood primarily 
in terms of the “monde ambiant.” Again, ambient implied not simply surrounding but aerial. The 
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“energy” in the atmosphere, for example, had declined over time. When respiration thus 
became difficult, it would affect the rest of “the animal economy,” producing modifications 
either beneficial or harmful. If the latter then such beings would cease to be and be replaced by 
others better suited to “the new circumstances.”146 Unlike Lamarck, Geoffroy prioritised the 
direct influence on vulnerable foetal development rather than the gradual accumulation of 
effects on the adult organism. In other words, unlike Lamarck’s striving creatures of habit, his 
organisms were passive to their transformation. 
While his basic cosmology remained, like Lamarck, that of Newtonian forces imposed 
upon matter, Geoffroy accepted the facts of the new anatomy, whereas Lamarck had not 
believed the hype about extinction.147 Except perhaps for some large animals in dry lands, or, 
as Buffon had held, those unfortunate species that had crossed the paths of humans, unidentified 
fossils were surely out there somewhere yet to be discovered. Whatever their disagreements, 
Geoffroy remained respectful of his predecessor; however, he also maintained a certain distance. 
4.3: Destitute of the means: Denunciations and reclamations 
On 26 November 1832, an éloge for Lamarck was read at the Académie des Sciences.148 
Although composed by the Baron Cuvier, it was read in his stead by the Baron Antoine Isaac 
Silvestre de Sacy (1758–1838), as the former had died five months previously. As perpetual 
secretary of the Institut National des Sciences et des Arts, the right to formally eulogise had 
been an important part of Cuvier’s institutional armoury. Although gaining entrée to the Paris 
of museums, salons, and savants with the aid of Geoffroy, he quickly exceeded both his 
contemporary and his elder. Passing somewhat unperturbed from one regime to the next, as 
well as being made a peer (and hence a Baron) in 1819, he served as Director of the Muséum 
national d’Histoire naturelle four times for a total of eight years (a two year post) between 1808 
and 1831. Today, one finds said museum at 57 Rue Cuvier. 
 The remarks relayed were far from eulogistic—indeed, they were unapologetically 
censorious. Recognition of Lamarck’s botanical achievements were expressed as lament. Not 
content with “scrutinising the evidence,” such minds as Lamarck’s came to think themselves 
“able to outstrip both experience and calculation” and so set about constructing “vast edifices 
on imaginary foundations, resembling the enchanted palaces of our old romances.” Abysses of 
“unlimited time” were the stuff of the “religion of the magi.”  
“Thus, while Lavoisier was creating in his laboratory a new chemistry, founded on a 
beautiful and methodical series of experiments, M. de Lamarck, without attempting 
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experiment, and destitute of the means of doing so [aucun moyen de le faire], imagined that 
he had discovered another, which he did not hesitate to set in opposition to the former, 
although nearly the whole of Europe had received it with the warmest approbation.”149 
Such wild speculations were justly “left undisturbed.” No less preposterous was the formula of 
“time and circumstances” taken to “enable a monad or a polypus gradually and indifferently to 
transform themselves into a frog, a stork, or an elephant.” Though such systems “may amuse 
the imagination of a poet,” they cannot but crumble before “any one who has dissected a hand, 
a viscus, or even a feather.” His more workmanly labours might have deserved better. But he 
brought it upon himself.150 
This was, of course, an eminently self-interested narrative. However, it also bore the 
distinct possibility of being self-confirming. Nevertheless, regardless of whether or not Lamarck 
or Cuvier deserve greater credit for the biological developments that came after them,151 and 
although both were very much present in the debates that followed Darwin’s On the Origin of 
Species, it was “the illustrious Cuvier,” along with the similarly respectable Geoffroy, that were 
granted special mention in Darwin’s epochal text itself (Lamarck earning only two passing 
mentions). “It is generally acknowledged, Darwin wrote, “that all organic beings have been 
formed on two great laws—Unity of Type, and the Conditions of Existence,” this latter law 
being “fully embraced by the principle of natural selection.”152 
Moreover, in the preface to the third edition of 1861, Darwin made specific reference 
to Geoffroy, particularly via the biography written by his son and intellectual successor, Isidore 
Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (1805–1861).153 The elder, Darwin wrote, “seems to have relied chiefly 
on the conditions of life, or the ‘monde ambiant,’ as the cause of change.” However, “as his son 
adds, ‘This is therefore a problem entirely reserved for the future, if even the future can grapple 
with it.’”154 Thus, Darwin recognised that the father’s research had by no means claimed 
resolution of the problem of adaptation. Moreover, as well as assimilating Cuvier’s conditions 
of existence to natural selection, he conflated, or at least did not distinguish, monde ambiant and 
conditions of life.155 
In contrast to the later evolutionary conception inspired in both Darwin and Alfred 
Russell Wallace (1823–1913) by both Thomas Robert Malthus (1766–1834) and extensive 
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exploratory travel (see §9), there was no “struggle for existence”—that is, no inter-species 
competition or predation—entailed in Lamarck’s circumstances, climates, and milieus (or, 
indeed, in Geoffroy’s monde ambiant). Indeed, other species were not of particular relevance. For 
Geoffroy, it was the gradual flux and infiltration of the physico-chemical surroundings that were 
at issue. Such a conception certainly differed from that of Lamarck’s omni-permeating milieus, 
or from the “forces pénétrantes” of Buffon—that is, agencies such as gravity, chemical affinity, and 
magnetism, that, in their irresistible action, guaranteed the passage of nutrients and other 
essentials to the “moules intérieurs [interior moulds],”156 the basic organic molecules from which 
life was assumed to germinate.157 However, such worlds also differed markedly from that which 
Darwin and his struggling species came to subsequently inhabit. 
It was not until 1909 that a statue of Lamarck was raised in his hometown of Bazentin, in 
the département of the Somme. In an inaugural speech (published in the Revue Scientifique in 1913), 
Edmond Perrier (1844–1921), a specialist of invertebrates, noted, with classic rhetorical 
numerology, that it was both the centenary of the publication of Philosophie Zoologique and of 
Darwin’s birth. Time had, in his estimation, treated the former rather more favourably than it 
might have seemed in decades past. Certainly, Lamarck embarked upon his theories on that 
ethereal fire “continually in motion” and “the agent of all metamorphoses” at just the moment 
when Lavoisier “instituted a new Chemistry based on the indestructibility of matter and the 
immutability of atoms.” 
“But what do physicists say today? Do they not also recognise a substance which fills 
[emplit] space, penetrates all bodies, has perhaps generated them, and, according to the 
movements which agitate it, becomes light, electricity, or gives birth to those mysterious 
radiations that we have revealed with the Roentgen, the Becquerel, the Curie, 
radiations which seem to decompose atoms that are no longer immutable, and destroy 
matter that is no longer eternal?”158 
Likewise, Lamarck may have “lived in the house of Buffon” and his milieu extérieur may have 
seemed outdated after the Baron Cuvier’s pronouncements on the “sudden and tragic 
revolutions” of the globe. However, was not the latter also endowed with “the imagination of a 
poet, the subtlety of a metaphysician” in reconciling the earth of the chronologists, all of 6,000 
years old, with the evidence of extinction that he so amply and ably uncovered?159 In 1909, at 
least in Bazentin, then, one might have reasonably expected it to be a Lamarckian century 
ahead. 
                                               
156 A term taken from Louis Bourguet (1678–1742). Roger 1997, 129.  
157 Staum 2014, 26; Roe 2003, 17. 
158 Perrier 1913, 226.  
159 Ibid., 227. 
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The remarks constituting Lamarck’s Discours of 1800 were reassembled and reprinted 
several times, with the definitive version being the noted tome of 1809. What was, then, 
identified as the crucial passage of chapter seven160 was translated into English and published 
in The American Naturalist in 1888 as “On the Influence of Circumstances on the Actions and 
Habits of Animals, and that of the Actions and Habits of Living Bodies, as Causes Which 
Modify Their Organization.”161 The book as a whole was translated into English in 1914,162 
where chapter seven was titled: “Of the Influence of the Environment on the Activities and 
Habits of Animals, and the Influence of the Activities and Habits of These Living Bodies in 
Modifying Their Organisation and Structure.” And so, by 1914, environment had overlaid 
circumstance, becoming a backwardly-projectable commonplace. 
By the time of Lamarck’s éloge at the Académie, there was little place for divine sensoria 
in mathematical physics. Pierre-Simon Laplace, who had died five years before (1749–1827), 
famously (if perhaps apocryphally), “had no need of that hypothesis.” Nevertheless, Cuvier’s 
(very much small-r) revolutionary pieties were well-ensconced as regards the meeting point of 
geology and anatomy. Medium and milieu, too, were firmly established as technical terms. 
Moreover, as we shall see in §6, from the 1790s onwards neo-Hippocratic understandings of 
medical climates were commonplace. However, despite the later attribution of “milieu” to such 
circulations, there was little to link them in contemporaneous terms. That connection would 
only follow Auguste Comte, and the positivist systems of biology and sociology. 
                                               
160 Of twenty-five. 
161 Lamarck 1888a; Lamarck 1888b. The French title of chapter 7: “De l’influence des circonstances sur les actions et les 
habitudes des animaux, et de celle des actions et des habitudes de ces corps vivans, comme causes qui modifient leur organisation et leurs 
parties.” Lamarck 1809, vol. 1. 
162 Reprinted: Lamarck 1963. 
  97 
Excursus A: Ontonomic: The assembly of obligation 
As seen in §2, for Georges Canguilhem, circa 1950, “[t]he notion of milieu” was becoming 
something like “a universal and obligatory mode of apprehending the experience and existence 
of living beings.”1 For Canguilhem, this construction of obligation was to be understood through 
epistemology. Here, I wish to understand such obligations though ontology—or, more precisely, 
ontonomy. 
Moreover, the following pays attention to the fact that the Newtonian milieu was a 
principle of universal connection. As we shall see in the next chapter, the positivist milieu 
divested this expression of its direct physical meaning; however, such connotations remained. 
One might thus detect echoes of such earlier meanings in “the environment,” familiar to us 
from the mid-twentieth century onwards.2 
The ontonomic articulates one dimension of the amalgam known as ontology: that of 
the formation of collective obligations to ‘receive things as real.’ This excursus explicates this 
conception. However, it also recognises that, much as lόgos in itself can already be associated 
with the germinal principles of the cosmos (“In the beginning…”), the ontonomic already 
implies a relation to the earth, with nόmos entailing the primordial ground of collectivity. 
This section is, therefore, conceptually propositional. However, it is also, in its later 
stages, speculative; a matter of “design” rather than “definition” (§3). 
~~~~~~ 
On 4th September 1784, an Exposé des Experiénces concerning the experiments assessing Mesmer’s 
“animal magnetism” was presented before the French Académie des Sciences. Read by Jean 
Sylvain Bailly (1736–1790), on behalf of Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790), Jean-Baptiste le Roy 
(1720–1800), Gabriel de Bory (1720–1801), and Antoine Lavoisier, it declared: 
“One must not be indifferent to the ill-founded [mal-fondé] reign of false opinions. The 
sciences that build themselves [s’accroissent] from truth gain much from the suppression 
of error: error is always an evil yeast [levain] that ferments & ultimately corrupts the 
mass into which it is introduced. But when this error comes from the empire of the 
Sciences to spread to the multitude, to divide & agitate minds [partager & agiter l’esprits], 
when it presents a mendacious means [moyen trompeur] of curing the sick and prevents 
them from seeking other relief, when, above all, it influences at once the moral & the 
physical, a good Government has an interest in destroying it. The distribution of light 
is a good employment of authority!”3 
                                               
1 Canguilhem 2008a, 98. 
2 Warde, Robin, and Sörlin 2018. 
3 Donaldson 2014, 79, 155. Translation modified. 
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It was not only, then, that the Mesmerists had been spreading falsehoods but, moreover, they 
had been cloaking themselves in scientific authority in doing so. While not every charlatan 
might merit such an intervention, this case was clearly exceptional. When experienced under 
experimental conditions, by authoritative observers not already convinced of the doctrine, the 
phenomena were altogether wanting in their manifestation. In several permutations, adherents 
were shown to experience Mesmeric “crises” when magnetism was absent, and experienced 
nothing when it was surreptitiously present. Thus, the co-authors added: 
“Is not Magnetism announced to be a universal fluid, to be the principle of life & the 
great mainspring of Nature? What sort of agent is it that does not always act under like 
[semblable] circumstances?”4 
As the official Rapport put it, the apparent effect, therefore, has “no physical cause, or external 
cause, & can have no other cause than the imagination.”5 
 However, this was far from the first public quarrel concerning aetherial media and 
experimental rationality. During the 1660s, Robert Boyle had turned the subtle matter of 
Cartesian plenism into a question of experimental research, via the construction of an air-pump. 
With this expensive, complicated, and (his critics were quick to point out) leaky device, Boyle 
was able to relate physical principles to an observable, if imperfect, void.6 For Thomas Hobbes 
in particular, such laboratorial caprices were anathema. How could truth, and therefore order, 
be established upon such defective and localised contrivances? No matter how cohesive its 
construction, some “purest aetherial substance”7 must, of necessity, always seep into the 
supposed vacuum. Thus opposed to this insinuation of the immaterial, and hence orderless, into 
the world,8 the author of Leviathan maintained the fundamentality of mathematical, geometrical 
knowledge of a mechanical, material universe. For Boyle, by contrast, the aether possessed no 
experimentally relevant properties.9 Moreover, his philosophical claims presupposed quite 
another model of authority than the traditional Platonic-Cartesian geometrician: an authority 
premised upon the permittance of dissension and debate within a semi-public forum of 
demonstration and witnessing.10 
 This, the much-cited account propounded by Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer in 
1985, concluded that Hobbes and Boyle articulated “radically different solutions to the question 
                                               
4 Ibid., 80, 158. Translation modified. 
5 Ibid., 56,121. Translation modified. 
6 Shapin and Schaffer 1985, 38. 
7 Quoted: ibid., 119. 
8 Ibid., 19. 
9 Ibid., 184. 
10 Ibid., 80. 
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of what was to count as knowledge,” which were, at the same time, “solutions to the problem 
of social order.”11  
I wish, also, to understand the experimental mode of authorisation in relation to ‘what 
counts…’; however, I wish to achieve this not only in terms of knowledge but, also, of ontology. 
In order to do so, I must better understand the mode of existence of experimental knowledge—
that is, what is both fundamentally and specifically necessary for its practice. 
Crucial to Boyle’s mode of authority was a certain disposition: “A man whose narratives 
could be credited as mirrors of reality was a modest man; his reports ought to make that modesty 
visible.”12 In 1997, Donna Haraway dubbed this Boylean man the “modest witness.” It was not 
only that such an observer had to pay close attention, it was (quoting Sharon Traweek) that 
“such a man must inhabit the space perceived by its inhabitants to be the ‘culture of no 
culture.’”13 Such a disposition was thus constitutively exclusive with regard to stratifications of 
gender and class. Women could not witness modestly, nor were the men composing and 
working the pumps of any significance. Haraway thus set out to “queer the elaborately 
constructed and defended confidence of this civic man of reason.”14 However, she did so not in 
order to condemn the practice as such but, rather, in recognition of the “practical inheritances” 
received from this history: “The important practice of credible witnessing is still at stake.”15 
 In 1993, Isabelle Stengers constructed a similar but more practically exacting account 
of experimental practice, not seeking so much to “queer” Boylean man as to displace the 
question of disinterested rationality into one of interested risk. The invention of experimental 
science was, she wrote: 
“the invention of the power to confer on things the power of conferring on the experimenter the power to 
speak in their name.”16 
That is, the experimental event was not brought about by the abstentious disinterest of a rational 
mind neutrally observing nature. Rather, it was the result of objects being creatively configured 
in such a way that they can, effectively, ‘object’ to what is said about them. For Stengers, the 
exemplary experimental situation is found in Galileo’s inclined slope: polished balls roll down, 
their calculated velocities then testifying to the advocated equations. To be sure, this 
configuration is a matter of abstraction. 
                                               
11 Ibid., 332. 
12 Ibid., 65. 
13 Haraway 1997, 23; Traweek [1988] 1992, 162. 
14 Haraway 1997, 24. 
15 Ibid., 33. 
16 Stengers [1993] 2000, 88. 
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“Outside the laboratory, one finds friction, wind, the irregularity of soils, and the 
density of milieus—everything whose elimination allowed Galileo to establish 
authority.”17 
Nevertheless, what thus constitutes the mode of existence of experimental scientific practice is 
the principle that by taking the “risk” of instigating an artificial situation wherein experimental 
things can be made to ‘speak for themselves’ (the risk, thus, is that they speak otherwise than 
scripted)18 these same things thereby authorise the experimenter to “speak in their name.” 
This, then, brings us back to asking: “What sort of agent is it that does not always act 
under like [semblable] circumstances?” 
In 1989, writing with the psychiatrist and hypnotist Léon Chertok, Stengers identified 
the Mesmer affair as a crucial moment within the history of “rational practices.”19 This royally 
authorised intervention constituted an attempt to submit to “the order of science a practice that 
seemed threatening to political and to social order.”20 Moreover, it did so not only by employing 
experimental methods but, furthermore, by insisting upon the fundamental opposition of the 
“physical” and the “imaginary.” The former entailed a multiplicity the disaggregation of which 
was the very objective of inquiry. The latter, by contrast, was merely an artefact—precisely that 
which breaks the chain of authorisation for an experimental author, revealing the things 
‘speaking for themselves’ to be merely grandiloquent ventriloquies.  
However, Chertok and Stengers do not cast Mesmer as a victim or martyr as such. His 
claims were indeed made, quite deliberately, to resonate in the register of authoritative natural 
philosophy. His substances, though, could not stand up to the test. As such, according to what 
Bruno Latour latter called “Stengers’s shibboleth,”21 Mesmer’s claims cannot be said to have 
been ‘unscientific’ or ‘irrational’ simply because they relied upon the imagination. However, 
nor did they accept the risk entailed by the experimental situation. 
~~~~~~ 
In §3, I wrote: “The ontological occurs when an entity is received as real by a collective whose practices 
cultivate that reception,” where “as real” entails the reception of a thing “in accordance with its 
characteristic mode of existence.” The ontonomic, furthermore, was described as that through 
which a collective obligation to ‘reception as real’ is made. That is, one does not simply decide, 
out of nothing, to adopt a particular orientation towards reality. Such relations are collectively 
cultivated, and, when they are resisted, this dissension remains collectively practiced. 
                                               
17 Ibid., 127. 
18 Latour 1988. 
19 Chertok and Stengers 1992, 24. 
20 Ibid., 1. 
21 Latour 1997, xix. 
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Figure 4—Under the influence of Mesmerism, c.1785 
What can be found in the case of the Commission is, therefore, a matter of conflicting 
and misarticulated obligations.  
 It is quite straightforward to understand how the grand, theatrical performances of the 
mesmerisers—with their robes, incantations, apparatuses—consisted of a “cultivation” of 
obligations to particular bodily comportions, elemental invocations, and experiential reveries. 
To be a Mesmerist was, indeed, to be permitted inculcation into the lore. It is also apparent 
that Mesmerian media could not satisfy the obligations of the experimental situation in the 
manner that it was constructed—that is, so as to assess the existence of beings defined in the 
modality of the physical. However, the judgement of Lavoisier et al. was no less performative—
and no less creative. With their methods of closed experimental conditions, precise weighing 
and balancing of matter, and, then, the analytic dissolution of compounded substances into 
simpler elements, such self-consciously modest witnesses, in France, England, and elsewhere, 
had established a whole new conception of chemistry. This experimental event—or, rather, 
series of events—had accorded such figures a particular kind of authority: that which reaches 
beyond its own immediacy, becoming exemplary for practices of all kinds. It was becoming, in 
a word, paradigmatic (from parádeigma,22 “pattern or example”). 
                                               
22 παράδειγμα. 
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 With the “ontonomic,” I am claiming that such relations of obligation do more than 
adjudicate “what [is] to count as knowledge.” By making such judgements, they form 
obligations as to what can be received as real—a relation that the verb ‘to know’ rather fails to 
do justice. 
This point will be taken up again in the next excursus. However, this is not yet enough 
to account for the full conceptual implication of the ontonomic. In particular, and thinking 
towards the twentieth-century significance of the environmental, nόmos must be recognised as 
already implying the earth. 
~~~~~~ 
To speak of nόmos is to invoke law, rule, or custom. It is related to nemein, meaning to manage, 
regulate, or distribute. This latter sense is usually articulated in terms of the apportioning of 
land, such as was practiced in the Greek colonies. Further back, it can be attributed to the PIE 
root *nem-—assign, allot, or take. However nemein could also mean to read, and nόmos, as early 
as Hesiod, could signify the diffusive ‘distribution’ of music.23 
 However, to speak this etymology is also to invoke a certain disgraced professor whose 
reflections thereupon have become authoritative in their own right. 
“Nomos is the measure by which the land [den Grund und Boden] in a particular order is 
divided and situated; it is also the form of political, social, and religious order 
determined by this process.”24 
That is, the origin of all human law is set in the pioneering appropriative partition of the earth. 
Each “concrete order” derives from such “radical title.”25 However, this professor was not writing 
as a historian, and we should not read him as one. Rousseau, a century before, and with rather 
different inclinations, took the original land-appropriation to have been the founding act of civil 
society.26 However, neither are examples to be followed. Both posit as the ur- or arkhḗ—the 
beginning—a primordial taking. The ontonomic, by contrast, must be understood as a perpetual 
receiving.27 
To inherit may be to take into possession but it is not to appropriate. The terms of what 
distinguishes an inheritance from an appropriation can only be internal to the tradition 
concerned. Nevertheless, the distinction holds. No one inherits in general (there can be no 
universal tradition). Moreover, no one inherits individually (an inheritance must always be 
recognised as such). However, to speak of ‘rules’ or ‘customs’ is to imply something contrary. 
                                               
23 Svenbro 1993, 109–114; Zartaloudis 2018. 
24 Schmitt [1950] 2003, 70; Schmitt [1950] 1974, 40. 
25 Quoted in English. 
26 Rousseau [1754] 1992, 44. 
27 Cf. Clark 2011, chap. 8. 
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That is, the very notion of nomic obligation implies the possibility of ‘freedom’ therefrom. This 
is crucial—and what must now be formulated.  
Since inheritance implies, in every sense, interest, one possible antonym of the receptive 
might be the uninterested. Or, since the relation in question concerns ‘rules’ that are apparently 
willingly cultivated, this relation might be contrasted with a ‘dictat,’ imposed. Moreover, since 
it is the reception of ‘what counts as real’ that concerns us, we may be lured into thinking that 
to inhabit a different tradition is somehow to be ushered into another universe. However, all 
these set up false oppositions. 
 Rather, I will say that the ontonomic turns upon the trivial. From tri- (three) and via 
(road), the trivium was, literally, a crossroads—hence, a public place, or common-place. Thus, 
the association “common, vulgar, trivial.”28 One may well, then, discern a historic violence 
buried within this concept—a contempt for the common as such. However, with respect to the 
ontonomic, this concept can be altogether reconceived. 
Since one does not inherit in general, inheritance is necessarily a matter of attention. This, 
in turn, presupposes triviality—the trivial is that which obligates little or no attention, relative 
to the tradition to which one belongs. However, rather than making the trivium qua public space 
emblematic of the trivial, it would be better to say that this point of crossing or confluence is the 
middle-place—the milieu, indeed—from which one may move in order to meet other modes of 
attention. What is trivial to one mode may be fundamental to another. Triviality is not, 
therefore, a pejorative or denigrative judgement but an admission of attentive relation. 
By reclaiming the trivium from such condescension, the intermediate common-place 
itself may thus be found to have always been a hubbub of dissension, tale-telling, and thought—
always a collocation of minorities, as well as the jealous enforcements of majorities. The common 
should not, therefore, be imagined as generally and intrinsically carceral. In every discord there 
is implicit the possibility (if not probability) of a departure. 
Given this reconfiguration, it becomes possible to further thematise the distinction of 
the historical, philosophical, and political. The historian, attends (that is, leans, stretches towards, 
pays attention) to the commonplace. The philosopher, by contrast, contemplates roads not taken. 
The politician, then, is prepossessed with the possibilities of alliances and danger. 
As such, nomos—thus placed within the common-place of the trivium, understood in 
contrast to those (non-pejoratively) ‘trivial’ common-places to which other roads lead—ceases 
to be given its narrative of origination in the pioneering division of an altogether idealised 
“earth” (as though it relented to the breath of human industry at the first stroke of individual 
labour). Moreover, it is no longer concerned with the ‘distribution’ (see §C) of “Grund und Boden” 
(as though the very possibility of agriculture did not itself imply massive cooperation). To be 
                                               
28 Lewis 1895, 875. 
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sure, from the most peripheral common-place to the humblest foot-beaten track, each and every 
passageway presupposes its earthly fundament. However, hearing more of the nόmos of reading 
and music—that is, of the communicative—such impressions must be taken as traces not of a 
taking-and-excluding but of a going, shuttling, fleeing or, indeed, receiving; that is, of a 
receiving into shelter, or into harbour. 
The trivium is thus emblematic of the reality of the commonplace (we are all of some 
common or other), and the partiality of the common-place (since there are always ‘roads not 
taken’). As such, while it may not be preoccupied with the metaphysical arkhḗ as such (see §F), 
the ontonomic bears a necessarily profound relationship with the inherited past: Every road is 
a monument to an inherited relation; a past event of communication (for better or worse). That 
is, the very possibility of the trivial, which is the very possibility of the receptive, presupposes the 
necessity of maintaining relations between commons, which is to say, between collectives (see §E). 
~~~~~~ 
In 1952, in an essay titled The Political Partitioning of Our World: An Attempt at Analysis, the 
geographer Jean Gottman (1915–1994) remarked that: 
“Crossroads seem to have been one of the earliest and perhaps one of the most 
permanent fears of mankind. For it is alarming for anyone who knows his own weakness 
to contemplate whom we might be meeting at the next crossroad—friend or foe, weaker 
or stronger than he.”29 
This relating of the “ontonomic” to the “trivial” has attempted to reclaim the crossroads, not 
as a site of fear and danger but as one of collectivity and possibility. In this sense, ontology has 
been supplemented by a kind of mythic hodology (the study of pathways). 
These speculative, even mythological, propositions, should not be taken as 
developmental or anthropological ones. They are acts of speculative philosophy30—attempts to 
make sense of what happened, without accepting that such occurrences need have occurred in 
the way that they did. In other words, they attempt to conceptually imagine alternative roads 
(even if there was little or no probability of any such ever being taken). 
Thus, as well as being speculative, the preceding addresses a fundamental aspect of the 
mesologic, or environmental: that these are things supposed to ‘connect us,’ with ‘us’ usually 
meaning ‘humanity’ as such. This was the conceit of the Mesmerian aether: a single, underlying 
principle, suffused through everything, granting the mesomancer apparently unlimited power. 
One may well discern its echo in “the environment” of today. 
 To accept such entities as being ‘a thing of the past’ is to place a certain distance of time 
between then and now—the distance of anachrony (§3/§F). However, to follow the methodical 
                                               
29 Gottmann 1952, 517. 
30 E.g. Stengers 2011b. 
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assessment of the Commission by no means obligates acceptance of its judgement regarding 
“the distribution of light.” Indeed, according to Stengers’ shibboleth, there is nothing 
whatsoever in the experimental mode of existence that necessitated the dismissive elimination 
of “imagination” as a homogeneous, “marked” category, relative to the “unmarked” and 
disaggregable physical. Nothing, therefore, necessitates that those seeking to inherit from the 
experimental tradition should be obliged to partition things in this way (§C), or that such 
jealousies should animate what gives sense and cohesion to their world (§B). 
However, before coming to consider these issues, the history of milieu must be explicated 
several steps further. 
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5: “The total ensemble”: Association from Comte to Tarde 
By the mid-nineteenth century, medium and milieu, as terms of natural philosophy—that is, 
increasingly, of science—could be, and were, taken for granted as practical concepts. However, 
they were also concepts invoked in physics, chemistry, and biology, as well as the nascent social 
sciences. With sciences of various kinds being increasingly a part of popular fiction, such 
concepts were also brought into literature, more or less imbued with laboratorial sobriety or 
séance-esque spiritualism. 
 This chapter concerns, first, the career of Auguste Comte, his conceptual establishment 
of sociology, and the role that his conceptions of milieu played in this. However, second, it also 
concerns the religion of humanity that he took to be an integral aspect of this intellectual 
endeavour, and the role that diverse milieus had in that. Third, it will then consider the 
popularisation of milieu concepts, particularly in the interconnected (and mutually referencing) 
literature and literary theories of Honoré de Balzac, Émile Zola, and Hippolyte Taine. Finally, 
it will examine criticisms and contestations as regards the proper conception of both sociology 
and milieu occurring at the end of the century, through debates between Gabriel Tarde and 
Émile Durkheim.1 Thus, it will be shown how a ‘mechanistic’ understanding of milieu was 
successfully asserted over the spiritual or ætherial understanding. However, it will also be shown 
that diverse associations were continually reclaimed throughout the century, and after. 
5.1: From order to animation: Comte’s positivism 
Positivism, today, is known as a branch of the philosophy of science. However, in the lifetime 
of its founder Auguste Comte (1798–1857), it began as an intellectual plan to reconstitute social 
order and ended as a cult. France, in the decades after the Revolution, was awash with utopian 
schemes (and schemers) of various sorts. Henri de Saint-Simon (1760–1825), for instance, 
promoted rule by a technocratic oligarchy led by mathematicians, and worshipping Newtonian 
gravity (later, physiology and anatomy).2 From 1817 to 1824, Comte was Saint-Simon’s 
secretary. They parted in acrimony, disputing the authorship of a work penned by Comte and 
first published in 1822. This “opuscule fundamental,” as he later called it,3 laid the basis for a multi-
volume Système de politique positive—a schematising of knowledge intended to help “re-establish 
order in Europe.”4 
                                               
1 With regard to these thinkers, drawing on e.g. Pickering 1993, vol. 1; Tresch 2012; Vargas et al. 2008. 
2 Tresch 2012, 197–198. 
3 Comte 1998, 47. 
4 Ibid., 49. 
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In short, Comte’s project was to establish an equilibrium between revolutionary and 
reactionary ideas, founded upon “positive” knowledge, so as to bring to a close the still-lingering 
era of political and existential licentiousness. The fundamental law of this transition, Comte 
claimed to have realised, early one morning in 1822: the law of the three stages; that is,5 “the 
theological or fictional state; the metaphysical or abstract state; the scientific or positive state.”6 
Although a four-volume work titled Système de politique positive was published between 
1851 and 1854,7 the project Comte had been pursuing in the 1820s was not realised. Instead, 
setting out to systematise independently, in April 1826, Comte commenced a series of lectures, 
titled Cours de philosophie positive, establishing the historical and scientific foundations for the 
endeavour. The early lectures were attended by a considerable cast of notables, including 
Joseph Fourier (1768–1830), Henri de Blainville (1777–1850), and François Arago (1786–
1853).8 However, before the fourth, Comte suffered a catastrophic, and series-ending, “cerebral 
crisis”—only the most public of a procession of such episodes.9 The Cours was eventually 
published between 1830 and 1842.10 In 1853, it was “freely translated and condensed” into 
English by Harriet Martineau (1802–1876)11—thereby, as we shall see, relating “environment” 
to Comte’s milieu.12 
In the first two volumes of the Cours on mathematics, astronomy, “milieu resistant,” “milieu 
ambiant,” “milieu atmosphérique,” and so on, were utilised in senses that would have been familiar 
to Buffon. However, the third volume on chemistry and biology examined the concept 
specifically. The sciences, for Comte, were arranged in order of complexity—astronomy, 
physics, chemistry, biology, and sociology (the latter coined by Comte in 1830)—with each 
                                               
5 He recounted this quasi-religious experience only later. Pickering 1993, vol. 1, 199. 
6 Comte 1998, 81. 
7 Comte 1851, vol. 1; Comte 1852, vol. 2; Comte 1853, vol. 3; Comte 1854, vol. 4. 
8 Pickering 1993, vol. 1, 370. 
9 Ibid., vol. 1, 372. 
10 Comte 1830, vol. 1; Comte 1835, vol. 2; Comte 1838, vol. 3; Comte 1839, vol. 4; Comte 1841, vol. 5; Comte 
1842, vol. 6. 
11 Comte 1853, vol. 1; Comte 1853, vol. 2. 
12 The later Système was translated rather more straightforwardly by several English positivists: 
 1875, vol. 1.: John Henry Bridges (1832–1906); translator. 
 1875, vol. 2.: Frederic Harrison (1831–1923); historian. 
 1876, vol. 3.: Edward Spencer Beesly (1831–1915); historian. 
 1877, vol. 4.: Richard Congreve (1818–1899); founded the London Positivist Society in 1867 and the Comtist 
Church of Humanity in 1878. 
Likewise, the Discours sur l’esprit positif (1844) and Catéchisme positiviste (1852), works intended for a lay audience were 
translated straightforwardly. 
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developing its methods from its predecessor. Thus, for the purposes of developing a physics of 
society, the example of biology was paramount. 
Having studied vitalist biology in Montpellier, after being expelled from the École 
Polytechnique in 1816, Comte knew what positive science had to overcome. In 1800, the same 
year as Lamarck’s Discours, Marie-François Xavier Bichat (1771–1802) had defined life as: “the 
set [l’ensemble] of functions that resist death.”13 By insinuating an inscrutable force into living 
matter, not only was biology divorced from physics and chemistry but, moreover, the living 
being was separated from—indeed, defined against—that in which it lived. On the contrary, 
Comte wrote, “the idea of life constantly presupposes the necessary correlation of two 
indispensable elements, an appropriate organism and a suitable milieu.” To this declaration 
was appended a footnote: 
“It would be superfluous, I hope, to specifically justify the frequent use that I shall 
henceforth make, in biology, of the word milieu, to designate in a clear and simple 
manner not only the fluid in which the organism is immersed, but, in general, the total 
set [l’ensemble total] of external circumstances of any kind that are necessary for the 
existence of each particular organism. Those who have sufficiently meditated on the 
capital role which the corresponding idea must play in any positive biology will, without 
doubt, not reproach me for the introduction of this new expression.”14 
This statement, published in 1838, is crucial for several reasons. First, Comte claims milieu as a 
biological neologism (a practice to be avoided, in general). Although reference to an immersive 
fluid reflects the long-familiar elementary sense, milieu here became something else entirely. 
That is, second, it was defined, unambiguously, as the totality of surrounding entities. It thus 
became a completely abstract concept, devoid of any internal differentiation. Third, against 
both Bichat and the anatomists, this was a bifurcation that necessitated attention to both sides 
of the consequent equation. Life cannot, hereupon, be understood only in terms of the organism 
itself. Fourth, also against Bichat, as Martineau put it in her translation: 
“The harmony between the living being and the corresponding medium (as I shall call 
its environment) evidently characterizes the fundamental condition of life; whereas, on 
Bichat’s supposition, the whole environment of living beings tends to destroy them.”15 
That is, the relationship of organism to milieu was made one not of hostility but, rather, 
appropriateness and harmony. Indeed, producing a general theory that would connect “the 
double idea of organ and medium with that of function” is the highest objective of biology.16  
                                               
13 Bichat [1800] 1805, 1. 
14 Comte 1838, vol. 3, 301; cf. Comte 1853, vol. 1, 363. 
15 Comte 1853, vol. 1, 360. 
16 Ibid., vol. 1, 364. 
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 In making this fundamental reconception, Comte adopted an appreciative but equivocal 
relationship to Lamarck. Although the charge of possessing an “artless imagination” appears 
only in Martineau’s text, Comte did write of “la naïve imagination de Lamarck”17 and sided with 
Cuvier regarding the “indefinite variability of species.”18 Indeed, Comte’s harmonious milieu 
had rather more to do with Cuvier’s final causes and “conditions of existence” than Lamarck’s 
terrestrialised cosmic solvent. Nevertheless, when Comte came to design his positivist calendar 
in 1849, the Baron was nowhere to be found, while Lamarck’s name featured in the final week 
(celebrating biology) of the thirteenth month (celebrating science), itself named after the 
“incomparable” Bichat. In the Système, Lamarck was also honoured as the “true founder” of “an 
entirely new branch of biology” studying “the general theory of organic milieux.”19 Then came 
François-Joseph-Victor Broussais (1772–1838), Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis (1757–1808), 
leading to the proto-phrenologist Franz Joseph Gall (1758–1828). 
Sociology, developing from its forerunner in the hierarchy, thus adopted the same basic 
principles, and Comte’s texts from the Cours onwards are scattered with the “milieu social.”20 
However, in the Système, he was also careful to distinguish these respective domains. Indeed, not 
only must the sciences be strictly stratified in terms of their relative complexity and variability 
but so must all stages of social development. The “ascending scale” of social development is 
initially prompted by “the aggregate of material influences: first astronomical, then physical, 
lastly chemical.” This “first system of modifying forces,” the simplest and most easily 
understood, were also the first to be systematically studied, as with Hippocrates and his 
“unequalled treatise upon climate.” However, the phrase “material influences” thereafter 
becomes overextended and inadequate. 
“The word milieu, already used as a general term of biology, seems to me the most 
convenient for the purpose. Nevertheless, we must not confuse the theory of the 
sociological milieux with that of the biological milieux, supposing the latter theory were 
completed, whilst it is as yet hardly conceived.” 
The social order being only “indirectly affected” by the consequences of the “material milieu” 
upon “vital order,” 
“we should in the first instance limit the sociological milieux to those material influences 
which directly affect sociality, without sensibly disturbing vitality.” 
There being no “special theory” of the biological milieu, it would be premature to attempt one 
of the sociological, although the former will of course “serve as introduction and systematic 
                                               
17 Ibid., vol. 1, 415; Comte 1838, vol. 3, 561. An accusation repeated in Comte 1851, vol. 1, 499. 
18 Comte 1851, vol. 1, 537–538. 
19 Translation modified (original: “environments”). Comte 1875, vol. 1, 537; Comte 1838, vol. 3, 308. 
20 Comte 1839, vol. 4; Comte 1842, vol. 6; Comte 1852; Comte 1854, vol. 4. 
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guide.” Such a general, abstract theory of milieux is not then to be anticipated immediately; 
nevertheless, it is the ultimate objective of positive social science.21 
                                               
21 Comte 1875, vol. 2, 364–365. Translation modified. 
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Figure 4—The thirteen-month Positivist Calendar; Comte, 1849 
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Much like Lamarck vis-à-vis the organism, “many irrational conceptions, especially in modern 
times” had overstated the dominance of the material milieu vis-à-vis human agency. However, 
such conceptions are developmentally diminished as “civilisation permits man to further modify 
the world [monde].” Although seeming, at first, to “dominate [maîtriser] us absolutely,” the empire 
of the world never infringes upon “the natural independence of the laws of sociology,” which 
merely vary in intensity. The “influence of the milieu on man” is therefore gradually decreasing 
from its prehistoric height.22 So it was that during the first age, “the age of fetishism,” humans 
were divided, as per the incorrigible triaphilia of Comte’s disavowed Catholicism, into three 
distinct races. The “black” race remained at the fetishistic stage, the “yellow” advanced to 
polytheism, and the “white” to monotheism. The non-whites of the world were, therefore, 
teleological stragglers. However, all were on the same path of civilisation, being gradually 
emancipated from merely local conditions.23 In this respect, Comte not only endorsed the 
mission civilisatrice but wrote it the into the very fabric of existence.24 
The mission of Positivism did not stop at diagnosis. It was to actively produce the “Ordre 
et Progrès” that its dictums dictated. The “Religion of Humanity” that Comte envisaged was not 
in the least unprecedented. However, the église positiviste was perhaps uniquely successful among 
secular theologies. Popularised in the Catéchisme (1851), and detailed in the final volume of the 
Système (1854), its founding principles were order, progress, and altruism (another Comtean 
coinage). However, to be effective, it also had to be, as had Comte’s personal regimen, 
ritualistically practical. To this end, Comte expounded what he called Le Grand-Être—The Great 
Being: 
“the whole constituted by the beings, past, future, and present, which co-operate 
willingly in perfecting the order of the world.” 
Though all “gregarious” animals cooperate, “it is only the paramount race on each planet that 
can attain unity as a race.” Thus, the Great Being was, in the fullest sense, Humanity—fated to 
inherit the Earth, not by dint of any deity but by the lawful unfolding of biological and social 
evolution. The human race would be its own god. Thus, all lower demarcations of peoples or 
nations were no more than “parts,” with “no real foundation in nature.” Indeed, international 
interaction had lately become so intense that “no one [nation] is really separable from the 
others.”25 Accordingly, the mission of positive religion was to realise “the ultimate regeneration 
of Humanity” as a self-deifying totality. 
                                               
22 Comte 1876, vol. 3, 168–169; Comte 1853, vol. 3, 202–203. Translation modified. 
23 Pickering 1993, vol. 3, 237–8. 
24 Though Comte’s works were also appropriated to anti-imperialist ends: Claeys 2010; Pickering 2018. 
25 Comte 1877, vol. 4, 27–28. 
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However, for this higher unity not simply to be imposed, it had to accommodate the 
particular features of all stages, extending a hand to the “priestly castes” of China and India, 
“offering to the Orient an acceptable union with the Occident,” in the munificent name of 
Humanity.26 Thus, although Comte espoused the crude racial conventions of Gall’s skull-
science—blacks having greater propensity for emotion, yellows for activity and whites, of 
course, for intelligence—a true, salvific synthesis must make the hierarchy a trinity. 
Fetishism, with its love and reverence of all things, was of particular benefit to art and 
religion, avoiding the cold abstractions of theology (now linked to the second stage rather than 
the first). Being limited “by its nature to the external world,” fetishism thus instituted “fatalism” 
as “the foundation of man’s true wisdom,” aiding positivism in “giving cohesion to 
submission.”27 Science was, of course, the paramount fruit of the positive; however, being “more 
sympathetic” and “more synthetic,” art’s fictions exceeded science in satisfying “the deeper 
wants of our nature.”28 The poetry of the second, metaphysical era had indeed empowered “the 
general growth of abstraction,” thus including the subjective “world of man,” as well as external 
beings. However, this “metaphysical tendency” was “in essential antagonism with art” in taking 
“events independently of beings.” It was, therefore, only in absorbing the “infancy” of fetishism 
that “art in its maturity re-possesses the external world,” allowing for animation, imagination, 
and worship. 
However, the new “subjective milieus” of positive religion also required the flights of 
abstract fancy germane to the second stage. Indeed, from metaphysical mathematics was taken, 
and perfected, the very notion of space itself. In the genius of human childhood, a “universal 
fluid” was imagined so as to conceive of extension and motion independent of actual bodies. 
Without such a “milieu,” geometrical and mechanical cogitation would be left with “signs 
without images.” However, this “primeval institution” had become too dominant in the 
“occidental mind,” precluding its necessary extension to other phenomena. 
“It follows that we must deliberately create for the phenomena of physics, chemistry, 
nay even of biology, the equivalent of the milieu which space offers us without effort in 
the domain of mathematics. In this way, and in this way only, can art in its maturity 
adequately idealise the world without, by giving life to these milieus of man’s creation, 
just as in his infancy he attributed life to all the objects of nature.” 
In other words, the milieu of space presented an inspiration and a task: to create for science the 
abstract images adequate to their positively (i.e. lawful, useful, sensorially-accessible, non-
speculatively) known objects. For its part, the positive philosophy of art would then take its place 
                                               
26 Ibid., vol. 4, 11. 
27 Ibid., vol. 4, 39. 
28 Ibid., vol. 4, 45–46. 
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alongside that of science, organising a “twofold empire” encompassing “the world and man.”29 
Moreover, by the institution of such “subjective milieus,” in combination with principles of 
numerology and sundry catechisms, images will be “brought into habitual combination with 
signs, so as to allow a permanent influence to the emotions,”30 thereby enacting the religion of 
humanity in its immersive experiential entirety. 
As objective, scientific propositions, Comte was frequently scornful of the ethereal, 
electrical, and phlogistic fluids that pre-positive naturalists had insinuated into the universe.31 
However, there was no apparent contradiction in affirming their subjective necessity. Such ideas 
were vaguely and sporadically developed in the Système; however, in Comte’s final, unfinished, 
and largely forgotten work, the Synthèse subjective (1856),32 the “trinité positive”33 was more precisely 
specified. 
At the apex remained the Le Grand-Être, signifying humanity. However, the “monde 
extérieur” of fetishism was now Le Grand-Fétiche, signifying the earth. Meanwhile, the fluid of 
metaphysical immaturity was now Le Grand-Milieu, signifying space. As before, each aspect of 
the secular divine corresponded to its particular historical stage, cognitive faculty, and 
characteristic race.  
Each now also corresponded to a particular form of orderly subordination: analysis to 
synthesis, progress to order, and selfishness to altruism. These were the theoretical, practical, 
and moral “modes” of the problem that the subjective synthesis was to resolve by its requisite 
objects of worship.  
 
 Stage Faculty Race Problem Subordination 
Le Grand-Être 
Positive/ 
normal 
Intelligence White Theoretical 
Analysis to synthesis/the spirit of 
the detail to the genius of the whole 
Le Grand-Milieu 
Metaphysical/ 
theological 
Activity Yellow Practical 
Progress to order/perfection to 
conservation 
Le Grand-Fétiche 
Primeval/ 
infancy 
Feeling Black Moral Selfishness to altruism 
 
Since 1844, Comte had taken to signing his works and letters “The Founder of Universal 
Religion, Great Priest of Humanity.” With the Synthèse in hand, his “universal priesthood 
[sacerdoce universel]” would guide befuddled Occidentals into a historically deducible future, 
                                               
29 Ibid., vol. 4, 48. 
30 Ibid., vol. 4, 153. 
31 Comte 1853, vol. 1, 301; Comte 1875, vol. 1, 446. 
32 Comte 1856. Subtitled: ou Système universel des conceptions propres à l’état normal de l’humanité. This, envisaged as the 
first of four volumes, covered issues of the mind, while later (never written) works would address morality, and 
practical activities: Schmaus, Pickering, and Bourdeau 2018, 17. 
33 Comte 1856, 34. 
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putting an end to the revolution “more intellectual than social” that had again raised its head 
in 1848 and, much to Comte’s satisfaction, been returned to stasis by the coup of Napoleon III 
three years later.34 The ultimate human problem was in the end, then, that of “affective 
harmony,”35 writ-mondial. However, although towards the end of his life Comte had started to 
write poetry,36 this was not the role of the Synthèse.37 Rather, his task was to “conceive the nature 
of it and to foresee the event.”38 
First came the Grand-Fétiche. However, “primitive subjectivity” erred in imposing human 
characteristics upon everything, thus lacking understanding of living beings, “which cannot 
subsist except in a milieu more fixed than themselves.”39 Nevertheless, the “affective and 
speculative advantages” of fetishism could be retained, endowing external bodies with “the 
faculty of feeling and acting” but depriving them of “thought,” ensuring that “their wills are 
always blind.”40 
“Dispelling theological prejudices, which represented matter as essentially inert, science 
tended to restore to it the activity that fetishism had consecrated spontaneously. 
However, restitution became complete only when positivism systematically discarded 
the metaphysical fluids, which, under the modern anarchy, concealed the true existence 
of bodies.” 
Positivism thus reconciles the over-animation of fetishism and the de-animation of theology by 
having (white) intelligence mediate (black) feeling and (yellow) activity. Thus, having placed 
fictional or subjective milieus in the place of metaphysical fluids, all manner of sympathy-
swaddling speculations are availed. It cannot be proved, for instance, that a body “does not feel 
the impressions that it undergoes and does not want the actions that it exercises.” It is only 
“deprived of the faculty to modify its conduct according to its situation,” this being the aptitude 
of intelligence.41 
 However, while “the least molecules” were thus limited to feeling, far back in time, the 
earth itself could have possessed higher faculties, before it wilfully reduced them to make way 
for man. 
“Yet it is permissible to suppose that our planet, and the other habitable stars, were 
endowed with intelligence before social development became possible. Thereupon, the 
                                               
34 Ibid., 3. 
35 Ibid., 1–2. 
36 Pickering 1993, vol. 3, 475. 
37 Though poems by Clotilde de Vaux were appended to Comte 1875, vol. 1, 612–613. English translation: de 
Vaux 1895, 39–40. See also: Pickering 2009, vol. 2, 190.  
38 Comte 1856, 4. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 8. 
41 Ibid., 9. 
 
  116 
earth devoted its forces to prepare the stay of Humanity, whose growth could only be 
accomplished in a seat [siège] of exhaustion […].” 
Absent this agentic diminution, “thought would provoke, in the surrounding bodies [corps 
ambiants]” a continual “agitation” of the “milieu” that collective existence could not endure. 
Being obliged to obey the “laws of planetary life,” when possessed of intelligence, the Earth 
could have altered its “physico-chemical” activity and moderated the eccentricity of its orbit via 
“a long series of explosions similar to those from which comets originate.” So cast-iron is the 
“spiritual ascendancy” of the Grand-Être, such planetary preparatories are the stuff of 
“immutable fatality,” though humans themselves lack such a magnitude of “material power.”42 
By instilling gratitude for “the immutable order on which rests his whole existence,” 
man is “regenerated.” However, this “adoration of the Earth [la Terre]” is insufficient. Under 
fetishism, the “dominion [empire]” of fatality was found in the stars, a form of worship 
extinguished by theology, which deanimated matter, “concealing [dissimula] the moral order 
under the caprices of the gods.” This regime had the merit of compelling its adherents to 
“cherish subjugation.” However, it was also necessary to reinstitute a “general milieu,” such as 
has been imagined by “abstract genius” from time immemorial. Reduced to its geometrical and 
mechanical sense, the milieu “conserves the imprints” of imagination, permitting the 
conception of “densities, flavours, temperatures, odours, colours, sounds and all other material 
attributes” independently of concrete bodies, as well as abstract physical laws. This milieu must 
therefore preserve the passive characteristics necessary to “secular science.” However, it must 
also become an object of worship.  
More than any other, it was Chinese civilisation that had inaugurated adoration “of the 
Earth and the Sky [Ciel].”43 Comte offers no ethnological details. However, both this artefact of 
Oriental fetishism and the universal Ether of the Occidental savants “spontaneously prepared” 
the necessary “systematisation of Space.” While an “aquatic species” capable of abstract 
conception would surely worship a liquid milieu, due to our “aerial existence,” the “constitution 
of the Grand-Milieu becomes necessarily gaseous.” However, while the synthesis must also 
include both the ocean, and “the stars [les astres]” that are “really related to the human planet 
as objective or subjective annexes,” Comte is clear that the fixed stars must be subjectively 
excluded. 
“[T]he Grand-Milieu must not go beyond the presence of the Grand-Fétiche, as the seat 
and base of the Grand-Être. The limits of our World [Monde] are also those of our 
Space.”44 
                                               
42 Ibid., 9–11. 
43 Ibid., 23. 
44 Ibid., 261–262. 
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Thus, the Grand-Milieu subjectively reverses the so-called Copernican revolution. Recentring the 
Earth, from the infinite universe to the closed world,45 Comte affirms that the “absolute 
tendencies,” which the very purpose of positivism was to overcome, could only flourish in an 
open, unbounded cosmos. 
~~~~~~ 
Evidently, therefore, in Comte’s conceptual lexicon, milieu retained its historical multivalence, 
connoting space, aethereality, fluidity, and transcendence, while at the same time being 
fashioned into more precisely specified technical tools—first with biology, then sociology, later 
with regard to fictive religiosity. The full historical significance of milieu, scientific and fictive, 
was crucial. This mode of expression offered not only the functional, positive abstraction from 
all specificity (“the total ensemble”) but yet it still permitted the effect of philosophic profundity.  
The lines between subjective and objective were occasionally admitted to be blurry, 
particularly with regard to those institutions “moral and mental”46; however, this divide was to 
be uncompromisingly policed. For example, the understanding of vital functions must not, by 
any means, have resort to “the phantoms emanating from the subjective milieu.”47 Subjective 
beings were unequivocally and unambiguously not to be taken as real—or, rather, their mode 
of existence was exclusively “subjective.” However, they must nevertheless invoke worship 
since, ultimately, they were all constellations circulating the most existentially significant being 
of all, Humanity. Logical circularity was, therefore, stabilised by the hierarchical structure of 
the trinity. The Great Being, moreover, “consecrates” the very existence of the Earth and, 
hence, any conceivable consideration of its future.48 Comte does not spell out the corollary to 
this, indeed his talk of harmony between occident and orient obfuscates it; however, it is 
apparent that human supremacy is also white supremacy. Indeed, on a wilfully self-deanimated 
earth, it seems that the white race becomes the thinking head of the universe. 
5.2: From romance to experiment: Balzac, Taine, Bernard, and Zola 
Eccentric as such High-Priestery may now seem, Comte’s insistence that “the domain of fiction 
become as systematic as that of demonstration” was not altogether unusual.49 Indeed, it is in 
realist and naturalist literature in France through the nineteenth century that we can find milieu 
being appropriated and adopted beyond, beside, and in imitation of the scientific. 
~~~~~~ 
                                               
45 Cf. Koyré 1957. 
46 Comte 1856, 20. 
47 Ibid., 22. 
48 Ibid., 12. 
49 Ibid. 
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By the time that Honoré de Balzac (1799–1850) signed off the Avant-propos to his la Comédie 
Humaine—“Paris, juillet 1842”—this ambitious, and never-completed, literary project was 
already well underway. Indeed, between 1829 and this particular July, Balzac had published 
the majority of the texts that his life’s work would generate. Every bit the romanticist and 
romancier, Balzac’s works revelled in inscrutable vital forces and occult wellsprings of will. 
Moreover, his preferred medium was the novel—le roman. 
 The idea for The Human Comedy, Balzac wrote, originated in “a comparison between 
Humanity and Animality.”50 The “great quarrel” roiling between Cuvier and Geoffroy Saint-
Hilaire a decade before was not, he continued, anything unprecedented. The idea of “the unity 
of composition” was already at work in the most magisterial minds of the preceding two 
centuries—mystics such as Emanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772) and Louis Claude de Saint-
Martin (1743–1803) no less than natural historians such as Leibniz, Buffon, and Charles Bonnet 
(1720–1793). 
“There is only one animal. The creator has used but one and the same pattern for every 
organised being. The animal is a principal that takes its external form, or, to be more 
accurate, the differences of its form, from the milieus in which it is called to develop. 
Zoological Species result from these differences.51 
The triumph of this system was the “eternal honour” of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, and endorsed 
by the late writings of Goethe. Having well-understood the finer points of this system since long 
before such debates: 
“I saw that, in this respect, Society resembled Nature. For does not Society make man, 
in accordance with the milieus in which his action unfolds, as many different men 
as there are varieties in zoology?” 
Although the differences between a wolf, lion, donkey, crow, shark, seal, or sheep might be 
more easily defined than those between a soldier, workman, lawyer, layabout, scientist, 
statesman, merchant, sailor, poet, beggar, or priest, these latter sort are no less profound.52 
Balzac’s task was, therefore, to do for the organisms and milieus of la Société what Buffon had 
done for those of la Nature. 
 However, in contrast to those “dry and repellent nomenclatures of facts” conventionally 
nominated as “histories,” the Comedy was to construct what all such exercises had hitherto 
neglected: a “history of morals [mœurs],” inspired particularly by the historical novels of Walter 
Scott (1771–1832). However, although Scott conceived his characters “in the entrails of their 
age [siècle],” finding the very “human heart” moving within their “envelope,” he had never 
                                               
50 See also Balzac’s short story Guide-âne à l’usage des animaux qui veulent parvenir aux honneurs, which satirically addressed 
the Cuvier-Geoffroy debate. Balzac 1842; English translation: Balzac 1877; see: Tresch 2012, 232–233. 
51 Balzac 1865, vol. 1, 2. My translation; however, English also available: Balzac 1901, liii–lxix. 
52 Balzac 1865, vol. 1, 2–3. 
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connected his compositions in such a way as to constitute “a complete history.” It was this “lack 
of connection [défaut de liaison]” that Balzac backed himself to overcome. “French Society would 
be the historian; I would be nothing but the secretary.”53 Requiring the portrayal of “two or 
three thousand significant types [figures saillantes]” in each “epoch,” the task was considerable, 
to say the least.54 
Foremost among Balzac’s philosophical fictions in terms of doctrinal deliberation is the 
quasi-autobiographical Louis Lambert (1832). The titular Louis, a preternatural boy-genius, is 
plucked from impoverished obscurity by the historical Madame de Stäel (1766–1817) and 
placed with principled, if rather injudicious, charity in a grimly suffocating boarding school (the 
College de Vendôme, where Balzac himself studied from age 8). There, he strikes a pitifully 
intimate friendship with the tale’s narrator (known only as “the Poet” but apparently also 
channelling Balzac). The narrative largely scaffolds the philosophical exposition, which is 
initially unfolded as the juvenile protagonists conspire to write a secret book, subsequently 
unjustly confiscated: a “Treatise on the Will.”  
“The word WILL [VOLONTÉ] served to name the milieu in which thought enacts its 
evolutions; or, in a less abstract expression, the mass of power [force] by which man can 
reproduce, outside of himself, the actions composing his external life. […] The word 
THOUGHT, which for him was the quintessential product of the Will, also designated 
the milieu in which originate the IDEAS to which thought gives substance.”55 
The milieu qua volonté was thus integral to this vitalistic idealism. Moreover, the significance of 
this term (italicised in the original) was explicitly noted: 
“The expression milieu was suggested to him by an observation made during his 
childhood; of which he certainly did not suspect the importance, but the peculiarity [la 
bizarrerie] of which must have struck his delicately impressionable imagination.”56 
The observation in question involved a six-year-old Louis watching electric sparks fly from his 
mother’s hair as she combed it. Such insights are favourably compared to Bichat, and Gall, as 
well as the prescient electrical intuitions of Mesmer, and the one true gospel of Swedenborg. 
However, it was not just in the lavishings of propositional metaphysics that the milieu 
made its mark on Balzac’s prose. Another of Balzac’s philosophical studies, La Recherche d’absolu 
(published in 1834, four years before Comte’s “l’ensemble total”), begins: “There is in Douai, in 
the Rue de Paris, a house”—an old Flemish building, typical of the quaint, patriarchal manners 
of the Low Countries. However, before proceeding, Balzac issues a protest against “ignorant 
                                               
53 Ibid., vol. 1, 5–6. 
54 Ibid., vol. 1, 14. 
55 Balzac 1865, vol. 36, 46. Original emphasis. 
56 Ibid., vol. 36, 47. 
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and impatient [voraces]” readers who crave feeling but desire “the flower without the seed.” 
Accordingly, he prefaces his story with a didactic plea on behalf of realism. 
“The events of human life, whether public or private, are so intimately tied to 
architecture that most observers can reconstruct nations or individuals in all the truth 
of their habits, from the remains of their public monuments or by examining their 
domestic relics. Archaeology is to social nature what comparative anatomy is to 
organised nature. A mosaic reveals an entire society, as an ichthyosaur skeleton implies 
an entire creation.” 
Duly, Balzac’s prose rigorously presents the building, its furnishings, art, region, climate, 
economy, and the national personality within which his protagonists unfold their events.57 
Within these walls reside the family Claës; principal protagonist, head of the household 
Balthazar. A student of the late Lavoisier, and of independent wealth, he becomes obsessed—
indeed, it is stated repeatedly, “possessed”—by the quest to discover the underlying principle of 
all things: the Absolute.58 Amassing the finest laboratory, he sets about endless experiments, to 
the eventual ruination of his family and his mind. The perpetually horizon-brimming “unknown 
X” is sought for in the decomposition of elements, electrified and magnetised every which way.59 
The language of the laboratory suffuses the narrative. Metals must be evaporated under 
“immense heat in a milieu were the atmospheric pressure is zero.”60 The reverie of blind 
ambition is all-consuming. 
“My soul has no consciousness of these acts, remaining fixed, immersed in an idea, 
numbed by this idea, the search for the Absolute, of this principle by which seeds, 
absolutely similar, put in the same milieu, give one [flower] with white chalices, the 
other with yellow!”61 
Narrating a period from around 1810–1832, events pass Balthazar by. Sunken in the milieus of 
physical phantasmagoria, his own will, and hence self, recedes into abeyance. An eventual 
respite from his mania only presages the tragic finale. 
Evidently, then, Balzac’s realism involved both the will to describe everything and the 
concept of milieu. However, there was not yet a meeting of the two, after the fashion of Comte. 
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In 1865, Hippolyte Adolphe Taine (1828–1893) wrote of Balzac that he “grasped the 
truth because he grasped the whole [les ensembles].”62 To understand a human person, one 
must grasp every aspect of his existence. Such was Balzac’s genius. However, his was an 
inconstant realism. “When Balzac put down his microscope, he became a Swedenborgian,”63 
displacing the straight lines of cosmic enlightenment for fancy, phantasm, and filigree. Taine 
                                               
62 Taine 1865, 89. Partial English translation: Taine [1906] 2010. On Taine and Comte: Pickering 2018, 256. 
63 Taine 1865, 166. 
Figure 5—Balthazar carries his grief-stricken wife; by Adrien Moreau (1843–1906) 
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would be a rather more solid, indeed stoical, realist—and, under his pen, milieu would be 
disambiguated. 
Though the author of numerous works, widely translated, it was in Histoire de la Littérature 
Anglaise, first published 1863, that he made his programmatic statements regarding literary 
interpretation. “History,” he began “within a hundred years in Germany and sixty years in 
France, has been transformed”: 
“It has been discovered that a literary work is not a mere play of the imagination, the 
isolated caprice of an eager head but rather a copy of the surrounding manners [mœurs 
environnantes] and the sign of a state of mind [état d’esprit].”64 
The tremendous multiplicity of individuals was, therefore, to be explained by the profound 
multiplicity of their location in space and time. And this epochal realisation demanded a more 
rigorous conceptual apparatus. This, Taine identified as “the three primordial forces”: “race, 
milieu, and moment.” 
The forces of race—“those innate and hereditary dispositions” generally corresponding 
to temperament and bodily structure—are profound; however, milieu is no less so: 
“For man is not alone in the world; nature envelops him [la nature l’enveloppe], and other 
men surround him [l’entourent]; on the primitive and permanent fold are added 
accidental and secondary folds, and the physical or social circumstances disturb or 
complete the naturalness which is delivered to them.”65 
Every animal “must adapt to its milieu.” Its air, food, temperature—each climate and situation 
engender varying needs and hence different systems of needs, actions, habits, aptitudes, and 
instincts. “Man,” needing “to be in equilibrium with circumstances,” adopts a temperament 
and character fitted to them—tendencies imparted, in turn, by heredity. Thus, “at every 
moment one can consider the character of a people to be the summary [résumé] of all their 
preceding actions and sensations.” The past is thus “a burden [un poids]” carried from 
generation to generation, relievable only by the acquisition of yet other actions, habits, and 
sensations.66  
Also in 1866, Émile Zola (1840–1902) wrote that that Taine’s theoretical triptych was 
scarcely needing of an introduction, since “there is no one at this time who does not know it 
and has not discussed it with themselves at least.” However, Zola was at once enthusiastic for 
Taine’s manly, muscular literary science and critical of its excesses. In particular, Taine had 
failed to account for the irreducibility of the individual: 
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“as soon as one introduces the personality, the free and unbounded human impulse 
[l’élan humain libre et déréglé], all the springs cry out [crient] and the mechanism breaks 
down.”67  
As an original artist in his own right, Taine must surely understand that an artist’s works are 
like their children—“they are the cry of a heart and a body,” a cry for love and life.68 Thus, 
Taine was indeed a man of his own moment—“the contemporary of the electric telegraph and 
the railways.” In such an epoch, one can hardly feign surprise that we become “only cogs 
obeying impulses from the outside [du dehors].”69 Or, as Taine’s translator Lorenzo O’Rourke 
put it, appreciatively, in 1906: “His scenery is not nature; it is a herbarium lit by electricity.”70 
 Such equivocations aside, Zola was nevertheless a committed mechanic of the milieu. 
In Naturalisme au théâtre (1881),71 he placed milieu at the heart of modern dramaturgy. In the era 
of Shakespeare, stage decoration had been, by and large, a shabby afterthought. At best, painted 
canvases; at worst, mere pretence. Such “carelessness [insouciance]” for the “unity of place [l’unité 
de lieu]” was the result of “the ambient nature, the milieus” being disregarded in their “influence 
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Figure 6—Still from Germinal (1913), adapted from eponymous novel by Zola (1885) 
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on the action and characters.” Thus, in that epoch, there had been only “man,” abstract and 
airless, about whose passions and ratiocinations playwrights would scrawl endlessly—“nature 
counted little.” In modern times, however, a slow but steady transformation had taken place, 
“giving, every day, greater importance to the influence of milieus.”72 What were “abstract 
characters [personnages]” were thus superseded by “individualities,” that acted and existed 
“under the dominion of surrounding influences [sous l’empire des influences environnantes].”73  
This was, indeed, the law of modern décor—a transition of “human and social 
evolution”74 entailing nothing less than a renunciation of “metaphysical man” and the 
installation of “physiological man” in his place.75 Thus, Taine remained the model of the 
critic,76 and Balzac that of the novelist. Where lesser writers sketched “marionettes,” the latter 
rendered beings “in flesh and bone.”77 In Les romanciers naturalistes (1893), Zola crowned him 
“genius of the century” —the very first to have discerned and asserted “the decisive action of 
the milieu over the character [personnage].”78 However, this was Balzac thoroughly rinsed of his 
para-Newtonian fluidities. In his own literary saga, Les Rougon-Macquart, Zola continued Balzac’s 
project of writing the truth of society in novel-form (for the period 1852–1870). However, his 
primary scientific inspiration had come from elsewhere—in particular, from the pioneer of 
vivisection Claude Bernard (1813–1878), who had made a science of what had previously been 
thought an art: medicine.79 Zola was to do the same for the novel.80 
Contrary to received prejudice, the “spontaneity” of living things did not, in fact, 
preclude their being made objects of experimentation. The difference was simply, as Zola 
explained, that “lower [brut] bodies” possess merely “le milieu extérieur,” whereas the “higher 
[supérieurs] organisms” are bathed in “un milieu intérieur”—a milieu interior and “perfected,” with 
consistent physicochemical properties. In other words, the more complex living beings possess 
a sanguineous, humoral, endocrinal interior that grants them powers of equilibrium and 
autonomy deprived of beings without.81 This, the milieu intérieur, was Bernard’s outstanding 
conceptual achievement and the basis of the experimental science of living beings. While “inert 
bodies [corps inerte]” are, Bernard wrote, “subordinated” and “shackled [enchaîné]” to all their 
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“cosmic conditions”—i.e. their milieu extérieur—the living body retains an independence, 
“animated by an interior force” that governs its actions and resists “the variations and 
perturbations of the ambient physico-chemistry [physico-chimiques ambiantes].” It was this 
regulatory power that led vitalists to attribute to living bodies “a vital force” pitched in “ceaseless 
battle [lutte incessante]” with the “physico-chemical forces” that would destroy them.82 
Accordingly, argued Zola, had not the likes of Balzac already practiced precisely this 
process of manipulation and manifestation? The novelist qua observer-experimenter first sets 
the “solid ground [terrain]” under their characters feet, and then “institutes the experiment 
[l’expérience],” moving persons about within “a particular history,” in order to demonstrate the 
“determinism”—in Bernard’s terms, that cause which “determines the appearance of 
phenomena”—of their configuration. That is, the novelist also made manifest certain 
phenomena under particular conditions. Thus, for example, Balzac subjects the Baron Hulot83 
to a “series of tests [épreuves],” passing through “certain milieus,” and demonstrating “the 
functioning of the mechanism of his passions.” Thus, the novelist is not a “photographer” but 
rather “intervenes” so as to place his character in conditions of which he is “master.” 
“The problem is to know [savoir] what passion, acting in such a milieu and under such 
circumstances, would produce from the perspective of such an individual and society; 
and an experimental novel […] is simply the report [procès-verbal] of the experiment, 
which the novelist repeats before the eyes of the public.”84 
This “decisive conquest”85 of the experimental over the philosophical was an “inevitable [fatale] 
consequence of the scientific evolution of the century.”86 
A fuller development of these ideas, Zola conceded, would require consideration of the 
ideas of Darwin, such as heredity—a concept particularly crucial to Les Rougon-Macquart. 
However, whereas Bernard had emphasised the “intra-organic milieu,” Zola affirmed that “the 
social milieu is also of paramount importance.” While the mechanism of thought and passion 
would, no doubt, one day be explained by physiology, no action of organs within the “interior 
milieu” ever occurs “in a vacuum” but always “in a society, in a social milieu,” in reciprocal 
relation. This, then, is the agenda of the experimental novel: to demonstrate, under the 
influence of heredity and milieu, the mechanisms of manifestation so as to arrive at scientific 
mastery of the problem of social behaviour, thus enacting a “practical sociology” that would 
solve, in the long run, “all the problems of socialism.”87 
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5.3: The phantom milieu: Science against metaphysics 
There was little that Auguste Comte was most sure of than his own greatness. However, he was 
realistic enough to realise that the truly positive epoch would not arrive in the lifetime of his 
feeble, failing body. Thus, his Synthèse of 1856, he informed his readers, had been written as 
though it were the year 1927—the seventy-third year of the “normal state.”88 Though Comte’s 
religion enjoyed certain successes, particularly in Brazil where the national flag bears the maxim 
“Ordem e Progresso,”89 his epoch, it is fair to say, never arrived.  
In 1864, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), otherwise one of Comte’s principle Anglophone 
supporters, was vituperative about the erstwhile rationalist’s descent into bizarrerie: 
“This stuff, though he calls it fiction, he soon after speaks of as belief (croyance), to be 
greatly recommended, as at once satisfying our natural curiosity, and ‘perfecting our 
unity’ (again unity!) […].”90 
Such “wretched” speculations, “palpable absurdities” and “pitiable niaiseries [foolishnesses]”91 
were scarcely to be repeated. Others were more kind about these late-life philosophies. From a 
sojourn in Biarritz in 1867, Mary Anne (or Marian) Evans (1819–1880), better known as George 
Eliot, wrote to Maria Congreve (wife of Comte’s translator, Richard) that, after reading “the 
‘Politique’” with George Lewes (1817–1878), she was kept “in a state of enthusiasm through the 
day—a moral glow, which is a sort of milieu subjectif for the sublime sea and sky.”92 
This was almost the last that anyone heard of Comte’s aesthetic-theologic milieus, 
although his chosen executor, Pierre Lafitte (1823–1903), continued to promote the full 
Comtean teaching, against the famed lexicographer Émile Littré (1801–1881) who, like Mill, 
rejected the later excrescences.  
However, in the same year as Mill’s rebuttal, Sara Sophia Hennell (1812–1899)—
translator, author, erstwhile associate of Evans, and the other London positivists93—published 
the first volume of her Present Religion: as a Faith owning Fellowship with Thought.94 At this time, she 
simply noted that although the conception of Humanity advocated by “the disciples of Comte” 
was “indeed the necessary first stage of the view here aimed at,” it was not adequate. However, 
in subsequent texts,95 Hennell engaged with Comte rather further.  
                                               
88 Comte 1856, viii–iv. 
89 Pickering 2018. 
90 Mill 1865b, 18; reprinted in Mill 1865a, 192. 
91 Mill 1865a, 193, 200, 195. 
92 Eliot 1885, vol. 3, 3. 
93 Hardy 2006. 
94 Hennell 1865, vol. 1. 
95 Published separately in 1869, 1871, and 1873, and collected together as the second volume of Present Religion in 
1873. 
 
  127 
As per the High Priest, Hennell sought to demonstrate the necessity of religion to a 
healthy mental life.96 However, she disagreed altogether with his disavowal of Christianity, his 
subordination of religion to science, his subservience of the subjective individual relative to 
society, and the impatiently irreligious way in which he went about crafting his secular faith. 
Moreover, and substantively, she criticised his style. “Positivism,” Hennell concluded near the 
end of her (lengthy) tome, “has no sense of atmosphere.” Any “truth of ex-pression,” she 
continued, as regards her “im-pression about Religion,” requires a style that is “as if a word-
painting of it: expressly, as of the landscape-sort.”97 That is: 
“The problem, in religious exposition, is precisely to paint air—to paint that which in 
fact cannot be painted—to describe that which from the very simplicity and 
unvaryingness that constitute its peculiarity, is undescribable!”98 
However, neither amendments to his airless style, nor ameliorating his will to “subordinate”99 
religion to science, would be sufficient to satisfy Comte’s attempts at religiosity. Rather, his very 
attempt to “over-master religion” in “the direct mode” typical of science is sufficient “to nullify 
the whole character of religion.” Likewise, by placing himself at the head of his religion, he had 
plainly contradicted his very effort.100 “I do not believe,” Hennell added “that Christ spoke of 
himself as the ‘light of the world.’” Rather, he had “a concrete purpose”—“world-
restitution.”101  
Positivism was thus, for Hennell, to be supplanted by a philosophy—and Religion—of 
“Developmentalism,” derived methodologically, if not substantively, from the work of Herbert 
Spencer.102 Duly, she wrote of “environments” rather than milieus. Nevertheless, her exposition 
evidently derived, even as it deviated from, the Comtean religion, as received via his London-
based “disciples.” By the 1870s, it was the “environment” of Spencer, closely acquainted with 
this circle, that was becoming the preferred technical expression. However, Eliot concluded her 
Middlemarch (first serialised 1871–1872) by remarking: 
“For there is no creature whose inward being is so strong that it is not greatly 
determined by what lies outside it. A new Theresa will hardly have the opportunity of 
reforming a conventual life, any more than a new Antigone will spend her heroic piety 
in daring all for the sake of a brother’s burial: the medium in which their ardent deeds 
took shape is forever gone.”103 
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Indeed, Comte’s formative-sociological milieus would prove rather more enduring—but would 
remain contested. 
~~~~~~ 
On 7th June 1848, the Société de Biologie held its inaugural meeting. As its vice chairmen served 
Claude Bernard, and the anatomist Charles-Philippe Robin (1821–1885).104 The latter, an 
acknowledged Comtean, read a paper defining the society’s remit and objectives in terms of the 
investigation of milieus.105 His proposed name for this fundamental science: mésologie.106 A 
decade later, the statistician and medical anthropologist Louis-Adolphe Bertillon (1821–1883) 
went on to popularise the concept, writing in 1860 that, a living body “must be placed in a 
milieu in harmony with its constitution.” 
“Knowledge of the conditions of this milieu, and of the reciprocal influences that each 
of the two terms exert on one another, constitutes a third point of view [in addition to 
anatomy and physiology], a third abstraction with respect to which the various species 
of the series of beings: this is the science of milieus or mesology.”107 
In 1872, Bertillon remarked that it was Hippocrates who had perhaps produced the first 
mesological treatise, while Blainville, Comte, and Robin revived the tradition.108 However, 
despite being accorded a certain amount of early institutional prestige, it was Ökologie, coined by 
Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919) in 1866, that came to designate this science, in French and other 
European languages, from around 1900 onwards. 
Nevertheless, the presiding semantic institutions around this time recorded milieu’s 
increased authority. The seventh edition of Le Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (1878) featured a 
change for milieu for the first time since 1762: “Fig. Milieu, The society where we live. The 
individual is always greatly affected by the milieu in which he lives.” Thus, the “social milieu” was 
understood as a figurative rendering of the word.109 The eighth edition (1932–1935), in turn, 
considerably amended and expanded previous versions. The physical version was then: “said 
of a Substance in which a body is placed, or which is traversed by a body or radiation.” This 
therefore removed the outdated reference to “les corps Diaphanes,” and added a radiological 
dimension. It also modified the version added in 1762, replacing “The fluid that surrounds…” 
with “The element proper to the life of a being….” Moreover, and most crucially, there was 
now an explicitly biological milieu: “In biological terms, it is said of the Set [l’Ensemble] of 
                                               
104 The latter also served as secretary. 
105 Robin 1849; Rey 1998, 207–208. 
106 Canguilhem 1994, 252. 
107 Bertillon 1860, 124–125. 
108 Bertillon 1872; Staum 2011, 58; Jennings 2006, 27–28. 
109 Académie française 1878, vol. 2. 
 
  129 
conditions in which animals and plants live.”110 Though perhaps not yet evidencing “a category 
of contemporary thought,”111 milieu thus remained of increasing, and increasingly specified, 
significance. 
 Changes in meaning were, however, not always welcomed. In the British Medical Journal 
in 1923, a reader (given only as “C.A.”) responded to the biologist, socialist, and popular science 
writer J.B.S. Haldane (1892–1964),112 questioning his apparently obscure use of the words 
“mechanism” and “mechanistic” before asking: 
“Before I close, may I reflect upon the word ‘environment,’ as ugly and ineffectual? Dr. 
Haldane probably feels this defect as we all have felt it. In certain of his sentences, 
especially in such sentences as the ‘internal environment of a cell,’ the phrase hardly 
speaks for itself; it does not tell. Cannot some other and better word be found?”113 
In reply, Haldane somewhat conceded the point: 
“I must admit that the word ‘environment’ used by me is clumsy. The French ‘milieu,’ 
as used by Claude Bernard, is much superior; but I have had to accept what ordinary 
English usage has given me. The only alternative word seemed to be ‘medium.’ I feel 
sure that this would not satisfy ‘C.A.’ any more than it does me.”114 
Until around the 1910s Bernard’s “milieu intérieur” was rendered in English as “interior milieu”; 
only after this time did it commonly become “interior environment.” This translational change 
is striking given that the concept essentially refers to the blood and other fluids that bathe the 
organs. Therefore the sense of milieu as ‘fluid’ is effaced—a loss that still remarkable in 1923, 
although apparently without the possibility of resisting the convention. In any case, this specific 
problem would be soon assuaged, since, in 1932, Walter Bradford Cannon (1871–1945), in his 
popular book The Wisdom of the Body, transformed the concept of “milieu intérieur” into that of 
homeostasis—this would then be the proper designant of the internal stability of organisms.115 
 Thus, having first been purged of its aetheriality, milieu also lost its fluidity. However, 
such conceptions did not, of course, disappear entirely. Rather, they were reconceptualised, and 
given novel expression. 
~~~~~~ 
However, whatever the definitional authorisations and conceptual divergences to which it was 
commonly subject, milieu continued to be reclaimed and contested, through the fin de siècle. 
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In Paris in October 1894, in an address to the First International Congress of Sociology 
(published 1898),116 the criminologist and sociologist Gabriel Tarde (1843–1904) declared: 
“There is a fetish, a deus ex machina, that the new sociologists make use of, like an Open 
Sesame, every time they are embarrassed, and it is time to point out this abuse which is 
becoming truly worrying. This explanatory talisman is the milieu.” 
This expression is “the all-purpose formula whose illusory profundity conceals the emptiness of 
the idea.” All social evolution, it has been said, will be found “in the properties of the ‘internal 
social milieu.’” But in what can the “properties” of this milieu, whether “internal or external,” 
consist, if not in “notions and memories, aptitudes and habitudes,” lodged in brains, and 
assembled in society? Indeed, it is well known that “men act en masse, and not individually,” 
most obviously in the case of the “impulsive mob [foule],” or the “regiment mounting an assault,” 
but also, quite ordinarily, whenever one mind is impressed by the productions of another—“in 
all these cases, that is, at every moment of social life, the notion of the social milieu has a real 
meaning [signification].” However, it must be understood that each who is thereby “driven and 
impressioned [actionne ́s et impressionne ́s] by the social milieu” is also part of that very milieu that 
“drives and impressions their kind.” 
As for this phantom-milieu, this ghost we delight in evoking, to which we lend all sorts 
of marvellous virtues so that we may dispense with recognising the existence of the true 
and truly beneficial geniuses by whom we live, in whom we move, without whom we 
would be nothing—let us eliminate it from our science as soon as possible. The milieu 
is a nebula which, upon closer inspection, resolves into different stars, of very unequal 
sizes [inégale grandeur]. 
It is plain to see that individuals mutually influence and model themselves after one another. 
However, Tarde concludes: 
“nowhere do I see them swimming together [ensemble] in this sort of subtle and 
imaginary atmosphere, as we call it, and which, like the ether in physics but with much 
less reason, would be the factotum [i.e. underlabourer] in sociology.”117 
It was indeed necessary, Tarde had argued, to found sociology upon the existing sciences, yet 
with its own “domain.” However, evidently, milieu was not the way to do it.118 
In a footnote to the published version, Tarde further commented: “Needless to say, this 
expression, ‘the emptiness of the idea,’ does not apply to Mr. Durkheim who remains, as it 
happens, one of the most serious sociologists we know, despite his bias [parti-pris].”119 Whatever 
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courtesy this comment may have been extending, it was something of a corrective. Indeed, 
Tarde’s diagnosis of said “fetish” had directly followed a quotation from Durkheim’s Les Règles 
de la Méthode Sociologique (only published in 1895): “The determining cause of a social fact must be sought 
among antecedent social facts and not among the states of the individual consciousness.”120 That is, at issue 
was Durkheim’s claim that society was a sui generis realm fundamentally distinct from 
individual psychology. His iteration of sociology was therefore to found its “domain” upon the 
basis of the “social fact” understood as an “external constraint” capable of exerting itself “over the 
individual.”121 As he put it in the preface to the second edition of 1901: 
“Social facts differ not only in quality from psychical facts; they have a different substratum, 
they do not evolve in the same milieu, or depend on the same conditions.”122 
That is, society was a realm transcending any and every individual mind. It was, Tarde 
commented, as though “the determinative cause” of the railroad was not in the minds of “Papin, 
Watt, Stephenson,” or other such “great minds” but, rather, “in the network of roads and the 
mail-coach services that had existed before.”123 That is, when Tarde spoke of “truly beneficial 
geniuses by whom we live, in whom we move, without whom we would be nothing,” he meant it. 
It was these greatly-imitated geniuses themselves who were the true “milieu sociale.” 
In his Latin dissertation of 1892, on the subject of Montesquieu (1689–1755) as a 
founder of sociology, Durkheim had criticised the ancien Baron, though having “paved the way 
for his successors,” as having been unaware of “the notion of progress.” That is, he did not see 
that societies are in a state of continual, incremental, cumulative development and 
improvement. Thus, he could not see the “conflicting factors” that each society embodies as a 
result of its passage from one form to another.  
“Failing to see the relations of succession and kinship between societies, Montesquieu 
completely overlooks causes of this kind. He does not reckon with this vis a tergo [force 
acting behind] that drives societies forward, but considers only the surrounding 
circumstances.”124 
In particular Montesquieu had overemphasised factors of topography, numbers of citizens, etc. 
Comte, by contrast, had understood this developmental movement, though inadequately.125 
What the translator of the 1937 French edition, Franck Alengry (1865–1946), rendered 
as “circonstances environnantes,” Durkheim had called “circumfusa”126— a Latin term mostly used by 
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hygienists earlier in the century.127 The English translation of 1960 (from the French rather 
than Latin) rendered “circonstances environnantes” as “environmental factors.”128 Likewise, when 
Tarde’s address of 1894 was translated into English in 1969, its key missive now read: “This 
explanatory talisman is environment.”129 However, while the translation of Tarde may have lost 
several layers of significance, it remains salient that Durkheim did not, here, employ “milieu.” 
His longer French dissertation on the division of labour, published in 1893, made reference to 
milieus of various kinds—“social,” “professional,” “natal,” and so on—but without any 
particular technical significance.130 However, in his Règles, this concept became integral. 
It should be apparent, Durkheim noted, how far his conception of the social fact departs 
from “the ingenious system of Tarde.”131 This was the only explicit reference to his imitationist 
critic. However, it will also be clear, Durkheim later adds, “how unjust it would be to rely on 
the terms ‘exterior conditions’ and ‘milieu’ to serve as an indictment of our method, and seek 
the sources of life outside what is already alive.”132 Indeed, was it not, in fact, “the theory which 
seeks to derive society from the individual” that could be reproached for “seeking to deduce the 
internal from the external”?133 Though the text makes no reference to Claude Bernard, his 
concepts were clearly alluded to:134 
“since the distinct totality [l’ensemble déterminé] formed by the union of elements of all 
kinds which enter into the composition of a society constitutes its internal milieu, in the 
same way as the totality [l’ensemble] of anatomical elements, together with the manner 
in which they are arranged in space, constitutes the internal milieu of organisms, we 
may state: The primary origin of social processes of any importance must be sought in the constitution 
of the internal social milieu.”135 
Thus, it was upon both the differentiation of internal and external milieus, and the claim to base 
sociology on biological principles, while fundamentally transcending them, that Durkheim 
sought to repudiate Tarde’s accusation.  
 As regards Spencer’s reiteration of the Comtean definition of life as “a correspondence 
between the internal and the external milieus,” this was “only approximate” but, nevertheless, 
“in general it remains true.”136 Accordingly, the social milieu incumbent upon an individual—
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that is, the “internal” milieu of the social organism—was conceived, in consummately 
mechanical terms. For instance: 
“The pressure to which the child is subjected unremittingly is the same pressure of the 
social milieu which seeks to shape him in its own image, and in which parents and 
teachers are only the representatives and intermediaries.”137 
However, Durkheim was also both clear and incessantly insistent that the social milieu, and the 
social as such, transcended the physical or biological. Indeed, immediately following his 
statement concerning “The primary origin of social processes…” (which itself followed shortly after 
the statement quoted by Tarde: “The determining cause…”).138 Durkheim clarified that, while this 
“internal milieu” consisted of “two kinds: things and persons,” nevertheless: 
“neither material nor non-material objects produce the impulsion that determines 
social transformations, because they both lack motivating power. […] Thus the 
specifically human milieu remains as the active factor.”139 
Nor could all-important internal social forces be conflated with “the external social milieu—
that which is formed by neighbouring societies.” While such relations were undoubtedly 
“capable of exercising some influence,” this was effected “only upon the functions of attack and 
defence” and “can only make its influence felt through the mediation of the internal social 
milieu.” Thus, and reiterating positively the criticism earlier made of Montesquieu: 
“The principal causes of historical development would not therefore be found among 
the circumfusa; they would be found in the past.”140 
The past, that is, being the hereditary relation of inheritance from past social organisms—a 
relation, no matter how purified as “human” and “social,” fundamentally cut off from other 
social organisms. 
 Nothing could have been more paramount to Durkheim’s social-scientific propositions 
than this: 
“This conception of the [internal] social milieu as the determining factor in collective 
evolution is of the greatest importance. For if it is discarded, sociology is powerless to 
establish any causal relationship.” 
This foundational “power” must be precisely understood. Much like Zola’s experimental 
vivisectionist-novelist, the milieu concept entailed an analogy of the experimental laboratory. 
“Given the same milieu, each individual, according to his temperament [humeur], adapts 
himself to it in the way he pleases and which he prefers to all others.”141 
                                               
137 Durkheim 1982, 54; Durkheim 1919, 11. 
138 Durkheim 1982, 134. 
139 Ibid., 136; Durkheim 1919, 138. Translation modified. 
140 Durkheim 1982, 139; Durkheim 1919, 143. Translation modified. 
141 Durkheim 1982, 122; Durkheim 1919, 116. Translation modified. 
  134 
That is, by extricating abstract subjects from their concrete relations but nevertheless insisting 
upon their absolutely necessary subordination to social relations taken likewise abstractly, it thus 
became possible to consider such relations as causes. Moreover, Durkheim was very explicit 
about this being a crucial rule of method. When “the conditions which explain and justify the 
general character of the phenomenon have been induced and not observed directly,” he noted: 
“We know that the phenomenon relates to the nature of the social milieu without 
knowing by what, or how, it is connected [tient].”142 
Thus, the milieu is the principle of abstraction whereby specific causal relations are not necessary 
in order to assert general causal relations. 
Tarde, for his part, retained his more or less eccentric “milieu.” In 1893, the year prior 
to his address to First International Congress of Sociology, he had published a short 
philosophical treatise on Monadologie et Sociologie, adapting the philosophy of Leibniz to matters 
of social imitation. Therein, with echoes of the Nietzschean will-to-power and the Newtonian 
aether, Tarde wrote that every atom aspires to become a “milieu universel”—a universal medium 
for all others.143 Then, in Fragment d’histoire future, his science fiction novel of 1896,144 he 
constructed a story of a human race that has retreated underground to escape the cold of the 
dying sun. Such troglodytic existence eliminates “every influence of the natural milieu,” 
allowing “the social milieu” to “reveal and display its true virtues.”145 Thus, Tarde, every bit 
like Zola’s expérimentateur, fabricated a world wherein he could manipulate his social actors in 
seclusion from those factors that would confound and confuse its essential dynamics. Thus, a 
factorially purified social complex founded openly on the imitative reflections of genius—that 
is, of Great Men—could be imagined. 
In January 1903, Durkheim, with co-author Paul Fauconnet (1874–1938), lamented 
sociology’s continued languishing at the stage of Comte or Spencer—that is, in “essentially 
philosophical speculation.”146 Though “new systems” proliferated daily, all were absorbed with 
the mania for discovering the law governing all social evolution—“the ‘key which opens all 
locks,’” as per the philosopher’s stone of the alchemists (or, we might add, the “Absolute” of the 
aforementioned M. Claës). This line concerning “all locks” was taken from Tarde’s Les lois de 
l’imitation of 1890, which, in turn, attributed the comment to “one of our greatest philosophers 
of history,”147 inferred by the co-authors to be Taine.148 Indeed, to the famous literary-
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interpretive mechanist, Tarde had accorded one his fundamental principles: “that the brain is 
a repeating organ for the senses and is itself made up of elements which repeat one another.”149 
This, then, was the physiological substrate of Tarde’s “pure sociology” or “general sociology”—
that is, sociology abstracted from “vital and physical characteristics,” and understood in its “the 
purely social side.”150 
In December that same year, at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Tarde 
and Durkheim engaged in a debate concerning their respective social scientific tenets. Only the 
Resumés and short summaries of their respective lectures were published.151 However, 
Durkheim reprised his repudiation of the agenda of general laws, advocating scientific progress 
on the basis of greater specialisation—that is, as per his own theory of a progressively extended 
division of labour. Tarde, meanwhile, accepted the need for specialisation but insisted it be 
based upon the primacy of “[i]nter-mental psychology,” which “must be to the social sciences 
what the study of the cell is to the biological sciences.” As every individual “enters social life,” 
he continued, they “feel the influence of certain great persons,” whose “individual examples 
fuse with many other influences of the same type and form a collective product”—a 
“psychological synthesis” that indeed “acts on us” but which “can only have a false air of 
exteriority.”152 
Durkheim, by contrast, insisted that, at present, sociologists were ignorant of “what the 
elementary social fact is”—whether that be the individual, or whatever else—and must 
therefore proceed upon the basis of reserved judgement. This showed, Tarde rejoindered, 
Durkheim was committed to a society existing above and beyond any and all individuals. 
“‘If you believe that,’ said Mr. Tarde, ‘I understand your method, which is pure 
ontology. Between us is the debate between nominalism and scholastic realism. I am a 
nominalist. There can only be individual actions and interactions. The rest is only a 
metaphysical entity, mysticism.’” 
Mr. Durkheim then apparently declined to comment further on what he considered to be an 
problem he had not raised, and which resulted from the conflation of entirely separate 
questions: that of method, and that of existence.153 
~~~~~~ 
Having begun in medias res, we may now leave it in kind. By the end of the nineteenth century, 
milieu was an established concept across Francophone literary and scientific culture, and 
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beyond. Its most prominent meaning had been progressively rendered mechanical and abstract 
rather than fluid or aetherial, although all relevant connotations remained available.  
Having seen the alteration, and associated proliferation, of milieu as a significant 
concept, it is now necessary to ask what this concept tells us about our received patterns of 
conception. That is, we must now understand how such concepts may play a part in tying 
together broader understandings of the world. 
  137 
Excursus B: Ontoturgic: The manifold of worlds 
As seen in §2, for Leo Spitzer, denizens of the Ancient τὸ περιέχον [tò periékhon] experienced 
their cosmos as “a kind of loving milieu round about” their being.1 After the geocentric 
firmament cracked and crumbled (more on this in the next chapter), moderns were left fallen, 
lost to a lesser enclosure, content to “‘belong’ somewhere.”2 The milieu, it must be recognised, 
then, is also an aesthetic concept. 
 It has also been said (§3) that while the historian is committed to “establishing evidence,” 
and the philosopher to “conceptual creation,” the fictionist reckons with “worldly 
manifestation.” After the example of Comte, Balzac, and Zola, we might now add that it is not 
only fictionists that perform such acts. Rather, it is they who do so without bearing the 
commitments of other modalities. 
 Having, in §A, sketched the hodological conception of mythic collectivity—that of the 
trivium—it now remains to establish that this space of intersection is not to be understood as a 
bare network but, rather, as a world—that is, as a space of assembly threaded through and for 
those who belong there. If collectivities are inherently partial in their obligations, and hence 
their experiences, how then do their worlds become full, palpable, enclosing? This is the 
question of the ontoturgic. 
~~~~~~ 
“Ontology,” for Comte, belonged to the second stage of development, alongside theology.3 
Derived, most impressively, from the great Greek metaphysicians, and perfected by the likes of 
Bichat, it had been preparatory of positive science.4 However, being speculative, it was 
inherently capricious, anarchic, and subversive. Ontology was, therefore, the problem of 
positivism. 
 In the Cours, Comte thus declared that, as “founder of a new general philosophy, at once 
historical and dogmatic,” his work was to finally and definitively replace “ontological 
influences” with “the universal preponderance of the positive spirit.”5 With regard to “the 
theory of hypotheses,” he held that if one hypothesis be “quasi-metaphysical” then the 
subsequent will be wholly so. Thus, such doctrines as that of chemical “affinities,” even more 
so than “the electric fluid and the luminous ether,” must be regarded as “ontological.”6  
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In the Système, such statements were both more frequent and uncompromising. In 
chemistry, for instance, “the aberration of ontological fluids” had been assuaged with the 
discarding of phlogiston. However, eminent chemists of late had attributed rather fantastic 
powers to “the so-called electric fluid.”7 As the “founder of sociology,” Comte wrote that he 
owed a “particular homage to that of all biologists who best prepared me to build a philosophy 
as purified of all ontology as of any theology.”8 
When coming to anticipate the historical destiny of his mission, the High Priest observed 
that a solution to the disunity of the German peoples would be of paramount importance. 
However, despite their “admirable soil,” these countries would present the greatest challenge, 
since: 
“the ontological disease [la maladie ontologique], inherent in Protestantism, has gradually 
acquired, in the Germanic milieu, so much consistency and extension that this case 
must arouse [susciter] the principal triumph of positivism.” 
The French, by contrast, had always been least affected, while the “the British milieu repels 
metaphysicians,” its lamentable Anglicanism notwithstanding.9 
Crucially, such repudiations were unabated in the Synthèse, where Comte explained that 
Newton’s first law of motion had been “empirically confounded” with inertia, as “algebraic 
ontology” had attempted “to explain what can only ever be observed.” Thus: 
“Mixing the objective with the subjective, to the point of taking one for the other, is the 
principal symptom of the metaphysical disease [maladie] in all its forms, since the study 
of laws has directly eliminated the search for causes in all true theorists.”10 
~~~~~~ 
In §1, I stated that the history of the concepts in question demonstrates “conflicted conceptions 
of existence”—a conflict that it is necessary to better understand in order to “learn from this 
history.” Although the ontological concepts developed through these excurses evidently differ 
from what Comte understood by this term, his repudiation of “ontology” typifies this conflict in 
its simultaneous presumption that ontonomic obligations can be reduced to positive knowledge 
and that a feeling for reality must be produced through techniques of illusion that human beings 
qua human beings must enthusiastically bring upon themselves. 
For Comteans and Kantians alike (see §3), through the nineteenth century (and beyond), 
“ontology” could be an effective term of denigration—even for Tarde, author of Monadologie et 
sociologie (author, that is, of the claim that every monad strives to become a “milieu universel” for 
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all others).11 But was Tarde incorrect in identifying Durkheim’s social organism, defined by its 
Bernardian internal and external milieus (and thus existing in transcendence of any individual), 
as ontological? 
 Durkheim had articulated his conception as an essential point of methodology: 
“We know that the phenomenon relates to the nature of the social milieu without 
knowing by what, or how, it is connected.”12 
Deprived thereof, sociology would be explanatorily “powerless.” And yet, had he not also 
described so vividly the unbearable “pressure” under which each individual is made in the very 
“image” of the milieu itself?13 
In 1990, Ian Hacking wrote of what he called “the avalanche of numbers” inundating 
the nineteenth century.14 That is, the surveys, censuses, logbooks—driven by cheaper printing, 
war, the railways, greater precision in measurement, more expansive state regulation, and more 
intensive permeation of life by economy. This was one aspect of what brought about “the 
taming of chance”—that is, the acceptance that, while any given occasion (the roll of a dice, 
recovery from illness) is beset with indeterminacy, the aggregate of many such occasions will 
display lawfulness—that is, “normality.” The two representatives of “normalised” science, for 
Hacking, were Francis Galton (1822–1911) and Émile Durkheim.15 
The fundamental difference between Tarde and Durkheim can, then, be understood in 
terms of these new paper technologies. The former, the magistrate and criminologist, was no 
less enthusiastic than the latter about such possibilities for social control. However, for Tarde, 
every entry in the logbook must be understood as a trace of an imitative connection (or “ray,”16 
as he put it, in the language of physics) between individuals who, therefore, are the basis of 
association. By contrast, for Durkheim, the self-conscious inheritor (and surpasser) of Comte, 
any question of to what it is that the phenomena causally correspond must be conjecturally 
suspended—such self-restraint being precisely what it means to be “positive.” Thus, when 
Durkheim wrote of “milieus,” “organisms,” and “pressures,” he was writing, effectively, sous 
rature (under erasure). However, to continue the Tardean line, this erasure was itself erased, as 
Durkheim’s language not only became carried away with its own embellishments but, 
moreover, through its very success, became formative of an ontonomic obligation to 
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experience society in accordance with these conceptions. Neither, therefore, could avoid the 
ontological (as I have articulated it). 
And so, Michel Foucault, may have been quite correct to find the notion later known as 
milieu already in “the first [French] town planners of the eighteenth century”—or, at least, in 
the “pragmatic structure” underlying their planning.17 Indeed, as seen in §1, what he “roughly” 
defined as “[t]he space in which a series of uncertain [aléatoires] elements unfold” comports 
admirably with Durkheim’s “without knowing by what, or how….” That is, on Foucault’s 
account, such planners can be understood as having acquired the license to anticipate, on the 
basis of wafting miasmas, the sorts of causes that are likely to arise, given certain configurations 
of space. Whether such circulations, well over a century before “the taming of chance,” can be 
understood as aleatory (in the more specific English sense of the word) is another question. 
Nevertheless, the point to be made is that, being so quick to grant himself the license to abstract 
notion from concept, Foucault was not brought to consider that such an aleatory space of 
circulation was also ontologically formative of the judgements of sociology—and hence of his 
own practice (cf. conclusion to §2). 
It may be that Foucault would have been chary of acknowledging any inheritance from 
the likes of Durkheim. Nevertheless, as seen in §3, Hacking identified “historical ontology” as 
concerning “the space of possibilities for character formation that surround a person.”18 It is 
hardly standing “at the extreme margin” to characterise such spaces as subject-formative 
milieus. Moreover, on what basis could Foucault himself affirm that “[i]n any given culture and 
at any given moment, there is always only one episteme”?19 In what else could such 
epistemological strictures circulate? What else is a social structure than a thoroughly de-
elementalised milieu? 
The claims being made, then, are threefold:  
First, while the Comtean l’ensemble total, in contrast to the Newtonian ætherial medium, 
is, in its own terms, nothing but a placeholder for describing a relation between a definite being 
and surrounding entities of any kind, it nevertheless has ontological effects. That is, it affects how 
those ontonomically involved feel, act, and think. Indeed, we can easily follow the elemental 
and aetherial connotations in Comte’s works right until the end, and the fluid implications of 
“milieu” remained contestable, even as the word was being overlaid in translation. 
Second, and with a greater (though, I think, admissible) degree of ‘marginal extremity,’ 
the double erasure of Durkheim’s doubly-mediated social organism cannot hide the fact that 
the explanatory license assumed, in more recent times, through such concepts as “social 
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structure,” can be found to inherit from what was called “the interior milieu.” Thus, a history 
of environmental or mesologic concepts constructed on the basis of “space[s] of possibilities” is, 
in some measure, a history of its own ontonomic relations. 
Third, such achieved commitments do not manifest in an experiential vacuum any more 
than the Boylean modest witness was an inelastic, unfeeling validity-processor. As such, and 
beside the ontonomic, if we are to understand the ontological significance of environmental 
concepts, we must therefore understand, in Hennell’s expression (though, as seen in §9, not in 
her conception), the “world-effect”20 that they impart. 
~~~~~~ 
It may be that no one belongs to only one common, but it can be confidently stated that no one 
belongs to all. Such partiality of belonging may be made palpable. In particular, for those 
existing simultaneously on the inside and outside of a collective, it may be written into the faces 
of those who say, wordlessly or otherwise, ‘you do not belong.’21 However, a crossroads does 
not dissolve into the ways that cross it; no common world is without its sense of coherence. And 
such sense requires work. 
In 1948, the philosopher Étienne Souriau delivered an address titled Le Cube et La Sphere: 
“I submit the principle that in all the arts without exception, but particularly in the art 
of the theatre, the main business is to present a whole universe—the universe of the 
work [l’œuvre]—en patuité, in a state of patency. […] A universe that exists manifestly 
before us … a universe presented with all its power to stir us deeply; to overwhelm us; 
to impose its own reality upon us; to be, for an hour or two, all of reality.” 
As regards theatre, Souriau distinguishes two modalities by which such a world-effect, or reality-
effect, can be achieved. 
 First, there is the cube: The stage is set. Cut out, “as though with a saw”—a small piece 
of another world, dressed with furniture, ornaments; “in wood or in canvas, with real or sham 
articles (it does not much matter which).” 
“And then this cube of concrete, visible, and audible realities is opened on the side 
facing the spectator; one side is removed.”22 
As regards patency, the principal task of the actors, then, becomes that of inducing the audience 
to experience the whole whirling, outspreading world beyond stage left and stage right; to 
granting the boxy dramatic fragment its temporary reality as a window, or portal. 
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 Second, there is the sphere: The stage is removed. Rather than extracting “a 
predetermined fragment” from “the world that will be instituted [le monde à instaurer],”23 one 
rather “seeks out its dynamic center, its beating heart”—the centre that “is permitted to 
irradiate its force freely and without limits.” 
“The actors or the group of actors who incarnate this heart, this punctum saliens, dynamic 
center of the universe of the work, are officiating priests, magicians whose power 
extends outward indefinitely into open space.” 
Moving freely about or amidst their audience, all limits upon the extension of the “fictitious 
world” converging on the actors’ act are removed: “They are the center, and the circumference 
is nowhere.”24 
 It is with respect to this modal distinction that Comte’s extraordinary statement 
concerning “the metaphysical disease”—and, then, the various attempts of Balzac, Zola, and 
Tarde to combine the sociologic and the fictive—can be understood. Each of these authors, in 
their own way, attempted the same thing: to construct fictive worlds productive of obligations 
regarding social order. By imparting such obligations with patuité, they engaged the ontoturgic. 
To be sure, nothing could be less remarkable than an eighteenth-century philosopher 
attempting to reconcile the multiplicity of experiences with the equally evident irreducibility of 
existence to conception via the subject/object divide (these being distinct realms that may exist 
in mutual tolerance so long as neither impinges upon the other’s propriety). Such were, indeed, 
founding planks of the “Modernist Constitution.”25 Nevertheless, Comte took this principle 
perhaps further than anyone. 
Only positive—that is non-speculative, lawful, useful, precise26—knowledge has license 
to make claims on objective existence. Nevertheless, the very possibility of healthful human 
existence requires worshipful submission to the trinity of Le Grand-Être, Le Grand-Milieu, and Le 
Grand-Fétiche, and the active construction of “subjective milieus” for everything from numbers, 
densities, flavours, and sounds to space itself. The very place of the Earth within the universe 
must be alternately reversed whether one is talking subjectively (geocentric) or objectively (non-
geocentric). And the Earth itself had been a thinking thing! Through its self-induced “long series 
of explosions,” it was given a rigorously geophysical backstory. The warm artfulness of fetishism 
served to revive the “matter” that metaphysics had rendered “essentially inert.”27 Nevertheless, 
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one must always be on guard against “the phantoms emanating from the subjective milieu,”28 
lest they be taken in the manner of the “maladie.” 
The solution to this dizzying duality, it would seem, was the “universal priesthood 
[sacerdoce universel],”29 which would spread the word, while maintaining the fundamentality of 
the opposition. With all due phrenological positivity, Comte called the regimen he established 
for his own mental health “cerebral hygiene.”30 However, after the example of the Royal 
Commission, the more apposite term might be ontological hygiene—the insistence that existence 
be a category closely guarded by modest witnesses (who just so happen to be Barons and High 
Priests). 
It would be easy to join Mill in a chorus of judgement against such “pitiable niaiseries,”31 
and to find that Comte effected a reductio ad absurdum against his own principles. However, I 
would rather say: Comte’s mania is ours too. Ours, that is, so long as we fail to address the 
contradictions inherent in making ontological hygiene a principle of public order (§E).32 
Moreover, the patriarch of Positivism was surely right about one thing: it takes an 
extraordinary amount of work to maintain “all of reality” for more than “an hour or two.” 
~~~~~~ 
The expressions dramaturg and dramaturgy are complex and take on quite varied significance in 
different European languages. In contemporary anglophone theatrical practice, a dramaturg is 
often described as a mediator, working between director, playwright, and company, operating 
as an in-house critic. However, from the Greek δραματουργός [dramatourgόs]—ergos meaning, 
literally, work—dramaturgy as the work of drama may imply the theory or, otherwise, the 
capacity or aptitude for realising a dramatic creation. The expression may also resonate with 
thaumaturgy—the work of performing miracles.33 Indeed, in Souriau’s venerative account of 
“magicians” and “officiating priests,” it is precisely this sort of work that is invoked.34 
 However, such talk of performance and miracle raises a problem. As the “cry” identified 
in Doležel was heard to attest:  
“Totalitarian power […] gives its gaps ontological status, projects them into the actual 
world.”35 
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There is a world of difference between maintaining a “world-effect” for “an hour or two” and 
enrolling a cast of millions. And yet it happens. Such a difference cannot be taken too seriously. 
If the real is to be made an ‘effect’—an effect felt multiply and severally in each and every 
collective—what gravity remains in the word ‘reality’?  
 Returning to the trivium, there are always roads not taken. Thus, there are always other 
worlds—or, other world-effects. We inhabit, in this sense, a manifold of worlds. However, such a 
concept entertains a threefold risk:  
First, to invoke a manifold may insinuate a prior, primordial world (e.g. nature) behind 
or underneath all other particularities, accessible only by a ‘modest’ sacerdotal elite. 
Second, there may then result a lapse from world-effects to world-views, as all worldly 
differences become a matter of subjective-phenomenal perspective; a view of ‘outside’ from 
‘inside.’ 
However, third, if no one ‘world’ stands to guarantee the unity of all others, thereupon 
would seem to follow a declaration, at once facile and needful of all seriousness: that to inhabit 
‘different worlds,’ and hence different ontonomic obligations, and ontoturgic manifestations, 
entails inhabiting mutually exclusive realities, such that no comment can be meaningfully made 
from one to another, and things can really be made up as they go along (with the powerful being 
ontoturgic auteurs). 
As such, while Comte’s imagistic milieus, or Zola’s mesologic-socialistic reportage, may 
well be valuable for thinking through the techniques and ontoturgic effects of historiographical 
practice,36 the manner in which “historiography opens out onto history,” as I put it in §3, must 
not be detached from the ontonomic commitments that must be retained in order to maintain 
the account as historical. To this, the next excursus will turn (§C). 
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6: “Under a single sky”: Inclination from Hippocrates to Cabanis 
Before milieu, there was climate. In 1876, the naval doctor and hygienist Jean-Baptiste 
Fonssagrives (1823–1884), in a lengthy entry for the Dictionnaire encyclopédique des sciences médicales, 
introduced “Climat” as pertaining to a tradition running from Hippocrates to Bodin, through 
Montesquieu to Cabanis. However, he added:  
“One might ask, however, whether it is permissible, in the present day, to give the word 
climate such a comprehensive meaning, and whether it is not more rational and fruitful 
for studies to restrict this term to influences that derive from the atmosphere alone; 
taking into account, however, the reciprocal meteorological influences of the soil and 
the surrounding natural atmosphere.”1 
This chapter considers how climate came to be associated with the lineage Hippocrates–Bodin–
Montesquieu–Cabanis, how unusual the latter’s hyper-extended iteration of it was with respect 
to this history, and, moreover, how climate became a distinct and contestable concept more 
generally. 
 The concept of climate, as definitions from the mid-eighteenth century onwards have 
seldom failed to note, has a long history, being from the Greek κλίμα [klíma], meaning slope or 
inclination; from κλίνω [klinō], to bend or slant.2 However, the Hippocratic teachings, with 
which ‘climate’ became indelibly associated, preceded this expression by at least a century. For 
well over a millennium afterwards, such works were preserved, translated and reinterpreted 
principally by Arabic, Persian, and Jewish scholars, from Afghanistan to Iberia. Through the 
Reconquista, texts and persons were transported, by trade, migration, and plunder to Northern 
Europe, whereupon climatic conceptions were reconstructed again, particularly by those 
concerned, in one way or another, with expanding imperial trade relations, medical practice, 
and governance. 
Covering this entire timescale, though concentrating largely upon developments in the 
eighteenth century, particular attention is given to the development of, and immediate reaction 
to, Montesquieu’s l’Esprit des loix of 1748, a work which, famously, declared climate to be “the 
first of all empires.” It was around this time that climate came to be a concept disproportionately 
contestable in philosophical, theological, and political terms. Thus, it can be said to have 
become a ‘concept’ in the stronger sense3 that it served as a locus of contestation for wider issues. 
This chapter, therefore, also seeks to identify the various ways in which this concept could be 
conceived, and with what was at stake in its contestation, investigating, for example, the 
philosophy of David Hume, and the jurisprudence of Catherine II of Russia, to these ends. The 
                                               
1 Fonssagrives 1876, 14. 
2 Fleming 1998, 11–12. 
3 As explored in §3 with respect to Koselleck and grundbegriffe. 
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final section then returns to Cabanis, and associates, demonstrating the passion for climatic 
holism evident amongst the idéologues of the early 1800s. 
6.1: From Ouranós to interrelation: Climatic traditions over two millennia 
The Historíai of Herodotus (c.484–c.425) discoursed regularly on the relations of temperature, 
moisture, and position as regards settlement and peoples.4 However, when referring, for 
example, to Ionia as enjoying the most beautiful of aerial and seasonal conditions, the expression 
used was: “toũ mèn ouranoũ kaì tō̃n hōréōn.”5 While hōréōn signified seasons, ouranoũ could suggest, 
more generally, sky, heaven, firmament, or universe, Ouranόs being the god of the sky.6 
 Signifying the angle or inclination of the sun above the plane of the local horizon, the 
first known uses of klíma are found with Hypsicles and Hipparchus (both c.190–c.120 BCE).7 
The practice of making lateral divisions of the earth defined by length of day had been known 
since at least Eratosthenes (c.276–194 BCE).8 However, such bands became κλίματα [klímata] 
only around the time of Geminus and Cleomedes (c.1st century BCE).9 Such climes were not, 
therefore, climates as such. Firstly, the klímata partitioned only the oikouménē,10 the inhabited 
earth.11 By contrast, Parmenides (born c.515 BCE) had divided the entire terrestrial sphere itself 
into five zones: two frigid, two temperate, and one torrid.12 Aristotle (384–322 BCE) followed 
the same scheme,13 deeming only the two temperate regions (“khṓras”)14 to be inhabitable 
(“dinatē̃s oikeĩsthai”).15 Symmetry suggested that there must be inhabitable land in the southern 
hemisphere; however, this was thought inaccessible due to the infernal heat of the equator. 
Nevertheless, klímata accrued connotations. Already in Strabo (63 BCE–c.23 AD), klíma 
could mean latitude in association with characteristic atmospheric conditions or indications of 
                                               
4 E.g. Herodotus 1926, vol. 1, 190–191, 316–317, 364–365. 
5 τοῦ μὲν οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν ὡρέων. Herodotus 1926, vol. 1, 183; Thomas 2002, 105. 
6 Liddell et al. 1940. 
7 Shcheglov 2016, 21. 26; Dicks 1955, 249. 
8 Honigmann 1929, 7; Altmann 2005; Shcheglov 2016. 
9 Shcheglov 2016, 26. 
10 οἰκουμένη. 
11 Glacken 1967, 98. 
12 Sanderson 1999, 669; Harley and Woodward 1987. 
13 Aristotle 1952, 179–180. 
14 χώρας. 
15 δυνατῆς οἰκεῖσθαι. Oikeísthai—to be situated, settled, housed. Khṓra also translated as region, land, country, 
district. 
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the direction of winds.16 The Epistles of Paul the Apostle (c.5–c.64 AD) used klímata,17 klímasin,18 
and klímasi,19 all in the sense of ‘regions.’ The Tetrábiblos20 of Ptolemy (c.90–168 AD) declared 
that klímata distinguish the “particularities of peoples”21 by their earthly “parallels and angles”22 
and the relation this entails to the outer stellar spheres.23 Below the more southern parallels 
resided the Ethiopians, their skin burned black by the sun; to the north, the Scythians, cold in 
both clime and character.24 Such klímata were, therefore, not only astronomical and geometrical 
but also astrological and morphological. 
Though the theory of the four bodily humours was not explicitly referenced in Ptolemy’s 
text, this, the doctrine of Hippocrates of Kos (c.460–c.370 BCE), was both available and 
evident. Galen (c.130–c.210 AD) endorsed these tenets, remarking that anyone acquainted with 
medicine would concur that health requires the balance or isonomía of humours (khumόs).25 The 
quadripartite scheme, echoing the elemental doctrine of Empedocles (c.490–c.430), was not 
necessarily reproduced consistently or exactly, even within the Hippocratic corpus. 
Nevertheless, it became conventional. 
 
Humour Element Season Organ Qualities Temperament 
Αἷμα [Ahĩma] 
Blood 
Air Spring Liver Moist/warm Sanguine 
Ξανθη χολή [Xanthē kholḗ] 
Yellow bile 
Fire Summer Spleen Dry/warm Choleric 
Μέλαινα χολή [Mélaina kholḗ] 
Black bile 
Earth Autumn Gallbladder Dry/cold Melancholic 
Φλέγμα [Phlégma] 
Phlegm 
Water Winter Brain/lungs Moist/cold Phlegmatic 
 
                                               
16 Marcotte 1998, 275–276. 
17 κλίματα. Galatians 1:21, c.53 AD. Paul the Apostle 2018b. 
18 κλίμασιν. Second Corinthians 11:10; c.55 AD. Paul the Apostle 2018a. 
19 κλίμασι. Romans 15:23; c.57 AD. Paul the Apostle 2018c. 
20 Also known as “Ἀποτελεσματικά [Apotelesmatiká]” or “Effects.” 
21 ἐθνικῶν ἰδιωμάτων [ethnikón idiomáton]. 
22 “παραλλήλους καὶ γωνίας” [parallḗlous kaì gōnías]. 
23 Ptolemy 2005, 42. 
24 Glacken 1967, 112–113. 
25 Grant 2002, 25. Specifically regarding the Hippocratic text περὶ φύσιος άνθρώπου [Perì phúsios ánthrṓpou], or On 
the Nature of Man. While attributed by convention to Hippocrates, the corpus that bears his name is of uncertain 
authorship. Unusually, this text is also attributed to his student and son-in-law Polybus. Craik and Hippocrates 
2014, chap. 36. 
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The fundamental Hippocratic concern was, therefore, with krãsis26—mixing, blending, and 
balance. The Latin temperamentum, accordingly, denoted a proportionate mixture; a well-
balanced complexio, or bodily constitution.27 
 The Hippocratic work known as Epidemics is named from epidēmiō̃n,28 meaning a visit or 
stay in a particular place, as per the practice of a travelling physician. Thus, this text recounts 
discontinuous medical observations presented as a series of “constitutions”—i.e. the factorial 
mixtures relating to each situation. Likewise, the famous On Airs, Waters and Places29 informed 
medical practitioners of the constitution—that is, the “katástasis”—of health and disease in 
relation to a settlement’s orientation to the winds, different kinds of water, and the changing of 
seasons. Moreover, it compared the constitution of Mediterranean Europeans to that of Asians, 
with extremities of heat accounting for the latter’s supposedly war-like temperaments.30 
Eratosthenes had, avant la lettre, distinguished seven klímata; however, other schemes 
were available. Ptolemy’s Geography31 eschewed the climatic system and Tetrábiblos discussed the 
influence of the five rather than seven planets. His Mathēmatikḕ Súntaxis32 (later known as the 
Almagest)33 distinguished systems of thirty-three, twenty-four, and eleven, as well as seven climes; 
however, in its reception, the system of seven became doctrinal.34  
The Syriac scholar Bardaisan of Edessa (154–222 AD)35 influentially repudiated the 
doctrine attributed to the Chaldeans—that God’s subjects be governed in their health, wealth 
and morals by the seven stars; the earth being divided into seven portions, named climes, each 
overseen by one such sidereal governor.36 Not the 7 planets, nor the 12 signs of the Zodiac, nor 
the 36 of the Decani, he argued, only the One who is the source of all and promises salvation is 
the giver of universal law. Thus, proaíresis—that is, will, volition, choice, or moral character—is 
secured.37  
                                               
26 κρᾶσις. 
27 Arikha 2007, 8. 
28 ἐπιδημιῶν. 
29 περὶ έρων ὑδάτων τόπων [Perì érōn hudátōn tόpōn]. De aere, aquis, locis in Latin. Craik and Hippocrates 2014, 
chap. 2. 
30 Hippocrates 1881, 71. 
31 Geōgraphikḕ Huphḗgēsis31 (Geographical Guidance or simply 
32 Μαθηματικὴ Σύνταξις. 
33 Almagest deriving from its Arabic title al-majisṭī (the greatest). 
34 Shcheglov 2016, 26; Olsson 2014, 491. 
35 In a work later titled either The Dialogue Concerning Fate or The Book of the Laws of the Countries, published in Greek 
and English in James Cureton’s Spicilegium Syriacum in 1855. See Ramelli 2009, 57. 
36 Cureton 1855, 11, 27. 
37 προαίρεσις. See Ramelli 2009, 43. 
 
  150 
Somewhere in Basra, Iraq, around the tenth century, the Ikhwān Al-Ṣafā, or Brethren of 
Purity, wrote their Rasā’il (Encyclopedia or Epistles). To the seven climates, under their seven 
planets, were attributed the temperaments of the humours; and, to these were attributed the 
characters, customs, colours, physiques, languages, and modes of governance of peoples.38 By 
this time, Ptolemy was established as a geographical authority. The Almagest was translated into 
Arabic in the early ninth century,39 as were Hippocratic works. 
Terminologically, klíma and klímata became the Arabic iqlīm and aqālīm; a temperament 
or mixture was rendered as mizāj,40 and ta‘adil related isonomía in signifying equilibrium.41 
However, although Ptolemaic climates and Hippocratic constitutions became common 
elements of geographical and medical knowledge in the lands from Afghanistan to Morocco, 
there was no singular doctrine. The Suwar al-aqālīm of Abu Zayd al-Balkhi (850–934) concerned 
regions rather than latitudes as such.42 Likewise, Al-Bīrūnī (973–1048) rendered the aqālīm 
through the Persian concept of kishvar, figuring them as six circles, issuing out from Baghdad’s 
iqlīm at the centre.43 However, the older connotations were recovered, and claiming the 
middlemost of the aqālīm was a serious concern among elites and their geographers.44 For 
example, the Basra-born literatist Al-Jāḥiẓ (776–c.868) quoted a resident of that same city who 
boasted not only that Iraq is the centre of the world and Basra of Iraq and al-Mirbad of Basra 
but his home lay at the centre of them all.45 
Climatic concepts did not reach Europe until early in the new Christian millennium. In 
1123, the Sefer ha-ʿIbbur46 of Abraham bar Ḥiyya (1070–c.1140),47 an Iberian Jew, distinguished 
seven climes, each with a width of six degrees. Several years later, his compatriot and 
contemporary Judah Halevi (c.1075–1141) wrote his most famous work, Kitab al Khazari,48 
pointedly placing the Land of Israel at the centre of the earth, thus affording the very best of 
air, water, soil, and astral influences, and, hence, the most perfect balance of the four qualities.49 
                                               
38 Olsson 2014, 488; Altmann 2005, 227. 
39 Meri 2005, vol. 1, 77. 
40 Olsson 2014, 488. 
41 Meri 2005, vol. 1, 158. 
42 Selin 1997, 149. 
43 Meri 2005, vol. 1, 158. 
44 Olsson 2014, 489. 
45 Ibid., 493. 
46 Book of Intercalation. 
47 Also known as Abraham Judaeus or Savasorda. 
48 Translated as The Book of Refutation and Proof in Support of the Abased Religion. Written in Judeo-Arabic, later translated 
to Hebrew. 
49 Altmann 2005. 
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In the ninth century, al-Masʿūdī wrote of the north that lack of sun rendered the 
humours of its inhabitants, such as the Franks and Slavs, cold and moist.50 Thus, they were 
large, flaccid, and pale, with lank hair; moreover, coarse, dull-witted, and irreligious. In 1154, 
Muhammad al-Idrisi (1100–1165) produced the Tabula Rogeriana,51 commissioned by Roger II, 
the Norman ruler of Sicily. Augmenting the Ptolemaic system, it added ten longitudinal 
divisions to the seven of latitude.52 Yāqūt al-Hamawī (1179–1229) described the people of Iraq 
as proportioned, rational, and well-composed. Their brown skin was an indicator of well-
moderated humours, being the most balanced of all colours.53 
Thus, by the time that Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406) published the Muqaddimah [Prolegomena] 
to his planned Kitāb al-ʿibar in 1377,54 he was able to summarise and expand upon traditions of 
knowledge, wealthy and well-established. A philosophical, universal history based upon the 
concept of ʿaṣabiyyah, meaning collective feeling, cohesion, or solidarity,55 the first chapter of the 
Muqaddimah summarised the geographical, cosmological, and spiritual basis of this work. 
With reference to Ptolemy, the inhabited portions are divided into seven “climes 
[aqālīm],” which relate to fundamental climatic and ethnological differences. After the example 
of al-Idrisi, ten longitudinal divisions are added, which are organisational only.56 These 
delineations are made in relation to the movements of the zodiac; however, astrology as such is 
regarded as a sham.57 As per classical klímata, it is the relative inclination of the sun that 
engenders the parameters of plant and animal life as well as science, architecture, agriculture, 
health, and physiology. Accordingly, all achievements of culture occur within the inner five 
aqālīm, and most around the central clime, with ever more solitary, animalistic depravity found 
in the outer fringes. 
The aqālīm are described section-by-section, with the all-important fourth clime, centred 
on the Mediterranean, admitting coastal North Africa and Europe as far north as the Pyrenees, 
extending eastwards through Syria and Persia, all the way to the frontiers of China. While both 
mountains and coasts are understood to affect local moisture and temperature, the golden mean 
of elemental and humoral well-being is nevertheless predominantly defined by laterality.58 
Referencing Galen, the spirit itself is taken to consist of a fine vapour.59 Moreover, the 
                                               
50 In Kitāb al-Tanbīh [The Book of Notification]. 
51 Nuzhat al-mushtāq fi’khtirāq al-āfāq [Entertainment for Him Who Longs to Cross the Horizons]. 
52 Olsson 2014, 506. 
53 Ibid., 490. 
54 That is, Prolegomena to the Book of Lessons. 
55 Alatas 2014, 41–42. 
56 Khaldûn 1958, vol. 1, 49–50. 
57 Khaldûn 1958, vol. 1, 54. 
58 Ibid., vol. 1, 65. 
59 Ibid., vol. 1, 63. 
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movement of the spirit through the body at night, in states of illness, and during ritual, explains 
dreams, insanity, and prophecy. 
 
Figure 7—World map of al-Idrisi, from 1456 copy of ‘Alî ibn Hasan al-Hûfî al-Qâsimî 
It would take around four centuries for Ibn Khaldūn’s works to be recognised in 
Europe60 and it was only in 1406, the year of his death, that Ptolemy’s Geography was translated 
into Latin.61 In the 1240s, referencing Avicenna and Ptolemy, the Dominican friar Albertus 
Magnus (c.1193–1280) wrote of the “latitudinum septem lineis [seven lines of latitude]” 
                                               
60 Alatas 2013. 
61 By Jacopo d’Angelo (1360–1411). Italiano 2016, 33. 
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distinguishing “climata,” which he further divided in three.62 His student Thomas Aquinas 
(1225–1274)63 advised that when founding a “city or kingdom” one should choose a “temperate 
region [regionis enim temperie],” with good health depending upon the right temperature of the 
“vital fluids [humorum].” However, he did not write of clima but rather, of “region [regio]” and 
“place [loco].”64 As a word in the English language, climate first appeared, contemporaneous 
with Ibn Khaldūn, in the late fourteenth-century. The Travels of Sir John Mandeville (possibly 
pseudonymous),65 first circulated between 1357 and 1371, spoke of the people of India being 
“in the firste clymat, þat is of Saturne,” while the text’s readers were “in the seuenthe clymat 
þat is of the mone.”66 
In Venice in 1511, a Latin edition of Ptolemy’s Geography was produced, complete with 
a large map—looming to the west, the coastline of an enormous land mass labelled “TERRA 
SANCTAE CRVCIS,” Land of the Holy Cross.67 Sub-equatorial regions were now well-accounted 
for. Thus, to seven northern climates were added three to the south. The Ptolemaic earth was 
stretched to breaking point but there would be no sudden rupture.68 In 1543, shortly before his 
death, Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543) published De revolutionibus orbium coelestium;69 however, 
a century later, an aging Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) would pass his final years under house 
arrest for reproaching the geocentric regime. 
In Les Six livres de la République,70 first published in 1576, Jean Bodin (1530–1596) 
defended the geocentric orthodoxy, maintaining a world of Aristotelian physics, astrological 
influence, humoral medicine, and latitudinal ethnology. However, though he remained focused 
on the northern hemisphere, he made no use of the seven climates, instead differentiating polar, 
temperate, and tropical regions.71 Indeed, Bodin used the word “climat” only when remarking 
that, in the “same climates,” Oriental and Occidental peoples differ greatly and that, moreover, 
even “in the same climate, latitude, longitude, and under the same degree,” there are hills and 
plains, which impart their particular effects.72 Moreover, Bodin departed with Ptolemaic 
tradition still further by redistributing the influence of the planets, placing the cold region under 
                                               
62 Glacken 1967, 267. 
63 In his De regno [On Kingship], addressed to the King of Cyprus. Thomas Aquinas 1979. 
64 Ibid., 68–71; Glacken 1967, 274–276. Parallel Latin available: Thomas Aquinas 2010. 
65 Larner 2008. 
66 OED Online 2008a; Mandeville 1900, 109. 
67 Ptolemaios and Sylvanus 1511; Schwartz 2008, 51. 
68 McGuirk 1984. 
69 On the revolutions of the celestial spheres. Copernicus 1543. 
70 The Six Books of the Republic. Bodin 1993; Bodin 1967. 
71 Bodin 1993, 412–413. Three regions of 30 degrees each (Glacken 1967, 437). However, these regions didn’t 
necessarily adhere to the geometry when discussing political matters. 
72 Bodin 1993, 407–408. 
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Mars and Luna, the hot under Venus and Saturn, and the middle under Jupiter and Mercury.73 
To the three peoples “Northern, Southern, and middle [Septentrional, Méridional, et moyen]” 
corresponded three virtues. The former were hard-headed, excelling at war and manufacture; 
the latter, spiritual and intelligent, with aptitude for the occult. It fell, therefore, to “the peoples 
of the middle [les peuples du milieu]” to “negotiate, traffic [trafiquer], judge, preach [haranguer], 
command, establish Republics, and compose laws and ordinances for the other peoples.”74 
Jupitarian and Mercurial, the task of the Republic was, thus, one of constitutive 
equipoise. Still within an Aristotelian cosmos, where every being is essentially purposeful; where 
matter collides with form only thanks to the perpetually oscillating, ascendingly perfected 
spheres; where bodily constitutions ebb and flow with breezes, aerial and helial. Bodin was not 
appraised of the corporeal mechanics and frightful infinities that would so impress (and appal) 
savants a generation hence. His earth, bihemispheric but still, could not, by definition, be a 
planet;75 the astéres planē̃tai76—stars that wander—yet wandered. The terrestrial and astral 
remained fluidly co-extensive. However, Bodin was already embedded in those out-reaching 
                                               
73 Ibid., 424–426. 
74 Ibid., 423–424. 
75 First use of “planet” in sense including the Earth: OED Online 2006; Wilkins 1640. 
76 ἀστέρες πλανῆται. 
Figure 8—Bernard Sylvanus world map on the basis of Ptolemy's Geography, 1511 
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flows of oceanic itinerants, pirates and profiteers, tale-tellers, and traders, daily bringing worlds 
to into collision. 
~~~~~~ 
The famous frontispiece to the Novum Organum Scientiarum77 of Francis Bacon (1561–1626), 
published in 1620, depicts a ship passing through the Pillars of Hercules. Below reads: “Multi 
pertransibunt & augebitur Scientia,” a Latin rendering of Daniel 12:4—“many shall run to and fro, 
and knowledge shall be increased.”78 Though disgraced by allegations of debt and corruption 
the following year, in 1620, Bacon was Lord High Chancellor of England, and this, the second 
book of his never-completed Instauratio Magna,79 announced a plan: “to begin the whole labor of 
the mind again.”80 
“The sciences we possess,” Bacon wrote, “have been principally derived from the 
Greeks.” Roman, Arabic and other writers “are but few and of small importance.” However, 
those fêted Hellenics were altogether too “prone to talking,” vain for public gratification, and 
“unproductive of effects.”81 Indeed, “a vast number of climates and zones [climata et zonae], in 
which innumerable nations [populi] live and breathe, were pronounced by them to be 
uninhabitable, while, in Bacon’s day, many parts of the New World “and every extremity of the 
Old” were well within grasp.82 
In 1583 Richard Hakluyt (1553–1616) was sent to the English Embassy in Paris, under 
the guise of being the ambassador’s chaplain, to acquire information on the “Westerne 
discoueries.” At the commission of Walter Raleigh (c.1554–1618),83 Hakluyt wrote an 
enthusiastic report on the prospects of English colonisation, presented to Elizabeth I (1533–
1603) in 1585.84 Three years later, he returned to England, whereupon he published a series of 
encyclopaedic, pan-continental collations of travel writing.85 Mandeville’s remarks on “the 
sevenethe climat” were excerpted.86 However, the primary concern of Hakluyt, the authors he 
copied from, and his presumed readers was, unambiguously, with what each climate contained, 
                                               
77 New Instrument of Science. 
78 King James Version. 
79 The Great Restoration. 
80 Bacon 1902, 7. 
81 Ibid., 47–49. 
82 Ibid., 50; Bacon 1858, 182. 
83 Knighted in 1485. 
84 Hakluyt 1993. 
85 Culminating in The Principal Navigations, Voiages, Traffiques and Discoueries of the English Nation of 1598. Hakluyt 1885–
1890, vols. 1–16. 
86 Hakluyt 1888, vol. 8, 211. 
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not with relative position. The text spoke of climates, frequently “colde” and “Northren”87 but 
also “hote,”88 “temperate,”89 “wholesome,”90 “watery,” and “sickly.”91 The climate of Persia, it 
Figure 9—Frontispiece to Francis Bacon’s Instauratio Magna, 1620 
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is mentioned, is the “selfe same” as that of Virginia, the provenance of “Silke works” as a 
“Merchantable” commodity not going unmentioned.92 Thus, in both its specificity and its 
possibility, Hakluyt’s Navigations attests to a world being forcibly expanded outwards. 
If climate as an expression was, with Bodin, threatened with obscurity, by the time that 
William Shakespeare (1564–1616), contemporary of both Bacon and Hakluyt, wrote The 
Tempest sometime around 1611, it had become rather more commonplace.93 After mocking the 
optimistic Adrian and aspirant Gonzalo who are convinced, against the evidence, of their 
island’s colonial prospects, the sarcastic Sebastian and Antonio remain awake, as their fellow 
castaways are lulled to sleep by the sprite Ariel. 
“SEBASTIAN. What a strange drowsiness possesses them! 
  ANTONIO. It is the quality o’ th’ climate.” 
Shakespeare’s earlier works refer to “our clime”94 or “native clime,”95 largely preferring clime 
to climate. However, in Richard II (1595), the Bishop of Carlisle speaks of “a Christian climate” 
in similar terms.96 Meanwhile, King John (c.1596) has the French monarch Philip declare that 
his own oathful hand “sways the earth this climate overlooks.” Later, in The Winter’s Tale 
(c.1611), the king Leontes, believing his wife unfaithful, demands that she abandon their child 
in some remote place, leaving it to the “favour of the climate.”97 Thus, by 1611, a popular, 
poetic climate could be an airy and enveloping entity, productive of characters, sensations, and 
constitutions. It had a sense of highness, openness, and the meteoric. However, it was tied to 
country, land, place, or domain.  
Among the most popular texts in the growing national characteristics genre in 
subsequent decades was the 1614 Icon animorum of the neo-Latin poet John Barclay (1582–1621). 
There is in every age, Barclay’s second chapter declared, “a particular Genius” and in every 
region “a proper Spirit,” that makes its inhabitants, “according to it selfe.”98 However, while 
                                               
87 Hakluyt 1885, vol. 1, passim. 
88 Hakluyt 1889, vol. 11, 273. 
89 Hakluyt 1887, vol. 5, 296; Hakluyt 1889, vol. 12, 58; Hakluyt 1889, vol. 13, 19. 
90 Hakluyt 1886, vol. 4, 10. 
91 Hakluyt 1890, vol. 15, 169, 308. 
92 Hakluyt 1889, vol. 13, 331. 
93 All references to: Shakespeare 1994, unpag. 
94 Titus Andronicus (c.1591); The Merchant of Venice (c.1596). 
95 Henry VI: Part 2 (1591). 
96 While John of Gaunt describes Bolingbroke as “flying to a fresher clime,” and Richard himself declares himself 
headed northward, “Where shivering cold and sickness pines the clime.” 
97 Despatched to the Oracle at Delphos to confirm suspicions, Cleomenes remarks to Dion, “The Clymat’s delicate, 
the Ayre most sweet.” 
98 Barclay 1631, 36. 
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“under those Climates” that suffer “much cold, and moist ayre,” persons “faire and gray ey’d” 
tend to be produced, such effects are not uniform in any region.99 
The 1664 treatise Sylva100 by John Evelyn (1620–1706), prepared for the Royal Navy, 
catalogued the kinds and qualities of plants in order to promote rational forestry practices. 
Discussing the arboreal writings of Pliny, Evelyn remarked that the ancient author “attributes 
much to the indoles [in-born qualities] and nature of the Climate, and Impressions of the Air.”101 In 
the third edition of 1679, Evelyn added that, with regard to the effects of harsh weather on 
timber, “when we speak of the climate, ’tis to be understood of vallies rather than hills, and in 
calm places, than exposed, because they shoot streight and upright.”102 Thus, climate was 
understood as being a localised effect of several factors. 
When Bacon’s Novum of 1620 was later translated into English, “climata et zonae,” became, 
quite straightforwardly, “climates and zones.”103 However, the poet Barclay’s Icon of 1614 was 
worded somewhat differently compared to its iteration of 1631: not “under those Climates” but 
“sub iis sideribus”—literally, under the stars.104 Climate was, then, becoming a more conventional 
term, able to stand in for other expressions becoming archaic. 
In 1676, Henry Oldenburg (c.1616–1677)105 wrote in his preface to the eleventh volume 
of the Philosophical Transactions: 
And, I think, I may say, that a Natural History of Countries is most wanting; which, if well 
drawn, would afford us a copious view, and a delightful prospect of the great variety of 
Soyls, Fountains, Rivers, Lakes, &c. in the several places of this globe […].” 
The state of knowledge was, in many respects, parlous: “Destroying heats,” sometimes appear 
in “colder Climats,” with “Refrigerating seasons in the Sunny Climats.” Assuagement of the 
“Epidemically destructive” maladies that resulted clearly required understanding of their 
cause.106 Following Oldenburg’s preface was a highly favourable review of the Observationes 
Medicae, circa Morborum Acutorum Historiam et Curationem of Thomas Syndenham (1624–1689).107 
It was translated into English in 1696 by John Pechey (1655–1716).108 Further translations 
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followed in 1742, 1848109 and 1922,110 with many more editions and impressions, becoming a 
standard medical textbook for the next two centuries. 
As early as the mid-eighteenth century, Sydenham was dubbed the “English 
Hippocrates.”111 However, this inheritance is complicated. The preface to Observationes begins 
by declaring: 
“As the Human Body [humani corporis fabrica] is so framed by Nature, that by reason of 
a continual flux of Particles, and the force of external Things [externarum rerum], it cannot 
always continue the same; upon which account there have been great numbers of 
Diseases in all Ages […].” 
Then are expounded four principals of a “Practice of Physick”: first, diseases must be described, 
as per Lord Bacon; second, “reduced to certain and definite Species,” without “Philosophical 
Hypothesis”; third, permanent “Phænomena” distinguished from accidental; finally, and 
fundamentally, “the seasons of the year” must be carefully observed.112 However, while 
empiricism and seasonality was straightforwardly Hippocratic, Sydenham’s understanding of 
humours differed dramatically. Disease was the result not so much of imbalance as from the 
“vitiated Particles,” impairing humoral passage, which Nature attempts to expel with “the help 
of a Fever.”113 An epidemic persists “as long as this secret constitution of the Air [illâ aeris 
constitutione], and no longer.”114 
 Thus, Sydenham focused on five “Epidemical Constitution[s] [Constitutio Epidemica],” 
occurring over multi-year periods from 1661 to 1675.115 While heat, cold, and moisture may 
constitute disease one year, others proceed, for example, “from a secret and inexplicable 
alteration in the Bowels of the Earth, whereby the Air is contaminated with such Effluvia as 
dispose Bodies to this or that Disease.”116 A “morbifick Contagion” may, therefore, be an 
element of the disease phenomenon but the complete cause was more complex. Thus, while 
Sydenham occasionally used the term climate, for example remarking that the pox found in the 
Caribbean and in France appears the same despite “the diversity of Climates [Climatum],” this 
was, for his Physick, an inessential concept.117 
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At his home in Pall Mall, London, Sydenham was a neighbour of Katherine Jones, the 
Viscountess Ranelagh (1615–1691), in whose house her brother Robert Boyle (1627–1691) kept 
his laboratory.118 Indeed, Sydenham and Boyle were close collaborators. When in failing health, 
Boyle enlisted the help of John Locke (1632–1704) to complete his General History of the Air (duly 
published the year after Boyle’s death in 1692).119 Long a reader of his treatises, since at least 
1666 Locke had, at Boyle’s suggestion, begun making notes on the weather. Moreover, in April 
of that same year, Boyle sent Locke a barometer, hoping him to descend a mine in the Mendip 
Hills, near the latter’s Somerset birthplace. This was a failure, neither the instrument nor its 
bearer convincing the interloped miners of their purpose.120 In 1667, Locke had become 
personal physician to Lord Anthony Ashley Cooper, First Earl of Shaftesbury (1621–1683), 
while studying medicine under Sydenham. The two also collaborated, with Locke likely helping 
to edit, and perhaps embellish, the preface to the aforementioned Observationes Medicae.121 
Thus, by 1700, climate as a general relation of place to temperature and humidity could 
be unremarkable. However, climate was not the air, nor the atmosphere, nor the constitution 
thereof. Nor was it an essential point of reference for either medicalists or moralists—it was 
altogether absent from Locke’s own works. However, its significance for morals and for 
government had by no means dissipated. 
Having spent most of the period 1664 to 1677 in Persia, the East Indies, and the Black 
Sea region, the Paris-born Jean Chardin (1643–1713) published his travelogues in 1686, an 
expanded edition appearing in 1711, with considerable success.122 As well as customarily 
extensive descriptions of provinces, peoples, and customs, remarking regularly on the “the 
quality of Land & Climate [du Terroir & du Climat],”123 Chardin would also locate certain places 
in terms of their latitudinal climate; however, like Hakluyt a century before, this was not his 
main climatic concern. 
 Rather, Chardin repeatedly declares: “I always come back to the air, & the climate, 
when it comes to the customs and manners of Peoples.”124 Explaining that Persians do not stroll 
about (“Promenade”) or seek to travel (“Voyager”), and that the men are always on horseback, he 
adds that since “climate” is the main cause of each people’s “inclinations and customs,” 
accordingly peoples are not more diverse than the “the constitution of the air,” which varies 
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from place to place.125 However, he is sure to add that, rather than accusing distant peoples of 
“caprice or fantasy,” experience shows that men always have enough “good sense to make use 
of things in the manner that is most appropriate [convenable].” 
“The climate is undoubtedly the inventor, so to speak, & the cause of all we find singular 
in the manners [manieres] of Peoples, & perhaps even in their morals [mœurs], as I never 
tire of observing.”126 
Two years after Chardin’s travelogues, Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle (1657–1757) wrote 
that ideas are, “like plants or flowers,” partial to “climate.”  
“the interrelation [l’enchaînement] and reciprocal dependence between all the parts of the 
material world, the differences of climates that plants feel, must extend also to brains 
[cerveaux].” 
However, unlike plants, “art and culture” have far greater effect “with brains than with the 
earth [terre],” which is of more obdurate and “intractable matter.” Indeed, “the thoughts 
[pensées] of a country are more easily transported to another than its plants.” Thus, if French 
married only Greeks, the effect of reading Greek books would be much the same, even if faces 
were altered a little. Slight differences between neighbouring climates are, therefore, easily 
effaced due to the “exchange [commerce] of books that they will have together,” though this is 
not true of very distant peoples. “And so, here we are all perfectly equal, ancient and modern, 
Greeks, Latins and French.”127  
~~~~~~ 
Sailing between the equator and the northern fifteenth parallel, shortly before his ship is 
attacked by Moorish pirates, the titular character of Robinson Crusoe (1719) by Daniel Defoe 
(1661–1731) is “thrown into a violent Calenture by the excessive Heat of the Climate.”128 
However, after his shipwreck, he learns to live with the torrid conditions. On his way to the 
West Indies, and shortly after being attacked by pirates (Japanese this time), the titular character 
of Gulliver’s Travels (1726)129 by Jonathan Swift (1667–1745) finds himself on a flying island 
inhabited by astrologers, finding an “Abundance of Vivacity” in the women of the island, thus 
demonstrating that such “Caprices” are “not limited by any Climate or Nation, and that they 
are much more uniform, than can be easily imagined.”130 
The time of Shakespeare had seen climate becoming an increasing concern of Anglo-
French authors but was yet conceptually novel enough for literary experimentation. In both its 
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geo-lateral and ethno-causal senses, what was more or less notionally familiar to Shakespeare 
was, for Chardin, Fontenelle, Defoe, and Swift, clearly conceptually defined. However, climate 
was far from all-encompassing, remaining, for the most part, attached to notions of latitude and 
being medically secondary to the more expansive question of airs. Moreover, although issues of 
Figure 10—The flying island of Laputa, 1839 
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causation were paramount, the distribution of agencies that this climate implied was, and 
remained, contested. 
6.2: From art to instruction: The climate of Montesquieu 
In 1719, Jean-Baptiste, l’Abbé Dubos (1670–1742) published a three-volume tome on 
aesthetics, Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture.131 In 107 sections,132 Dubos begins, rather 
à la mode of an Ancien Régime aristocrat, from “the necessity of being occupied in order to 
escape ennui [fuir l’ennui],” which, he counsels, can be ameliorated through art. However, at the 
centre of Dubos’ reflections, the second volume begins with the question of “genius.” It is an 
inborn condition, the enabler of all invention, received from nature itself.133 Nevertheless, its 
causes are varied. “Moral causes”—defined as those which do not affect the “mind [esprit]” or 
“physical” nature of the artist but which enable and reward their labours—are first 
acknowledged to have much to do with the differences between countries and centuries. 
However, it is “physical causes” that put “moral causes in motion.”134 
None other than the chevalier Chardin noted the enervation of the spirit imparted by 
torrid climates.135 “It has always been observed,” Dubos declares, “that climate was more 
powerful than blood and origin.” Indeed, when such effects weigh not just upon a particular 
body but an entire people, their consequence must be even greater. Those Greco-Gaulish who 
settled in Asia “in five or six generations” lost their inborn belligerence, becoming “effeminate.” 
“Spanish blood,” so courageous in Europe, “degenerated” in the Americas.136 The fall of such 
high and mighty empires as the Roman could, likewise, only be explained through “great 
changes in the air.” After suffering the pillages of Goths and Normans, various waterways and 
“cesspools [cloaques]” became clogged with “debris [décombres],” no longer able to flow into the 
Tiber, thus becoming “infected.”137 Citing Tacitus (c.56–c.120 AD), the world is found “subject 
to changes and vicissitudes.”138 However, the aerial imperium was not total. While the 
transportation of books and ideas, pace Fontenelle, could not supplant primary physical causes, 
aspects of distant climates could be conveyed through the trade of commodities such as wine, 
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sugar, tobacco, and chocolate. By such means, “the land [terre] of the Canaries” is consumed in 
English stomachs.139 
Though differing in conclusion, Dubos echoed Fontenelle in articulating the relational 
dependencies of aerial nature. Minds, blood, lungs, and air are tightly bound. Moreover, the 
air affects the soil, hence the efficacy of its ploughing. Moreover, as the earth’s composition 
varies, so the air that “encircles [enserre]” it differs. Being “a mixture of solids and liquids” of 
various species, the earth is constantly active, generating “fermentations” as the “central fire” 
puts such matter into motion. The colour of the skies, especially at dusk and dawn, reveal these 
“diverse changes” to the senses. In Italy, “a greenish blue”; in the Netherlands, “pale blue”—
contrasts apparently evident in the paintings of Titian (1488–1576) and Rubens (1577–1640). 
Moreover, such “exhalations” as the earth conveys airborne are the very materials of thunder 
and lightning. Earthquakes and volcanoes, too, cannot yet be attributed to anything but 
continual “fermentations” in “the bosom of the earth.” No other cause can be invoked “unless 
we wish the stars to act out [agir] their influences once again.”140 Thus, though the powers of 
climate were considerable, as with Boyle and Sydenham, it was not climate so much as the 
emanation of airs that were, for Dubos, conceptually primary. 
In 1733, the physician and satirist John Arbuthnot (1667–1735) published his popular 
treatise An essay concerning the effects of air on human bodies. “Diet, […] Air, Rest, and Motion” were 
the four “Non-naturals” upon which Arbuthnot planned his medical works.141 This text would, 
therefore, deal with the second. Both “the great Hippocrates” and “Dr. Sydenham” had assiduously 
observed Air’s effects “in the Oeconomy of Diseases,” with the former making it “the τὀ θεῖον 
[to theĩon]”—that is, of the gods, divine—as regards diseases. “Air,” for the physician of Kos, was 
nothing less than “the Powers of the Universe,” which “Human Nature cannot overcome.” 
Thus, Arburthnot quotes what he takes to be Hippocrates’ maxim: “that whoever intends to be 
Master of the Art of Physick, must observe the Constitution of the Year.” 
In now quite conventional terms, Arbuthnot wrote that Air is formative of “the 
Constitutions of Mankind,” establishing their “Features, Complexion, Temper,” and 
“Manners,” which differ between “Countries and Climates,”142 this being “an uncontested 
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Figure 11—Titian’s Bacchus and Ariadne, c.1522; and Rubens’ A View of Het Steen in the Early Morning, c.1636 
Matter of Fact.”143 As Hippocrates had it, European courage owes “to the Variety and Coldness 
of their Climate, and their Laws which secure their Property to their Courage.”144 Thus, bodily 
being is profoundly malleable to circumstance. 
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“I believe if a Race of Laplanders were transplanted thither, in a few Years they would 
be found in the Condition describ’d by the Emperor Julian. Governments stamp the 
Manners, but cannot change the Genius and Temper of the Inhabitants; and as far as 
they are unrestrain’d by Laws, their Passions, and consequently their National Virtues 
and Vices will bear some Conformity with the Temperature of the Air.”145 
However, further than Sydenham, and even Dubos, Arbuthnot endeavoured to rearticulate the 
principles of their “sagacious old Man” in terms of “mechanical Causes,”146 for example as 
regards the effect of “the Weight of the Air” on “the Tension of the Fibres, the whole nervous 
System, and the animal Spirits.”147 
~~~~~~ 
The Bordeaux magistrate known generally as Montesquieu (1689–1755) first achieved literary 
success in 1721 with his Lettres persanes, a satirical account of French society through the eyes of 
two Persian noblemen. In the third of the letters, one protagonist receives a letter from one of 
his wives, Zachi, who laments: “Thou leav’st us, Usbek, to go rambling [aller errer] in barbarous 
Climates.”148 In letter 70, Rica writes to Usbek of a Parisian who deigned to lecture him on the 
details of Persia “upon the authority of Tavernier and Chardin.”149 However, it was 
Montesquieu’s De l’esprit des loix150 of 1748 that would associate his name almost indelibly with 
the concept of climate.  
Travelling to England on his Grand Tour in 1730, Montesquieu journeyed with Philip 
Dormer Stanhope, 4th Earl of Chesterfield (1694–1773), to whom John Arbuthnot was personal 
physician. Whether or not they met, already in 1729, Montesquieu shared one of Arbuthnot’s 
core concerns: bodily fibres.151 In a collection of notes largely composed between 1736 and 
1741 (though not published until 1892),152 Montesquieu set out his fiberal physiology. Soul and 
body are related “like a spider in its web.” The tauter the threads, the stronger the 
“communication” to the soul.153 Thus, in the Americas, for instance, it has been established that 
“savages” cannot be disciplined, corrected, or educated. One can no more teach them, 
Montesquieu says, than “bend the fibers of their brains.”154 However, this geography of cranial 
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fibrosity did not straightforwardly privilege the European esprit. Canarins (native Goan 
Christians) are said to be so intellectually superior to the Portuguese that the colonisers forbid 
them any sort of work except being solicitors. This is attributed directly to “climate”; however, 
such differences must take an indeterminate amount of time to effect.155 Thus, since their 
conquest, the Portuguese have remained much the same, unaffected by the benefits of their ill-
gotten climes. 
However, this long-unpublished assortment of thoughts also places strict limits on 
physical causes. 
“For there is, in every nation, a general character that affects [se charge] every member, 
to a greater or lesser degree. This is produced in two ways: by physical causes, which 
depend on the climate, of which I shall say no more; and by moral causes, which are a 
combination of laws, of religion, of mœurs and manners, and of this kind of emanation 
of a way of thinking, of the air and nonsense [sottises] of the Court and of the Capital, 
which spreads itself far and wide.”156 
Thus, moral causes have more effect on “the general character of a nation and the quality of its 
spirit [esprit]” than physical.157 
“You have to go into a little detail. Our particular genius [génie] is formed to a large 
extent by the persons with whom we live. The association of intelligent people [Le 
commerce des gens d’esprit] gives us a perpetual education. […] Human machines [i.e. 
bodies] are invisibly linked; the springs [ressorts] that make one move one also move the 
others.” 
Being amongst the moderate imparts gentleness; amongst the impetuous, vivacity. However, 
“[a]ll our ideas are linked to one another, and to ourselves.” Thus, being connected to our 
brains by so many “sides [côtés],” sentiments are altered only with great difficulty.158 However, 
these draft principles were not to form a blueprint for the opus to come. 
Published in 1748, De l’esprit des loix (subsequently “lois”), consisted of thirty-one books 
in six parts. “Laws,” Book I begins, are, “in their most extensive signification, the necessary 
relations deriving from the nature of things.”159 Natural law, then, antecedes all positive law, 
“deriving only from the constitution of our being.”160 Once in society, the fear-induced 
weakness and equality of the state of nature ceases and “the state of war commences”—a war 
between both individuals and nations. On “so large a planet, it is necessary that there are 
different peoples [peuples].” Thus, there arises a variety of laws dealing between peoples. 
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However, Montesquieu sets aside this general right, “which can be seen in all societies,” to focus 
on what is particular to each. No matter how a polity is configured, “the government most in 
conformity with nature is the one whose particular disposition best relates to the disposition of 
the people [peuple] for whom it is established.” 
“They must be relative to the physics of the country [au physique du Païs], to the icy, 
burning or temperate climate; to the quality of the land [terrein], its situation, its extent 
[grandeur]; to the way of life [genre de vie] of the people, be they laborers, hunters, or 
shepherds; to the degree of liberty that the constitution must sustain [souffrir]; to the 
religion of the inhabitants, their inclinations, their riches, their number, their 
commerce, their morals [mœurs], their manners [manieres].” 
Taken together, this will be called “l’ESPRIT DES LOIX.”161 
Part three (Books XIV-XIX) were dedicated to matters of climate, soil, and manners. 
Cold air, contracting the outer fibres of the body, shortens them and “increases their strength 
[force].” Hot air has the contrary effect, loosening the fibres. As such, those in cold climates are 
more “vigorous,” their fibres and “liquids [liqueurs]” in a better equilibrium, blood being pushed 
closer to the heart, which has greater power.162 Observing a sheep’s tongue under 
magnification, papillae covered in tiny hairs are noted and, between them, “pyramids,” 
presumed to be “the principal organs of taste.” After freezing, the papillae decrease in size and 
the pyramids disappear but return upon thawing. This, Montesquieu takes to confirm his claim 
that those in cold countries “have little sensitivity to pleasures,” while in hot countries such 
sensitivity will be “extreme” and, in temperate countries, moderate.163 Infamously, he adds: “A 
Muscovite must be flayed before he is given any feeling [sentiment].”  
Because, in hot countries, perspiration dries out the blood, alcohol will cause the blood 
to coagulate. Thus, the Islamic prohibition of such vices is “a law of the climate of Arabia.” By 
contrast, in cold countries, where one is “full of humours [humeurs]” (the only time Montesquieu 
uses this particular expression in l’Esprit), strong liquors that “give movement to the blood” are 
not only acceptable but inevitable.164 However, not everything could be thus attributed. 
“Many things govern men—climate, religion, laws, maxims of government, examples 
of past things, mœurs, manners—from which is formed a general esprit as a result. 
To the extent that, in each nation, one of these causes acts with greater force, the 
others yield to it. Nature & climate almost solely dominate savages; manners govern the 
Chinese; laws tyrannise Japan; mœurs formerly set the tone in Lacedaemon [Sparta]; 
maxims of government & ancient mœurs set it in Rome.”165 
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Thus, while Montesquieu’s Essai differentiated moral and physical causes in general terms, 
placing significant emphasis on the former, l’Esprit differentiates climatic and other influences 
in strictly hierarchical terms, as per relative proximity to the supposed state of nature. 
In Book XIX, Chapter XIV, Montesquieu explains that a legislator should not attempt 
to change mœurs and manners by laws since this would seem “too tyrannical.” Rather, mœurs 
and manners should be altered by their own means. Accordingly, the law requiring Russians to 
shorten their beards and clothing, like the policy of Peter I requiring women called to court to 
dress in the German fashion, was injudicious. Though successful in transforming Russian 
dispositions, this was because: 
“the mœurs of the time were foreign to the climate, & had been brought there by the 
mixture of nations & by conquests. Peter I, giving the mœurs and manners of Europe 
to a nation of Europe, found facilities that he did not himself expect. The empire of 
climate is the first of all empires.”166 
Thus, Montesquieu’s most quoted statement regarding climate was not a straightforward 
declaration of climatic determination. First, concerning the appropriateness of morals to 
climate, it entailed acknowledgement that other morals could, at least for a time, be adopted. 
Second, it concerned a people recognised to be in a high, and ascending, social state with moral 
causes being, accordingly, of greater significance. Finally, while “climate” was, in contrast to 
Arbuthnot, Dubos, et al., given unambiguous primacy over airs, soils, and other earthly aspects, 
climate was still one factor among others. 
Nevertheless, the backlash against Montesquieu’s materialistic pronouncements was 
more or less immediate. In April 1749, the Jesuit Journal de Trévoux requested clarification and, 
in October, in rather more vituperative terms, the Jansenist weekly Nouvelles ecclésiastiques accused 
him of being a Spinozist. In the latter, Jacques Fontaine de la Roche (1688–1761) took 
particular exception to the author’s climatic theory, which placed “on the same line [ligne] all 
the monks, of whatever religion, be they Christians, Muslims, idolaters.”167 In February 1750, 
Montesquieu published Défense de L’Esprit des lois in an attempt to clarify and secure his position. 
As regards “Climat,” he wrote: 
“all effects whatsoever [quelconques] have causes: the climate & other physical causes 
produce an infinite number of effects. If the author had said otherwise, he would have 
been regarded as stupid.” 
Proof of such differences is provided by “an infinite number of writers of all places & all times.” 
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“In a word, this physics of climate [ce physique du climat] can produce diverse dispositions 
in the esprits; these dispositions can affect human actions: does this offend [cela choque-t-
il] the empire of the one who created, or the merits of the one who redeemed?” 
He did not claim, Montesquieu continues, that “diverse local practices of religion” were “either 
good or bad.” Rather, it was said that “there were climates where certain practices of religion 
were easier to receive.”168 
In the same year, 1750, Joseph de La Porte (1714–1779)—priest, poet, and playwright—
argued the “noble & brilliant” author of l’Esprit to have failed in method,169 with his conception 
of climate becoming “what motion [le movement] is in the Universe, the universal cause of all 
things.”170 Scarcely anything escapes its auspices: “Everywhere, it is the climate that decides, 
that governs; & the first of all empires is, he says, the empire of climate.”171 Against such impenitent and 
obdurate creeds, La Porte argues that courage, for example, arises from birth, education, 
prejudices, and honour; “in a word, it’s the way of thinking [façon de penser] & not the climate.”172 
Indeed, recent French successes on the battlefield were to be attributed to the present leadership 
of Louis XV (1710–1774): 
“Behold the true climate [Voilà le véritable climat] that bestows bravery, & brings into even 
the most timid soul that strength, that martial warmth, which makes heroes. He 
animates, he warms, he ignites the heart of the troops by his presence.”173 
It would of course, La Porte concedes, be “stupid” to deny that “climate and other physical 
causes produce an infinite number of effects.” Simply, one must know whether such characters 
“are more frequent in one climate than in another.”174 
However, the besieged Baron had his advocates. In May 1750, with characteristic 
causticity, Voltaire (1694–1778) published a pamphlet175 decrying the “tonsured clerics” of the 
Nouvelles ecclésiastiques.176 In 1751, in a reply to La Porte’s own Observations, the Jesuit-educated 
lawyer Claude Francois Felix Boulenger de Rivery (1725–1758) wrote that “the Author of 
l’Esprit” had been attacked as if he were the very inventor of “the influence of climate.” On the 
contrary, this “is a principle as old as the world [aussi ancien que le monde], it is a truth of 
experience.”177 Nevertheless, such efforts plainly failed to assuage Montesquieu’s critics and, in 
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November 1751, l’Esprit was placed on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum, the Vatican’s index of 
prohibited books, though this, in turn, failed to sunder the Baron’s standing.178 
In the 1754 edition of his Lettres persanes, Montesquieu added a censure of transatlantic 
slavery, the Americas having become “deserted” despite every year receiving new inhabitants: 
“These slaves, who are transported to another climate [dans un autre climat], perish by the 
thousands,” while the “malignant exhalations” of the ceaselessly laboured mines, and the 
continual use of “quicksilver,” destroy natives and foreigners alike.179 However, critics 
remained. 
There was more to the dispute surrounding l’Esprit than the concept of climate. 
However, no other specific concept was more pointedly in dispute. Being suggestive, if not 
denotative, of a whole cluster of physical causes, including both latitudes and airs, it could be 
made the argumentative crux of the polemics. In Arbuthnot or Dubos, climate could have a 
broad and significant meaning, but airs were primary. With Montesquieu, however, climate 
became both central and unambiguously political. Its contestability was, in this sense, the point. 
In his Dictionnaire philosophique of 1764,180 Voltaire sardonically evaluated Chardin, 
Bodin, Dubos, and their climatic fatalism, siding with “the ingenious Fontenelle.” 
“The author of the l’Esprit des lois, without citing anyone, pushed this idea even further 
than Dubos, Chardin and Bodin. A certain part of the nation believed it to be the 
inventor, and made this a crime.” 
Alas, it was ever thus the way with those sundry bloviators possessing more “enthusiasm” than 
“esprit.” Nevertheless, Montesquieu’s ages-old nonsense could hardly be taken seriously:  
“Everything changes in bodies and esprits over time. Perhaps one day Americans will 
come to teach the arts to the peoples of Europe. 
The climate has some power, the government a hundred times more; religion joined 
to the government more still.” 
Not “soil and atmosphere” but rather “opinion, this fickle queen of the world [reine inconstante du 
monde]”—“the climate cedes to opinion.”181 
~~~~~~ 
In 1738, at the age of 28, David Hume (1711–1776) completed A treatise of human nature,182 
intending to do for “the essence of the mind” what others had for “external bodies”—that is, 
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ascertaining “its powers and qualities” through “careful and exact experiments, and the 
observation of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and 
situations.”183 
 “Reason is, and ought only to be,” Hume wrote, “the slave of the passions.” When in 
anger, “I am actually possest with the passion.” That is, as far as “the science of human nature” 
was concerned, it is internal passions, not external objects, that effect the “modification of 
existence.”184 However, and moreover, such passions are also intrinsically communicable—that 
is, they are in common—and depend profoundly upon “sympathy.” It was to this principle, 
Hume argued, that should be attributed “the great uniformity” that may be observed “in the 
humours and turn of thinking of those of the same nation.” This being so: 
 “[…] ‘tis much more probable, that this resemblance arises from sympathy, than from 
any influence of the soil and climate, which, tho’ they continue invariably the same, are 
not able to preserve the character of a nation the same for a century together.”185 
Thus, in contrast to the fibrous bodily spider’s web of Montesquieu’s esprit, Hume’s “mind” was 
altogether existentially sui generis. Moreover, in contrast to the classical schema, which was 
very much still alive, national “humours” had not so much a physiological as a sympathetic 
existence. One could not be “possest” by airs, only by others. The influences of soil and climate 
were real but secondary. Thus, for Hume, as for Voltaire nearly three decades later, “the climate 
yields to opinion.”  
However, it was in his 1748 essay Of National Characters, published the same year as 
Montesquieu’s l’Esprit, that Hume elaborated upon this previously offhand comment. While 
“vulgar” observers had confused the issue, Hume noted that national differences had generally 
been accounted for by causes either moral or physical. 
“By moral causes, I mean all circumstances, which are fitted to work on the mind as 
motives or reasons, and which render a peculiar set of manners habitual to us.” 
The moral, therefore, includes forms of government and public administration, states of wealth 
and penury, relations to neighbouring nations, “and such circumstances.” 
By physical causes I mean those qualities of the air and climate, which are supposed to 
work insensibly on the temper, by altering the tone and habit of the body, and giving a 
particular complexion, which, though reflection and reason may sometimes overcome 
it, will yet prevail among the generality of mankind, and have an influence on their 
manners.” 
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Thus, in contrast to Dubos and Montesquieu, Hume was quite clear that the moral must take 
priority, “since a nation is nothing but a collection of individuals, and the manners of individuals 
are frequently determined by these causes.”186 
As for that which distinguishes such consistent human characters as, for example, 
soldiers and priests, Hume declares himself “inclined to doubt altogether” the operation of 
“physical causes.” Such explanations may, indeed, “at first sight, seem probable.” After all, “such 
circumstances have an influence over every other animal.” However: 
“The human mind is of a very imitative nature; nor is it possible for any set of men to 
converse often together, without acquiring a similitude of manners, and 
communicating to each other their vices as well as virtues. The propensity to company 
and society is strong in all rational creatures; and the same disposition, which gives us 
this propensity, makes us enter deeply into each other’s sentiments, and causes like 
passions and inclinations to run, as it were, by contagion, through the whole club or 
knot of companions.” 
Thus, like La Porte’s ovationary account of Louis XV, Voltaire’s scepticism of climate, and 
Montesquieu’s pre-l’Esprit reflections on “Le commerce des gens d’esprit,” Hume counterpoised to 
the physical causes of climate not just moral causes but, more specifically, to inspiration and 
“communication.” Across the “globe” and throughout history, altogether absent are “the 
influence of air or climate,” everywhere one finds “signs of a sympathy or contagion of 
manners.”187 
In 1751, the same year as l’Esprit des loix received the Vatican’s official censure, Hume 
wrote in his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals:  
“The laws have, or ought to have, a constant reference to the constitution of 
government, the manners, the climate, the religion, the commerce, the situation of each 
society.” 
Such were the principles, he added, of a “late author of genius.” Though remaining nameless, 
an appended footnote further praised the “author of L’Esprit des Loix.” However, this “illustrious 
writer,” Hume warned, is mistaken in attempting to found his system “on certain rapports or 
relations.”188 It is notable, then, that Hume’s citation and praise of Montesquieu occurs as a 
passing comment in a chapter concerning the origins and foundations of justice, particularly 
with regard to the legitimacy of private property. His momentary prostration to Montesquieu 
would therefore seem to be more a declaration of solidarity among philosophes than a conversion 
to the climatic doctrine.189 Indeed, in the remainder of his writings, moral contagion and social 
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communication retained their primacy, displacing the climatic. For example,190 in a margin 
note added to the 1753 edition of his essay on national characters, Hume wrote:  
“In JAMAICA indeed they talk of one negroe as a man of parts and learning; but ‘tis 
likely he is admired for very slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few 
words plainly.”191 
Thus, racially-inscribed existential hierarchies could just as well be inscribed by moral 
contagion as climatic mechanism. Nevertheless, distributions of agency were being contested 
along other lines. 
Hume’s empiricist “contagion” did not proliferate during his life anything like as far and 
wide as climate had already. However, his six-volume History of England (1754–1761) won him 
long-desired popular and intellectual esteem and was replete with “the contagion of 
superstitious prejudices,” and the like.192 Climate, meanwhile, remained, in these works, an 
expression rare and inconsequential. 
~~~~~~ 
Sophie Friederike Auguste, Princess of Anhalt-Zerbst (1729–1796) first became acquainted with 
the works of Montesquieu in 1744, aged 15.193 In June of the same year, Sophie became 
Екатерина [Yekaterina], leaving Prussia for Russia, converting from Lutheran to Russian 
Orthodox. Eighteen years later, in July 1762, Catherine led a coup against her husband Peter 
III, being crowned Empress Catherine II two months later. 
Amidst an extensive programme of reform, in January 1765, Catherine set about writing 
a work of jurisprudential guidance for a prospective Grand Commission. This Instruction or 
Наказ [Nakaz] borrowed extensively, often copying verbatim, from various Western European 
authors, including Montesquieu, Cesare Beccaria (1738–1794), François Quesnay (1694–1774), 
and Adam Smith (1723–1790), as well as the Encyclopédie.194 In July 1767, 460 Commission 
deputies were called to the opening ceremony and given copies of Catherine’s text.195 Written 
in her own hand, mostly in French, Catherine supervised the Russian translation and, in 1770, 
a lavish four-language edition was issued in St. Petersburg, featuring Russian, French, German, 
and Latin.196 Two years previous, the first English version had been published in London, and 
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a second, though long-unpublished, version was produced at the St. Petersburg Embassy of the 
Earl George Macartney (1737–1806).197 
Straight from Montesquieu’s Book I, Chapter III, the fifth paragraph of the Nakaz 
declared: 
“For those Laws are most conformable to Nature, the peculiar Genuise of which, is best 
suited to the Circumstances of the People for whom they are instituted.” 
However, what both English translations rendered as “Geniuse” and “Circumstances” were, in 
the French, in both cases, “disposition.” In Russian, likewise, the word chosen in both instances 
was “raspolozheniye”198 (location, disposition or arrangement). The German, like the English, 
differentiated “Einrichtung” (facility, establishment, arrangement) and “Beschaffenheit” (nature or 
composition). The Latin, meanwhile, utilised “tenor” and “tenori,” expressions suggesting holding 
to a course of movement, or the sense or contents of a law.199 The subsequent statement then 
declared, crucially: “Russia is a European Power.” Indeed, as per Montesquieu,200 Peter’s 
reforms had been successful because “the manners then existing” had “disagreed entirely with 
the nature of the Climate.” The transformation of Russian “mœurs” was thus given a climatic 
basis.  
Further indicative of a general familiarity, “le climat” of the French could be 
straightforwardly rendered in Russian and German as “klimatom”201 and “Klima,” respectively. 
The Latin, by contrast, opted for “coelo” (meaning air, climate or weather but also stars, 
universe, heaven). Montesquieu had written of those things that “govern men” and result in “a 
general esprit”: “climate, religion, laws, maxims of government, examples of past things, mœurs, 
manners.”202 Catherine retained the list although altered the order: 
“Mankind is influenced [gouvernent] by many things: Religion, Climate,203 Laws, 
Fundamental Maxims of Government, Examples of Actions, Morals [Mœurs], and 
Customs.”204 
Climate, it would seem, was now the second of all empires. Nevertheless, the hierarchy of 
climatic imperium was retained, with “Savage Nations”205 being “influenced almost solely by 
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Nature and the Climate.” Thus, while many legal and administrative terms were difficult to 
translate between French and Russian, climate was a communicable heritage, across the living 
European languages. 
The Commission ended in failure; sunk, according to its enlightened despot, by the 
ignorance of the gentry.206 Nevertheless, some 5,000 copies of the Nakaz were printed, in various 
editions; sections of it were read aloud in schools; and, moreover, Catherine was ultimately 
successful in legitimising her leadership and the principles of absolutism more generally.207 For 
all her lofty elocutions, Catherine ruled, and conquered, with the same ruthlessness that 
dispatched her much-despised husband.  
Shakespeare’s Gallic monarch possessed a hand that “sways the earth this climate 
overlooks.” Climates no longer looked down from the stars. And yet, they retained—and 
retain—the capacity to place peoples beyond reason’s latitudes. The seat of climatic Jerusalem 
was forever shifting; its grandeur ever ready to be reclaimed. 
6.3: This ensemble itself: The demands of the whole 
By the end of the eighteenth century, therefore, climate had become a concept both 
commonplace and contested, at least amongst the European intelligentsia. Over the next few 
decades, its significance was expanded and consolidated. 
In 1795, in the final of six Leçons d’histoire,208 Constantin François de Chassebœuf, comte 
de Volney explained what is required to construct an “exposition of the whole physical and 
moral system of a people.” 
“Taking a determinate people and country, one must first describe its climate, and, by 
climate, I mean [j’entends] the state of the sky under which each lives; its latitude, its 
temperature, according to the seasons; the annual system of winds, the humid or dry, 
cold or hot qualities of each rumb [i.e. direction or bearing]; the duration and returns, 
periodic or irregular; the amount of water that falls per year; the meteors, 
thunderstorms, fogs and hurricanes; then, passing to the physical constitution of the 
soil, it is necessary to make known the aspect and configuration of the ground, to 
calculate it for areas flat or mountainous, wooded or open [découvertes], dry or watery, 
for marshes, rivers and lakes; to determine the general elevation, and particular levels 
above sea level, as well as the slopes of large masses of earth to the diverse regions of 
the sky; then examine the nature of the diverse bands and strata of the ground [bandes 
et couches du terrain], its clayey or calceous, sandy, rocky, muddy [luteuse]209 or vegetal 
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qualities; its banks of schistose rocks, its granites, its marbles, its mines, its salts, its 
volcanoes, its waters, its vegetal productions of all kinds, trees, plants, grains, fruits; its 
wild animals [animaux volatiles], quadrupeds, fish and reptiles; finally, all that constitutes 
[ce qui compose] the physical state of the country.”210 
“If this,” Volney announced, “is what Montesquieu had meant [entendu] by climate, he ought to 
have said it and then there would have been no more debate.” Indeed, every day, new facts 
accumulate, “demonstrating that it is these circumstances” that form “the physical and moral 
constitution of nations”—circumstances that are “without regard to zones and latitudes.”211 
This breathless litany signals a patent expansion of empirical ambition, conceptual 
precision, and practical opportunity. It was during his voyages through Egypt and Syria, 
between 1782 and 1785, that Volney claims to have come to this exacting historical method. 
There, “under a single sky [sous un même ciel],” within four degrees of latitude, “the authority of 
Montesquieu was thwarted” by the many and various facts. Thus, Volney adds, “I resisted the 
empire of a great name,” who had only stated more vaguely what the ancients, Hippocrates in 
particular, had known long ago but with greater precision and insight.212 Beyond Bacon’s 
belittling of trivial epidemical travelogues, the ancients might yet best the Ancien Régime. 
In the same year as his Leçons, Volney set off on another three-year expedition, this time 
westward, resulting, in 1803, in the publication of Tableau du climat et du sol des États-Unis 
d’Amérique (translated into English the next year).213 Here, climate was explicated less 
exhaustively but more exactly. 
“BY climate, if we adhere to the literal signification of the word, we should understand 
[entendre] only the degree of latitude of a country [pays]: but since, generally speaking [parce 
qu’en thèse générale], countries are hot or cold according to their latitude, the secondary 
idea [l’idée accessoire] has become so intimately associated with the primitive [l’idée 
principale], that the term climate is now synonymous with that of the habitual temperature of 
the air. It is not true, however in fact, that the temperature is essentially determined by 
the latitude: on the contrary, numerous instances [une foule de faits] prove it to be 
modified, nay even it’s [sic] nature to be changed [et même dénaturée], by the different 
[diverse] circumstances of the soil such as it’s surface being dry or watery, woody or bare, 
high or low with respect to it’s elevation [son élévation ou son abaissement] above the level 
of the sea; it’s aspect [son exposition à tel ou tel aspect du ciel]; and more particularly by the 
kind and quality of it’s currents of air, or the winds that sweep [parcourent] it’s surface. 
Hence it follows, that the soil becomes an essential constituent [un élément constituant] of 
the temperature, and consequently of the climate, in the sense in which we understand 
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the word; and the account I have to give of the phenomena [divers phénomènes] of that of 
the United States will afford fresh proofs of this truth.”214 
While Bodin had pointedly noted the local effects of hills on characters and natures, this was 
not, for him, ‘climate’ as such. Furthermore, while Evelyn, a century later, expressly related the 
concept of climate to local conditions of relative shelter, this suggested nothing programmatic. 
Likewise, while climate was a crux for the dispute around Montesquieu’s materialism, his 
climate remained non-encompassing of airs and soils. No longer preoccupied with subterranean 
vapours, Volney’s pointed incorporation of soil was an overt acknowledgement of the role of 
clearing and ‘improvement’ of the surface of the land upon the local climate. However, this 
climate stopped short of being ‘total’—that is, of incorporating all surrounding entities, 
whatsoever they may be, in the manner of Comte’s milieu. 
In 1802, Cabanis, Volney’s friend, colleague, contemporary, companion salonist, fellow 
idéologue, and revolutionary moderate, published his Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme. 
After mémoires on the influence of age, sex, temperament, malady, and diet [régime] “on the 
formation of ideas and moral affections”—these being some of the “links [chaînons] that unite 
moral and physical nature”215—in the ninth chapter, he turned to matters climatic. Against 
those who would “overthrow [renverser] the whole system,” Cabanis entreats his readers to return 
to the meaning Hippocrates “attached to the word climate.” As the very title “Des Airs, Eaux et 
Lieux” demonstrates, Cabanis reasoned, the great physician addressed not only temperature and 
latitude but, moreover, “all the important objects proper to each soil, to each situation, all the 
constant and major qualities by which these objects can affect the senses and modify human 
nature.” 
“The climate, therefore, is not restricted to [resserré dans] the particular circumstances of 
latitudes, or of cold and heat; it embraces, in a manner absolutely general, the ensemble 
of physical circumstances attached to each locality [local]; it is this ensemble itself: and 
all the characteristic features [traits] by which nature has distinguished the different 
countries, enter into the idea that we must form of climate.”216 
Running to 1,108 pages over the two volumes, in the author’s note to the second edition of 
Rapports in 1805, Cabanis explained that, for greater ease of reading, three “tables de l’ouvrage” 
had been added: paginated indexes of matters and authors, plus a point-by-point condensed 
summary of each mémoire. The above definition was therefore given an abridged version: 
“WE must not reduce the word climate to mean only the latitude of a place [lieu], and 
the degree of heat that reigns there. This term must be understood [entendre] to mean 
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the entire ensemble [l’ensemble de toutes] of the natural and physical circumstances in the 
midst of which we live in each place. 
This is how Hippocrates understood it [l’entendoit].”217 
Crucially, this formulation—“l’ensemble de toutes”—prefigures Auguste Comte’s 1838 definition 
of milieu (“l’ensemble total des circonstances extérieures”). Whether or not this formulation of climate 
had any bearing on his definition, Comte’s proposed positivist reading list of 1851 listed 
Cabanis’ Rapports.218 
 The abridged version would be oft-quoted in the coming decades. For example, already 
in 1833, the poet August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767–1845) wrote (in French and without 
attribution) of climate being “l’ensemble de toutes les causes matérielles” that affect, directly or 
indirectly, the inhabitants of a place.219 The next year, the first edition of A Dictionary of Practical 
Medicine by the Scottish physician James Copland (1791–1870) began its entry on “CLIMATE. 
Syn. (From κλιμα, a region)” by noting: 
“Climate, in its rigorous acceptation, means only a district placed between certain 
equatorial and meridional circles; but it possesses a much wider signification in 
medicine […].” 
The shorter definition of the Rapports was duly quoted to authorise the point.220 In 1839, it was 
taken as a chapter epigraph in the Official report on the medical topography and climate of Calcutta221 by 
James Ranald Martin (1796–1874), a surgeon in the employ of the British East India Company. 
An 1841 review of Martin’s report approvingly noted this citation, remarking that “in a 
professional sense, it is impossible to take too extended a view of climate.”222 In 1842, the same 
epigraph appeared on the title page of The climate of the United States and its endemic influences by 
Samuel Forry (1811–1844), assistant Army surgeon and founding editor of the New York Journal 
of Medicine.223 
However, whether or not any of those who reproduced this statement with deference to 
Cabanis had perused his 1,108 pages, they had not read the author’s note to the second edition 
or the beginning of the additional “tables de l’ouvrage” very carefully, both of which made clear 
that the summary of each mémoire—and thus the precise formulation “l’ensemble de toutes”—had, 
in fact, been composed by Cabanis’ friend, colleague, and successor at the Académie française, 
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Antoine Destutt de Tracy, the aristocrat and philosopher best remembered for having coined 
the term “idéologie.”224 
~~~~~~ 
It took some millennia for the hitherto astronomical, astrological, or geographical climate to 
become aligned with the tenets of the Hippocratic tradition. Insofar as a singular concept was 
required for the progressively mechanised ‘Hippocrates’ reanimated by Sydenham, Arbuthnot, 
and others, it was the epidemical constitution that was primary. Climates as classificatory 
cartographical distinctions had initially been useful in primarily latitudinal terms. In this sense, 
the earlier development of climatic conception was not so much globalising as sectionalising. 
The earth, inhabited or otherwise, explored or mysterious, was given powerful degrees of 
equivalence relating to its exposure to the sun, and to the other astéres planē̃tai. 
Nevertheless, climates were, from very early on, rather more than organisational. Such 
sectional equivalence also entailed, necessarily, local difference. The climatic chauvinism of 
being in the middle of the middle of the middle went along with a morality of temperance—
being the most balanced, the most moderated. Moreover, it could also write this temperance 
into a kind of physio-physico-climatic autochthony: any given people could only inhabit those 
lands under familiar climates. However, given other physiological and medical principles, 
climatic supremacy could just as well license imperial disinhibition: the building of empires upon 
which the sun never inclines beyond the horizon. 
 Moreover, the power of climatic explanation could fortify not only latitude-specific or 
non-specific constitutional convictions, it also provided a powerful implement of governance. 
When quietly reflecting in his own papers, Montesquieu could entertain the freedom of peoples 
and persons relative to their characteristic principles of location. Nevertheless, in expounding 
the very spirit of the laws, it was not any degree of freedom but, rather, proper conviction of 
decision making that was of consequence. 
                                               
224 The paginated indexes of matters and authors were by “M. Sue.” The index of authors noted both Sue’s and 
Tracy’s authorship. The third edition of 1815 (posthumous) even displayed this on the title page, albeit with Tracy’s 
name starred out: “PAR M. D***-T***, Membre de l’Institut.” Cabanis 1815, vol. 1; Cabanis 1815, vol. 2. The 
only text I know of to quote the original and note the attribution to Tracy: Cheung 2014, 170. 
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Excursus C: Ontodesic: The partage of possibility 
As seen in §1, for Rachel Carson, circa 1962, while the whole history of terrestrial life had been 
one of the “interaction between living things and their surroundings,” it was only within the 
twentieth century that “one species—man—acquired significant power to alter the nature of 
his world.”1 Such diagnoses are, today, the stuff of everyday headlines. 
 Thus far, we have spoken of ontology in terms of collective obligation (§A) and manifest 
experience (§B). However, any discussion will be incomplete so long as it does not incorporate 
the dimension of action and anticipation. The reality-effect that the concept of ontology means 
to understand, it has been said, is a matter of establishing, “for any given occasion, what is 
encountered as possible” (§3). 
 The confrontation of “man” and “environment” was a central theme of Carson’s time, 
and only became more so in the subsequent years. It is to understand such distributions of 
agency, with all due “realism,” that the ontodesic is necessary.  
~~~~~~ 
Long before climates became a matter of Euro-Imperial jurisprudential validation, and aside 
from their recurrent cartographic and organisational convenience, such divisions in the earth 
and sky were frequently contested as regards their relegation or elevation of those upon which 
they imposed. 
 For instance, despite their shared Stoic adherences, Strabo criticised his predecessor 
Posidonius for exaggerating the effect of geographical and climatic distributions compared to 
education, and other institutions.2 Plotinus, in the second century AD, criticised astro-climatic 
theories for making those on which they impose into mere stones, rolling.3 The Stoic problem 
of proaíresis4—that is, will, volition, choice, or moral character—was also taken up by Bardaisan 
in his criticism of the septenary doctrine of the Chaldeans, in which he noted that various laws 
had been established in various countries, regardless of stars and inclinations. When, nearly a 
millennium later, Judah Halevi placed Jerusalem in the central climate, thus granting its 
inhabitants the utmost humoral moderation, he was particularly concerned with aptitude for 
prophecy—a capacity that, in exile, had been observed diminished.5 Similarly, Khaldun 
                                               
1 Carson [1962] 2002, 5–6. 
2 Glacken 1967, 104–105. 
3 Ibid., 113. 
4 προαίρεσις. Ramelli 2009, 45. 
5 Altmann 2005, 240. 
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conceived the spirit as being a fine bodily vapour, sensitive to climate, that explained dreams, 
insanity, and prophetic experience.6  
Only several centuries later, Arbuthnot described the Hippocratic estimation of Air to 
be one of “the Powers of the Universe,” which “Human Nature cannot overcome.” While 
Montesquieu’s De l’esprit des loix was perhaps more nuanced than some critics allowed, their 
judgements nevertheless demonstrated a clear contrast. As La Porte also wrote:  
“What an idea, wanting to attribute everything to climate & government, & nothing to 
passions, taste, prejudices, education, fashion [à la mode], everything physical & nothing 
moral; everything to the elements & nothing to man!”7 
“[I]n a word,” La Porte added, “it’s the way of thinking [façon de penser] & not the climate” that 
matters.8 Likewise, for Voltaire “the climate cedes to opinion,”9 while, for Hume, two decades 
earlier, much like for Tarde a century and a half later, it was the “sympathy or contagion of 
manners” that were primary.10 
Such longitudinal connections should not imply a direct lineage, nor epochal 
equivalence. Nevertheless, they do demonstrate the possibility of tradition, hard-earned through 
myriad acts of requisitive reception. The ontonomic commitments, and ontoturgic efforts, 
relating to such have been reconstructed only barely. However, it should be plain that the 
Brethren of Purity, Bodin, or Catherine II inhabited rather different worlds. And how different 
these worlds were, too, from the much-satellited, carbonically overburdened situation of today. 
 However, upon this point, it becomes necessary to establish and maintain another 
distinction. As stated in §B (and now more precisely), there may be an objection made, “at once 
facile and needful of all seriousness”: in relinquishing the ontological fundamentality of earth 
and/or nature as given unities that underlie and hence guarantee the ultimate coexistence of all 
collectives as such, and in thus insisting upon a manifold of worlds, it may be assumed (a) that 
someone can simply declare themselves ‘in another world,’ and, moreover, (b) that being thus 
differently worlded, subject to different ontonomic obligations, entails a fundamental 
arbitrariness with regard to what, in any given situation, one may hold to.11 This is indeed the 
risk of admitting the existence of the ontoturgic: If fictive implies frippery, and aesthetic implies 
ornamental, then it really may seem that “things can really be made up as they go along.” 
 However, this objection altogether misconstrues what is at stake, and what is being 
claimed. From Strabo to Montesquieu, and beyond, the issues that such authors were debating 
                                               
6 Khaldûn 1958, vol. 1, 63. 
7 La Porte 1751, 87–88. 
8 Ibid., 97. 
9 Voltaire 1784, 35. 
10 Hume 1889, vol. 1, 246–249. 
11 Cf. Lugones 2003, 20–21. 
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and narrating were not only the obligations germane to their situation, or the aptitudes for 
bringing them into patency but, furthermore, the distribution of possibilities for action that such 
obligations entailed. It is for this reason that the nomós of the ontonomic had to be divested of 
its essential association with “distribution.” Thus dissociated, this capacity can now be 
formulated as ontodesic.  
~~~~~~ 
In 1992, Michel Callon and Bruno Latour rejoindered to sociological critics of the “ontological 
experiments” each had respectively undertaken12 that, rather than taking the “distribution of 
agencies between the things-in-themselves and the humans-among-themselves”13 as a given, the 
more productive endeavour would be to study the distribution itself. That is, rather than 
accepting “a fixed repertoire of agencies”—either social or natural, a priori—the sociologist 
should start from “the very act of distributing or dispatching agencies.”14  
In 2013, as seen in §3, Latour argued that the philosophy of science had become “the 
main knot for the settlement of legitimate ontologies: that is, for what should be expected from 
agencies”—a task for which anthropology was also crucial.15 Thus, as per two decades previous, 
anthropologists were encouraged to study, rather than presume, the distribution.16 However, 
and crucially, it was not only the much-discussed division between nature and society that was 
now at issue but, furthermore, all relevant differences pertaining to the conflicts between 
Western naturalistic ontologies, and those of other collectives. 
This is the point from which I wish to formulate the ontodesic.  
In French, one may speak of la distribution, much the same as English. However, le partage, 
also, has a similar range of significance, entailing distribution, in the sense of allocation, or 
placement, but also sharing, parcelling, or apportioning. Moreover, as seen in the Exposé of 1784 
that denounced Mesmerian attempts to “partager & agiter les esprits,” it may also mean distribution 
in the sense of dividing, or partitioning.17 This somewhat conflicted cluster of meaning, 
combining both apportioning and partitioning, is what I want to relate to the ontodesic—from 
daíō, to divide; as per geodesy, or geōdaisía (literally, earth-division). That is: there are varieties of 
agencies; these varieties bear distinct qualities or capacities; the possibility of all action depends 
upon which kinds of agencies are being related to which—soul to stars, humours to climate, 
                                               
12 Collins and Yearly 1992; Callon and Latour 1992, 345. 
13 Callon and Latour 1992, 366. 
14 Ibid., 350. 
15 Latour 2014, 302. 
16 Though Latour did not use this exact expression. 
17 E.g. Jacques Rancière’s Partage du Sensible, rendered in English as “The Distribution of the Sensible.” Rancière 
2006. 
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and so on. Thus, the conceptual statements historicised herein can be understood as addressing 
and contesting ontodesic distributions of what ontonomically obligates, and ontoturgically 
works into patency. 
 Before Hume’s para-laboratorial extrication of mind from nature, John Locke divided 
reality into primary qualities (those inhering in objects regardless of their observation) and 
secondary (the effects of the primary upon mind)—a demarcation that Alfred North Whitehead 
later took as the archetype for what he diagnosed as “the bifurcation of nature.”18 Durkheim, 
for his part, undertook to found sociology upon its sui generis irreducibility to the biological or 
physical (a model largely followed by the critics of Callon and Latour’s “ontological 
experiments”). Tarde, by contrast, insisted that “sociology” could be a science of all kinds of 
associations. Nevertheless, imitative reflections were primary, and the social milieu could 
therefore be taken in isolation from the natural in the fictive abstraction of his speculative 
sociological parable (see §D). 
 However, such authors were not only concerned with distributive divisions relating to 
the social and natural, or mind and world. As already seen with Hume and Tarde, and as will 
be shown further in §8 and §9 with Thomas Carlyle, William James, and others, among the 
discussions formative of Euro-American social thought during the eighteenth, and particularly 
nineteenth, centuries, was that concerning the role of “Great Men” relative to the general 
masses. Indeed, Tarde’s lyricism concerning “the true and truly beneficial geniuses by whom 
we live, in whom we move, without whom we would be nothing” may be understood as an 
attempt to reclaim the authoritative concept of “milieu” from the likes of Durkheim, who would 
employ it to ontologically dissolve the vaulting individual into a pressurised atmosphere of 
aleatority. 
Thus, in addition to historically varied lines of climatic partition, both natural and social 
milieus were matters of distributive propriety. Indeed, in these latter distinctions can be found 
an enduring homology. As noted appositely (if anachronistically) by Luhmann in §2, before 
beings could have an “environment,” their mode of relation with all others had to be defined in 
terms of interiority and externality. Notionally, such a division was present in the 
Commissioners’ Rapport, which equated “physical” causes with “external,” and may be evident 
in experimental practice in general. 
However, while such distinctions are undoubtedly crucial for understanding the history 
recounted herein, they are not sufficient. A fuller understanding can be had by a consideration 
of the issue of racism. 
~~~~~~ 
                                               
18 Whitehead 1920, chap. 2. 
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In 1995, the historian and anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot argued that the Haitian 
Revolution (ending with the declaration of independence on 1st January 1804, beginning in 
August 1791) was, from the contemporaneous White Euro-American perspective, 
“unthinkable.” 
“Indeed, the contention that enslaved Africans and their descendants could not 
envision freedom—let alone formulate strategies for gaining and securing such 
freedom—was based not so much on empirical evidence as on an ontology, an implicit 
organization of the world and its inhabitants.”19 
This event was “unthinkable,” that is, not only before but also after it occurred. Black slaves—
by the very nature of black slaves—could not act with rigorous organisation, strategic planning, 
and ruthless efficacy. Much less could they possess an ideal of freedom. This was axiomatic. 
Such ‘unthinkability’ did not, of course, preclude a brutal attempted (and failed) reconquest. 
Nevertheless, whether or not Trouillot is correct that European minds were, at that time, 
constitutively incapable of holding to “the fundamental unity of humankind in the same way 
some of us do today” (a strong structural anachrony),20 the point is that this event upset the 
existing distribution of agencies so radically that it could scarcely be understood as an event at 
all—an historical ignorance that endures to this day. 
Of course, there is no question that people act (and do not act) on the basis of things 
they do not intend, and of which they are not especially cognisant. However, there is a danger 
inherent in assuming this as a general principle: How and when can anyone, if anyone, be 
excepted?21 Understood in the terms developed herein, it might be said, rather, that White 
Euro-Americans—as they saw it, not only consciously but conscientiously—considered the 
existence of the black slave to be reducible to the manner in which said slaves were manifested 
in the White common-place: that is, effectively, in the slave-yard. Thus, more or less by 
definition, a slave cannot maintain a common-place of its own.22 
To be sure, it was well understood by, for example, plantation slaveholders in the 
American colonies that many black Africans were highly skilled in metallurgy, hydrology, 
medicine, and other practices necessary to the furtherment of their enterprise.23 Likewise, they 
can hardly have been unaware of the regular rebellions, runaways, and maroon communities 
that were generated as a result of the trade. Nevertheless, it should be clear that, in terms of 
common significance, there could not be “roads not taken” to black collectives, except as a trail 
of “degeneration,” perhaps under the deleterious effects of climate. Indeed, polygenism—the 
                                               
19 Trouillot 1995, 73; Sepinwall 2013. 
20 Trouillot 1995, 82. 
21 Cf. Dutoit’s criticism of Taine (§1). 
22 Cf. Roberts 2015. 
23 Schiebinger 2017. 
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doctrine, espoused by Voltaire, Hume, and others, that different races were, in fact, different 
species—inscribed this impossibility into the existentially, and even providentially, immutable 
lines of speciation itself (to be sure, “not so much on empirical evidence…”). 
Thus understood, the racialised distribution of agencies entailed in Trouillot’s analysis 
informs the ontodesic in several respects: First, a “distribution” requires not merely the relative 
positioning of concepts. Rather, it also involves the configuration of all sorts of bodies, related 
in many kinds of modalities. Second, it shows that a distribution may be disconfirmable by 
agencies themselves. However, equally, nothing guarantees that an event will be recognised as 
such by a collective established upon the basis of the effective nonexistence of other collectives 
qua collectives. Third, it should be readily apparent that the racialisation of persons made black 
and slave through the epoch known as “modern”24 occurred in close-knit relation not only with 
changing conceptions of physiological immutability but, correlatively, with changing forms of 
climatic explanation. 
Today, climate has itself become an agency applying extreme torsion to those 
distributions that consider its form of event to be impossible. However, long before this 
development, climates were agencies invoked in the construction of the very order that brought 
about this torsioning.25 
~~~~~~ 
This analysis is, of course, far from complete—both with respect to racialisation, and in terms 
of the other traditional categories of sociological analysis that could be related to the process of 
distribution and partition in this way.26 Nevertheless, with this admittedly cursory analysis, it 
should now possible to confront again the objection that would denounce the very notion of 
manifold worlds. 
As a successful popular science writer put it in 1995: 
“Show me a cultural relativist at thirty thousand feet and I’ll show you a hypocrite. 
Airplanes built according to scientific principles work. […] Airplanes built to tribal or 
mythological specifications, such as the dummy planes of the cargo cults in jungle 
clearings or the beeswaxed wings of Icarus, don’t. […] Tribal science, believing that 
the moon is just above the treetops, will never touch it outside of dreams.”27 
Such self-declared-rationalist haranguings are certainly not uncommon. However, it should be 
made clear: While several statements quoted herein have been identified as a resounding “cry” 
                                               
24 Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam 2014; Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015. 
25 Haraway 2015. 
26 An analysis incorporating the concept of “intersectionality” is thus possible; however, this would require more 
space than is available here. Crenshaw 1989; Mollett and Faria 2018. 
27 Dawkins 1995, 32–32. 
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that must be respected, this statement must, taken in a political modality, be understood as a 
“symptom”; indeed, a poison. 
Of course, no one has ever claimed that “tribal” knowledges (whatever “tribal” is 
supposed to mean) would be practicable as regards the construction and operation an 
aeroplane. However, let us take this statement charitably and assume that those making such 
remarks are comprehending of this fact. Taken thus, the real, and insidious, point must be found 
as implied, and thus imputed: That there is no problem or situation for which Western, natural-
scientific knowledge would not be, unequivocally, the best of all available knowledges as regards 
this reality. Or, put another way: That were non-Western, non-natural-scientific manners of 
reception to disappear, nothing would be lost. Besides the curious ‘richness’ of human diversity, of 
course. 
  This fundamentally malicious supposition is here invoked, then, not for the sake of 
condemnation—though hereby condemned it is. Rather, its purpose is to underscore the 
seriousness of what is at stake: The ontodesic involves a real division; a cutting, or incision, if 
you will; a ‘real material effect,’ if you prefer. It concerns not only what kinds of things exist, 
and in what relation, but, as a direct consequence of this, what kinds of things do not exist, and 
have no claim on doing so.  
However, and moreover, it also concerns the very possibility of performing any action. 
Thus, the popular writer is correct about one thing: One must be extremely careful in 
understanding the mode of existence in accordance with which any given thing must be 
engaged. What the mode of existence of any given thing requires cannot be reduced to the 
ontonomic obligations collectively arrived at with respect to it. Or, stated another way: the 
common-place is where it is established how any given thing—be it familiar or (so to speak) 
outlandish—is to be received. Thus, to be sure, Aristotelian, or Icarian, or “tribal” physics are 
unlikely to be much use to the professional practice of an engineer working for BAE Systems. 
But only in a chauvinist’s sarcasm is such confusion likely to occur. 
Not unlike the situation of the slave-yard, the disposition that assumes “nothing would 
be lost” precludes the possibility of “roads not taken”—that is, of ever thinking or relating 
otherwise. It seeks to extend its own common-place to the boundaries of the universe, in 
perpetuity. It thinks itself a universal tradition. 
In conclusion, then, I will make a further claim: Those who adhere to the principle that 
“nothing would be lost” should have no license to the appellation “realist.” Rather, the more 
appropriate term would be “finalist”—or, in more Greco-philosophical fashion, “telist”: A telist 
is one who pursues the thought that would allow us to stop thinking. That is, not just to “stop thinking” 
with regard to any given problem but to stop thinking in general. By contrast, a realist is one 
who situates thought in practical relation with the requirements of things; that is, with their relevant modes of 
existence.  
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Thus, a realist qua realist possesses no powers of disqualification whatsoever. Their 
practice bears no necessary relation to matters of ontological hygiene. As such, any claim they 
make on nonexistence must involve a shift of register to an unambiguously political mode of 
ontology: that of making things ‘a thing of the past’ (§F).  
 And so, it is now possible to answer the “cry” previously found in Doležel’s 
condemnation of totalitarian fiction-ontology:28 Any historical work worthy of that appellation 
must be articulated in accordance with the realism that bears relevance to it—that is, with 
regard to the assembled evidence; to the assembled traces of past events. However, this is an 
operation that necessarily involves other issues and modalities of action. The historian’s 
problem is, therefore, to relate these differences in a text (if not, precisely, to ‘reconcile’ them). 
Of course, no appeal to “evidence” is ever innocent or straightforward, in particular 
when evidentiary records have been subject to not only decay, or incomprehension, but, 
moreover, systematic erasure (as is emphatically the case in colonial history).29 This will be taken 
up further in §F. Nevertheless, before that, having understood the significance of obligation, 
patency, and now realism, as regards the deamalgamation of ontology, another crucial issue is now 
raised:  
If the trivium—understood as the common-place and locus of attention where the 
reception of certain beings is cultivated in their particular reality—cannot be grounded in 
nature or earth as a pregiven global unity made partial by a founding act of division, how is 
each common-place not to hang as if in mid-air; that is, as if in the aether? 
This will be taken up in §D. 
                                               
28 Doležel 1998b, 799. 
29 Mir 2015; Shepard 2015; Stein 2015; Elkins 2015; Neptune 2015; El Shakry 2015; Bailkin 2015; Cobain, 
Bowcott, and Norton-Taylor 2012; Sato 2017. 
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7: “Veins of the Macrocosm”: Circulation from Halley to Humboldt 
In the British Medical Journal for Saturday, 25th August 1860, the Cornish physician Charles 
Foster Barham (1804–1884), on the topic of “Climate, and the Cosmical Agencies affecting it,” quoted 
the definition of climate attributed to Cabanis that was, by now, rather familiar for medical 
climatologists: “the entire ensemble of the natural and physical circumstances […].”1 Barham 
noted this definition to be “perhaps rather wide,” and suggested adopting that offered by 
Alexander von Humboldt’s recently published Cosmos: 
“The expression climate, taken in its most general sense, signifies all those states and 
changes of the atmosphere which sensibly affect our organs […].” 
Such phenomena would include, at a minimum: temperature, humidity, air pressure, winds, 
electrical tension, aerial exhalations, and transparency.2 However, Barham adds, if “we trace 
these conditions further back to their source, we must, I think, attribute them, for the most part, 
ultimately to the sun.”3 In 1867, John Patterson, a physician in the Egyptian Medical Service, 
criticised Humboldt’s definition, which, “though exceedingly comprehensive, fails in embracing 
many other conditions necessary to the study of medical climatology from its most scientific 
point of view.”4 The next year, a review of Patterson’s book noted: “He would probably be 
better pleased with that short but all-embracing phrase of Cabanis.”5 
Thus, Humboldt’s moderately comprehensive climate presented a not-incontestable 
alternative to that of Cabanis, as neo-Hippocratic holism was gradually divested of its ancient 
affiliations. However, there was more to Humboldt’s climatology than the medical, or 
aesthetical. 
In 1800, the same year that Jean-Baptiste Lamarck made his noted statement 
concerning les milieux environnans—“[t]he principal circumstances are born of the influence of 
climates, the variations in the temperature of the atmosphere and of all the surrounding 
milieus”—the same author published an essay on the method of recording meteorological 
observations, writing: 
“It seems [for meteorologists] that the sole purpose of meteorological observations is to 
obtain the determination of the extreme terms and average terms of the variations that the 
atmosphere undergoes in each climate. It very much appears, however, that one can 
do more […].”6 
                                               
1 Barham quotes the French. 
2 Humboldt 1846b, vol. 1, 312. 
3 Barham 1860, 660. 
4 Patterson 1867, 1–2. 
5 Anonymous 1868, 166. 
6 Lamarck 1800b, 419. 
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As seen in §4, Lamarck’s far-in-advance meteorological reports, published in eleven volumes as 
Annuaire Météorologique between 1800 and 1810, were less than warmly received amongst his 
peers,7 with his “probabilités” being cast as “prédictions,” and earning the denunciation of Laplace, 
among others. Around the same time, Volney, and Cabanis (with de Tracy) were formulating 
conceptions of climate that closely resembled the “milieu” that Comte would later formulate, 
and with which Lamarck would later be closely associated. 
While, in 1832, Cuvier posthumously disparaged Lamarck’s anti-experimental 
predilections as having been “destitute of the means of doing so [aucun moyen de le faire],” there 
was nothing lacking in the means of Humboldt, circa 1800. Indeed, in this very year, his 
meteorological despatches from Caracas had featured in Lamarck’s Annuaire, and he was very 
much convinced “that one can do more”—though the “method of means [moyennes],” as he 
would later call it, remained essential.8 
 This chapter will therefore come to investigate the place of climate within Humboldt’s 
career, understood through his major publications. However, first, it will consider the relation 
of naturalistic knowledge, exploration, and the increasingly close relationship between these 
with projects of state power—the authors and actors involved in this process being some of 
Humboldt’s principal predecessors, inspirations, and associates. Then, second, it will explicate 
in detail the portion of Johann Gottfried Herder’s philosophy of history concerned with climate. 
Not only did Herder, in this work, undertake a wide-ranging philosophical synthesis of the 
climatic works of preceding years but, moreover, was among the first to explicitly formulate 
climate as a distinct concept—and as a concept more expansive than had been the case for 
Montesquieu. Humboldt, then, is understood to follow these developments. 
7.1: From Helena to Pennsylvania: The enrolments of naturalism 
In June 1676, the British East India Company received correspondence from the King 
recommending that Edmund Halley (1656–1742) and a companion be admitted to “the first 
ship bound for St Helen’s,” receiving every aid and convenience so that they might undertake 
“rectifying and finishing the celestial globe.”9 The pair set off soon afterwards, spending a year 
on the island, returning to England in May 1678.  
In 1686, Halley published an account of the trade winds. Assembled from his own 
experiences and those of conversant seafarers, he appealed for the kindness of “any Master of a 
Ship, or other person, well informed of the Nature of the Winds” who might “communicate 
                                               
7 Burkhardt [1977] 1995, 10. 
8 Humboldt 1820, 5; Humboldt 1817, 13. 
9 Quoted in Cook 1998, 61–63. 
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their Observations” so that the history “may be either confirmed or amended, or by the addition 
of some material Circumstances enlarged.”10 In 1691, Halley added an essay on water 
Figure 12—Map of the trade winds; Edmond Halley, 1686 
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circulation, postulating “the Method used by Nature” in returning marine “Vapours” back 
again to the sea. In being heated and thus expanded, water particles are caused to rise in 
proportion to the warmth to which they are subject, as can be observed in “a boyling 
Cauldron.”11 Meeting land, vapours cool and hence contract—a phenomenon that had 
produced “a great Impediment to [his] Celestial Observations” on Saint Helena. In such 
manner “is the Circulation performed,” and such “Streams” gently descend, “like so many 
Veins of the Macrocosm to be the more beneficial to the Creation.”12 
By this time, Halley was one of the best-connected savants in England. It was through his 
encouragement—even insistence—that Newton had been coaxed into publishing his Principia 
in 1687. It was he who brought it to press, corrected the proofs, paid for its publication from his 
own funds, and prepared the King’s personal précis.13 From 1698 to 1701, Halley was made 
master and commander of the HMS Paramour, for the purpose of making magnetic observations. 
The results were published in 1701 as a map of the Atlantic, showing lines of equal magnetic 
inclination14—what became known as “Halleyan lines”15 or “isolines.” It was in 1705 that 
Halley claimed the comets observed in 1456, 1531, 1607, and 1682 to be one and the same, 
predicting its return in 1758.  
The eponymous comet remains Halley’s most famed legacy; however, it was these other 
works (along with allegations, made by various enemies, of boorish and adulterous behaviours), 
that earned him his contemporaneous notoriety. Nevertheless, in Halley’s example we should 
notice three things in particular: first, the increasingly sophisticated conceptual and 
technological infrastructures by which diverse sciences were being assembled; second, the close, 
contractual alliances that were thereby being made with commercial and military agencies; 
third, the fact that, despite his interest in all manner of matters and mediums elementary, 
circulatory, colonial, and geophysical, singularly absent from Halley’s concerns was the concept 
of climate.16 
By contrast, when Charles Marie de La Condamine (1701–1774) published his Journal du 
voyage fait par ordre du roi à l’équateur in 1751, he was writing within a genre for which the 
description of various climats was a long-established practice.17 However, such descriptions were 
not the principal occasion of the mission despatched by Louis XV to Ecuador from 1735 to 
                                               
10 Halley 1686b, 162. 
11 Halley 1686a, 469. 
12 Ibid., 470–473. 
13 Shapin 1998. 
14 Laloë 2016, 115. 
15 E.g. Cavallo 1787, 340. 
16 Bibliography: Rudolph 1905. 
17 La Condamine 1751. 
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1739. Rather, in collaboration with a corresponding mission to Lapland lead by Pierre Louis 
Maupertuis (1698–1759), the assembled savants were to determine Newton’s geogonic 
deduction as to the Earth being an oblate spheroid (i.e. rounder at the equator)—a conjecture 
that was confirmed. 
By mid-century, naturalistic expeditions by European savants were becoming ever more 
frequent and extensive. Carl Linnaeus (1707–1778), for example, had travelled to Lapland in 
1735. However, his students and followers, given free passage by the Swedish East India 
Figure 13—“New and Correct Chart Shewing the Variations of the Compass”; Edmond Halley, 1701 
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Company,18 forayed rather more widely. Pehr Kalm (1716–1779), in particular, travelled to 
Pennsylvania, and as far north as Montreal between 1748 and 1751. His travelogues, passed 
comment on, for example, the town of Whitefield’s “temperate climate [behagligt Climat],” as 
well as the state’s fine water, and the convenience of Delaware for trade.19 However, if climate 
was a wholly familiar concept, it was not a technically imperative one. Nor were issues of 
“circulation.” The abiding problem binding natural philosophy to state patronage at this time 
was, and for some time would remain, that of efficiently and accurately establishing longitude 
at sea. In July 1714, the British Parliament had passed the Longitude Act, offering financial 
rewards for a solution to the problem. Transatlantic commerce was booming, the trade in 
human beings at the centre of it. 
In 1766, the Admiral Louis-Antoine, Comte de Bougainville (1729–1811) received 
permission from Louis XV to circumnavigate the globe.20 Duly furnished with relevant savants, 
the expedition’s two vessels landed at Tahiti in April 1768, a year after the expedition led by 
Samuel Wallis (1728–1795) had condescended to lay claim to the island in the name of the 
English Crown in June 1767. Bougainville’s Le voyage autour du monde of 1771 provided the natural 
history of the voyage, though, once more, the concept of climate was largely inessential.21 
As seen in §4, the Comte de Buffon (1707–1788) was well-acquainted with such geogonic 
incandescences as were the subject of La Condamine and Maupertuis’ Newton-corroborating 
expeditions, calculating, as he did, the age of the earth upon the basis of its immemorial 
solidification within the “milieu ambiant.” Issues of the milieu were not those of climate. However, 
in 1766, his influential essay De la dégénération des animaux began by commenting on the 
“alterations” endured by the nature of “man” once he “has begun to swap one sky for another 
[commencé à changer de ciel], and has spread from climate to climate,” away from his place of origin. 
At first, the changes were but slight but, over the centuries, the species “degenerated [dégénérées] 
under the influence of different lands [terres],” venturing eventually to the “extreme climates” of 
the “south [Midi]” and “north [Nord].”22 
Such unparalleled climatic versatility, beyond that of any other plant or animal, Buffon 
attributed to the “soul [âme]” rather than to the body.23 In Des époques de la nature of 1778, he 
inscribed this supremacy into a geogonic teleology. There had been seven epochs of terrestrial 
time and this, the seventh, was the epoch of man, announced as: “When the power [puissance] 
                                               
18 Pratt, 25 
19 Kalm 1772, vol. 1, 36; Kalm 1756, vol. 2, 183–184. 
20 This was to be the first French circumnavigation, although the Victoria of Magellan and Elcano had become 
the first Europeans to do so between 1519 and 1522. 
21 Bougainville 1771. 
22 Buffon 1829, vol. 18, 255. 
23 Ibid., vol. 18, 256. 
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of man has come to assist [secondé] that of nature.” In “the hands of man,” Buffon wrote, forests, 
usually bringers of cold, become “food [aliment] for the element of fire.” Thus, “man can modify 
the influences of the climate that he inhabits, and fix, so to speak, the temperature at the point 
most appropriate [convient] to him.”24 However, not all were so optimistic. For example, Pierre 
Poivre (1719–1786), Intendant of the Isle de France (i.e. Mauritius) from 1767, prominently 
raised the deleterious issues of deforestation, installing a series of conservation programmes in 
order to protect the island’s resources—a model much discussed and imitated.25  
In 1772, both Johann Reinhold Forster and his son Johann Georg Adam Forster (1754–
1794) were taken aboard the second voyage of Captain James Cook (1728–1779) to the Pacific, 
returning to Europe in 1775. The first expedition of 1768 to 1771 had set forth ostensibly as 
part of a multi-national enterprise to observe the transit of Venus, thereby more accurately 
measuring the distance from the earth to the sun, leading to more accurate calculations of 
longitude. However, Cook’s vessel was secretly instructed to diverge from their announced 
course and search, instead, for Terra Australis, the long-conjectured southern land mass. 
Forster the elder’s subsequent Observations Made During a Voyage Round the World (1778) 
discoursed widely.26 Climates were, variously, “wretched,” “rigid,” “fine,”27 and so on, and 
were well-understood as the result of more than latitude alone.28 Forster the younger’s A Journey 
around the world, likewise, wrote of climates “hot,” “cold,” “tropical,” also telling of the troubles, 
ailments, and aliments found variously throughout.29 His father cited “[t]he Great Mr. de 
Montesquieu” on the subject of the effects of a fish diet on the prolificacy of a people.30 Likewise, 
both regularly cited the collative and interpretive tomes of Buffon. However, their conceptions 
often differed from the past masters. Whereas Buffon had identified the Caspian Sea region as 
the most probable locus of human origins—that place of original balance from which migration, 
and “degeneration,” subsequently ensued—Johann Reinhold considered that “the human 
species was originally settled, in or near the tropics and from thence spread towards the 
extremities.”31 That is, the further a people drifts and adapts to climates far from the tropics, 
the greater that people will “degenerate.” 
However, while departing from their predecessors in granting the peoples of the tropics 
ancestral and climatic priority, Forster was not providing ethnographic proofs to a Rousseauian 
                                               
24 Buffon 1829, vol. 5, 336–337; Buffon 2018, 128. 
25 Grove 1996, 199–216. 
26 Forster 1778. 
27 Ibid., 134, 231, passim. 
28 Ibid., 97. 
29 Forster [1777] 2000, 38, 51, passim. 
30 Forster 1778, 314–315. 
31 Ibid., 292–293. 
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state of nature.32 On the contrary, the densely populated and technologically sophisticated 
islanders of Tahiti, or “O-TAHEITEE” as Forster writes, were characterised not by a naïf 
bucolicity but, rather, a high state of development. The fertile soil was well-cultivated, with 
lands divided into “private property, well and neatly fenced in”; domestic animals were well 
cared for, with the islanders’ houses and boats displaying many impressive “conveniences” and 
“contrivances”; their clothing, “well adapted to the climate” and embellished with “texture and 
dyes”; their poetry and songs a wonder, and so on.33  
The tropical climate, J.R. Forster argued, “certainly contributes a great deal” to the 
“felicity” of the Tahitians; however, “farther to the West, new isles in the same happy climate, 
and in the same latitude” harboured inhabitants “infinitely inferior in point of civilization.”34 
Georg Forster was likewise cautious about climatic fatality, being “far from convinced of this 
general and powerful influence of climates.” Thus, although “the influence of climate,” as had 
been “so strongly defended by count Buffon,” could not be discounted, nor did its generalisers’ 
abstract pronouncements stand up to the complications of experience.35 
Buffon’s observation that forests and deforestation could affect the local temperature 
were nothing new. Evelyn, Dubos, Hume, and many others, had observed similarly.36 However, 
it was in the Americas that such debates became of particular significance, with colonists apt to 
be disappointed by the continent’s climates, even when sharing latitudes with European 
homelands. Thus, climatic amelioration was to become a matter of self-conscious patriotism. 
For example, in 1763, Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790) wrote to Ezra Stiles (1727–1795) that 
“cleared land absorbs more heat and melts snow quicker.” The physician and politician Hugh 
Williamson (1735–1819), likewise, claimed in 1771 that “a very great observable change of 
climate,” widely observed among long-time residents of Pennsylvania, had notably moderated 
the seasons. This Williamson attributed to the cultivation of the interior of the country—a 
practice that, if continued, would mean “we shall seldom be visited by frosts or snows.”37 
Clearing forest, draining marshes, and removing excessive moisture through cultivation would 
not only ameliorate climate but also dispel noxious and pestilential vapours.  
Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826) also shared such concerns, noting how land clearance 
allowed beneficial sea breezes to extend inland. With the American Philosophical Society in 
1800 (shortly before becoming President the next year), Jefferson petitioned the US Congress 
                                               
32 Du contrat social having been published in 1762. 
33 Forster 1778, 294. 
34 Ibid., 295. 
35 Forster 2000, 491. 
36 Fleming 1998, 32. 
37 Ibid., 24–25. 
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to include soil and climatic information in its upcoming census.38 The comte de Volney (1757–
1820), in his travelogue of 1803, also noted such climatic changes to have been “quick and 
sudden, in proportion to the extent of cultivation.”39 There was not, at this time, any consensus 
regarding the ameliorability of climate—many would doubt, or indeed reverse, the tenet that 
clearance imparted a warming effect. Nevertheless, the desire and intention to effect local and 
regional climate change was assuredly commonplace among colonial improvers, archipelagic 
and continental. 
7.2: From critique to chaos: Herder’s ideas of history 
In the twenty books of his (never completed) Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784–
1791),40 Johann Gottfried Herder41 (1744–1803) sought to construct a universal history of 
mankind. No less an aesthetic, poetic, and natural philosophy than a theodicy, this work would 
demonstrate both the providential bestowment of the Earth and the privileged place of “man” 
as a species dwelling thereupon.42 
In 1762, Herder had enrolled at the University of Königsberg, attending, among others, 
the lectures of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). However, despite studently enthusiasm, Herder 
soon after departed from Kant’s earlier tenets, and did not share the concern with the fallibility 
of the senses or the propriety of reason (or, indeed, the limits thereto) that prompted his later 
‘critical’ writings. Basing his philosophical reflections upon the organisational and expeditionary 
labours of Linnaeus, Kalm, Buffon, the Forsters, and others, Herder sought to synthesise rather 
than criticise, reconciling plurality and unity, human and terrestrial, philosophical and religious, 
with an active, creative, generative, genetic, and purposeful Nature—a task requiring poetry as 
much as reason, feeling more than foundation. 
Within this scheme, Book VII was to extensively examine the role of climate. It began 
from the principle that, physiologically, “every man is ultimately a world,”43 resembling many 
but identical to none. Not only the human frame but “not one point on our complicated 
[vielartigen44] Globe, not one wave in the current of time, resembles another [einer andern gleich 
                                               
38 Ibid., 29–31. 
39 Ibid., 26. 
40 Translated into English in two volumes as Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man in 1800 (the translator’s 
preface dated 1799). References below are to the second edition of 1803. 
41 Von Herder after 1802. 
42 Notably, Herder thus deployed the collective singular der Geschichte rather than the previously more prevalent 
feminine plural die Geschichte, or the alternative Historie (an ensemble of distinctions lost in English). His was, 
therefore, a philosophical history in the fullest sense—a sense, at this time, still in formation. Koselleck 2005, 33–
34. 
43 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 293; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 86. 
44 Lit. many-sided. 
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ist45].” Man is thus “a multitudinous harmony, a living self, on whom the harmony of all the 
powers that surround him operates.”46 Moreover, each new creature is “the realization of an 
idea of creative [schaffenden] Nature.”47 Such unfolding demonstrates a “genetic Power,” a “vital 
power [Lebenskraft]” existing within all, rendering assistance in both sickness and health.48 Both 
“human intellect [Verstand]” and that of the divine seeks “unity in every kind of variety,” 
bringing together the Earth’s “innumerable multiplicity.”  
As it is with earthly nature, so it is with mankind, which is, categorically, “one and the 
same species [Gattung49].”50 While some had deemed to differentiate humanity into four or five 
“divisions [Abteilungen],” even terming them “races [Rassen],” Herder rejected both the divisions 
and the denomination, suitable only for beings of distinct origins. 
“For every nation is one people [jedes Volk ist Volk], having it’s [sic] own national form 
[Nationalbildung], as well as it’s own language: the climate [Himmelsstrich], it is true, 
stamps on each it’s mark [über alle bald ein Gepräge], or spreads over it a slight veil [linden 
Schleier], but not sufficient to destroy the original national character [das ursprüngliche 
Stammgebilde der Nation].”51 
From Himmel (sky, heaven) and strich (line, stroke), Himmelsstrich is suggestive of both the 
astronomic or astrologic klíma and the skyey cœlo of Latin or ouranoú of Greek.52 However, it 
came, like klíma, to be a general designation for a geographical area.53 
After stating, or restating, the basic principles of his philosophy, Herder then undertook 
to “investigate the term climate more narrowly” in a chapter titled “What is Climate [Klima]? 
and what Effect has it in forming [Bildung] the Body and Mind [Seele] of Man?” Among the first 
to pose this question explicitly, at least in philosophical terms, Herder did not give an exact 
definition. Rather, he began by noting the lack of knowledge as to the structure of the earth, 
particularly at the poles, and the phenomena of magnetism that affect them.  
Presently ignorant of the “climates [Klimate]” in such “regions [Weltgegend],” the magnet 
has not, yet, provided such an overview. Herder finds calculations of heat and cold deriving 
from the “angle of the solar beams,” as per the method of Halley, to be a worthy mathematical 
                                               
45 Is equal to one another. 
46 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 293–294; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 88. 
47 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 319; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 124. 
48 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 321; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 126. 
49 Genus. 
50 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 295; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 92. 
51 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 298; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 94. 
52 See §6.1. 
53 It was in relatively popular usage in the 1770s but became less common by the turn of the century. It was defined 
in the dictionary of Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm in 1877 as a “strip of land [erdstrich] under a certain part of the sky 
[des himmels], especially with regard to the climates [des klimas].” Grimm 1877, vol. 10, 1364. 
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undertaking; however, a philosopher may be reproached for drawing firm conclusions 
therefrom. The relative proximity of the sea; the direction of the wind, or elevation of the land; 
the presence of mountains, the prevalence of rain or mist—many a “local qualification” must 
be added to the “general law.” Accordingly, it is common to find “the most opposite climates 
in places bordering upon each other.”54 
What was fundamentally at stake, physiologically, Herder recognised, was bodily heat. 
However, in contrast to the old doctrines of Montesquieu: 
“Whatever climate may effect, every man, every animal, every plant, has his own 
climate; for every one receives all external impressions [äußern Einwirkungen] in his own 
manner, and modifies them according to his organs.”55 
“It is true,” Herder admits, that “we are ductile clay [bildsamer Ton] in the hand of Climate”; 
however, “her fingers mould so variously [mannigfalt], and the laws, that counteract them, are 
so numerous [vielfach],” that it might take the entire “genius of mankind” to meaningfully relate 
all such “powers in one whole [Gleichung56].” Accordingly, Herder declares Hippocrates to be 
“my principal author on the subject of climate.”57 
Any kind of “climatology of the human frame [Baues]”58 was, therefore, a distant 
objective. Indeed, heat and cold are far from the only forces in the “atmosphere [Luft]” active 
upon us that must be taken into consideration. For one thing, there is the “stream of electric 
fire,” the powerful influences of which go as yet little known. The air itself remains a mystery in 
its “almost innumerable local modifications [Lokalbeschaffenheiten59],” and sundry “effluvia 
[Ausdünstungen],” not to mention those obscure and awful causes of disease, “arisen from an 
invisible malignant seed,” named by the physician “miasma” (literally, bad airs). 
“Lastly, the elevation or depression of a region [Erdstrichs], it’s nature [Beschaffenheit] and 
products, the food and drink men enjoy in it, the mode of life [Lebensweise] they pursue, 
the labours in which they are employed, their clothing, even their ordinary attitudes, 
their arts and pleasures, with a multitude of other circumstances [Heer anderer Umstände], 
which considerably influence their lives, all belong to the picture of changeable climate 
[Gemälde des vielverändernden Klima].”60 
Again, like Volney, though with less didactically ostentatious completism, Herder asserted the 
multi-factorial complexity implicit in the concept, encompassing not only physical but also 
                                               
54 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 308–309; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 108–109. 
55 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 322; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 128. 
56 Equation. 
57 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 311–313; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 113–116. 
58 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 310; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 111. 
59 Local textures. 
60 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 311–312; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 113–115. 
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moral aspects, thus tempering the will to climatic explanation—without, however, in any way 
disavowing such an aspiration. 
“Climate,” for Herder, was thus “a chaos of causes.” Its actions being gradual, it does, 
nevertheless, “penetrate to the internal part [das Innere]” of the being, changing it “by habit 
[Gewohnheit]”—an incremental effect that “the genetic power” duly resists but, as it is “not 
independent of external affections [Leidenschaften],” must “accommodate [bequemen61] itself to 
them in length of time.”62 
“The action [Wirkung] of climate extends itself indeed to bodies of all kinds, but chiefly 
to the more delicate, to fluids [Feuchtigkeiten], the air, and the ether. It operates rather 
on the mass [die Massen der Dinge], than on the individual: yet on this, through that.” 
Thus, while finding the extension of inferences concerning fibral contraction, and so on, to 
whole peoples was to be treated with scepticism, if not scorn, Herder followed Dubos, 
Montesquieu, and others, in reconciling climatic influence with constitutional individuality 
through its aggregate effect on the collective whole. Accordingly, “climate does not force 
[zwingt], but incline [neigt].”63  
However, climates were not to be considered only in terms of their influences upon any 
given creature but also in terms of their part in a providential whole. 
“We are surrounded by an atmosphere; we live in an electric ocean: but both, and 
probably the magnetic fluid with them, are in continual motion [Bewegung64]. The sea 
emits vapours [dunstet aus]; the mountains attract them, and send them down in rain 
and streams on every side. Thus, winds relieve each other: thus years, or periods of 
years, fulfil their climatic days. Thus, different regions and ages follow one another; and 
every thing on our Globe combines in one general connexion [gemeinsamer Verbindung].” 
If the Earth had been “flat, or angular, as the chinese have dreamed, it’s corners might have 
produced [nähren65] climatic monsters [klimatischen Ungestalten].” Thus, felicitous form 
presupposed a beneficent climate, which, in turn, required an appropriately constructed Earth, 
formed in just such a manner that “the degeneration [Ausartung] of the human species” was, to 
the greatest extent possible, prevented.66 
 In the final chapter of Book VII, Herder insists that “Nature has drawn determinate 
lines [genaue Grenzen] round her species [Gattungen],” preferring that a “creature” would 
                                               
61 Become comfortable with. 
62 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 329–330; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 141.  
63 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 317; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 121. 
64 Motion or agitation. 
65 Nurtured or nourished. 
66 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 314–315; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 117–119. 
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“disappear [untergehen67]” rather than “deface or falsify [verrücke oder verderbe] it’s figure [Gebilde].” 
Thus, while Cuvier’s Discours sur les révolutions du globe of 1812 would suppose that any significant 
change to a species relative to its “conditions of existence” would necessarily lead to its 
extinction, Herder, after Buffon, granted living kinds a degree of malleability within definite 
and permanent limits of form.68 
As regards the singular human species, “the figures of all nations [den Bildungen aller 
Völker]” may be modified with time, as their displacement through different “regions 
[Weltgegend]” alters them; however, the process is extremely slow. 
 “See the negro [Mohren69] in Europe: he remains as he was. Let him marry a white 
woman [Weißen], and a single generation will effect a change, which the fair-
complexioned climate [das bleichende Klima70] could not produce in ages [Jahrhunderte].”71 
Climate as an “external power” cannot, therefore, be articulated in law-like terms, and it is 
always counterpoised to the vital genetic power. Nevertheless, it can by no means be discounted. 
“We should never overlook [vergäße] the climate from which a people [Volk] came, the 
mode of life [Lebensart] it brought with it, the country [Land] that lay before it, the 
nations [Völkern] with which it intermingled [vermischte], and the revolutions it has 
undergone in it’s new seat.”72 
As far and wide as they have ranged, the human form nevertheless became profoundly related 
to its habitual region, forming an intrinsic attachment. 
“The arab of the desert belongs to it, as much as his noble horse, and his patient, 
indefatigable camel. As the mungal wanders [umherzog] over his heights [Erdhöhe], and 
among his hills [Steppe73], so wanders the better-formed [wohlgebildetere] bedouin over his 
extensive asiatic-african deserts; also a nomade, but a nomade of his own region 
[Gegend].”74 
Degeneration à la Buffon—Ausartung or Verartung in Herder’s vocabulary—was not, therefore, a 
necessarily deleterious process; however, any such transformation is apparently traumatic. 
While the marauding hoardes of yore may have presumed to venture far beyond their 
ancestral seat, “all sensual people [sinnliche Völker]” bear an intense attachment to their “country 
[Land]” such that to “deprive [Raubt]” them of this is to “deprive them of every thing.” 
                                               
67 Sink, perish, go under. 
68 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 330; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 140. 
69 Curiously, the translator thus excises Mohren (Moors). 
70 Lit. the bleaching climate. 
71 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 325; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 132. 
72 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 331; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 142. 
73 Churchill, rather confusingly, translates Steppe as “hill,” where Herder presumably meant to contrast Erdhöhe 
(heights; literally high earth) with the great flat grassland plains on which the Mongols, infamously, roamed. 
74 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 300; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 96–97. 
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“The constitution [Beschaffenheit] of their body, their way of life, the pleasures and 
occupations to which they have been accustomed [gewöhnt wurden] from their infancy, 
and the whole circle of their ideas [Gesichtskreis ihrer Seele75], are climatic.”76 
That is, without their relevant climate, none of these things are capable of constituting a liveable 
mode of life. Citing the German theologian and missionary David Cranz (1723–1777) and his 
Historie von Grönland of 1765,77 Herder recounts the distress of those native “greenlanders” 
brought to Denmark. Despite being met with apparent generosity, “their eyes were often turned 
toward the north and their native country [Vaterlande], with melancholy looks and piteous sighs; 
and at length they attempted to make their escape [die Flucht ergriffen78] in their canoe.” Likewise, 
the “negro slave” who will never again see “his native shore [die Küste seines Vaterlandes].” 
Moreover, the native American “savages [Wilden], as they are called [sogenannten],” whose 
ancestral “territory [Lande]” was, for millennia, “to it’s inhabitants the universe.” Subject to the 
“violence and extortion” of European “despots,” thus was awakened in the natives “hereditary 
national feelings [angeerbten Nationalgefühl].”79 
The story of such proprietorial attachment goes back to the beginnings of history: having 
acquired the art of clothing, and suchlike, man then became capable of “taking possession 
[Besitz] of every part [Klima] of the Earth.”80 Thus: 
“climate is a compound [Inbegriff] of powers and influences, to which both plants and 
animals contribute, and which every thing that has breath [allen Lebendigen] promotes in 
it’s reciprocating mutations [wechselseitigen Zusammenhange81], so man is placed in it as a 
sovereign [Herrn] of the Earth, to alter it by art.” 
The “dank” forests of Europe were “exposed to the rays of the Sun”; Egypt, but for such “art 
and policy [Polizei und Kunst],” would have been no more than the “Schlamm”—mud or 
sludge82—of the Nile. Here, and further into Asia, “the living creation has” thereby “adapted 
itself to the artificial climate [künstlichen Klima bequemt].” 
“We may consider mankind [Menschengeschlecht], therefore, as a band of bold though 
diminutive giants, gradually descending from the mountains, to subjugate the earth, 
and change climates with their feeble arms [schwachen Faust]. How far they are capable 
of going in this respect futurity [Zukunft] will show.”83 
                                               
75 Lit. horizon of their soul. 
76 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 303; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 101. 
77 History of Greenland. Cranz 1765; Cranz 1767, vol. 1; Cranz 1767, vol. 2. 
78 Lit. took flight; “escape” suggests incarceration, which is not the point of the story. 
79 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 304–306; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 102–105. 
80 Herder 1803, vol. 1; Herder 1785, vol. 1, 254. 
81 Lit. mutual connections. 
82 Churchill translates as “slime.” 
83 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 316–317; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 120–121. 
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However, to every climatic point, Herder poses a counterpoint.  
Kalm’s travelogues inform us that rapid “destruction [Ausrottung]” of the forests, and 
extension of land cultivation, reduced the number of hitherto abundant birds and fish. The 
“lakes, streams, rivulets, springs, rains, thick long grass of the woods, &c.,” likewise, were 
detrimentally diminished. Moreover, such destruction “seemed to affect the health and 
longevity of the inhabitants, and influence the seasons.” 
“Let it not be imagined, that human art can with despotic power [stürmender Willkür84] 
convert at once a foreign region [Erdteil] into another Europe, by cutting down it’s 
forests, and cultivating it’s soil: for it’s whole living creation is conformable to it [ist im 
Zusammenhange].” 
Herder acknowledges Williamson’s arguments regarding the artificial amelioration of climate 
by clearance. However, while such “subjugation [Überstrengung] of Nature” may be beneficial in 
places, its general applicability is found doubtful. For one thing, the supposed insalubrity of 
these lands pertains only to the “foreigners [Fremdlinge].” Moreover, since “Nature is every 
where a living whole [ein lebendiges Ganze],” it will therefore “be gently followed and improved 
[befolgt und gebessert], not mastered by force [gewaltsam beherrscht].”85 
“And does not Nature revenge every insult [Frevel] offered her? Where are the conquests 
[Eroberungen], the factories [Handlungsplätze86], the invasions, of former times, when 
distant foreign lands were visited by a different race [ungleichartige Volk], for the sake of 
devastation or plunder! The still breath [stille Hauch] of climate has dissipated or 
consumed [Verweht oder weggezehrt] them, and it was not difficult for the natives 
[Eingebornen] to give the finishing stroke to the rootless tree [wurzellosen Baum].  
Thus, Herder providentially reprises the old argument—criticised, for example, by Joseph de 
La Porte via the example of Louis XV, “le véritable climat,”87 in 1750—regarding the failures of 
armies in foreign climes. However, granting such conceptions a rather grander poetic and 
philosophical vista, he concludes: 
The quiet plant [stille Gewächs] […] that has accommodated [bequemte] itself to the laws 
of Nature, has not only preserved it’s own existence [selbst fortdauert], but has beneficially 
diffused [fortbreitet] the seeds of cultivation [Samenkörner der Kultur] through a new land 
[Erde]. Future ages [Das folgende Jahrtausend] may decide, what benefit, or injury, our 
genius has conferred on other climates, and other climates on our genius.”88 
                                               
84 Lit. storming arbitrariness or capriciousness. 
85 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 334–336; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 145–148. 
86 An archaic and somewhat obscure term. Literally action-places. In use seemingly only around the time Herder 
uses it. Presumably the translator means “factories” in the (now) archaic sense of an establishment of merchants 
and traders in a foreign place. 
87 La Porte 1751, 101–102. 
88 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 337; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 149–150. 
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An ancestral Klima was not, therefore, an eternal Klima. Nevertheless, from the Mongols to the 
Euro-Americans, only destruction and diminution followed the attempt to ride roughshod over 
the Lande of others. 
~~~~~~ 
It may have been an idiosyncratic synthesis; however, in his Ideen, Herder systematically 
assembled the major Euro-American accounts of climate and travel of the preceding decades. 
Thus, as the Montesquieu affair had achieved rather more publically, he made climate a distinct 
and expansive concept; an expressive conceptual locus that assembled and connected an 
assortment of entities, interests, processes, and problems. Moreover, he went considerably 
further in reconciling the contradictions of climatic theories than had his predecessors. 
The forcefulness of climate with respect to his fundamental tenets of individuality was 
tempered in Herder’s account in at least six ways: first, there is a vital power inherent to 
individual living beings that neither transcends nor acquiesces to external forces; second, climate 
acts gradually; third, it acts rather more on the whole than on the individual; fourth, it is so 
inordinately multifaceted that description and specification must be preferred over 
generalisation; fifth, the earth is structured so as to yield generally beneficent, and hence 
degeneration-minimising, climates; finally, were a living kind to be truly overpowered by its 
climate, Nature would sooner have it perish than surrender. Thus, whereas Montesquieu had, 
for the most part, arranged forces, categorised as moral or natural, in mechanical opposition, 
sometimes siding with one and sometimes the other, Herder attempted to place the 
heterogeneous forces in circumstantial and historical counterpoise—without, however, 
engendering an ascendential progression of spiritual or earthly states. His universe was 
teleological but the telos was relative to each Geschöpf, every Volk, and all Klimate.  
 When Herder wrote of “the picture of changeable climate,” to this image pertained not 
only the elevation and typical productions of the land but also the modes of life, labour, pleasure, 
and dress enjoyed by the inhabitants, along with various other circumstances affecting their 
existence. There is a certain ambiguity as to whether, in this instance, “climate” was to be 
understood as constitutively inclusive of moral or cultural entities or whether these were entities 
integrally associated with the effects of climate. Moreover, when writing of climate generally, 
he undoubtedly prioritised physical rather than moral elements. However, there is no doubt 
that Herder’s climate, though less loquaciously litanous than that of Volney, was significantly 
extended. 
One authority altogether unconvinced by Herder’s proto-Romantic poetics was Herr 
Kant. Reviewing his erstwhile student’s opus, the sage of Königsberg, in a tone both ironical 
and teacherly, took issue with the rather “epic” style, particularly considering that its grand and 
general conclusions were drawn from mere travellers’ remarks. From a system placed upon such 
“unstable foundations [wankende Grundlage],” only “ramshackle hypotheses” may result. 
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However, more to the point was Herder’s dismissal of “the division of mankind into races, 
especially on the basis of inherited colour.”89 Further still, in Book IX, Herder had attacked an 
“evil” principle: specifically, that “man is an animal, that needs a master [Herren], and must 
derive the happiness of his destination from this master, or from a connexion with him.”90 
Quoting this passage, Kant dismisses such reproaches, noting this principle to be “confirmed 
by the experience of all ages and peoples.” To be sure, it may be, as Herder argued, that 
providence granted the most easy attainment of happiness to individuals, sparing many 
generations “these costly machines of state as much as possible.”91 However, Kant retorts, “first 
comes the happiness of the animal, then that of the child, then that of the youth, and finally that 
of the man.” Thus, such transhistorical comparisons ignore the ascendential, stadial structure 
of time, and of worth. With a fencer’s flourish, Kant then adds: 
“Does the author really mean that, if the happy inhabitants of Tahiti, never visited by 
more civilised nations, were destined to live in their peaceful indolence for thousands 
of centuries, it would be possible to give a satisfactory answer to the question of why 
they should exist at all, and of whether it would not have been just as good if this island 
had been occupied by happy sheep and cattle as by happy human beings who merely 
enjoy themselves?” 
This so-called “evil” principle was, he concluded, nothing of the sort, though “it may well have 
been stated by an evil man.”92 This “man” was, of course, Kant himself.93 It was, then, in 
defence of racial, civilisational, developmental and, hence, existential hierarchy that Kant 
undertook to set historical thought on secure, transcendental foundations, based not on the 
fickle, vicarious storytellings of those who might erringly valorise the falsely free, but upon 
judgements universalisable. The chaos of climate, then, meant nothing to the critical intellect. 
7.3: Making cosmically comparable: Humboldt’s terrestrial physics 
In 1806, recently returned from his half-decade expedition to the Americas, Alexander von 
Humboldt (1769–1859) published a short essay titled Ideen zu einer Physiognomik der Gewächse.94 It 
was included in his Ansichten der Natur of 1808, a series of short essays (with much longer scientific 
                                               
89 Kant 1991, 217; Kant 1965, 32. 
90 Churchill translates as a “bad fundamental principle [böser Grundsatz]” but böser is rather stronger. Herder 1803, 
vol. 1, 447; Herder 1786, vol. 2, 313–314. 
91 Herder 1803, vol. 1, 402. 
92 Kant 1991, 216–220; Kant 1965, 43–47. 
93 Eigen and Larrimore 2012, 57. 
94 Ideas for a Physiology of Plants. 
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notes) intended for a popular audience, and translated into English twice.95 Seeking to articulate 
the basis of his terrestrial geophysics, Humboldt also paid tribute to his foremost forebears: 
“George Forster, in the narrative of his voyages, and in his other publications—Goethe, 
in the descriptions of nature [Naturschilderungen] which so many of his immortal works 
contain—Buffon, Bernardin de St. Pierre, and Chateaubriand, have traced [geschildert] 
with inimitable truth of description the character of some of the zones [Himmelsstriche] 
into which the earth is divided.”96 
Such portrayals provided not only “mental enjoyment” but, moreover, “knowledge of the 
character which nature assumes in different regions [Weltgegenden],” and, moreover, the 
“national character [Volkscharacter]” that depends “in a very high degree on climatic influences 
[Verhältnissen].” 
“The influence of the physical on the moral world—that reciprocal and mysterious 
action and reaction [Ineinander-Wirken] of the material and the immaterial [Sinnlichen und 
Aussersinnlichen97]—gives to the study of nature, when regarded from higher points of 
view, a peculiar charm, still too little recognized.” 
Thus, Humboldt articulated themes and convictions that would be recurrent throughout his 
career. 
However, besides various nuances of translation—Himmelsstriche as “zones into which 
the earth is divided,” Sinnlichen und Aussersinnlichen as “the material and the immaterial”—there 
was something more significant missing from this version. Both English translations were made 
from the 1849 third German edition of Ansichten. In previous versions, alongside the dues paid 
to Forster et al., was an acknowledgement of Herder.98 The reasons for such a belated excision 
of the author of Ideen are unclear. Nevertheless, Humboldt had read Herder’s work, and was 
well acquainted, often personally, with its sources.  
In 1805, the year before his essay on plant physiology appeared (and the year after 
returning from the Americas), Humboldt published the Essai sur la géographie des plantes, co-
authored with his companion and collaborator Aimé Bonpland (1773–1858).99 Centring on one 
enormous plate, the famous altitudinal diagram of Chimborazo, the accompanying text was 
written first in French. In 1807, Humboldt made his own translation into German (the only 
                                               
95 Translated into English twice, contemporaneously: in 1849 as Aspects of Nature: in different lands and different climates 
by Elizabeth Leeves Sabine (1807–1879), wife of the astronomer and geophysicist Edward Sabine (1788–1883), 
and in 1850 as Views of Nature: Or, Contemplations on the Sublime Phenomena of Creation by the linguist and historian Elise 
C. Otté (1818–1903), and the publisher Henry George Bohn (1796–1884). 
96 Humboldt 1849, 235; Humboldt 1808, vol. 1, 175–176. 
97 Lit. the sensual and nonsensual (or extrasensory). 
98 Cf. Humboldt 1849a, vol. 2, 18. 
99 Humboldt and Bonpland 1805. Quotations are from recent English translation: Humboldt and Bonpland 2010. 
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major self-translation he undertook),100 dedicating this version to Goethe. As well as being a 
poet, novelist, and state administrator, Goethe had also established himself as a philosopher of 
botany with his 1790 Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären.101 Principally, this text 
                                               
100 Humboldt and Bonpland 1807b. 
101 Attempt to explain the Metamorphosis of Plants. Goethe 1790; Goethe 2009. 
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described the leaves of plants in terms of their derivation from a common, primordial form, the 
“Ur-phänomen.” However, Goethe did not describe this underlying unity in terms of its variation 
Figure 14—Physical tableau of Chimborazo; from German edition, 1807 
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under conditions of climate—indeed, neither climate nor its cognates featured in his text. His 
concern, therein, was with the unity of the form, not the distribution of its metamorphic 
variations. 
Humboldt’s Essai presented, in a single view, the essential elements of his and 
Bonpland’s investigations into the altitudinal distribution of vegetation. However, it was also a 
manifesto of sorts: the geography of plants, then existing “in name only,” was “an essential part 
of general physics.”102 In short: “This is the science that concerns itself with plants in their local 
association103 in the various climates.”104 Simultaneously comprehensive and abstract, it would 
“bring together all the physical phenomena that one can observe on the surface of the earth 
and in the surrounding atmosphere105.”106 
The centrepiece of the Essai is a table-sized foldout image, presented as a triptych. The 
panels display sixteen columns, which add quantitative and other descriptive information: 
1: Light refraction. 
2: Distance from which visible at sea level. 
3: Global altitudinal reference points. 
4: Electrical atmospheric phenomena. 
5: Soil cultivation. 
6: Gravitational force. 
7: Blueness of the sky. 
8: Humidity. 
9: Barometric pressure. 
10: Air temperature (centigrade). 
11: Chemical composition of the air. 
12: Comparison of perpetual snow limit with other mountains. 
13: Typical animal types. 
14: Boiling point of water (centigrade). 
15: Geological information. 
16: Light intensity. 
                                               
102 [physique générale/Geschichte unsers Planeten]. 
103 [les rapports de leur association locale/dem Verhältnisse ihrer Vertheilung]. 
104 Humboldt and Bonpland 2010, 64; Humboldt and Bonpland 1805, 13–14; Humboldt and Bonpland 1807b, 
1–2. 
105 [l’atmosphère qui entoure/der Luftkreis darbietet, der jenen einhüllt]. 
106 Humboldt and Bonpland 2010, 61; Humboldt and Bonpland 1805, vi; Humboldt and Bonpland 1807b, ii. 
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To each section corresponds a portion of the main explanatory text (altogether comprising 
nearly 80% of the total Essai).107 Without giving an explicit definition, Humboldt’s conception 
of climate encompassed not only temperature and humidity but also electrical tension and 
atmospheric pressure. Its usage principally concerned the distributions of various beings. 
However, such distributions do not necessarily conform to climatic dictates. Lichens, for 
instance, are found to exist everywhere, with a shape seemingly independent of climate.108 As 
regards humans, the capacities of cultivation were crucial. Those “savage” peoples not taken to 
agriculture have a “character109” that is “modified everywhere by the nature of the climate and 
the soil where he lives” (in the German version only, Humboldt adds: “mehr noch als Abstammung 
[even more than ancestry]”).110 
Aesthetically and scientifically, the tableau was the product of Humboldt’s singular 
Bildung. In 1787, he had studied with Carl Ludwig Willdenow (1765–1812), author of the 1792 
Grundriss der Kräuterkunde.111 Recognising that temperate zonation extends further north in 
Europe compared to North America, Willdenow attributed such divergences from climatic 
latitudinality to “mountains, valleys, rivers, marshes, woods, seas, and varying soil.” For this 
reason, he advocated distinguishing between “a physical and geographical climate,” where the 
latter incorporated the relevant complications.112 After Willdenow, both of the Forsters had 
impressed upon Humboldt the importance of climatic zonation, as had the Creole intellectuals 
Francisco José Caldas (1768–1816) and José Celestino Mutis (1732–1808). In 1805, Humboldt 
returned to a Paris where Lamarck was already formulating his own ruminations over species 
formation. Elsewhere, the works of William Playfair (1759–1823), with whom Humboldt 
maintained a correspondence, were already reworking the limits of informational 
representation.113 
Despite enormous public interest, the first volume (of thirteen) of Humboldt’s account 
of his and Bonpland’s journey was not published until 1814.114 However, while finally giving 
the public their stories of wonder, danger, and derring-do, it was much more than a travelogue. 
That the work ran to several thousand pages despite covering barely one third of the journey 
reflects not so much the abundance of anecdotes (although there are many) but rather the 
                                               
107 Jackson 2010, 26. 
108 Humboldt and Bonpland 2010, 68. 
109 [l’etat/die Lage und die Sitten]. 
110 Humboldt and Bonpland 2010, 70; Humboldt and Bonpland 1805, 25; Humboldt and Bonpland 1807b, 17; 
Glacken 1967, 545.  
111 Willdenow 1792; English translation: Willdenow 1805. 
112 Willdenow 1805, 371–372; Willdenow 1792, 345–346. 
113 Romanowski 2010, 188; Playfair 1801; Playfair 2005. 
114 Humboldt and Bonpland 1814, vol. 1. On the complicated printing and distribution, see: Troelstra 2017, 215. 
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incessant, lengthy, and seemingly compulsive digressions into everything from astronomic 
observations to temperature measurements. Humboldt was unambiguous about what set his 
and Bonpland’s endeavours apart from their predecessors. 
“It is not by sailing along the coast, that we can discover the direction of the chains of 
mountains, and their geological constitution, the climate of each zone, and it’s influence 
on the forms and the habits of organized beings.”115 
By procuring passports to travel into the interior of the Spanish imperial properties, making use 
of existing colonial and missionary infrastructures, not to mention gaining extensive access to 
colonial archives in Havana and other cities in the region, they had enabled the accumulation 
of specimens, measurements, descriptions, and statistics on a scale practically unprecedented. 
Considerations of climate related principally to temperature. However, such aspects of 
“the physical history of our planet” was, admittedly, an inchoate science. Did “the quantity of 
free caloric” vary over millennia? Have mean temperatures relative to parallels changed “since 
the last revolution” of the globe?  
“[W]e are ignorant of every thing that relates to a general change of the climates, as we 
know not whether the barometric pressure of the atmosphere, the quantity of oxygen, 
the intensity of the magnetic powers, and a great number of other phenomena have 
undergone any change since the time of Noah, of Xisuthris, or Menou.”116 
Nevertheless, it was, Humboldt understood, “a fact, which seems indubitable” that earthquakes, 
so regularly experienced in equinoctial America, exerted a “mysterious influence […] on the 
climate, and on the order of the dry and rainy seasons,” perhaps due to the vapours they 
released.117 Thus, climate was in a close-knit relationship with all manner of other forces that 
were not climatic as such. 
However, these prolific popular texts did not constitute Humboldt’s principal 
contribution to climatology during these years. While others had, in the preceding decades, 
employed Halley’s cartographic technique of isolines to such problems as the destructiveness of 
earthquakes,118 in his essay Des lignes isothermes et de la distribution de la chaleur sur le globe of 1817,119 
Humboldt was the first to apply them to relations of equal average temperature. Showing no 
landmasses but bearing a series of place names, his “Cartes des lignes Isothermes” thus demonstrated 
abstractly and graphically what had long been known descriptively: that climate did not 
                                               
115 Humboldt and Bonpland 1818, vol. 1–2, vii–viii; Humboldt and Bonpland 1814, vol. 1, 6. 
116 Humboldt and Bonpland 1818, vol. 1–2, volume 2, 82; ibid., vol. 1–2, 240–241.  
117 Humboldt and Bonpland 1818, vol. 1–2, volume 2, 219. 
118 Robinson and Wallis 1967; Robinson 1971; Stegena and Szeidovitz 1991; Varga 2008; Gercsák 2009; Kozák 
and Prachař 2010; Varga, Timár, and Kiszely 2015. 
119 Isothermal lines and the distribution of heat on the globe. Humboldt 1817. Abridged English version published in two 
parts: Humboldt 1820; Humboldt 1821. 
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straightforwardly correlate to latitude. The accompanying text, moreover, further explicated 
his conception of climate. 
 
Figure 15—“Carte des lignes Isothermes”; Humboldt, 1817 
After Willdenow’s “physical and geographical climate,” Humboldt distinguished, “as 
has long been done, between the solar and the real climate.”120 With regard to this distinction, the 
particular configuration of Europe productive of its climate had been misleading: 
“as the physical sciences almost always bear the impress of the places where they began 
to be cultivated, we are accustomed to consider the distribution of heat observed in 
such a region, as the type of the laws which govern the whole globe.”121 
The “method of means [moyennes]”—i.e. identifying climates in terms of mean temperatures—
is, therefore, inadequate for relating the influence of the sun to particular climates.122 Thus, in 
conclusion, Humboldt explains that, in proposing “the theory of isothermal lines and their 
inflexions, which determine the different systems of climates” (i.e. the configuration of various 
isolineally-defined climates taken together), he had “endeavoured to reduce the phenomena of 
                                               
120 Humboldt 1820, 6; Humboldt 1817, 14. 
121 Humboldt 1820, 4; Humboldt 1817, 11. 
122 Humboldt 1820, 5; Humboldt 1817, 13. 
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temperature to empirical laws.” The simplification of such laws, he expected, would be achieved 
by taking more frequent and accurate measurements.123 
 Two excerpts from Humboldt’s long essay were published in English in The Edinburgh 
Philosophical Journal in 1820 and 1821. All the above extracts were included; however, one 
particularly crucial passage was not. 
“As regards the organic life of plants and animals, we must examine all stimuli or 
external agents that modify their vital actions. The relations [rapports] between the 
average temperatures of the months are not enough to characterise the climate. Its 
influence is composed of the simultaneous action of all physical forces, and it depends 
on heat, moisture, light, electrical tension, and the variable pressure of the 
atmosphere.”124 
Thus, Humboldt’s climate was increasingly expansive, though perhaps less so than Volney, 
Cabanis, or Herder. 
In 1827, Humboldt returned to Prussia from Paris, as demanded by his benefactor 
Friedrich Wilhelm III. However, in 1829, at the behest of the Russian government, he 
undertook his second (and final) major expedition, through the Urals, Siberia and Central Asia 
(introducing the latter term to the geographical lexicon). Forbidden from commenting on social 
issues, his resulting publications, appearing a decade later, were strictly naturalistic. 
Methodologically, his Asie Centrale (1834–1838) was continuous with previous works.125 
However, climatology as such was, by now, a more confidently established concept, if not yet 
with the infrastructure to support it. Indeed, within a chapter on isotherms, an explicit definition 
of climate was now offered:  
“The word climate, in its most general acceptation, embraces all modifications of the 
atmosphere that sensibly affect our organs, such as temperature, humidity, variations 
of barometric pressure, the calmness [tranquillité] of the air, or the effects of 
heteronymous winds, the charge or quantity of electrical tension, the purity of the 
atmosphere or its mixtures with more or less unsanitary gaseous emanations; finally, 
the habitual degree of transparency [diaphanéité] and serenity of the sky, this being 
important not only with regard to increased [solar] radiation on the soil [le rayonnement 
du sol] but also for the influence it exerts on the development of organic tissues in 
vegetation, and the ripening of fruits, and with regard to the impressions which, in 
diverse zones, are excited in the soul by the senses.”126 
However, this, Humboldt adds, only considers the atmosphere as regards the transmission of 
light. Other modifications, of causes as yet unknown, “are revealed in the admirable 
photographical procedures of the Daguerreians”—i.e. followers of Louis Daguerre (1787–
                                               
123 Humboldt 1821, 31; Humboldt 1817, 145. 
124 Humboldt 1817, 88. 
125 Humboldt 1843, vol. 1; Humboldt 1843, vol. 2; Humboldt 1843, vol. 3. 
126 Humboldt 1843, vol. 3, 107–108. 
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1851). The flows of magnetic forces, particularly during the aurora borealis, were a case in 
point. Nevertheless, among the many, varied, and only partly known causes “that tend to 
diversify climates,” the most powerful is temperature.127 Thus, for sake of “the progress of the 
                                               
127 Ibid., vol. 3, 109–110. 
Figure 16—View of the Moon; daguerreotype by John Adams Whipple (1822–1891), 1852 
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sciences,” Humboldt concludes, it is imperative to “discover the reciprocal relations [liaisons]” 
between all such phenomena and, then, to deduce “empirical laws,” leading to a “mathematical 
theory of the climates,” which, one day, might be “subject to calculation,” with a sufficient 
number of the most distant parts of the globe rendered “comparable to each other,” producing 
a “theoretical Climatology.”128  
It was for this reason, then, that Humboldt was advancing material from what he 
referred to as his hitherto unpublished “Essai de Physique du Monde.”129 However, when the final 
version eventually arrived, it bore the title Kosmos. Published in five volumes between 1845 and 
1861 (the last posthumously), Humboldt’s magnum opus was wildly successful, selling 20,000 
copies of the first volume alone.130 The French translation was supervised by Humboldt himself. 
Three English translations were produced.131 
Starting from the outer reaches of the known universe, it would then gradually descend 
to the minutiae of terrestrial life—“from the nebulae to the hyssop,” as he described it to Charles 
Darwin (1809–1882) in a letter of 1839.132 Accordingly, when Kosmos appeared in 1845, it bore 
the subtitle Entwurf einer physischen Weltbeschreibung.133 It was to be a descriptive physical 
cosmography. However, rather than a mere encyclopaedic enumeration of facts, Humboldt 
wished to know den Zusammenhang der Erscheinungen—literally ‘the connection of phenomena,’ 
rendered by Otté as “the chain of connection, by which all natural forces are linked together, 
and made mutually dependent upon each other.”134  
While evidently affected by the Naturphilosophie of Herder, Schelling, and others, Kosmos 
made no claims to “a purely rational science of nature,” being, rather, a “rational 
empiricism135.”136 As such, it would work empirically rather than speculatively “to delineate 
                                               
128 Ibid., vol. 3, 358–359. 
129 Ibid., vol. 3, 110. 
130 Rupke 1997, vii. 
131 References below are to Elise C. Otté (1849–1865, in five volumes). Otté’s version was reissued as a two-volume 
version in 1997. In the below, we will investigate Otté’s translation, alongside the original German and authorised 
French. 
132 Letter dated 18th of September 1839. Humboldt and Darwin 1972, 171. 
133 Literally, Outline of a Physical World-Descripton. Both Otté and Sabine translate as: A sketch of a physical description of 
the universe.  
134 Humboldt 1849, vol. 1, 1; Humboldt 1845, vol. 1, 4; Humboldt 1846a, vol. 1, 2. 
135 [denkende Betrachtung der durch Empirie/empirisme raisonné]. 
136 Humboldt 1849, vol. 1, 30; Humboldt 1845, vol. 1, 32; Humboldt 1846a, vol. 1, 36. 
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nature in all its vivid animation and exalted grandeur,”137 tracing “the stable138 amid the 
vacillating, ever-recurring alternation of physical metamorphoses139”—reasoning from 
experience to general laws via the medium of the aesthetically acute intellect.140 It would pursue, 
in short, “unity in diversity [Einheit in der Vielheit],” that “harmony, blending together all created 
things141.”142 
Such a complete picture would include both nature itself and the history of human 
impressions thereof. However, “the sphere of objects” would be treated separately from “that 
of sensations,”143 with the first and second volumes taking up the former and latter, respectively. 
The second volume of 1847 itself consisted of two parts. The first examined “Incitements 
[Anregungsmittel] to the Study of Nature—The image reflected by the external world [monde 
extérieur] on the imagination.”144 In particular, the histories of poetry, landscape painting, and 
the cultivation of exotic plants. The second part then constructed a “History of the physical 
contemplation of the universe [der physischen Weltanschauung145]—Principal momenta of the 
gradual development and extension of the idea of the Cosmos as one natural whole [de l’idée de 
l’univers].”146 
Running through both the cosmological and intellectual aspects of Humboldt’s history 
was a vivid overall vision: 
“In interrogating the history of the past, we trace the mysterious course of ideas yielding 
the first glimmering perception of the same image of a Cosmos, or harmoniously 
ordered whole, which, dimly shadowed forth to the human mind in the primitive ages 
of the world [l’univers], is now fully revealed to the maturer intellect of mankind as the 
result of long and laborious observation.”147 
                                               
137 Humboldt 1849, vol. 1, xiv. The English here follows the German “die Natur lebendig und in ihrer erhabenen Größe zu 
schildern [lit. to portray Nature alive and in her sublime greatness] […]” Humboldt 1845, vol. 1, xv–xvi. The French 
excises any mention of nature: “retracer avec vivacité une partie au moins de ce que l’esprit de l’homme aperçoit [lit. to retrace 
with vivacity a part of what the mind of man perceives […]” Humboldt 1846a, vol. 1, vii–viii. 
138 [Beharrliche/constant, d’éternel] 
139 [wellenartig wiederkehrenden Wechsel physischer Veränderlichkeit/les apparentes fluctuations des phénomènes de l'univers] 
140 Humboldt 1849, vol. 1, xiv. 
141 [Verbindung des Mannigfaltigen in Form und Mischung]. Lit. connection of the manifold in form and mixture. While 
both the French and English articulate this in terms of “created [creés]” things, the German goes on to employ a 
more vitalistic vocabulary of “Inbegriff der Naturdinge und Naturkräfte, als ein lebendiges Ganze [the essence of natural 
things and natural forces as a living whole].” Humboldt 1845, vol. 1, 5–6. 
142 Humboldt 1849, vol. 1, 2; Humboldt 1845, vol. 1, 5; Humboldt 1846a, vol. 1, 3. 
143 Humboldt 1849c, vol. 2, 370; Humboldt 1847, vol. 2, 3. 
144 Here, only the subtitle exists in the German version (1847, vol. 2, 532) and only the subtitle in the French 
Humboldt 1849b, vol. 2, vi. English: Humboldt 1849c, vol. 2, ix. 
145 Lit. the physical worldview. 
146 Humboldt 1849c, vol. 2, ix; Humboldt 1847, vol. 2, 536; Humboldt 1849b, vol. 2, vii. 
147 Humboldt 1849, vol. 1, 2; Humboldt 1846a, vol. 1, 2. 
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Kosmos was itself, then, to be a moment within a teleological trajectory soaring tremulously but 
exponentially upwards from the slumbering depths of the primordial twilight. Its ‘maturity’ was 
not, however, ‘the end of history.’ Though he had lectured on these topics in Berlin 
contemporaneously with Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel in the 1820s, Humboldt’s thoughtful 
empiricism could not entertain the possibility of idealistic closure. Rather, for the octogenarian 
author of Kosmos, this was a “noble mission”148—a mission requiring far more than intellectual 
labour, and one that was only just beginning. 
The place of climate within this sweeping vista was crucial but not central. Towards the 
end of the first volume, Humboldt utilised precisely the same definition as he had in his Asie 
Centrale (albeit in German).149 However, the discussion of the concept was further elaborated. 
The reciprocal motion of air, sea, and land cannot be understood “independently of geognostic 
[i.e. geological] relations.” 
“The word climate has certainly special reference to the character [Beschaffenheit] of the 
atmosphere, but this character is itself dependent on the perpetually concurrent 
influences [Zusammenwirken] of the ocean, which is universally and deeply agitated by 
currents having a totally opposite temperature, and of radiation [wärmestrahlenden] from 
the dry land, which varies greatly in form, elevation, colour, and fertility, whether we 
consider its bare rocky portions or those that are covered with arborescent or 
herbaceous vegetation.”150 
However, once again, Humboldt affirmed that while the composition of climate should not be 
prematurely foreclosed, the “mean temperature of the air” was the fundamental element, 
although the mean temperature of the surface “is very different from that of the globe itself.”151  
In the same discussion, Humboldt referenced the “admirable investigations” of Joseph 
Fourier (1768–1830) on the geophysics of heat,152 though not specifically his 1824 paper153 
subsequently recognised to have articulated the physics of atmospheric retention of solar heat—
i.e. the ‘greenhouse effect.’154 Rather, as regards the possibility of climatic alteration, Humboldt 
remained an interlocutor of Buffon and Jefferson. The “often agitated” question of “whether 
the mean temperature has experienced any considerable differences in the course of centuries” 
is only answerable, he maintained, “by means of the thermometer,” an instrument whose 
                                               
148 Humboldt 1849, vol. 1, 17. 
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history dates back barely 120 years (and a history that he would subsequently trace).155 More 
and more precise measurements were, therefore, what was called for. 
Few savants of the nineteenth century are more emblematic of the budding 
infrastructural and intellectual project to construct a worldwide system of climatic surveillance 
than Humboldt. Moreover, in whatever language he was writing, Humboldt could employ a 
sophisticated spatial vocabulary. In German, there was not only Klima, Miasma, Zonen, 
Himmelsstrich, Umständen [circumstances], Luftkreises [atmosphere], various permutations of 
Weltgegend [region], and so on; he also referred to fluid envelope surrounding the planet as the 
Luftmeer—the “aerial ocean.”156  
However, recalling previous chapters—and, indeed, the narrative introduction of this 
thesis—one thing about Humboldt’s conceptual vocabulary is particularly striking: Although 
he was present at the debates between Cuvier and Saint-Hilaire, and at Comte’s first public 
lectures, and knew Balzac well (and although he outlived all of them), he never adopted (at least 
in his major published works) the term “milieu” in the sense of abstract, totalised surroundings. 
That is, just as he had been in 1799, through to his final works, Humboldt employed no exact 
cognate of the concept that became environment.157 His conception of climate may have come 
close; however, relations of temperature were always the priority. 
In his electrophysical experiments from before 1799, Humboldt remarked that: “In 
order to fully develop the conditions [Bedingungen] and circumstances [Verhältnisse] under which 
the phenomena of galvanism occur, we must also consider the medium [das Medium] in which 
the chain of metals and vital [belebten] organs are situated”158—media such as water, alcohol, 
chemical ether, and so on. Moreover, in the same work, Humboldt identified what he called an 
“atmosphere [Atmosphäre]” or “action sphere [Wirkungskreise]” surrounding the animal tissue, 
especially the nerve fibres, this being “the medium between the soul-organ [Seelenorgan] and the 
acting, irritating objects of the world of external sense [äussern Sinnenwelt].”159 This surrounding 
field, unique to biological substances, was argued to allow galvanic force to be transmitted at a 
distance and could account for the “sympathies” between different organs, which classic 
physiology had postulated to account for sympathetic actions and diseases.160 When these 
experiments were edited and adapted for the French language, published as Expe ́riences sur le 
                                               
155 Humboldt 1849, vol. 1, 168. 
156 Ibid., vol. 1, 6; Humboldt 1845, vol. 1, 10, passim. 
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galvanisme in the year Humboldt departed for the Americas, galvanism was likewise discussed in 
terms of “the effects of milieux.”161 
Humboldt repeatedly cited Volney’s treatise on American climate and soil, which 
included a litanous expansion of climate;162 he also cited Forry’s treatise of 1842,163 which took 
de Tracy’s popular rendering of Cabanis’ “l’ensemble de toutes” as its epigraph. However, while 
Humboldt’s omnivorous geophysical philosophy was keen to expand the remits of climatic 
science, he did not adopt climate as a totalised, exteriorised surrounding ensemble. 
~~~~~~ 
The translation of Herodotus’ Histories by Alfred Denis Godley (1856–1925) in 1920 recorded 
that the Ionians “found their cities in places with the loveliest of climate and seasons.”164 This 
expression, as we have seen, related the Greek, ouranoú, as per Ouranós. A 1914 rendering of the 
De architectura of Vitruvius (c.80–c.15 BCE) by Morris Hicky Morgan (1859–1910) explains that 
fortified towns should be situated “in a climate neither hot nor cold”—the relevant term here, 
                                               
161 Humboldt 1799, chap. 8. To the above quotation (op. cit. n.159) concerning Bedingungen and Verhältnisse 
corresponds: “Pour développer toutes les circonstances dans lesquelles les phénomènes galvaniques réussissent, il 
faut aussi considérer le milieu dans lequel se trouve placée la chaîne formée par les métaux et les organes vivants” 
(240). 
162 E.g. Humboldt and Bonpland 2010, 143. 
163 Humboldt 1843, vol. 1, lvi; Forry 1842. 
164 Herodotus 1926, vol. 1, 183. 
 
Figure 17—Galvanic “atmosphere” permitting action at a distance, 1797 
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similarly, being “regionesque caeli” (the latter also sky, vault, heavens; Caelus being the Roman 
equivalent of Ouranós).165 Following Vitruvius, some centuries later, the De re aedificatoria of Leon 
Battista Alberti (1404–1472), written between 1443 and 1452, utilised not climata but, rather, 
“Cœlo,” becoming “Cielo” in the Italian translation of 1546, and, in the English version of 1755, 
“Climate.”166 In 1882, Christian Edward Detmold (1810–1887) translated the 1531 Discorsi of 
                                               
165 Pollio 1914, 17; Pollio 1807, vol. 1, 16. 
166 Title of Book I, Chapter III: 
Latin [1452] 1512: “De regione, Cœlo seu aere, sole & ventis aerem ipsum euraiantibus.” 
Italian 1546: “De la regione del Cielo, over aria, del Sole & venti, che l’aria etiandio variano.” 
English 1755: “Of the Region, of the Climate or Air, of the Sun and Winds, which affect the Air.” 
Contemporary translation (1988, 9) does not include title. 
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Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) into English, “climate” substituting for the Italian “paese”—
country.167 And so on. 
 Climate has long possessed a general significance that allows it to stand in for other 
concepts. However, by the late nineteenth century, the new science of meteorology had laid 
claim to its most authoritative meaning. 
                                               
167 Machiavelli 1882, vol. 2, 97; Machiavelli 1848, 89. 
Figure 18—Isobars and isotherms for mainland United States, The Monthly Weather Review, 1908 
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In 1883, the Austrian meteorologist Julius von Hann (1839–1921) opened his Handbuch 
der Klimatologie, published in the “Geographischer Handbücher” series edited by Friedrich 
Ratzel, by declaring the “Concept and Task [Begriff und Aufgabe] of Climatology”: 
“By climate we mean the sum total of the meteorological phenomena that characterize 
the average condition of the atmosphere at any one place on the earth’s surface.”168 
Hann thus identified the science of meteorology as the paradigmatic climatic institution, thereby 
unambiguously relating its constitution to the atmosphere. Well into the new century, this would 
be an authoritative definition, with medical works defining their terms in relation to it.169 
Nevertheless, the emergence of a science definitively authoritative with regards to formal 
understandings of climate in no way restricted informal or figurative uses of the concept. Quite 
the contrary.  
In 1661, the philosopher and clergyman Joseph Glanvill (1636–1680), wrote that “those 
that never travail’d without the Horizon, that first terminated their Infant aspects”—i.e. that 
never had experienced the world beyond their immediate surroundings—were stuck in the ways 
of “their native soil,” while “the larger Souls, that have travail’d the 
divers Climates of Opinions, are more cautious in their resolves, and more sparing to determine.”170 
However, while evident thereafter, figurative iterations of climate were uncommon until the 
twentieth century, where they proliferated dramatically. 
For example (and harking back to §2/§3), in 1941, Arthur Oncken Lovejoy (1873–1962) 
wrote that, in the 1780s and 1790s, particularly in Germany, there had emerged: 
“to resort to the hackneyed but apt metaphor—not one, but a whole set of ‘climates of 
opinion,’ in which species of plants either unknown to the earlier eighteenth century or 
only germinant then, came to flourish mightily.”171 
This “massive historical fact” to which he referred was the emergence of Romanticism, 
understood, as per Lovejoy’s historiology of “unit-ideas,” as consisting of three constituent 
elements: “das Ganze, Streben, and Eigentümlichkeit”—that is, “holism or organicism, voluntarism 
or ‘dynamism,’ and diversitarianism.”172 The historian of ideas was, then, tasked with following 
these “basic or germinal ideas,” wherever and whenever they appear, identifying their “most 
prevalent formulas or phrases or sacred words.”173 Such a task was of particular consequence 
since, Lovejoy noted, “a particular group of these ideas, continuously at work on the minds of 
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the educated and reading public for fifteen decades” had recently resurfaced—its “pathos of 
struggle” playing “an essential and conspicuous part of the monstrous scene presented by 
Germany and by Europe today.”174 
 Three years later, Leo Spitzer (1887–1960) published a scathing response. Against the 
“History of Ideas,” he advocated “Geistesgeschichte,” a term claimed untranslatable. The 
procedural-analytical reduction of thought to units, Spitzer argued, “destroys the organic entity 
and makes the understanding of the whole no longer possible.” That is, such “terminological 
punctiliousness” precludes the historian from understanding that which has “been integrated 
into a unit, held together by a certain Geist.”175 It was thus essential to understand that 
“important ideas are from the start a passionate response to problems which agitate their 
period.”176 As such, there were “no connecting threads” between Romanticism circa 1800 and 
“the moral climate of Hitlerism”177—the two were “disparate and incommensurable.”178  
Lovejoy, as it happens, had been born in Berlin but grew up in the United States. 
Spitzer, by contrast, was a Jewish Austrian émigré who had fled Germany in 1933. As such, the 
latter had a rather different perspective on Lovejoy’s claim that, however distorted Nazi 
appropriations had been, Romantic ideas had nevertheless been working continuously upon 
the people, behind their backs, “making it easier for them to accept Hitlerism.”179 As Spitzer 
put it, quoting Eric Voegelin (1901–1985), from the point of view of most intellectuals, this rise 
had appeared as “an invasion by a foreign nation.”180 Thus, Romantic proclivities for the 
organic and vital were, for Spitzer, “healthy” instances of what the Nazis had corrupted.181 It 
was the corruptions of this particular historical “‘climate’ (Voltaire would say ‘moeurs’)” that was 
to blame, not the Romantics of more than a century before. A Geistesgeschichte, therefore, aimed 
at the sensible discernment of “the whole conceptual field (Begriffsfeld),” establishing “a world 
history of spiritual climates.”182 
By this time, then, “climate” could be employed much like the then-familiar “internal 
milieu” of the Durkheimians—to differentiate the internality of an organic collective. 
~~~~~~ 
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To be inside a circumambient sphere of influences—a milieu, a climate, an environment—
however defined its principles of constituency may be, and however extensive or precisely-
bounded may be its frontiers, is, it would seem, a mode of situation of rather recent genesis. The 
realisation of such an ontoturgic effect required a long and sustained effort.  
Of course, as should now be evident, physicians, medical philosophers, cosmographers, 
and social reformers of whatever sort were in no way somehow waiting for the singularity and 
comprehensiveness of a properly “environmental” concept to articulate the necessity of a 
holistic understanding of health, society (or anything else). Holism, organicism, an emphasis on 
the interconnectedness of all things, the correspondence of microcosmic and macrocosmic, the 
monism of physical laws—in Humboldt’s favourite phrase, the unity of nature—these are 
considerably more ancient, and rather more complicated, conceptions than can be brought 
down to any concept, never mind any statement. As such, the fact of Comte’s l’ensemble total 
having been stated, and imitated, perhaps means less than the fact that other attempts, less 
successful, were being made to do something similar—that is, to provide an abstract, generally 
agreeable technical vocabulary through which the projects of state, empire, society, and mind 
could be undertaken.  
Nevertheless, were the comprehensive singularity of environmental concepts (qua 
groundconcepts) incidental, the propriety of such should not have come into such regular and 
recurrent contestation.  
Figure 19—From “Remarkable Weather of 1911,” March 1912 
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Excursus D: Ontographic: The constitution of the cosmos 
As seen in §3, for Michel Foucault, an “historical ontology” was necessarily “of ourselves,” as 
subjects of knowledge, action, or ethics.1 By contrast, for Bruno Latour, the question of 
“ontologies” is that of “what should be expected from agencies” (human or otherwise).2 
The very conception of “reception as real” (§A) entails that ontologies cannot be formed 
amongst “ourselves.” For there to be an ontological relation, many things must become 
involved. However, pace Latour, the problem posed by lógos—that of the logics or ways of 
existing—will not, herein, be addressed through a series of “modes of existence” that can be 
articulated in a state of formal abstraction.3 Rather, the question of the ontic and the ontological 
will be addressed through a conception of exemplarity. 
 While the concept of the ontoturgic (§B) has expanded the image of the crossroads (§A) 
to encompass the manifestation of worlds, the question of from what those worlds could be 
composed has yet to be investigated. The ontographic must, then, address the question of the 
relation between existents and existence—of how a renovation of particular agencies may 
reconstitute the very mode of existence of the cosmos, as it is received. 
~~~~~~ 
Between Hume’s “sympathy or contagion of manners” of 1748,4 and Tarde’s “truly beneficial 
geniuses” of 1894,5 a great deal had changed. The former had been conceptually 
countermanding the high, indiscriminate hand of climate; the latter, the fashionably 
circumambient pressures of milieu. Both made the imitative human mind primary, and both 
employed the vocabulary of contagion and infection. However, the significance of such 
conceptions is marked by epochal difference in several respects.  
Since long before Sydenham, and for some time after, contagion and insalubrity were 
understood as complementary or interdependent, rather than distinct, causes of disease.6 
Indeed, nineteenth-century sanitarians such as the lawyer Edwin Chadwick (1800–1890) were 
rather more given to Hume’s scepticism as regards causal speculation than to contagion per se.7 
When the physician John Snow traced the origin of an 1854 outbreak of cholera in London to 
                                               
1 Foucault 1983, 237. 
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a particular well in Soho, this may have identified a definite causal vector. However, when Snow 
(1813–1858) wrote of “contagious molecular action,” this understood the pathological process 
as involving the elective affinities of organic molecules rather than germs as such.8 When, 
thereafter, both Louis Pasteur (1822–1895) and Robert Koch (1843–1910), competitively, 
formulated the microbe as a scientific object, within the laboratory and without, their new 
agents were by no means immediately accepted. Nevertheless, they had provided an agential, 
and biological, explanation to the phenomenon of vectoral epidemic contagion. To all this, 
Tarde’s “contagions” of genius (§5.3) could be related. Likewise, his “imitative rays” could be 
imbued with the electrical signals of the telegraph; or, indeed, the recent, and exciting, discovery 
of radiation for which Antoine Henri Becquerel (1852–1908), Marie Skłodowska Curie (1867–
1934), and Pierre Curie (1859–1906) were awarded the Nobel Prize for Physics in the same year 
as his debate with Durkheim. 
Such were, then, not only existing things but paradigmatically existing things: that is, things 
granted the capacity to provide an exemplary pattern for existents, and even existence, more 
generally.9 
Of course, Tarde was by no means alone in obtaining resonances with 
contemporaneously emergent beings of contagion and connection. For example, in 1895, his 
colleague Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931) published an influential study on crowd psychology, 
drawing, in part, on the experimental hypnotism performed by Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–
1893), and others, writing: “In a crowd every sentiment and act is contagious.”10 While the 
figure of the mob or multitude had long been pathologised in such fashion, Tarde affirmed the 
finer qualities of cognitive contagion. However, he also distinguished between this “slow 
contagion from mind to mind,” and “these rapid contagions, these noisy and captivating 
imitations that characterise popular movements.”11 
Nevertheless, in another respect, Hume and Tarde shared an epoch. For the ancient 
Stoics, sumpátheia12—literally, together-feeling—was that principle of resonance and affinity 
suffusing both minds and cosmos.13 For Hume, by contrast, “sympathy” was exclusively a 
relation between minds.14 In his Fragment d’histoire future, Tarde, likewise, described “a 
‘Geniocratic’ Republic” (i.e. rule by geniuses) to be based “on admiration, not on envy, on 
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sympathy, and not on dislike—on enlightenment, not on illusion.”15 Sympathy was not a cosmic 
feeling so much as a geniomesic one.  
Despite his avowals on being a “nominalist,” and repudiating “ontology,” Tarde did not 
follow the Humean-Kantian proscription of speculation—indeed, his social-scientific remit was 
universal in the largest sense. However, such extravagances involved little or nothing of cosmic 
sympathy. Fundamentally, his Monadologie et sociologie proposed that “being [être]” must be 
displaced as a philosophical first principle by “having.” Then, since “being is having [avoir], it 
follows that everything must be avid [avide]”—that is, eager, greedy, hungry, grasping.16  
Thus it is that every being strives to become a “milieu universel” for all others.17 This 
absolute drive to self-repetition will explain why light, heat, and electricity propagate, as “the 
least atomic vibration aspires by itself to fill the infinite ether,” jealously combatting every other 
ripple along the way. No less, this is also “why every species, every living race” undertakes to 
multiply—as per the well-known (but unattributed) maxim of Malthus—“in a geometric 
progression.” Likewise, “any social product”—industrial invention, poetic verse, political 
notion—also “dreams like Alexander of the conquest of the world.” 
As he had in previous works,18 Tarde then distinguished three forms of “universal 
repetition”: “wave-like, generative, [and] imitative.” These varied “procedures of government 
and instruments of conquest” produce “the three kinds of physical, vital, and social invasion: 
vibratory radiation, generative expansion, and the contagion of the example.”19 It was the latter 
imitative, social, exemplative modality, then, that permitted the geniocratic reverence of 
superiority that is permissive of sympathy. 
~~~~~~ 
To receive a thing as real—that is, in accordance with what is fundamentally and specifically 
necessary for that thing to be what it is—only becomes possible from within a relevant world of 
beings. Not all beings familiar to a collective figure equally in this world-effect. Thus, it is in 
relation to “paradigmatically existing things,” and against this rapacious conception of “the 
example,” that I wish to formulate the ontographic. However, at this mid-way point, it must 
now be made further apparent not only what this text is proposing but, moreover, what it is 
resisting. 
It will be evident to anyone familiar with another disgraced professor of the twentieth 
century that what is herein proposed bears little meaningful relation to what he—for many 
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paradigmatically—designated as “ontology.”20 That is, for Martin Heidegger, ontology was the 
science not of “ontic” beings but of Being as such—of what the existence of every existent 
presupposes. The foundation of this science was found in the essence of “man” himself—the 
paradigmatic being, above all.21 As a young Emmanuel Levinas explained: “The understanding of 
being is the determining characteristic and the fundamental fact of human existence.”22 That is, being is an 
issue for no other being but “man.” Thus, it is only through analysis of the human mode of 
existence (“Dasein,” being-there) that Being (“Sein”) itself can be understood. Thus, the empirical 
and transcendental sciences of man, though all imperfect, are already ontological, by definition. 
It is through the careful elaboration of this structure, Levinas adds, that “all the richness of 
human existence will be elaborated.”23 
Unambiguously, the critical-transcendental method of Heidegger, in the tradition of 
Kant, is telist (§C) in the most profound sense. Not only is the objective of thought to arrive at a 
final conception of Being—and hence to stop thinking—but, moreover, history itself is fitted to 
this ascendential trajectory. “Man” is never really different, only more or less “authentic” to 
himself. Needless to say, the Germano-supremacist, and particularly anti-Semitic, aspects of this 
historiology—long-known but oft-downplayed—have recently met with much-needed 
recognition.24 However, the objective of the following is not to criticise so much as to bypass 
such conceptions. 
Neither ontonomic obligation, nor ontoturgic patency, nor ontodesic realism require 
the transcendence of the ontic. Moreover, the ontomesic is staked upon the absence of such 
finalities, and the ontochronic renders ontology historical, without teleology. However, to resist 
the transcendence of the ontic, the ontographic is required. In particular, it must be 
distinguished from the ontoturgic, which is understood as the means of establishing ontological 
exemplarity. Ontographic practice, then, accounts for the diverse specificity of those ontic 
beings, which the very notion of exemplification presupposes.  
Furthermore, it is through the ontographic that the trivium may be ‘grounded’ without 
reference to either a unified earth, a totalised nature, or an all-suffusing aether. This possibility 
can be understood in relation to the dangers of the exemplary. 
~~~~~~ 
When the brothers Wilhelm and Alexander were still young, the Humboldt residence was one 
day graced by the regal presence of King Frederick II (that is “The Great”). Of Wilhelm, the 
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King enquired as to whether he aspired to a soldier’s life, like his father. “No, Sire,” replied the 
elder brother. His sights were set on a career in literature. Of Alexander, two years the junior, 
Frederick jested as to whether he intended to conquer the earth, like his ancient namesake. 
“Yes, Sire,” replied the fair-haired boy, “but with my head.” 
This anecdotal tableau carries an air of the apocryphal—and may well be so. However, 
no image so apt concerning ‘the great and the good’ can fail to be repeated in perpetuity.25 
Nevertheless, to repeat such an image poses a problem: What is one to do with a history that 
takes the glorification of conquest as its cornerstone? Can the exemplary be situated? 
Questions of personal specificity relative to amassed conditions, as we have seen, have 
been formative of mesologic and environmental conception. In the first chapter of Le Naturalisme 
au théâtre, Zola ridiculed those “idealists” who generalise, abstract, retreat into the past, portray 
clichés, and can deal only in petrified statues, never in “the complete analysis of an organism.” 
Confronted with “the contemporary milieu,” the idealist flounces and flounders. 
“Now, it is at this moment that naturalists arrive and say very frankly [carrément] that 
the poetic is everywhere [la poésie est partout], in everything, even more in the present 
and the real than in the past and in abstraction. Each fact, every hour, has its poetic 
and magnificent aspect.” 
Thus, there was not a “dramatist [dramaturge] in this century” that had founded characters as 
great as those of Balzac—“so individual and so alive.”26 The latter had indeed figured that his 
fictive encapsulation of French Society would amount to around three thousand “figures 
saillantes” for each “epoch.” Thus, in the naturalists’ estimation, the exemplary could be 
commonplace; the para-laboratorial fictive milieu was, then, applied to all. 
However, this dramaturgic advocation raises a crucial point: with even two or three 
thousand exemplars per society per epoch, a principle of conceptional condensation is evidently 
necessary. A dramaturg, in a production situation, may often be employed to cut down a script; 
they will seldom be asked to expand it. Likewise, the exemplar is something like what Souriau 
called the “punctum saliens,” the “dynamic center” from which a dramatic composition is made 
to “irradiate its force freely,” out into the open air.27 That is, the exemplary obtains from the 
principle that ‘less is more.’ Thus, this pertains to the ontoturgic.  
To make a common-place a world—that is, to bring it into patency—does not require a 
comprehensive assembly of all those beings that may be received by the collective in question. 
On the contrary, patency implies partiality. Thus, universes mechanistic, organismic, 
mentalistic, contagionistic, can be understood as patterning existents and existence upon 
“paradigmatically existing things.” For the ontographic, however, ‘more is more.’ Thus, the 
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question of ‘what exists?,’ in this mode, resists exemplification. It is no longer a question of 
enacting patency but, rather, of establishing particularity. The ontographic, then, far from being 
‘merely’ ontic, is concerned with modes of existence: with the specific and fundamental. 
However, it can never settle with a mode of existence but must always collocate many in their 
specificity. While the ontoturgic makes manifest, the ontographic makes manifold. Nevertheless, 
it does so for and with its common-place. That is, while it may trouble the designation ‘trivial,’ 
it can in no way transcend the necessity of attention. 
This distinction of ontoturgic and ontographic can itself be further dramatised through 
the example of the Alexanders.  
No matter how much Kosmos had practiced “rational empiricism,”28 and no matter how 
frequently lucid its digressionary adventures, the text enfolded orders of magnitude more 
information than could ever be meaningfully absorbed into a cohesive manifestation. 
Nevertheless, Humboldt had long since, and strenuously, resisted encyclopaedism. Most 
spectacularly, this resulted in the “Tableau physique” of Chimborazo. However, such forms of 
informative compression were not simply in the service of science. Rather, after the example of 
Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805), they aspired to a naturalistic aesthetic education of the 
populace.29 As Humboldt wrote at the climactic moment of the text accompanying his image 
of 1805: 
“It is the imitative arts that relate [retracent] to our eyes the varied portrait [tableau] of 
the equinoctial regions. In Europe, a man isolated on an arid coast can enjoy in thought 
the view [l’aspect] of faraway regions: if his soul is sensitive to works of art, if he is 
educated enough in spirit to embrace the broad conceptions of general physics, he can, 
in his utter solitude and without leaving his home [foyers], appropriate everything that 
the intrepid naturalist has discovered in the heavens and the oceans, in the 
subterranean grottos, or on the highest icy peaks. This is no doubt how enlightenment 
and civilization have the greatest impact on our individual happiness, by allowing us to 
live in the past as well as the present, by gathering around us [rassemblent autour de nous] 
everything produced by nature in its various climates, and put us in communication 
with all the peoples of the earth. Sustained by previous discoveries, we can throw 
[élancer] ourselves into the future, and by foreseeing the consequences of phenomena, 
we can fix once and for all the laws to which nature subjected itself. In the midst [au 
milieu] of this research, we can achieve an intellectual enjoyment, a moral liberty that 
fortifies us against the blows of destiny and which no external power can ever reach 
[atteinte].”30 
                                               
28 Humboldt 1849, vol. 1, 30; Humboldt 1845, vol. 1, 32; Humboldt 1846a, vol. 1, 36. 
29 Schiller 2004; Tresch 2012, 63–65, 71–76. 
30 Humboldt and Bonpland 2010, 75; Humboldt and Bonpland 1805, 34–35. Translation modified. 
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In the second volume of Kosmos, such means were further elucidated—landscape painting, 
botanical gardens, panoramas—such that all regions of the earth could be brought to the 
European common-place; not only as “centres of calculation”31 but as centres of manifestation. 
 Thus, Humboldt endeavoured to make present vast assemblages of the physical world in 
the common-places of sedentary cosmopolites. As such, this cosmography was in no way 
contradictory with ontoturgy—indeed, it worked very well with the fashion for cabinets of 
curiosity, and for naturalistic collecting generally. However, this cosmos was not without its 
exemplar, for that was circulation itself. In this sense, Humboldt’s labours only made the cosmos 
more cosmic. To put all things into circulation within a vastly and forcefully expanded Pariso-
Prussian common-place, was, in his estimation, an act in service of destiny. 
~~~~~~ 
In short: The ontographic presents the common-place with constituents—entities that must not 
only be existed with but, moreover, entities that may, if they are received as such, become 
elements of the collective themselves—and henceforth play their part in the act of reception. 
Such entities must, indeed, have been constitutive of what grants the collective its mode of 
existence since long before any meaningfully designable ‘human’ came to prescribe outlines. 
Each collective identifiable as such will have its own way of recognising this fact—or several. 
Thus, the trivium is laid not upon an appropriated portion of totality but, principally, upon its 
own inheritances. Were a common-place to be laid solely upon its appropriations, that would 
surely be a boneyard. 
                                               
31 Latour 1987, chap. 6. 
 
Figure 20—The Heart of the Andes; Frederic Edwin Church (1826–1900), 1859 
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It is often noted that Humboldt passed away in the year that Darwin’s epochal treatise 
on species was published, 1859.32 There, it might be supposed, ebbed a naturalism still in touch 
with Naturphilosophie and, however distantly, with the antiquarian cosmic harmony that could 
still be reinterpreted in terms of natural laws.33 In any case, it was very much à la mode of “the 
birth of geopolitics” that Tarde expounded his ontological speculations, writing an all-
consuming imperial fervour into the very fabric of existence.  
 It is not out of an indulgence of dolorousness that both Humboldt’s and Tarde’s 
ontoturgic panoramas must be recognised as, each in their own ways, glorifying endorsements 
of Euro-capitalist expansion. Rather, it is from this boneyard—a common-place that neither 
these nor any men of iconographic privilege can claim to own—that something must be made. 
~~~~~~ 
To revive the old Hippocratic terminology (as in §6.1), ontography concerns the katástasis—that 
is, the particular, relevant composition—of the cosmos relevant to each collective. It is in 
tension, but not contradiction, with the ontoturgic, which manifests. Between the ontographic 
and the ontoturgic is thereby effected a cosmic constitution—an account of things—that the 
ontonomic relates to reception, and the ontodesic to action. 
 Thus, the ontographic does not merely record the “ontic” constituents that philosopher-
magistri may then, through a decomposition of human nature, arrive at the answer by which 
all other answers would be redundant. Rather, it populates the collective with problems. How 
to live in a world with radiation? There is no Nobel Prize for constitutional peace. 
 However, if the ontographic makes manifold, and thus intrinsically troubles the 
statement ‘a common-place,’ any given instance of its practice can experience only one world—
or a few.  
The aesthetic-moralistic celebration of the “richness of human existence” is grossly 
cosmopolitically insufficient.34 It is a consolation prize for having lost not only the world but 
manifold thereof. However, our inheritances are undoubtedly epochally-constrained (cf. §F). If 
Herder’s suggestion that “Nature [will] revenge every insult offered her” may seem rather 
contemporary, it is plentifully evident that the “still breath of climate” does not sunder the 
hastily acclimated migrant. Our microbially-inclusive constitution cannot receive this 
proposition in anything like its initial sense. Nor, moreover, do any of these principles address 
the simple and irremovable fact that no trivium can ever exist without other common-places 
elsewhere. That is, next it will be necessary to address the ontomesic (§E). 
                                               
32 E.g. Gould 2011, 105. 
33 A “fate of superannuation,” as Stephen Jay Gould (2011, 105) called it. 
34 Stengers 2010a; Stengers 2011a; Stengers 2005b. 
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8: “The circum-ambient Life-element”: Visualisation from Carlyle to 
Spencer 
In contrast to milieu and climate, whose origin stories are long, complex, and relatively 
irretrievable, the semantic emergence of “environment” is recent, relatively well-documented, 
and can be described quite precisely: Before the nineteenth century, it was a relatively obscure 
term, meaning “to surround.” The first author to use it in something resembling its 
contemporary sense was Thomas Carlyle (1785–1881), who made it a recurrent, if idiosyncratic, 
feature of his writings from 1828 onwards. From the 1830s to the 1850s, it was in infrequent 
usage by other authors, apparently deriving from Carlyle. In the 1850s, Herbert Spencer (1820–
1903) learned the term from Harriet Martineau (1802–1876), who had utilised it as a translation 
of Auguste Comte’s “milieu” (see §5.1).1 Through to the 1870s, as Spencer’s philosophy gained 
greater prominence, this iteration of environment was gradually popularised, being frequently 
discussed in intellectual and scientific terms, generally in explicit relation to Spencerian or 
positivist doctrines. Charles Darwin (1809–1882) largely avoided the term, due to its 
associations with Spencer; however, his followers came to appropriate the expression. From the 
1880s, Spencer’s popularity gradually waned (and after 1900 plummeted), while environment 
took on a life of its own, becoming a widely adopted term of art, particularly in biology and 
sociology, but also in natural theology. It was also increasingly adopted in political rhetoric, at 
first as an expressly scientific term, though, by the late 1890s, usually as an expression needing 
no explanation. Around the turn of the century, the first histories of the term were written, and 
“environment” could even be satirised as something of a buzzword or cliché. Through the early 
decades of the twentieth century, usage proliferated exponentially, though it was not until the 
1960s, or even 1970s, that it ceased to be received as a primarily technical term. 
 This chapter concentrates on developments found through Carlyle, Martineau, and 
Spencer. With regard to Carlyle in particular, but Spencer also, a crucial corollary of their 
environmental conceptions was the projection of a grand visual sensibility indefinitely into the 
world, or even the universe. 
8.1: From obscurity to heroarchy: Carlyle’s drama of visuality 
From viron, meaning a circle or circuit, the English noun enuyroun, meaning to be within limits, 
is found from the fourteenth century, as is the verb meaning to surround, encircle, or 
encompass. For example, Mandeville’s Travels (c.1400) wrote of the Nile that it “envyrouneth all 
Ethiope.”2 However, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the most common sense of 
                                               
1 Jessop 2012; Pearce 2010b. 
2 OED Online 2011. 
  235 
“environed” was that of being surrounded by something threatening. Indeed, in the works of 
Shakespeare (1564–1616), this was the exclusive use of the word. For example, in Titus Andronicus 
(circa 1590), the titular character intones: 
“For now I stand as one upon a rock, 
 Environ’d with a wilderness of sea, 
 Who marks the waxing tide grow wave by wave, 
 Expecting ever when some envious surge 
 Will in his brinish bowels swallow him.”3 
Environs in the sense of the area or hinterland immediately surrounding a place (usually urban) 
is found from the mid-seventeenth century. Both these principal meanings—being surrounded 
by something threatening, and the surroundings of an urban area—remain in usage but 
declined through the nineteenth century, becoming somewhat archaic. 
In 1600, the dramatist Cyril Tourneur (c.1575–1626) wrote in the Prologue to his poem 
The transformed metamorphosis: 
Who tells me that the azure-colour’d skie, 
Is now transformd to hel’s enuironrie. 
However, “environy” would remain extremely obscure.4 “Environment” itself can be found as 
far back as 1603, in a translation of the Moralia of Plutarch (45–127 AD) by the schoolmaster 
Philemon Holland (1552–1637). Writing of a polyp’s ability to disguise itself, Plutarch 
comments that it has the capability to receive into its body “circumplexions and 
environments”—that is, particles, emanations, “parcels and small fragments,” and so on—so as 
to take on “semblable colour.”5 In 1725, the apothecary James Sedgwick wrote of that “perfect 
Environment of Glands and Emunctories all around the Neck.”6 In 1731, An Universal 
Etymological English Dictionary of Nathan Bailey (d.1742) recorded: “An ENVI’RONMENT, an 
encompassing Round.”7 However, the term remained unusual. It was not until 1828 that the 
essayist Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881), perhaps independently, re-coined “environment,” using 
the term in three separate essays published that year in a newly established periodical, The 
Foreign Review.8 
                                               
3 Shakespeare 1994. 
4 Tourneur 1600. 
5 Plutarch 1603, 1009. In another translation, first published between 1684 and 1694 “by Several Hands,” the 
Greek “περιελάσεις [perieláseis]” (for Holland “circumplexions and environments”) was rendered, as “circuitions.” 
Plutarch 1704, vol. 3, 467. 
6 Sedgwick 1725, 345.  
7 Bailey 1731, vol. 2; see also: Bailey 1730. 
8 Essays collected in Carlyle 1897, vol. 14 titled Goethe (194–255), Goethe’s Helena (142–193), and Burns (256–314). 
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After abandoning a career in the clergy, Carlyle had made a name for himself as a writer 
on, and translator of, German literature. In an essay published in July 1828, capitalising on this 
reputation, he set out to appraise (and praise), for an Anglophone audience, the “spiritual 
structure” and mental “outward form” of that distant literary giant of whom “[v]ague rumors” 
had “for more than half a century, been humming through our ears”9—that is, Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832). In particular, Carlyle discussed Goethe’s early career, in 
the period after his hugely successful novel Die Leiden des jungen Werthers of 1774.10 In so doing, 
he drew on, and translated excerpts from, Goethe’s autobiography,11 which narrated the 
author’s Bildung (i.e. formation), from childhood until his departure for Weimar in 1775. 
The notoriety of Goethe’s Werther, written at the age of 24, derived from its indulgence 
of emotionality, its themes of melancholy and gloom and, in particular, its titular character’s 
eventual suicide—an act interpreted by many as being somehow valorised. In his Leben, Goethe 
disavowed this depiction. It was not, he insisted, a promotion of such feeling but, rather, a 
reflection of his time. In Carlyle’s excerpted translation: 
“In such an element, with such an environment of circumstances [bei solcher Umgebung], 
with studies and tastes [Liebhabereien] of this sort; harassed by unsatisfied desires 
[Leidenschaften], externally nowhere called forth [angeregt] to important action; with the 
sole prospect of dragging on a languid, spiritless [geistlosen], mere civic life [bürgerlichen 
Leben] […].”12 
It was from this situation, argued Goethe, that Werther’s dark thoughts, and their popular 
success, derived.  
However, it was not only the listlessness and ennui of a bourgeois upbringing that 
engendered such a space of sentiment. Mentioned, though not excerpted, by Carlyle, the 
immediately preceding paragraphs attributed this feeling to the reception of English-language 
literature. In particular, as the 1846 translation of Goethe’s autobiography by John Oxenford 
(1812–1877) puts it, “Hamlet and his soliloquies were spectres which haunted all the young 
minds,” and “every body fancied he had a right to be just as melancholy as the Prince of 
Denmark, though he had seen no ghost, and had no royal father to avenge.” To this disposition, 
Ossian, the pseudo-Gaelic cycle of epic poems by James Macpherson (1736–1796) published in 
1760, had charmed the young romantics to “a perfectly suitable locality” in “Thule,” the mythic 
northernmost island: 
                                               
9 Carlyle 1897, vol. 14, 195. 
10 The Sorrows of Young Werther, published in English (as The Sorrows of Werter: A German Story) in 1779. 
11 Aus meinem Leben: Dichtung und Wahrheit [From my Life: Poetry and Truth]. In four parts, three published between 
1811 and 1814, the fourth written between 1830 and 1831 and published in 1833 (therefore after Carlyle’s review). 
12 Carlyle 1897, vol. 14, 217; Goethe 1874, vol. 9, 463. 
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“where on a gray, boundless heath, wandering among prominent moss-covered grave-
stones, we saw the grass around us moved by an awful wind, and a heavily clouded sky 
above us. It was not till moonlight that the Caledonian night became day; departed 
heroes, faded maidens, floated around us, until at last we really thought we saw the 
spirit of Loda in his fearful form.”13 
It was immediately following this tableau of frigid gloom, swirling greyness, and spiritual lurking 
that Goethe’s “Umgebung” appeared—a completely commonplace term meaning, literally, 
surroundings—and was rendered by Carlyle as “an environment of circumstances.” This 
phrase was not, therefore, a simple, literal translation. It was, rather, an attempt to convey the 
airy, spiritualistic, scenically evocative qualities of Goethe’s emotive prose. 
 Though this biography covered only its author’s “Wanderjahre,”14 Carlyle wrote, it was 
as though “a completed fragment”: 
“it coheres so beautifully within itself; and yet we see not whence the wondrous 
landscape came, or whither it is stretching; but it hangs before us as a fairy region, 
hiding its borders on this side in light sunny clouds, fading away on that into the infinite 
azure.” 
Thus, though restricted to the youth of a long life, it could hardly be considered unfinished. 
“But apart from its environment, and considered merely in itself, this Wanderjahre seems 
to us a most estimable work.”15 
Here, environment would seemingly pertain to those regions of the author’s life not yet 
incorporated into the account; however, once again, Carlyle’s language is evidently suggestive 
of more than merely an extensive surrounding. 
 Early in his essay, Carlyle counterpoised Goethe to the likes of John Locke, who had no 
less than “paved the way for banishing religion from the world” by giving “Mind […] a Shape, 
a Visibility,” and reasoning “as if it had been some composite, divisible and reunitable 
substance, some finer chemical salt, or curious piece of logical joinery.” Thus Lockean 
philosophical soul-carpentry, and its literary imitators, had begun to wear away the 
“immaterial, mysterious, divine though invisible character” of mind.16 Against such profane 
coarsity, the poet of Werther, with his “soft, melodious imaginations” promised a “religious 
Wisdom” that might, in “these hard, unbelieving utilitarian days,” reveal “glimpses” of that 
“Unseen but not unreal World” of “the Ideal” (as opposed to “the Actual”). Goethe’s writing, 
                                               
13 Goethe 1872, 506–507. 
14 The stage of a German artisan’s training after their Lehrjahre or apprenticeship and before their “Mastership.” 
Carlyle 1897, vol. 14, 228, n.1. 
15 Ibid., vol. 14, 229. 
16 Ibid., vol. 14, 210. 
 
  238 
as such, speaks “to the whole soul,” uniting both “Religion” and the “business of men.”17 
Environment, for Carlyle, then, was an expression ventured to actively resist the bookkeeperly, 
utilitarian materialism of Locke and his mental warehouse attendants. It insinuated around the 
person of the Individual a quotient of occult, inscrutable energy. 
 Later the same year, 1828, Carlyle published another essay on Goethe, commenting on 
the digression within Faust II18 that dramatised the persona of Helen of Troy. In particular, he 
commented on the “strange, piquant, quite peculiar charm” found in the imitation of “the old 
Grecian style”; a depiction so “graphic” that: 
“we could almost feel as if a vista were opened through the long gloomy distance of 
ages, and we, with our modern eyes and modern levity, beheld afar off, in clear light, 
the very figures of that old grave time; saw them again living in their old antiquarian 
costume and environment, and heard them audibly discourse in a dialect which had 
long been dead.”19 
Here, then, environment is given a scenic and still evocative sense, akin to ‘background’ or ‘mise 
en scène’ but with a more flamboyant aestheticism. In December 1828, in an essay on the Scottish 
poet Robert Burns (1759–1796), Carlyle further used the term twice. First, he wrote of Burns’ 
mournful verse that it expressed “the saddest feeling the saddest environment and local 
habitation.”20 Second, regarding the poet’s influence on both Scottish and English literature, 
Carlyle remarked upon a “remarkable increase of nationality” evident in the intervening 
decades. In Burns’ day: 
“A certain attenuated cosmopolitanism had, in good measure, taken place of the old 
insular home-feeling; literature was, as it were, without any local environment; was not 
nourished by the affections which spring from a native soil.”21 
Thus, environment also implied a certain autochthony of sentiment and idea; a befogged 
embeddedness in the deepening soils of nationality. 
And so, in these three essays of 1828, Carlyle’s environment entailed: an affected 
ambience of morbid discontent; the formative circumstances of romanticised, masculine 
individuality; a scenic sense of dramatic surroundings; and a nationalistic, characteristic 
rootedness in place. In the subsequent years, Carlyle used environment frequently, although, 
                                               
17 Ibid., vol. 14, 204. 
18 First performed 19 January 1829. 
19 Carlyle 1897, vol. 14, 168. 
20 Ibid., vol. 14, 273. The stanza in question: 
“The pale Moon is setting beyond the white wave,  
And Time is setting wi’ me, O;  
Farewell, false friends! false lover, farewell!  
I'll nae mair trouble them nor thee, O.” 
21 Ibid., vol. 14, 284. 
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relative to his abundant output, not continually. The term was often preceded by qualifiers such 
as “base,” “picturesque,”22 “intellectual,”23 “unmanageable,” “heavy,”24 “accidental,” 
“personal,” “dim,”25 “fittest,”26 “hard social,” “stern,”27 “kind,” “social, domestic, physical,”28 
“loud-buzzing,”29 “meaner,”30 “friendly,”31 “strange,”32 “new,”33 “distracted,”34 “beautiful,”35 
and so on. He also wrote of Diderot’s “character and his environment of circumstances”;36 
however, this specific phrase was not often repeated.  
The uses of environment were various; however, the term continued to be principally 
suggestive of formative conditions or aesthetic purview. For an uninitiated reader, it was likely 
to be understood as either a Latinate neologism or a creative resignification, being perhaps 
poetically suggestive of lineament, temperament, or firmament—these all being terms that 
Carlyle regularly employed. For example, in his satirical novel Sartor Resartus,37 the protagonist, 
Professor Diogenes Teufelsdröckh,38 is described as being “quite shut out from Hope; looking 
not into the golden orient, but vaguely all round into a dim copper firmament, pregnant with 
earthquake and tornado.”39 Whether or not environment and firmament had any connection 
for the neologist himself, the former term was evidently taken to imply something more like 
ethereal environs than any prosaic catalogue of circumstanding entities. 
 However, environment was just one amongst a vast stable of Carlylean coinages. The 
OED cites 547 as finding their first usage in his works (around 18% of which remain in usage), 
including: forgettable, philistine (1827), open-minded (1828), genetic, self-help (1831), decadent 
(1837), visuality (1841),40 and many more or less familiar. In 1835, the writer John Sterling 
                                               
22 Jean Paul Friedrich Richter (1830), Ibid., vol. 14, 580, 600. 
23 The Nibelungen Lied (1831), Carlyle 1897, vol. 15, 75. 
24 Biography (1832), Ibid., vol. 15, 259. 
25 Boswell’s Life of Johnson (1832), Ibid., vol. 15, 274, 281, 290. 
26 Goethe’s works (1832), Ibid., vol. 15, 369. 
27 Corn-law rhymes (1832), Carlyle 1897, vol. 16, 297, 299. 
28 Sartor Resartus (1831), Carlyle 1897, vol. 12, 109, 21. 
29 Sir Walter Scott (1838), Carlyle 1897, vol. 16, 150. 
30 On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History (1840), Carlyle 1897, vol. 12, 353. 
31 Past and Present (1843), Carlyle 1897, vol. 6, 407. 
32 Squire Papers (1847), Carlyle 1897, vol. 7, 570. 
33 John Sterling (1851), Carlyle 1897, vol. 13, 200. 
34 History of Friedrich the Second (1858), Carlyle 1897, vol. 5, 470. 
35 Early Kings of Norway (1871), Carlyle 1897, vol. 9, 256. 
36 Diderot (1833), Carlyle 1897, vol. 15, 419. 
37 Published in serial 1833–34 and collected 1836. Carlyle 1897, vol. 12, 3–231. 
38 Literally, god-born devil-dung. 
39 Carlyle 1897, vol. 12, 123. 
40 Mirzoeff 2006. 
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(1806–1844) wrote to his friend Carlyle with praise and complaint. This “wondrous account of 
Teufelsdröckh and his Opinions” had, he wrote, given him “much to think of.” However: 
“A good deal of this is positively barbarous. ‘Environment,’ ‘vestural,’ ‘stertorous,’ 
‘visualised,’ ‘complected,’ and others to be found I think in the first twenty pages, — 
are words, so far as I know, without any authority […].”41 
The word “Carlylese” dates from 1858,42 the year that the author’s 21-volume history of 
Friedrich II of Prussia was published.43 However, by the time this tome met its public, 
“environment” was no longer an idiosyncrasy. 
~~~~~~ 
                                               
41 Siegel 2013, 26–28; Carlyle 1897, vol. 13, 107. 
42 OED Online 1888; Anonymous 1859, 503. 
43 A work that reduced his output in the preceding decade to relatively little. 
 
Figure 21—Illustration to 1898 edition of Sartor Resartus by Edmund J. Sullivan 
(1869–1933) 
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In 1836, a writer in the Christian Examiner (signed only as “J.B.”) reviewed a work by the 
antiquarian Thomas Wright (1810–1877), writing of the falseness of opposing “earth and 
heaven, things seen and things unseen,” with God having “placed us here, in the precise spot 
and sphere in which we find ourselves, with that peculiar environment of circumstances, which 
solicit or claim our attention.”44 Though unattributed, this statement apparently alludes to both 
Carlyle’s phraseology and his convictions regarding Religion and the “business of men.”45 In 
1837, A New and copious lexicon of the Latin language by the late Frederick Percival Leverett (1803–
1836) recorded “Obsidio” as meaning “blockade, environment, or encompassment,” thus reiterating 
the older meaning found in Holland’s Plutarch.46 However, in the same year, at least two other 
authors used the term in Carlyle’s sense—though, again, without attribution. 
Capel Lofft the younger (1806–1873), son of the lawyer, poet, and astronomer Capel 
Lofft (1751–1824) wrote in his Self-formation,47 also of 1837, reflecting upon the formative virtues 
of a schooling at Eton: 
“If outward imagery impress itself upon the mind, as it surely does, where have you, 
where, at least, in England, a nobler environment, an outline more magnificently filled, 
a scene where the young mind can better hope to feed itself to greatness on the 
contemplation of surrounding objects?”48 
In the same year, and most crucially, Harriet Martineau (1802–1876), one year before the third 
volume of Comte’s Cours de Philosophie Positive was published, wrote of her disgust at the New 
England phenomenon of young women being married off “to men old enough to be their 
fathers,” expressing no sympathy “for those who, under any pressure of circumstances, sacrifice 
their heart’s-love for legal prostitution; and no environment of beauty or sentiment can deprive 
the fact of its coarseness.” The “mercenary marriages” of this “Auld Robin Gray story”—
alluding to the 1772 Scots ballad by Lady Anne Lindsay (1750–1825)—of course happen in 
Europe also. Thus, the “ultimate and very strong impression” was that “human nature is much 
the same everywhere, whatever may be its environment of riches or poverty.”49 Thus, 
Martineau had already related environment to a recognisably sociological purpose. 
The expression appeared once in the first volume of Martineau’s Retrospect of western travel 
of 1838;50 once in her essay The martyr age of the United States of the same year;51 and once again 
                                               
44 JB 1836, 301. 
45 Carlyle 1897, vol. 14, 204. 
46 Leverett 1842, 587. 
47 Subtitled: Or, The History of an Individual Mind; Intended as a Guide for the Intellect Through Difficulties to Success.  
48 Lofft 1837, vol. 2, 97. 
49 Martineau 1837, vol. 2, 168. 
50 Martineau 1838, vol. 1, 89. 
51 Reprinted: Martineau 1839, 22. 24 
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in her novel Deerbrook of 1839,52 though not in her other novels published around this time. 
Given the voluminousness of her writing, it was an extremely occasional term, though an 
apparently readily comprehensible one. 
In her autobiography of 1877, in the pages covering 1832–1834 (aged 30–32), 
Martineau told of her many and various friends and acquaintances in those years. Among these 
were denizens of the London address “number five, Cheyne Row,” Mr and Mrs Carlyle, of 
whom Martineau wondered how “considering the delicate health of both, they could ever 
flourish on that Chelsea clay, close to the river.”53 With the latter, she discussed literature and 
other matters, and helped the former to secure work lecturing, also aiding his publications. A 
few pages later, Martineau told of another and “[o]ne of the most striking” of her visitors in 
these years, “Capel Lofft the younger, the author of that wonderful book, the merits of which 
were discovered by [the publisher] Charles Knight;54—‘Self-formation,’ which should be read 
by every parent of boys.”55  
Thus, in the late 1830s, “environment” was in sufficient usage to go unattributed but 
was seemingly restricted to acquaintances of Carlyle, and associated literary elites. Moreover, it 
retained its principally aesthetic connotations, with, in Martineau’s case, circumstances being 
that which impose “pressure.” 
In 1831, Carlyle published an essay on Friedrich Schiller with the ultra-Tory Fraser’s 
Magazine for Town and Country, and regularly praised its politics.56 In 1841, Fraser’s included a 
serialised article on the subject of criminal incarceration (unsigned, as per industry convention). 
Few writers on the subject of “crime by individuals,” it declared, had taken into consideration 
“any thing but the crime or criminal,” altogether disregarding “proximate or remote causes” 
for such acts: 
“Neither has there been at any time a disposition manifested to scan the criminal’s 
character fairly; that is, by comparison, connected with the environment of 
circumstances, and in reference to the conduct of prosecutors.”57 
Thus, once again, the terminology was reproduced by authors likely familiar with Carlyle’s 
works; however, in this case, the phrase was given a more explicitly general causal connotation. 
Also in 1841, in the fifth of the letters constituting her Theory of Teaching, with a Few 
Practical Illustrations, the Massachusettsan educator and polyglot Elizabeth Palmer Peabody 
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(1804–1894) advised those who complain as to “the burden of civilized life” to improve their 
spiritual and physical lives, both, by following two “physical laws” in particular: 
“These are organization and circumstances. By circumstances I do not mean that 
superior facility of one course over another, which presents itself to weak and sluggish 
minds as an insuperable fate; but I mean the environment in which each man is born, 
which inevitably colors his existence, but which never interferes with his free will or 
moral worth. […] It is useless to deny the influence of these environments.”58 
Along with her younger sisters, Mary (1806–1887) and Sophia (1809–1871), Elizabeth was a 
prominent promoter of Romanticism and Transcendentalism in New England and, as such, 
could not fail to have been familiar with Carlyle’s Teutophilic output.59 In her eighth letter, 
Elizabeth then wrote of pedagogical method: 
“I might yield, as most do, to the stream of circumstances, and teach what those around 
me teach, were I not convinced, that as each spot has its peculiar difficulty to be cleared 
up, just there falls the beam of light, if we will only receive it; if we will only keep in 
view great distant lights, and at the same moment use the little rays from surrounding 
circumstances. Some fail from gazing too fixedly on the great and distant orbs, others 
from feeling no influences but those of the nearest environment.”60 
Thus, in her iteration, environment and circumstances remain closely associated, with the latter 
being, for such authors, the primary concept. 
 While the sense of formative circumstances were implicated in Carlyle’s environment 
from the beginning, this became more pronounced in his later works. In his book On Heroes, 
Hero-Worship, and The Heroic in History, published in 1841,61 Carlyle undertook to demonstrate 
that all “Universal History” is, “at bottom,” the history of “Great Men” and “Heroes.”62 This 
fundamental principle started in the “young generations of the world,” with those “who did not 
think that they had finished off all things in Heaven and Earth by merely giving them scientific 
names,” and so felt better the divine in Nature and man—who, then, “could worship Nature, 
and man more than anything else in Nature.” From this the “perplexed jungle of Paganism 
sprang” the worshipping of stars, but Heroes above all. A “Heroarchy,” a true “Hierarchy.”63 
“The History of the World” is, quite simply, Carlyle added, “the Biography of Great Men.”64 
 Following a stadial structure, its six parts expounded upon The Hero as: Divinity (Odin), 
Prophet (Muhammad), Poet (Dante, Shakespeare), Priest (Luther), Man of Letters (Johnson, 
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Rousseau, Burns), and King (Cromwell, Napoleon). Regarding the Norse system, which Carlyle 
finds to be “very genuine, very great and manlike,”65 Odin was surely that first “man of genius” 
and “Thinker” whose own “view of the Universe” grew and “promulgated” into all other minds, 
writing as if “in sympathetic ink.” Repudiating the accounts of those who would place his time 
within recent millennia, Carlyle argues that: 
“Odin’s date, adventures, whole terrestrial history, figure and environment are sunk 
from us forever into unknown thousands of years.”66 
Pushed thus back into the mists of yore, the upward curve of human achievement is preserved.  
In a more proximate and heightened eon, there appeared Martin Luther (1483–1546)—
though no epoch could explain his coming. All those who would “what they call ‘account’ for 
him,” Carlyle scorned, do so: 
“not to worship him, but take the dimensions of him,—and bring him out to be a little 
kind of man! He was the ‘creature of the Time,’ they say; the Time called him forth, 
the Time did everything, he nothing—but what we the little critic could have done 
too!”67 
Not only the “existence” but also the “desirableness of great men” they would deny. On the 
contrary, Carlyle goes on to argue, born on “the 10th of November, 1483,” it was altogether 
“an accident” that honoured Eisleben, a town of miners and obscurity, with a boy born to the 
name “MARTIN LUTHER.” 
“the whole world and its history was waiting for this man. It is strange, it is great. It 
leads us back to another Birth-hour, in a still meaner environment, Eighteen Hundred 
years ago—of which it is fit that we say nothing, that we think only in silence; for what 
words are there! The Age of Miracles past? The Age of Miracles is forever here!—” 
Being “intrinsically of the same material,” only the “outward shape” of a Hero “will depend on 
the time and the environment he finds himself in.”68 Bearing the spirit of the ideal ever upward, 
environment, to a suitably possessed Man, was but a firmamental impulsion to Greatness. 
 However, Carlylean Idealism was not indiscriminate. In 1848, a review in The Athenæum 
wrote of the dubiety of the desire expressed by John Herschel (1792–1871) for a universal 
language: “the varieties of form and terminology in language as the natural result and 
expression of organic differences of race and climatic environment”—differences 
irremediable.69 From the previous two chapters, it shall not be surprising that climate and 
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environment could, at this time, be combined in this way. However, for Carlyle, climate and 
environment did not, and seemingly could not, cross paths.  
In 1849, Carlyle published an anonymous essay in Fraser’s titled Occasional Discourse on the 
Negro Question.70 Most remembered for having introduced the phrase “the dismal science” to 
characterise economics,71 the piece was attributed to an “‘Absconded Reporter,’ Dr. Phelin 
M’Quirk.” Written as a faux-speech addressed to “My Philanthropic Friends,” the text 
expounded a luridly racist account of the state of freed black slaves in the West Indies, thus 
mocking the perceived hypocrisy of abolitionists.72 
“The Twenty Millions, a mere trifle, despatched with a single dash of the pen, are paid; 
and, far over the sea, we have a few black persons rendered extremely ‘free’ indeed. 
Sitting yonder, with their beautiful muzzles up to the ears in pumpkins, imbibing sweet 
pulps and juices; the grinder and incisor teeth ready for every new work, and the 
pumpkins cheap as grass in those rich climates; while the sugar crops rot round them, 
uncut, because labor cannot be hired, so cheap are the pumpkins.”73 
As well as “pineapples, and sweet fruits, and spices”—and, he repeats no fewer than 38 times, 
pumpkins—M’Quirk/Carlyle went on to hope for the day that the West Indies would “grow 
beautiful, heroic human lives too,” thus “making the earth nobler round them”—“heroic white 
men, worthy to be called old Saxons, browned with a mahogany tint in those new climates and 
conditions.”74 Thus, not environment but climate was the term germane to the formative 
impositions of the tropics, the inspirational exultations of the former being a world apart. 
As M’Quirk speaks, various audience members walk out in disgust, with Carlyle thus 
gleefully anticipating the article’s reception amongst those he hoped to provoke. However, 
Carlyle was serious in his irony. Unrepentant, the essay was republished four years later with 
the titular “Negro” replaced with the only word that could lend his polemic even more spite, 
the “M’Quirk” ruse dispensed with, and full ownership taken. A debate with London’s leading 
liberal, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), followed.75 Carlyle’s reputation in polite society was 
blemished though hardly shattered.76 
By now sufficiently financially independent to desist in workaday polemic and punditry, 
Carlyle spent the majority of the next decade working on his epic history of Friedrich II. Here, 
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environment was duly present again. “What the young Crown-Prince did, said, thought, in such 
environment, of backstairs diplomacies, female sighs and aspirations, Grumkow duels, drillings 
in the Giant Regiment” could not, Carlyle admitted, be specified “in the smallest particular,” 
as the many “extensive rubbish-books” on the matter had supposed. Nevertheless: 
“Ours is, to indicate that such environment was: how a lively soul, acted on by it, did 
not fail to react, chameleon-like taking color from it, and contrariwise taking color 
against it, must be left to the reader’s imagination.”77 
The expression also appeared capitalised: “King Friedrich, in contrast with his Environment at 
that time, will most likely never be portrayed to modern men in his real proportions” (but this, 
too, was to be “left to the ingenuous imagination of readers”).78 Finally, Carlyle now ventured 
a definition of the term. Deep in the details of 1742, setting aside the intrigues surrounding 
Voltaire’s appearance at Court, there were, Carlyle explained to his reader, “an immense arrear 
of War-matters to bring up.” To these, even more than Voltaire: 
“the afflicted reader must address himself, if he would understand at all what Friedrich’s 
Environment, or circumambient Life-element now was, and how Friedrich, well or ill, 
comported himself in the same.”79 
For now, by the late 1850s, Carlyle may well have been aware that his term had taken on a new 
vocation in the vocabulary of who would become one of his most prominent critics: Herbert 
Spencer. 
8.2: From economy to ethics: Spencer’s philosophy of correspondence 
As seen in §5, Comte’s Cours de philosophie positive (1830–1842) was “freely translated and 
condensed” as Martineau’s The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte (1853). Therein, she wrote: 
“The harmony between the living being and the corresponding medium (as I shall call 
its environment) evidently characterizes the fundamental condition of life […].”80 
Thus, Comte’s milieu, from Newton’s medium, became the English environment, which had 
been (in part) Goethe’s Umgebung. While environment remained an unusual term, the 
translational decision did not, when considered relative to the network of proliferation partially 
reconstructed above, require a large interpretive leap.  
Martineau’s atheistic Letters on the Laws of Man’s Nature and Development of 1851, co-written 
with the phrenologist and mesmerist Henry George Atkinson (1812–c.1890), did not use 
“environment.” However, it wrote of “medium” in terms of: electricity passing through the 
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nerves of the brain; the transmission of heat, rays of light, and sound; a “spiritual substance,” 
an “ether […] pervading space,” or a “universal medium.” Indeed, there are said to be “as 
many media as there are characters of action, each pervading each, and all existing together in 
a way too subtle for our sense and understanding.”81 By contrast, Comte’s statement was 
directed against Bichat’s conflictual definition of life. While Carlyle’s environment had nothing 
to do with either biology or competition per se, it connoted a multiplicity of formative 
circumstances and a certain aestheticised vitality, while the usages of his associates had already 
suggested broader and more mundane meanings. Environment remained a new and seemingly 
exciting term. Given the ambiguities of the physical-mesmeric “medium,” it therefore stood 
eminently appropriable. 
 Though his personage played no part in her autobiographical litany of notables, Herbert 
Spencer and Martineau were well-acquainted. In mid-1835, at school in Bath, Spencer he read 
Martineau’s Illustrations of Political Economy: Selected Tales (9 vol. 1834).82 At sixteen he returned 
home to Derby. In December 1848 (around the time of his twenty-eighth birthday), he moved 
to London, becoming sub-editor of The Economist, the offices of which stood across the road from 
142 Strand. This well-known address was the home of the publisher John Chapman (1821–
1894), host to the most notable radical liberals of London, such as James Anthony Froude 
(1818–1894), editor of Fraser’s from 1861, the positivist George Henry Lewes (1817–1878), and 
his partner Mary Ann Evans, aka George Eliot (1819–1880).83 
In 1851, Chapman published Spencer’s first major work, Social Statics: or, The Conditions 
Essential to Happiness Specified, and the First of them Developed. In its second chapter, titled “THE 
EVANESCENCE OF EVIL,” Spencer overtured: 
“ALL evil results from the non-adaptation of constitution to conditions. This is true of 
everything that lives. Does a shrub dwindle in poor soil, or become sickly when deprived 
of light, or die outright if removed to a cold climate? it is because the harmony between 
its organization and its circumstances has been destroyed. […] All imperfection is 
unfitness to the conditions of existence.”84 
Condition, circumstance, and climate were the vocabulary with which Spencer articulated his 
social convictions at this time. However, the basic tenets of his philosophy were present. 
The term “statics,” in contrast to “dynamics,” Spencer took from Comte, without 
attribution. With his French poor, he had not read Comte’s works but had ample opportunity 
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to learn of them via London’s sundry positivists.85 Social philosophy, like political economy, 
Spencer explained, could be divided in these two parts: statics dealing with “the equilibrium of 
a perfect society,” and dynamics those “forces by which society is advanced towards 
perfection.”86 His criticism was chiefly directed against the utilitarianism, or “expediency-
philosophy,” of William Paley (1743–1805), Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), and their followers, 
which Spencer considered merely empirical, and hence lacking foundation. 
Among all his points of vexation, Spencer particularly lambasted the expediency-
philosophers’ presumption of “the eternity of government”87—that is, the founding of moral 
philosophy upon endless governmental intervention. The history of any coercive governmental 
scheme, Spencer insisted, followed always one and the same story: 
“First comes enactment, then probation, then failure; next an amendment and another 
failure; and, after many alternate tinkerings and abortive trials, arrives at length repeal, 
followed by the substitution of some fresh plan, doomed to run the same course, and 
share a like fate.”88 
Little did English abolitionists averring armed suppression of the slave trade off the coast of 
Africa consider “that it would generate fast-sailing slavers with decks one foot six inches apart, 
suffocation from close packing, miserable diseases, and a mortality of thirty-five per cent”—
slavers that, when “hard pressed,” would turn their “whole cargo of 500 negroes into the sea.”89 
Nor did those who won the Spitalfields Act of 1773, which mandated prices for journeyman 
weavers, consider that, “before 1793, some 4000 looms would be brought to a stand in 
consequence of the trade going elsewhere.”90 Government was, for Spencer, an “external 
force,” its application necessarily indicating “a morbid state.” Accordingly, “we call government 
‘a necessary evil.’” It had not always existed, nor would it always; its present necessity merely 
testified to the persistence of “still-existing barbarism,” not yet overcome by the march of 
progress.91 
 Whatever the naïf expediency-philosophers may say, neither the “tangled web of social 
existence” nor “the multiplied phenomena of this ever-agitated, ever-changing sea of life” 
availed themselves in their endless complexity to human comprehension—or, therefore, to 
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“law-making.” Had Newton, undertaken to investigate every aspect of “the dynamics of the 
universe” in such a manner, “he might have cogitated to all eternity” without resolution. Thus, 
statics, for Spencer, as for Comte, pertained to the ascertainment of the basic ordering principles 
of society—those aspects only that could be understood as lawful and, hence, made a basis for 
morals. In this respect, the “social organism” was not sui generis in its static/dynamic duality; 
such an opposition was necessary to rational science as such.92 
This led Spencer to two Lemmata (sub-propositions). The first: neither “the character 
of mankind” nor that of physical nature were “constant.” 
“It is a trite enough remark that change is the law of all things: true equally of a single 
object, and of the universe. Nature in its infinite complexity is ever growing to a new 
development. Each successive result becomes the parent of an additional influence, 
destined in some degree to modify all future results. No fresh thread enters into the 
texture of that endless web, woven in ‘the roaring loom of Time’ but what more or less 
alters the pattern.”93 
This quoted phrase was from Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus, a translation of what the “Earth-Spirit” 
in Goethe’s Faust names “the living visible Garment of God”:94 
 
“‘In Being’s floods, in Action’s storm, 
   I walk and work, above, beneath, 
   Work and weave in endless motion! 
            Birth and Death, 
            An infinite ocean; 
            A seizing and giving 
            The fire of Living: 
   ‘Tis thus at the roaring Loom of Time I ply, 
   And weave for God the Garment thou seest Him by.’”95 
“In Lebensfluten, im Tatensturm 
  Wall ich auf und ab, 
  Wehe hin und her! 
  Geburt und Grab, 
  Ein ewiges Meer, 
  Ein wechselndes Wehen, 
  Ein glühend Leben, 
  So schaff ich am laufenden Webstuhl der Zeit 
  Und wirke der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid.”96 
 
However, Spencer’s immediate rhetorical objective was far from that of either poet or 
populariser—closer, rather, to the lyrical naturalism of Humboldt. Reading the book of nature’s 
past, interpreting the “hieroglyphics” of its unknown events, “we find this same ever-beginning, 
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never-ceasing change,” in the organic and inorganic alike. Formations of rock are worn away 
and deposited; matter ebbs and flows: 
“Forests and bogs become coal basins; and the now igneous rock was once sedimentary. 
With an altering atmosphere, and a decreasing temperature, land and sea perpetually 
bring forth fresh races of insects, plants, and animals. All things are metamorphosed; 
infusorial shells into chalk and flint, sand into stone, stone into gravel. Strata get 
contorted; seas fill up; lands are alternately upheaved and sunk.” 
As it is with “systems,” so with “worlds”—i.e. celestial bodies. Orbits vary, as do “axes in their 
inclinations, suns in their brightness”; stars are “fixed” in name only, and so on.97  
 The height of peculiarity it would be, then, if, amidst “this universal mutation,” man 
alone stood “constant, unchangeable.” Of course, it is not so: “His circumstances are ever 
altering; and he is ever adapting himself to them.”98 Nevertheless, Spencer’s second “Lemma” 
announced, however imperfect any given human may be before the natural law of 
circumstance, there is no other. 
“One right course only is open; and he must either follow that or take the consequences. 
The conditions of existence will not bend before his perversity; nor relax in 
consideration of his weakness. […] There is no alternative.”99 
Thus the provenance of “all evil”: it is altogether and entirely a matter of “fitness for 
surrounding circumstances”;100 “the conditions of existence, constitution, and conduct.” The 
duty of state was, then, solely to impart what “external agencies” were sadly necessary to correct 
“deficient internal faculties.”101 
 Slavery in the West Indies, with “rich soils, a splendid climate, and a large market” may 
have seemed, at one time, propitious; however, from Jamaica to the southern states of America, 
the history has been one “of distress and complainings, in spite of continual assistance and 
artificial advantages.” The monopolies of the East India Company, likewise, befell the fate of 
all who go against nature.102 Moreover, “state-colonization” was to be understood as 
“indefensible” on account of its of bureaucratic overreach: “six functionaries and their twenty-
three clerks, sitting at desks in Downing Street! being at the rate of 0.13 of a functionary and 
half a clerk to each settlement!”103  
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Likewise, the barbarous degeneration of those colonists living “under aboriginal 
conditions,” had been “universally remarked.”104 Nevertheless, while atavistic resurgence of 
“the old predatory instinct” may have “retarded civilization” in its production of conditions 
unconducive to “social life,” it nevertheless “subserved civilization by clearing the earth of 
inferior races of men.” As far as social progress is concerned, “the hindrance must be got rid 
of,” that space on the earth given up to races of a higher order of development—to “the social 
man over the anti-social man; or, strictly speaking, of the more adapted over the less 
adapted.”105 There is no alternative. 
 Indeed, this is not, to be clear, merely a matter of might-makes-right or, as Spencer 
would later put it, “the survival of the fittest.” This was, we must recall, a treatise concerning 
“The Conditions Essential to Happiness.” As per social philosophy per se, this doctrine was 
ascendential—that is, relating to the “animal series” that organised living beings in an 
increasing order of perfection, it entailed a stadial structure of progressively more elevated stages 
of social development. Or, in Spencer’s terms, the higher the development of an organism, the 
greater its powers of “self-preservation,” an observation that “may also be generalized under 
this same term—a ‘tendency to individuation.’” 
“The lower the organism, the more is it at the mercy of external circumstances. It is 
continually liable to be destroyed by the elements, by want of food, by enemies; and 
eventually is so destroyed in nearly all cases.” 
Lacking the “power to preserve its individuality,” the unfit organism is returned either to 
“inorganic matter” or “by absorption into some other individuality.”106 Happiness, then, is the 
state of being powerfully individuated, able to exercise the fullest “liberty” of one’s faculties. 
Society is the condition of realisation of this for human individuals. The state is the utility 
imposed upon those lacking individuality and, hence, independence from circumstance. Having 
the state not harm the society, and hence the individual, is the great moral quandary of the 
age.107 
Spencer concludes that, in the end, “the moral law” is, quite simply, “a statement of the 
conditions of beneficial action.”108 That is, the moral is what pertains to the formative conditions 
for social beings and, in particular, what elevates them towards more perfect correspondence, 
thus forming a natural foundation for morals. This moral conditionality was therefore, in a 
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word, transcendental. Indeed, Spencer titled an essay of 1857 Transcendental Physiology109 and, in 
his Social Statics, he had affirmed that “moral truth” had proven “to be a development of 
physiological truth.”110 However, in contrast to Germanic transcendentalism, the philosophy 
was not ideal as such but, rather, depended upon the more or less lawful substructure of Nature. 
It was this that was determinate of moral permissibility.  
Such commerce-friendly cogitations would prove, in the subsequent decades, very 
popular. However, at this time, Spencer remained reliant on Chapman for his access to market. 
In 1851, Chapman acquired the Westminster Review. In that periodical the next year, 
Spencer published an article titled A Theory of Population, deduced from the General Law of Animal 
Fertility.111 Nominally a review, Spencer took it as an opportunity to advance his own thoughts 
regarding life, law, and valid forms of human existence. The text begins with a quotation from 
Richard Whatley (1787–1863), the Archbishop of Dublin, defending the doctrine of Thomas 
Robert Malthus (1766–1834) against the criticisms of Thomas Doubleday (1790–1870), one of 
the authors under review.112 Though accepting Doubleday’s argument that “an essential 
beneficence” is at work in nature, like the solar system described by Newton and Laplace, 
tending towards balance and the “self-sufficingness of things,” Spencer argues that a more 
satisfactory account must begin from a definition of “Life itself.” Such a definition would include 
not only “the peculiar property of a living organism” but also both organic and inorganic beings. 
As the likes of Coleridge or Schelling had attested, “the characteristic which, manifested in a 
high degree, we call Life, is a characteristic manifested, only in a lower degree, by so-called 
inanimate objects.” In brief: 
“Life may be defined as—the co-ordination of actions.” 
The difference between living and non-living was, therefore, one of degree, not kind.113 
 So long as “any race continues to exist,” destructive and preservative forces “must 
perpetually tend towards equilibrium.” However, the means by which this occurs depends on 
the type’s level of organisation. Those given “high endowments” for self-preservation have low 
fertility, while those lacking the means to preserve themselves, whether by speed, guile, or 
                                               
109 This title was rejected by the editor of the The National Review, with which it was initially published in favour of 
The Ultimate Laws of Physiology but Spencer’s preferred denomination was returned as it was republished later the 
same year. Spencer 1891, vol. 1, 63–107. 
110 Spencer 1851, 461. 
111 Spencer 1852. 
112 Under review: works by William Benjamin Carpenter (1813–1885), Louis Agassiz (1807–1873) and Augustus 
Addison Gould (1805–1866), Richard Owen (1804–1892), Japetus Steenstrup (1813–1897) translated from Danish 
by George Busk (1807–1886), Thomas Doubleday (1790–1870), and a volume edited by Robert Bentley Todd 
(1809–1860). 
113 Spencer 1852, 472. 
 
  253 
whatever other faculty, accordingly, have high fertility.114 In human beings, the crucial faculty 
of preservation is that of intelligence. This, Spencer discusses phrenologically in terms of mean 
cranial capacity, with those in “our present phase of civilization” exceeding those in “the savage 
state” by “nearly 30 per cent.”115  
As regards why this “greater development of the nervous system must take place,” 
Spencer points to what he takes to be a commonplace: “the excess of fertility itself,” and the 
“constant pressure of population upon the means of subsistence” that is consequent. While 
migration may ease this “pressure” for some time, such release is limited. In time, there is 
necessarily an “increasing demand for skill, intelligence, and self-control,” and this, Spencer 
argues, institutes the “social state.” For example, a farmer who studies chemistry and adopts 
machinery yields more from his acre. 
“To meet the requirements of the market, the manufacturer is perpetually improving 
his old machines, and inventing new ones; and by the premium of high wages incites 
artizans to acquire greater skill.”116 
Thus, population as such is not the only “pressure” in this thermodynamic model of evolution. 
Of course, there is earth, the finitude of which inherently precludes indefinite population 
expansion. However, most crucially, as per the “hard pressed” slavers of Social Statics, there is 
also the market. The pressure towards specialisation and free trade itself serves as a natural 
externality on action and, therefore, upon cranio-social evolution. 
Thus differs the “Pacific Islander” whose wants are answered immediately by Nature, 
and the “Englishman” who ekes out a living from his wits. This “enlargement of the nervous 
centres,” and matching “decline of fertility,” Spencer affirms, is an average, not absolute, effect. 
Nevertheless, its law is iron. 
“For, necessarily, families and races whom this increasing difficulty of getting a living 
which excess of fertility entails, does not stimulate to improvements in production—
that is, to greater mental activity—are on the high road to extinction; and must 
ultimately be supplanted by those whom the pressure does so stimulate. This truth we 
have recently seen exemplified in Ireland.” 
This Irish example was, of course, an Gorta Mór—the Great Famine—occurring from 1845 to 
around the time of Spencer’s writing, caused in most part by British trade policies, knowingly 
enforced, and leading to around a million deaths and an equal number emigrating, reducing 
the population of the island by as much as a quarter.117 Such was, for Spencer, “the à priori law 
of maintenance of race, from the monad up to man”—the agency of equilibrium in nature at 
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work. It was the “proximate cause” of all social progress, from man’s animalistic origins to “the 
clearing of the earth’s surface” to the advent of “social organisation” to the ever more “mutually 
dependent relationships” of the then-present. And yet it continued to work, “the pressure of 
population” only ceasing when having produced its final act: human perfection—a being 
perfectly adapted to its conditions.118 
~~~~~~ 
In his later autobiography, Spencer recalls, in the period 1853–1854, reading “Miss Martineau’s 
abridged translation of Comte,” his curiosity piqued by “two of my friends, Mr. Lewes and Miss 
Evans.” In 1853, Lewes published Comte’s Philosophy of the Sciences, which Spencer also read, being 
thus appraised of “The Leader.” However, Spencer strenuously protested, as he did whenever 
characterised as a “positivist,” that, despite borrowing “statics” and “dynamics,” as well as, 
later, “altruism” and “sociology,” he bore the “Great Priest of Humanity” (as Comte termed 
himself) no debt whatsoever, besides “the indebtedness of antagonism.”119 In October 1856, 
Spencer travelled to Paris with Chapman, meeting Comte and exchanging pleasantries but 
seemingly little more.120 
The year before, Spencer had published his next major text, The Principles of Psychology.121 
This was his first work to deploy “environment” and was, indeed, of all his publications, the one 
to do so most enthusiastically, appearing over 200 times. As per the empiricist tradition, ideas 
were taken to be derived from experience. However, while Hume had made mind sui generis, 
Spencer’s psychology was determinedly re-embodied, with the universal “substratum” 
underlying the “complex structure” of experience being “the impression of resistance.” Every 
creature, or at least “every terrestrial creature,” was necessarily and continually subject to 
“external stimuli,” with the higher orders being ever more so.122 Thus, as regards human beings, 
“Matter, Space, Motion, Force—all our fundamental ideas” arise from “the relation between 
the organism and its environment.” 
“Here is a subject placed in the midst of objects. It can learn nothing of them without 
being affected by them. Being affected by them implies some action produced by them 
upon its surface.” 
It was this “direct contact,” guaranteed by “the law of gravitation” that was productive of all 
experience and ideation.123 
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At this point, around half way through the book,124 Spencer used “environment” for 
only the third time—and at no point was this term explained or justified.125 However, in and 
after the chapter “The Correspondence Between Life and its Circumstances,”126 the term was 
used almost continually. It began with a significant modification of his essay on population. 
“Life is defined as—The definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both 
simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external coexistences and sequences.”127 
Thus the organic-inorganic “co-ordination of actions,” which Spencer now decides “includes 
too much,”128 was relinquished in favour of an internal/external “correspondence.” This term 
Spencer did seek to justify, acknowledging that “we have no word sufficiently general to 
comprehend all forms of this relation between the organism and its medium, and yet sufficiently 
specific to convey an adequate idea of the relation” but nevertheless that this term “seems the 
least objectionable.”129 Though beginning, developmentally and logically, in terms of 
“resistance,” it was this “correspondence” that was the most crucial term of Spencer’s 
psychology (and, implicitly, his biology), with “all modes of consciousness” being “nothing else 
than incidents of the correspondence between the organism and its environment.”130 
 Spencer continued to use “conditions” and “circumstances” in the same manner as 
before. Moreover, “medium” retained its common usage with regard to surrounding fluids, 
whether liquid or gaseous.131 However, environment was distinct on two counts: first, it bore no 
elemental connotation and was therefore more completely abstracted; second, though things 
could be bathed in media, they corresponded to environments.132 A medium is one kind of 
environment; an environment one kind of condition. A medium may support an organism but 
it does not individuate it. 
Environments were not necessarily proximate (in spatial or causal terms). Nor was the 
extensity of an environment purely biologically determined. In particular, the “range of 
environment” germane to “man”—that realm to which his ever-increasing capacities bring him 
into correspondence—were augmented “by compass, and stars, and chronometer.” Thus, 
purchases on one side of the Atlantic “adapted to the prices” on the other. Likewise, 
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stratigraphic investigations “bring his actions into correspondence with the coexistences a 
thousand feet underneath.” Turning the other way, “his correspondences” extend beyond the 
earth altogether. 
“It stretches into the surrounding sphere of infinity. It was extended to the moon when 
the Chaldeans discovered how to predict eclipses; to the sun and nearer planets when 
the Copernican system was established; to the remoter planets when an improved 
telescope disclosed one, and calculation fixed the position of the other; to the stars when 
their parallax and proper motion were measured; and, in a vague way, even to the 
nebulæ, when their composition and forms of structure were ascertained.”133 
As such, “[t]he environment in general is infinite,” with limits being relative to the degree of 
development of any given creature.134 
In the fifth chapter of his Principles of Biology (first volume, 1864),135 Spencer reprised his 
arguments of a decade previous. Living beings were defined by their active “correspondence with 
external co-existences and sequences.” The name Comte went unmentioned in Psychology (although 
Spencer took issue with Blainville’s definition of life); however, here, in a footnote, Spencer 
made pointed his direct disagreement. It was “strange,” he remarked, that Comte had come 
“so near this truth and yet missed it”—specifically, that “the necessity of a harmony between 
an organism and its environment, as a condition essential to life” entailed, further, “that the 
continuous maintenance of such inner actions as will counterbalance outer actions” itself 
therefore “constitutes life.” Comte took harmony for granted, whereas Spencer saw it as 
produced by pressures, destructions, and adaptations. Thus, despite the positivist’s “often 
remarkable” intuitions, Spencer was again at pains to emphasise that, besides some excerpts of 
the Course, he knew of his opinions “only by hearsay.”136 
His insistent disavowals aside, Spencer plainly took “environment” from Martineau’s 
rendering of Comte.137 Nevertheless, there is every chance that he encountered the Carlylean 
version previously. As such, for Spencer, far from being “without any authority,” as Sterling 
had put it, environment was, even in Martineau’s iteration, plainly available as an English word. 
Accordingly, while Spencer, grudgingly, acknowledged his borrowing of terms such as 
“altruism,” he could consider himself having no dues to pay as regards this concept. 
Nevertheless, his “environment” was evidently cognate with what Comte in 1838 had 
designated “not only the fluid in which the organism is immersed, but, in general, the total set 
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[l’ensemble total] of external circumstances of any kind that are necessary for the existence of each 
particular organism.”138 That is, it was an internally undifferentiated externality individuating 
an internality, most commonly an organism. However, beyond the strictly biological or 
psychological usage, there were rather more cosmological implications to the concept. Quite 
unlike Comte’s anthropo-theistic “Grand-Milieu”—imagined as a kind of aether cloaking the 
earth, assuaging pretentions to having ideas above one’s station—Spencer’s environments 
opened infinitely outwards, projecting laissez faire into the universe. However, by far the most 
significant difference between Comte and Spencer concerned the elimination of “harmony” 
from the definition of life, and its redefinition in terms of the correspondential “survival of the 
fittest.” 
Later in his Biology, Spencer gave a more specific definition of environment. As per tenets 
developed from his Social Statics onwards, life “becomes more complex” as it accedes to “higher” 
states of development. 
“Though, literally, the environment means all surrounding space with the coexistences 
and sequences contained in it; yet, practically, it often means but a small part of this.” 
Thus, the parasitic “entozoon” has an environment extending only so far as the body it inhabits, 
and so on.139 This same principle applied, of course, to “the history of mankind,” whose 
progressively advancing “civilization” developed through its movement from the “less varied” 
Torrid zone to the greater and more demanding variation of the temperate. As more 
“complicated physical geography” was adaptively encountered, to “their physical environment” 
was added “a social environment,” which brought yet greater complexity and, hence, 
advancement.140  
However, as per Spencer’s essay on population, it was not only the geographical or 
climatic differences of the earth that formed the differentiations of the human environment.141 
Indeed, an organism’s environment “comprehends all those other organisms existing within its 
sphere of life,” this constituting “the most important and most numerous surrounding changes 
with which each animal has to deal.” This, indeed, was acknowledged to be the principal 
pressure to which internal adaptations have to respond.142 Since “individuals of a species” are 
necessarily “unlike,” the changes in their environment that overthrow “the moving 
equilibrium,” so long as these are not catastrophic, will necessarily, by the “continual 
                                               
138 Comte 1838, vol. 3, 235. 
139 Spencer 1864, vol. 1, 85. 
140 Ibid., vol. 1, 87. 
141 Ibid., vol. 1, 428. 
142 Ibid., vol. 1, 88. 
 
  258 
destruction” of individuals, favour the “fittest” among them, adjusting the survivors to a new 
“equilibrium with the altered conditions.” 
“This survival of the fittest, which I have here sought to express in mechanical terms, 
is that which Mr Darwin has called ‘natural selection, or the preservation of favoured 
races in the struggle for life.’ […] To him we owe the discovery that natural selection is 
capable of producing fitness between organisms and their circumstances.”143 
Thus, Spencer’s reading of Darwin, however apparently deferential it may have been presented, 
did not differentiate between distinct phases within the evolutionary process but saw 
environmental influence as continual. His fluido-thermodynamic or “mechanical” conception 
of environment, as per the principle of “resistance” in his Psychology, had to be direct. Even if 
other species were environmentally primary, the germane form of differentiation for Spencer 
remained the membrane of the organism. 
 Having previously dealt with vegetal, animal, and psychical evolution, in his Principles of 
Sociology of 1876, Spencer finally approached “the remaining division—Super-organic 
Evolution.”144 It is, Spencer begins, with “aggregates of men” as it is with beings organic or 
inorganic: the behaviour of an individual object “depends on the co-operation between its own 
forces and the forces to which it is exposed.”145 However, with higher phenomena, these forces 
are, of course, more complex. 
Among “The Factors of Social Phenomena,” one can, therefore, distinguish the 
“intrinsic” from the “extrinsic.” As regards the latter, there is “climate” (hot or cold, moist or 
dry), “surface” (clear or covered, uniform or multiform), “vegetal productions” or “Flora” 
(abundant or not, useful or otherwise), and, furthermore, “Fauna” (injurious or aidful, 
influential by species and individually). Such factors are not, of course, immutable. Climate is 
altered “by clearing and by drainage.” Nevertheless: 
“On these sets of conditions, inorganic and organic, characterizing the environment, 
primarily depends the possibility of social evolution.”146 
However, such conditions are not the only externalities of importance to the evolution of a 
society. Further to these, of “extreme importance” are “the influence of the super-organic 
environment—the action and reaction between a society and neighbouring societies.” Indeed, 
while a society’s “industrial” organisation, Spencer argues, is principally determined by its 
“inorganic and organic environments,” the organisation of its government is principally 
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determined by its inter-societal environment “by the actions of those adjacent societies with 
which it carries on the struggle for existence.” 
 However, there were yet more environments to consider. In particular, there were those 
“super-organic products” usually named “artificial” but which, in philosophical terms, “are no 
less natural than all other products of evolution”—that is, technological objects or “material 
appliances”; everything from “roughly-chipped flints” to steam-driven factories, “eighty-ton 
guns,” and cathedrals. Such beings, too, amount to “new genera and species.”147 
“They gradually form what we may consider either as a non-vital part of the society 
itself, or else as a secondary environment, which eventually becomes more important 
than the primary environments.”148 
However, social evolution did more than simply economically mobilise ever more technical 
elements. It altered what could be perceived. Spencer asks us to, “so far as we can, picture the 
imaginary environment the primitive man makes for himself”—a-swarm with “supernatural 
agents” and other phantasmagoria of the imagination.149 Moreover, the very wind itself—what 
could the “original conception” of this have been? How hard it was to think of this “surrounding 
medium as a material substance”; how incapable the “primitive man” was in apprehending it 
as “something which acts as do the things he sees and handles.”150 
Thus, Spencer’s initial enthusiasm for “environment,” and his regular reuse of this term 
to establish his philosophy, by no means supplanted his other terminology. Indeed, in the second 
volume of his Sociology, the word appears only three times. “Medium” in its circumambient sense 
(as opposed to, for example, the medium of currency), also only appeared three times in the first 
volume and not at all in the second.  
However, finally, in Principles of Ethics, first published in 1879, between pronouncements 
on “The Rights to Free Motion and Locomotion,” and “The Right of Property,” Spencer wrote 
of “The Rights to the Use of Natural Media.” It was not only, he noted, “by the actions of 
fellow-men,” or by restrictions of his movement, that a man may come to injury. Rather, the 
activities necessary for his “maintenance of life” could come “by traversing his relations to the 
physical environment on which his life depends.” For this reason, it had been claimed, for 
example by the Scottish jurist John Erskine (1695–1768), that such “natural agencies” as access 
to light or air must be kept in “common possession.”151  
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It would then follow, Spencer continues, that under the heading of “natural media” 
must be included, “by an unusual extension of meaning,” that which “admits of 
appropriation—the surface of the Earth,”152 since every being presupposes at the very least a 
place to stand. Moreover, the higher state of civilisation, he observes, has come to recognise the 
necessity of free access to light, and unpolluted air—such as regards smoking on railway 
carriages (no mention is made of industrial pollution).153 Thus, just as “cannibalism” or “slavery 
and serfdom” had ceased to be acceptable, “the uses of the atmosphere,” and due freedoms 
“with respect to the environment,” had already been admitted into the structures of urban 
organisation.154  
 However, while “equal claims to uses of the media in which all are immersed” are, then, 
readily agreed upon: 
“the proposition that men have equal claims to the use of that remaining portion of the 
environment—hardly to be called a medium—on which all stand and by the products 
of which all live, is antagonized by ideas and arrangements descending to us from the 
past.”155 
Were such earthly commonality to pertain to “men stood in possession of a territory not yet 
individually portioned out,” what is said of air and light may well go for land, also. However, 
given “long-standing appropriation, continued culture, as well as sales and purchases,” matters 
were more complicated. From the dawn of agriculture, Spencer argues, land tenure cannot be 
extricated from cultivation or hence from progress. Thus, the surface of the Earth, ethically 
speaking, could be an environment but not a medium. 
8.3: The imaginary environment: Victorian commonplaces 
Were we to take Spencer’s Psychology as the ur-text of the socio-biological “environment,” for his 
own oeuvre or in general, we might well conclude that the Spencerian environment was merely 
the shadow of the organism—that it is simply the product of taking the organismic membrane 
to be the fundamental line of differentiation for understanding life. However, by paying close 
attention to the development of Spencer’s thought before and after his text of 1855, we can see 
a wider range of implications.  
While “conditions” and “circumstances” could continue to be used interchangeably 
with environment, paying attention to Spencer’s earlier texts shows that it was not only the 
pressures of population, alongside those of climate, and so on, that were formative of the 
circumambient impulsions subsequently generalised as environment. Additionally, and most 
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consequentially, there were market forces. That is, the geographically decentred effects of 
labour division and specialisation of production were made a force continuous with the other 
forces captured under the quasi-thermodynamic conception of environmental pressure.  
Moreover, while Spencer made little attempt to claim “environment” as his own, and 
while it was not among his most argumentatively essential concepts, it cannot thereby be 
assumed that it did not perform distinct conceptual work. While environment was initially 
differentiated from “medium” simply by the latter’s connotations of fluidity, this distinction later 
took on more significant moral weight as media were presumed to be held in common, whereas 
environments were more general and could be appropriated. Finally, while environment 
remained to some extent interchangeable with other expressions, no other concept could clearly 
demarcate inner from outer—nor, then, could it carry the same connotations as regards self-
hood or subjectivity. This would continue to be crucial. 
While the distinction of appropriable environments from common media may have 
been idiosyncratic to Spencer, his concern with the sensual and perceptive—“picture the 
imaginary environment […]”—was not merely an echo of Carlylean egography (the scenic 
accoutrements to an individual’s grandeur) but remained crucial to the concept. From the 
beginning, environment was articulated in psychological, and hence egocentric, terms. As 
individuals became ever more individuated, so did the purview of their “correspondence” 
expand outwards, as the artificial contrivances of the state withered away. This process of 
environmental expansion was, for Spencer, the march of civilisation—we might say, empire. 
While Carlyle dramatised individual freedom in the manner of a pathologically cantankerous 
clergyman, Spencer did so as the chief choral orchestrator of laissez faire capitalism. While the 
former disdained the spiritlessly utilitarian, the latter gloried in it. However, the fact that both 
found their audience in Victorian England, and beyond, should surprise no one. 
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Excursus E: Ontomesic: The situation of contradiction 
As seen in §3, in William James’ estimation, there was, for “savages,” little “unity” in Nature. 
Rather, “[i]t is a Walpurgis-nacht procession, a checkered play of light and shadow, a medley 
of impish and elfish friendly and inimical powers.” Thus, in contrast to a Carlyle, a 
Schopenhauer, a Spencer, or any thinking man, there could be, for those stuck at this stage of 
uncivilisation, “no tincture of philosophy.”1 
 These words, from the opening pages of James’ lectures on A Pluralistic Universe (4th May, 
1908),2 no doubt sat well with an audience appraised of the policy of then-President Theodore 
Roosevelt: to assimilate Indigenous peoples, dismembering their communities, forbidding their 
language and culture, and, fundamentally, appropriating their lands (in part, under the guise of 
“conservation”).3 
 The postulation that “world” should not be taken as a synonym for “globe,” “planet,” 
or “cosmos”—that “worlds” are actively produced, relative to collective modes of existence, and 
are, therefore, multiple—is certainly not original.4 However, it can now be said, more precisely, 
that a world is: that which is made patent (§B) for the constituents of a collective (§D), relative to 
the obligations formative of that collective (§A), and by which possibilities of action and 
occurrence are made manifest to them (§C). 
 But how, then, if worlds are thus manifold, is passage, commonality, cooperation, or co-
belonging between collectives possible? Such aptitudes are here conceived as ontomesic. 
~~~~~~ 
For Bodin, it was “les peuples du milieu”—peoples of the temperate zones—that were uniquely 
suited to negotiate and organise the affairs of other peoples.5 For Comte, any demarcation lower 
than “humanity” had “no real foundation in nature,” and “no one [nation] is really separable 
from the others.”6 Thus, with perichoretic munificence,7 it was necessary to offer “the Orient 
an acceptable union with the Occident,” in the name of Humanity.8 Humboldt, likewise, 
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celebrated the work of connection that would “put us in communication with all the peoples of 
the earth,” thus effecting the cosmos that was due to all. However, for Spencer, without hint of 
such harmony, the matter of “extreme importance” was to recognise “the super-organic 
environment” and its “struggle for existence.”9 
 In a short essay co-authored with his nephew Marcel Mauss in 1913,10 Durkheim 
admitted that “social phenomena […] not strictly attached to a determinate social organism do 
exist”—extending beyond any single “national territory,” and over great lengths of time. Indo-
European languages, for example, share “a common fund of ideas and institutions.” Such 
supranational “systems of facts” were to be named “civilization.”11 Nevertheless, “the human 
milieu” as an integral totality—that for which Comte had hoped to found a science—was “only 
a construction of the mind [l’esprit].”12 The geographer Friedrich Ratzel, for instance, had 
shown that “symbolic frontiers [frontieres ideales]”13 could be spatially delineated no less than 
political ones. Civilisation was, therefore, “collective life of a special genre,” finding its 
“substratum” in “a plurality of interrelated political bodies acting upon one another”—a 
“higher kind” of social life that sociology must come to know.14 
 In La Nation, a manuscript written around 1920 (although not published until 1953), 
Mauss expanded upon this re-estimation of the “higher kind” of sociality, writing that it is “an 
abstraction to believe that the internal politics of a nation is not conditioned largely by the 
outside, and vice versa.” 
“A society that is already a milieu for the individuals that compose it lives among other 
societies that are also milieus. So we would express ourselves correctly if we said that 
the total set [l’ensemble] of international—or, better, intersocial—conditions of the living 
relation [la vie de relation] between societies, is a milieu of milieus.” 
This ensemble of milieus, “which is humanity,” is unlike “the physical milieu” in that it is, 
ultimately, susceptible to “human action.” However, this fact had all too often given rise to the 
“absurd notion” that societies could thus be changed “arbitrarily,” and at will. This fallacy 
Mauss takes to be “one of the great idea-forces of history,” having inspired “the great tyrants” 
from Alexander, Caesar, Robespierre, and Napoleon to Lenin.15 
~~~~~~ 
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There are doubtless indefinitely many ontological collectives “identifiable as such” (§3). 
However, these collectives do not necessarily correspond to conventional delineations of nations 
or societies. If the ontomesic is intersocial then it is not in the same sense as the international—
this being only one, albeit disproportionately significant, way in which collectivity is distributed. 
A scientific discipline, a religion, or a generation may also be understood in these terms. The 
concept of “collective,” then, can also be understood “in relation”—that is, as a kind of event 
occurring between multiple beings. An action is collective to the extent that those entering into 
it can presume a syndoxic, ontonomic rapport with regard to the matter of concern productive 
of the situation. Absent such commonality, a different order of mutual relation is called into 
being. 
Since the existence of a collective always presupposes other collectives, and since these 
are distinguished by their respective modes of attention, the question arises as to how collectives 
are capable of coexisting. Of course, it has been said that no one need belong to only one 
collective. Moreover, to speak of different collectives is not to assume that they need be radically, 
incommunicably alien to one another. They may, indeed, greatly overlap. Perhaps all 
collectives whatsoever may be said to share some facet of ontonomy—this is an empirical, and 
indeed political, question. However, the solution preferred by Comte, and very many others—
making human nature the given, universal ground in relation to which all are priorly unified—
must be avoided. Such ostensive humanistic beneficence is yet another means by which one 
collective “seeks to extend its own common-place to the boundaries of the universe” (§C). 
And yet, to return to the concept of the trivium, it is surely not the case that no ‘grounds’ 
are given. Indeed, the very notion of the cross-roads qua commonplace presupposes ancestral 
relations to places elsewhere. Each via is an inheritance of a possibility for attending otherwise—
though not every route will be well-maintained, and not every traveller taken in. 
The ontomesic, then, is what occurs in the middle, through the via, or in the interstices 
between one common-place and the next. It pertains to the aptitudes that permit passage, 
without adjoinment or agglomeration. It is, therefore, what permits the existence of a manifold 
qua manifold—neither connected nor disconnected but communicable.16 Nothing guarantees 
that such relations will be convivial or egalitarian. Nevertheless, if recognised in its relevant 
mode of existence, the ontomesic holds the possibility of alliance without unity. 
However, given such a degree of abstraction, such statements are likely to remain 
meaningless. By way of exemplification, I will therefore turn to the tradition of anthropology, 
and the case of mana. In particular, I will show how traditional anthropological accounts thereof 
have been without ontomesic aptitudes but, more recently, demands for such have been made. 
                                               
16 Cf. Blaser 2013; de la Cadena 2010. 
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~~~~~~ 
Around 1902,17 Mauss undertook to found a “science of religion” with its appropriate “scientific 
terminology.”18 To explain religion, magic, and the sacred sociologically (taking all these to be 
of a kind), it was therefore necessary to establish whether such phenomena “take place in a 
social milieu” or may be attributed to the individual.19 Here, the Comtean, positive milieu was 
deployed. However, the resonances of the aetherial milieu remained crucial. 
Towards the conclusion of the study, Mauss analysed the notion of “magical force”—a 
“composite idea of force and milieu” supposed formative of all magical and religious practice. 
Typifying this phenomenon was mana. Found in all of Melanesia, and much of Polynesia, mana 
signifies “not simply a force, a being, it is also an action, a quality, a state.”20 Further, “it is 
transmissible, contagious,” and “can produce its effects from a distance.” Further extended, 
“mana is power” itself, taking the form of an “ether, imponderable, communicable, which 
spreads of its own accord,” as well as being “a milieu […] which in itself is mana.”21 Thus, any 
performer of magical rites will habitually reside within an altered, exceptional milieu—a 
“specialized atmosphere which follows him everywhere.”22 
 However, although such examples derive from the Pacific islands, Mauss finds the “idea 
of ‘power-milieu’” to be a universal institution, existing “without having [always] been 
expressed.” It was through the transformation of a mana-like conception that, in ancient Greece, 
magic became “quasi-scientific.”23 Thus, within the obligatorily ascendential developmental 
schema, mana per se occupies the “primitive” rung, meekly making way for the dictates of 
reason. Indeed, such notions are so “absurd” that they can only be explained as deriving “purely 
and simply from the functioning of collective life.”24 In explicitly neo-Kantian terms, Mauss 
duly deems mana “a category of collective thinking.”25 Through this category, “magical dreams” 
are made “rational,” and thus “become confused with reality.”26 In producing this “sympathetic 
milieu,” this “mental atmosphere,” social beings become as “spokes of a wheel,” or “cells” 
within “an individual organism.”27  
                                               
17 First published in l’Année Sociologique between 1902 and 1903, English translation: Mauss [1972] 2001. 
18 Ibid., 9. 
19 Ibid., 12. 
20 Ibid., 133. 
21 Ibid., 135–138. 
22 Ibid., 170. 
23 Ibid., 142–143. 
24 Ibid., 149. 
25 Ibid., 146, 155. 
26 Ibid., 156. 
27 Ibid., 161–164. 
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 The anthropological fascination with mana had been initiated by the Anglican 
missionary Robert Henry Codrington (1830–1922) in 1891.28 It was put into abeyance by 
Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009) in 1950, who dismissed mana as a floating signifier, “in itself 
devoid of meaning and thus susceptible of receiving any meaning at all.”29 Nevertheless, this 
fascination was not contained within academia. Most prominently, from 1917 to 1931, Max 
Freedom Long (1890–1971) worked as a teacher on the islands of Hawai‘i, while attempting to 
learn traditional indigenous lore. His efforts were, it would seem, were consistently rebuffed. 
Nevertheless, from the early 1950s, Long formulated what he claimed to have learned as the 
New Age philosophy “Huna” (the Hawai‘ian word for secret)—claims and formulations widely 
regarded as spurious. Rather than recounting Hawai‘ian traditions, Long rearticulated the long-
established spiritualist philosophies of Franz Anton Mesmer, and the founder of the 
Theosophical Society, Helena Blavatsky (1831–1897), duly describing the “vital force” of mana 
in relation to magnetism and electricity, and making it the basis of cosmic connection, psychic 
exploration, and healing.30 Long’s teachings continue to be practiced, both on Hawai‘i and 
elsewhere. 
 With the waning of structuralism, after the style of Levi-Strauss, has come renewed 
academic attention to mana. For instance, in 2007, Martin Holbraad’s concluding chapter in 
Thinking through things, the influential ur-text of the self-declared “ontological turn” within 
anthropology, reconsidered the place of mana within that disciplinary tradition, particularly 
relating it to aché—an element of Ifá, the religion of divination, which the author takes to be 
“the Afro-Cuban cousin of mana.” Rather than relating it to an underlying explanatory structure 
(as per Mauss and Levi-Strauss), Holbraad argues for giving “the transgressive potential of mana 
full rein so as to reach new analytical departures—thinking neither about it, nor just with it, but 
through it.”31 That is, the agenda of anthropology, as per this “turn,” is not to explain the ways 
and worlds of others in terms of given social or cultural categories but, rather, to use the ways 
and worlds of others to creatively challenge the very categories of the anthropological tradition, 
and hence those of societies from which that tradition derives.  
As such, the ontological turn of Holbraad, and others,32 is unambiguously 
methodological in its articulation, being oriented towards disciplinary norms as regards what 
anthropologists qua anthropologists should be doing. In this model, the anthropologist utilises 
the “alterity” of the researched-other to rethink the researcher-self. This is, of course, nothing 
                                               
28 Codrington 1891. 
29 Lévi-Strauss [1950] 1987, 55. 
30 Morgain 2016, 286–295. 
31 Holbraad 2007, 200–201. 
32 Henare, Holbraad, and Wastell 2007; Carrithers et al. 2010; Holbraad and Pedersen 2017. 
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new.33 However, where the “turn” claims to differentiate itself is in demanding that no aspect 
of the researcher-self should be exempted from the challenge of “alterity.” In this regard, 
“ontology” is itself an empty signifier, legitimate only to the extent that it dissuades the 
researcher from holding on too preciously to their own presuppositions. 
Thus, the ontological turn has no particular political orientation, and requires little 
apparent consideration of the consequences of the research for the researched. As such, it is, at 
least after Holbraad’s example, profoundly depoliticised. However, while this is by far the most 
institutionally privileged exposition of ontology within contemporary Euro-American 
anthropology, it is by no means the only one. For instance, in greatly more politically 
sophisticated terms, Wende Elizabeth Marshall writes: 
“Reclaiming mana as ontology is crucial for decolonization and is an exigency for the 
survival of indigenous Hawaiians.”34 
Thus, like Annemarie Mol (§3), for whom the significance of “the word ‘ontology’” is that it 
“evokes ‘reality,’”35 Marshall recognises that, within the hegemonic conceptual lexicon in terms 
of which colonised peoples are required to articulate their claims to existence, ontology itself 
has a certain power. Accordingly, far from being a disciplinary, depoliticising empty signifier, 
“ontology,” here, is legitimate to the extent that it lends force to an agenda of restitution—
acting for a world historically subjugated, within the interstices of an imperial other. 
Anthropologists have been, by training and tradition, those who venture out from 
metropolitan centres of relative power to diverse parts of the human world, typically (though 
not always) far from such centres. Historically speaking, this was to be the science of ‘primitive’ 
peoples, the peculiarities of which it was needful for colonial administrators to know. This 
disciplinary association has a long history, and a deep present.36 However, from the early 
decades of the twentieth century, the likes of Franz Boas (1858–1942), Ruth Benedict (1887–
1948), and Margaret Mead (1901–1978), undertook to divest anthropology of racial essentialism 
and developmental hierarchy, reconstructing it, instead, upon the concept of “culture.”37 It is 
both with and against that received orthodoxy that, in the past two decades, “ontology” has 
come to be discussed as a superseding or radicalising alternative.  
For instance, in 2003, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro spoke of the “growing dissatisfaction 
with the uncompromisingly Kantian inspiration of our discipline” that relies upon concepts of 
culture and epistemology. For this reason: 
                                               
33 E.g. Wagner 1981. 
34 Marshall 2012a, 6. 
35 Mol 2014; see also Mol 2002. 
36 Todd 2016; Stocking 1991; Deloria Jr 1997. 
37 Stocking 1966; cf. Speth 1978. 
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“the language of ontology is important for one specific and, letʼs say, tactical reason. It 
acts as a counter-measure to a derealizing trick frequently played against the nativeʼs 
thinking, which turns this thought into a kind of sustained phantasy, by reducing it to 
the dimensions of a form of knowledge or representation, that is, to an ‘epistemologyʼ 
or a ‘worldview.ʼ” 
The anthropological problem, then, is “to create the conditions for the conceptual, I mean 
ontological, self-determination of people” or, rather, “peoples.”38 It is after such formulations 
that the so-called “ontological turn” came to be declared. However, with regard to the 
ontomesic, there is a world of difference between its methodological and political variants. 
 It should be apparent, then, that the methodological principle seeking “new analytical 
departures” for the benefit of the profession itself is markedly ontographic. That is, it seeks to 
record what exists beyond the established records of its common-place (in particular, the ways 
and worlds of others), and then uses those recordings of “alterity” to reassess the ontological 
constitution of its own world. 
By contrast, when Marshall writes of “[r]eclaiming mana as ontology” as an act “crucial 
for decolonization,”39 her statement addresses not a cluster of colleagues invited to rethink their 
researcher-selves but, rather, a situated and contradictory meeting of worlds—a meeting in 
which relations of learning, or appropriation, may occur in any direction. Indeed, her statement 
recognises that, while an anthropologist may make a career from learning the ways and worlds 
of other peoples, many of those same peoples will have already learned rather a lot about the 
anthropologist’s world—this being a necessity of survival.40 Marshall’s statement thus engages 
the conflicted complications of the ontomesic.41 
~~~~~~ 
If worlds are manifold then something must happen where they meet. To talk of ‘worlds’ and 
‘multiple ontologies’ must not be to imply purity and exclusivity. To reiterate: No one inhabits 
every common-place, though few, if any, will inhabit just one.  
The ontomesic, then, simply designates those skills and aptitudes for existing at the 
intersection, in the interstice, in-between. It is distinct from the ontographic in that its objective 
is not to populate the common-place with existents (thus troubling its specificity) but, rather, to 
deal with manifold worldly multiplicity itself (this being its initiatory condition). The ontomesic 
is possible anywhere there are diverging ontonomic obligations. However, this possibility will 
be foreclosed by any mode of attention that refuses to admit its own partiality. 
                                               
38 Viveiros de Castro 2003. 
39 Marshall 2012a, 6. 
40 Lugones 2003; Ortega 2016. 
41 Cf. de la Cadena 2015, 278–279; Conway 2017d. 
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There is nothing necessarily pacific or kind in such skills and aptitudes. As Achille 
Mbembe puts it: 
“the captured subject […] must develop an extraordinary capacity to become 
imperceptible and unassignable, to continually shift from one self to its alternate, to 
inhabit the tiniest of cracks and fissures.”42 
As well as a matter of coexistence, the ontomesic may be, simply, one of survival. Nevertheless, 
however it is configured, the mode of existence of the ontomesic requires the realisation that no 
single common-place can inflate its borders such that its distinctive ontonomic, ontoturgic, and 
ontodesic commitments can be assumed as sufficient for any existent anywhere. There is no 
universal tradition. However, nor is the ontomesic a matter of relinquishing or absconding from 
the commitments inherited from the traditions of one’s own common-places. Nor is it a matter 
of ‘tolerating’ the ‘beliefs’ of others. Rather, the ontomesic requires an orientation relative to 
the requirements of a situation—thus, it entails a kind of political realism. Its existence entails the 
possibility that what is ‘trivial’ with regard to any given mode of attention may become relevant 
to it through the formation of alliance without unity, and hence learning. 
To address an entity such as mana in accordance with the principles of the “ontological 
turn,” is to undertake to think “neither about it, nor just with it, but through it.”43 By contrast, 
I will say that to address such an entity in ontomesic terms requires the capacity to think—in 
the words of Gilles Deleuze, as interpreted by Isabelle Stengers—“par le milieu.” To think par le 
milieu, Stengers explains, means to think from the middle of a situation “without going to the 
root or to the final aim of a question,” while at the same time “taking into account the 
environment that this question requires and creates.”44 That is, it begins from a situation 
consisting of divergent parties (the middle) with distinct objectives and requirements (the milieu), 
and attempts to think through this divide in a manner that could, conceivably, satisfy all those 
concerned but—and this point is crucial—without resolving their differences into a unity. 
“The articulation is always a local one. There is no general opening of the border; 
instead a contradiction (either/or) has been turned into a contrast (and, and).”45 
Such an event, Stengers names “diplomatic.”46 
To not simply recognise but also embrace the ontomesic, in its identified mode of 
existence, is to accept a commitment to the manifold of worlds, or to “the pluriverse—the 
partially connected unfolding of worlds,”47 as it has also been called. Thus, to reiterate, it is not 
                                               
42 Goldberg and Mbembe 2018, 212. 
43 Holbraad 2007, 200. 
44 Stengers 2010b, 160. 
45 Stengers 2005a, 193. 
46 Stengers 2011a, chaps 25–26; Kohn 2015, 321. 
47 Blaser 2013, 552. 
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so much a descriptive proposition as a speculative and political one—speculating upon the 
conditions for improbable alliances, both with and against the history that we have received. 
Nevertheless, if existing through the ontomesic does not require “relinquishing or 
absconding from” the ontonomic obligations of the collectives to which one belongs and 
adheres, it remains to be understood how such obligations can be contested or disclaimed 
without a rejection of the tradition in general. In bringing this text towards a conclusion, 
therefore, it will be necessary to return to the question of the ontochronic (§F)—and, in 
particular, the idea that history is made by making things history. 
  271 
9: “A deep biological joy”: Determination from Darwin to Du Bois 
In 1880, the psychologist William James (1842–1910) addressed the Harvard Natural History 
Society on the subject of Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environment. He began:  
“It is a common platitude that a complete acquaintance with any one thing, however 
small, would require a knowledge of the entire universe. Not a sparrow falls to the 
ground1 but some of the remote conditions of his fall are to be found in the milky way, 
in our federal constitution, or in the early history of Europe.” 
In other words, everything presupposes everything; everything is connected. He adds: “It will 
soon be seen whose arguments I am, in form, reproducing here.”2 The pullback-and-reveal, as 
our cinematic epoch permits us to say, is that James is paraphrasing, or perhaps parodying, 
Herbert Spencer—the most popular Anglophone philosopher of the age. The rhetorical 
suspense works because James can assume that everyone in the room will be in on it. That is, 
in 1880, at Harvard, the Spencerian doctrine is a given. 
How “environment” came to its initial popularisation—bearing, with Carlyle, an aura 
of aesthetic sophistication, and, with Spencer, a sense of holistic scientificity—was shown in the 
previous chapter. In this, the concluding historical chapter, it will be shown how the concept 
went from being a quintessentially Carlylean, Comtean, and Spencerian term to being a crucial 
element of not only evolutionary theory but also the wider biological and sociology sciences, 
while, moreover, becoming a matter of some public cliché. That is, by around 1900, 
environment could be an exciting or profound expression, a serviceably functional one, or 
something rather overused. While environment was not yet “the environment” of the late 1960s, 
it could already be, in many regions of conceptual communication, a commonplace. As such, 
although it was always contested, it was no longer necessarily constrained to any particular side 
of any intellectual or political argument. Nevertheless, older connotations also endured. 
~~~~~~ 
The problem concerning James in his lecture was that of changing social characteristics—of 
manners, or mœurs, as it would have been said in decades previous. In the philosophy of 
Spencer, any and all such changes: 
“are due to the environment, to the circumstances, the physical geography, the 
ancestral conditions, the increasing experience of outer relations; to everything, in fact, 
except the Grants and the Bismarcks, the Joneses and the Smiths.” 
                                               
1 Referencing Matthew 10:29, “Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the 
ground without your Father.” 
2 James 1992, 618–619. 
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For James, contrariwise, it was “the accumulated influences of individuals, of their examples, 
their initiatives, and their decisions” that were truly consequential.3 As such, Spencer’s doctrine 
was declared “an obsolete anachronism”—indeed, it was “pre-darwinian,”4 supposing, as did 
certain older writers (who remain nameless), that “environment” works “to mould the animal 
by a kind of direct pressure, very much as a seal presses the wax into harmony with itself.”5 
Moreover, such a philosophy was even “pre-galilean” in its imposition of “Force” as a 
homogenous entity.6 
Against such monistic, monolithic cosmic monotony, James affirmed the reality of 
“different cycles of operation in nature; different departments, so to speak, relatively 
independent of one another.” This insight, indeed, constituted the “triumphant originality” of 
Mr. Charles Darwin: 
“Separating the causes of production under the title of ‘tendencies to spontaneous 
variation,’ and relegating them to a physiological cycle which he forthwith agreed to 
ignore altogether, he confined his attention to the causes of preservation, and under the 
names of natural selection and sexual selection studied them exclusively as functions of 
the cycle of the environment.” 
The pre-Darwinian environment was, thus, a conflation of two “cycles” that occur at distinct 
moments of genesis: that of production (i.e. variation or mutation), and that of selection. Thus 
arose the fallacy of “direct pressure”: 
“The exercise of the forge makes the right arm strong, the palm grows callous to the 
oar, the mountain air distends the chest, the chased fox grows cunning and the chased 
bird shy, the arctic cold stimulates the animal combustion, and so forth.” 
Further referring to the example of the giraffe, the unnamed Lamarck is clearly implicated.7 
Just like “the invisible factors of fermentation,” the causes of the “production of great 
men” reside “in a sphere wholly inaccessible to the social philosopher.” Moreover, such 
insurgent agencies act upon complex entanglements of other forces. Darwin had famously 
observed cats to influence the growth of clover in their neighbourhood. Rabbits released in New 
Zealand soon bred out of control. In just this manner, the great man “acts as a ferment,” and 
changes the “constitution” of society itself. The environment, then, “chiefly adopts or rejects, 
preserves or destroys, in short selects” the great man. The effects are not unilinear but reciprocal. 
Without the individual “impulse,” the community stagnates; without community’s “sympathy,” 
                                               
3 Ibid., 619. 
4 Ibid., 646. 
5 Ibid., 622. 
6 Ibid., 646. 
7 Ibid., 621–623; cf. Semple 1911. 
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the impulse perishes. “The mutations of societies” are, then, cognate to those of species.8 James 
imparts this “remarkable parallel” under the authority of Darwin. 
 However, it was not only Spencer who James thus anachronised. Aligning himself with 
the tenets of Physics and Politics (1872), “that golden little work” by Walter Bagehot (1826–1877),9 
James cast lament upon a whole swathe of notables on matters socio-natural. Quoting the poem 
Locksley Hall by Alfred Lord Tennyson (1809–1892), he wrote: 
“‘The individual withers, and the world is more and more,’10 to these writers; and in a 
Buckle, a Draper, and a Taine we all know how much the ‘world’ has come to be almost 
synonymous with the climate.”11 
Henry Thomas Buckle (1821–1862), John William Draper (1811–1882), and Hippolyte Taine 
(1828–1893) were all a generation or so James’ senior. However, he took particular issue with 
his close contemporary, and associate of Spencer: the popular science writer and novelist Grant 
Allen (1848–1899). Indeed, much of James’ lecture amounted to a response to Allen’s 1878 
essay Nation-Making: A Theory of National Characters. Taking this title from Bagehot’s book, though 
pointedly repudiating his arguments, Allen was adamant: 
“To me it seems rather that the differentiating agency must be sought in the great 
permanent geographical features of land and sea, and that these have necessarily and 
inevitably moulded the characters and the histories of every nation upon earth.”12 
Bagehot, by contrast, had relegated “surrounding circumstances” to being “mere fugitive 
collocations of petty causes,” insignificant compared to the originary act of will that 
differentiated races at their root. 
To be sure, in contrast to “our fussy, conceited, inconsequential old friend Buckle,” who 
had exempted Europe from geographical determination by “the intervention of certain abstruse 
metaphysical entities, denominated Moral Laws,” Bagehot had the benefit of writing after 
Darwin, whose theory of natural selection had, for Allen, provided the “master-key.”13 Under 
such authority, to regard any nation “as an active agent in differentiating itself,” thus 
disregarding “the surrounding circumstances,” is to exempt man’s mental life from universal 
causal laws. 
“There is no caprice, no spontaneous impulse in human endeavors. Even taste and 
inclinations must themselves be the result of surrounding causes. […] In the whole of 
human history we may see nothing but the perpetual action and reaction of these two 
                                               
8 James 1992, 624–626. 
9 Editor-in-chief of The Economist from 1860. 
10 Written 1835, published 1842. 
11 James 1992, 630. Original emphasis. 
12 Allen 1878, 123. This excerpt is quoted and discussed by James. 
13 Ibid., 124. 
 
  274 
primary factors, the Organism (including, of course, the nervous system, and therefore the 
character and intellect), handed down by heredity from previous generations as a 
relatively-fixed existence, and the Environment (including, of course, the surrounding 
organisms), whose various portions play forever upon the organism, producing minor 
variations, which in turn are handed down to posterity as part of the hereditary 
possessions of the race.”14 
For James, such pronouncements forsake “modern scientific determinism” and lapse into “the 
most ancient oriental fatalism.”15 The disagreements were, thus, unambiguous. Nevertheless, 
in another respect, all would appear to be in agreement: Darwin had established the principle 
by which evolution—human and nonhuman, social and natural alike—was to be explained, 
and this principle, though it could also be appellated “circumstances,” “conditions,” or 
“climate,” bore, in particular, the name “environment.” 
 Darwin, as we shall see, avoided the latter term, and for much the same reasons as James 
laid claim to it: this expression was closely associated with Lamarckian-Spencerian “direct 
action.” Such distinctions were wantonly flouted by Allen et al. Moreover, well into the 
twentieth century, the likes of Pyotr Kropotkin (1842–1921) would continue to insistently 
associate environment with the “direct” conception.16 Nevertheless, as with Lamarck and 
milieu, Darwin and environment became closely associated through the claims of their later 
followers and appropriators. Such associations secured the success of the concept.  
In 1884, Allen’s novel Philistia included a chapter titled “The Environment Finally 
Triumphs.”17 The next year, his book Charles Darwin noted: 
“Such expressions as ‘natural selection,’ ‘survival of the fittest,’ ‘struggle for existence,’ 
‘adaptation to the environment,’ and all the rest of it, are becoming as household words 
upon the lips of thousands who only know the name of Darwin as a butt for the petty 
empty jibes of infinitesimal cheap witlings.”18 
Then, in 1887, he wrote: 
“There is a deep biological joy in the term ‘environment’; it almost rivals the well-
known consolatory properties of that sweet word ‘Mesopotamia.’ ‘Surroundings,’ 
perhaps, would equally well express the meaning, but then, as Mr. Wordsworth justly 
observes, ‘the difference to me.’”19 
                                               
14 Ibid., 126. 
15 James 1992, 639. 
16 Kropotkin 1910; Kropotkin 1912; Kropotkin 1919. 
17 Writing under the pseudonym Cecil Power: “Herbert was right, after all: quite right. Yes, yes, all hope was gone: 
the environment had finally triumphed.” Allen 1884, 325. 
18 Allen 1885, 200. 
19 Allen 1887, 479. Reprinted in: Allen 1889, 56. Alluding to Wordsworth’s poem She Dwelt among the Untrodden 
Ways, written 1798, first published 1800. 
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Thus, whatever their contradictions, the combined scientific celebrity of Spencer and Darwin 
had, by the end of the century, ensured that adopting, defining, and historicising the concept of 
environment became common practice. However, such propagation was not reducible to these 
emblems of authority. Rather, environmental conceptions permitted a comprehensiveness of 
expression that allowed appropriation for diverse purposes. 
9.1: From selection to cosmism: Darwinian defenders and appropriators 
In December 1831, Darwin joined an expedition that was to sail around South America and 
through the South Pacific aboard the now-famous Beagle, returning in 1836, having amassed 
vast collections of specimens and descriptions. While aboard, he acquired and read the Principles 
of Geology (1830) of Charles Lyell (1797–1875), among other works.20 Upon his return, he made 
Lyell’s acquaintance and, in 1842, shared with him his initial ideas as regards species evolution, 
discussing the matter privately thereafter.21 However, being concerned as to how the theological 
and moral implications would be received, Darwin refrained from publication for a decade and 
a half. 
He was not alone in his caution. The best-selling Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, 
which combined speculations on stellar evolution with species mutation, and other popular 
ideas, was published anonymously in 1844. Martineau, among others, had been suspected of 
writing the accessible atheistic treatise.22 However, the twelfth edition of 1884 eventually 
revealed the geologist Robert Chambers (1802–1871) to be its author.23 Its initial publication 
coming more than a decade before Spencer’s Psychology, Chambers’ text spoke of the 
“adaptation” of living beings “to their respective spheres of existence,”24 “to the physical 
circumstances amidst which they are destined to live,”25 and “to the external world.”26 
 In 1856, Lyell read a paper by Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913), which articulated 
similar ideas to those that Darwin had been quietly developing.27 To avoid a priority dispute, 
in 1858, Lyell and Joseph Dalton Hooker (1817–1911) arranged a co-publication between the 
two naturalists, read before the Linnaean Society of London.28 
                                               
20 Lyell 1830, vol. 1. 
21 A “first pencil sketch” later published as: Darwin 1909. 
22 Secord 1994, xli. 
23 Chambers 1844; Secord 1994, xviii; Secord 2003. 
24 Chambers 1844, 147. 
25 Ibid., 324. 
26 Ibid., 325. 
27 Wallace 1855. 
28 Darwin and Wallace 1858. 
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Drawing from a manuscript first written in 1839, Darwin began by referencing the Swiss 
botanist Augustin Pyramus de Candolle (1778–1841), to the effect that “all nature is at war, one 
organism with another, or with external nature.”29 This war, Darwin added, though not 
“constant” but rather “recurrent in a slight degree at short periods,” is nevertheless exhibitive 
                                               
29 Ibid., 46; Candolle 1820, 26. 
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of “the doctrine of Malthus applied in most cases with tenfold force.”30 Moreover, besides “this 
natural means of selection”—a means principally concerning relations of predation and 
alimentation—by which beings become “best adapted to the place they fill in nature,” Darwin 
noted a “second agency” performing a similar role, particularly that of “the struggle of the males 
for the females”—that is, what he would subsequently name “Sexual Selection.”31 
Then, reproducing a letter he had written the year before, Darwin elaborated further 
upon the “intentional and occasional selection” undertaken by man, which had produced 
domesticated species. “Selection” (in general), he continued, “acts only by the accumulation of 
slight or greater variations, caused by external conditions,” or due to generational 
differentiation. Were there a being who “who could study the whole internal organisation” of 
things, selecting repeatedly over “millions of generations”—“who will say what he might not 
effect?” It was, Darwin asserted, “changed conditions of existence” that were the main cause of 
inter-generational differentiation. Geology had revealed the “almost unlimited time” available 
to such a process. Such would be explained in his book titled “Natural Selection.” This “struggle 
for life,” he now believed “to be far more important to the life of each being than mere 
climate.”32 
 Wallace’s essay against “the original and permanent distinctness of species” also began 
by noting: “The life of wild animals is a struggle for existence.” The procurement of food and 
evasion of “the attacks of their most dangerous enemies” are, he added, “the primary 
conditions” determinative of both individual and species existence.33 While the difficulty of the 
task was considerable, were it possible to establish the capacity of each being for preserving its 
existence “under all the varying circumstances by which it is surrounded,” then, Wallace 
argued, it might be possible to calculate the outcome.34 
 Notably, in conclusion, Wallace also sought to repudiate “[t]he hypothesis of Lamarck” 
that changes in species were the result of “attempts of animals to increase the development of 
their own organs”—a principle “repeatedly and easily refuted” by all writers on the subject.35 
Moreover, this “acting cause,” productive of the observed “balance” in nature, Wallace 
remarked to be “exactly like that of the centrifugal governor of the steam engine,” which 
“corrects” irregularities in its functioning. In like terms, the struggle productive of selection 
effects a balance, ensuring that changes are gradual rather than catastrophic—a thesis befitting 
Lyell’s uniformitarian geology. 
                                               
30 Darwin and Wallace 1858, 46–47. 
31 Ibid., 50; Darwin 1859, 88. 
32 Darwin and Wallace 1858, 50–52. 
33 Ibid., 54. 
34 Ibid., 57. 
35 Ibid., 61. 
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This joint presentation of 1858 went largely unremarked. However, in 1859, to 
considerably greater fanfare, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of 
Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life was published, rapidly selling its initial print runs. In the book’s 
introduction, between telling of his days on the Beagle, and begging to differ with the “author of 
the ‘Vestiges of Creation,’” Darwin wrote: 
“Naturalists continually refer to external conditions, such as climate, food, &c., as the 
only possible cause of variation. In one very limited sense, as we shall hereafter see, this 
may be true; but it is preposterous to attribute to mere external conditions, the 
structure, for instance, of the woodpecker, with its feet, tail, beak, and tongue, so 
admirably adapted to catch insects under the bark of trees. In the case of the misseltoe, 
which draws its nourishment from certain trees, which has seeds that must be 
transported by certain birds, and which has flowers with separate sexes absolutely 
requiring the agency of certain insects to bring pollen from one flower to the other, it is 
equally preposterous to account for the structure of this parasite, with its relations to 
several distinct organic beings, by the effects of external conditions, or of habit, or of 
the volition of the plant itself.” 
Thus, from the very beginning, it was the tangled relations of various species, not merely a 
generic externality, that was at issue in realising natural selection. Accordingly, being only four 
years after Spencer’s Psychology, one year after Carlyle’s Friedrich II, and given that Darwin, like 
Wallace, sought to differentiate his arguments from the Lamarckian mode of evolution, it is 
Figure 23—Galapagos finches; sketched by John Gould (1804–1881), 1845 
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surely not surprising that environment did not enter into his vocabulary, which remained similar 
to that of Vestiges—“circumstances,” “conditions of life,” and “external world.” 
However, as mentioned in §4, Darwin referenced Lamarck only in passing, with 
Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, senior and junior, given rather more credit. Meanwhile, at the end of 
Chapter VI, “Difficulties on Theory,” Darwin wrote: 
“It is generally acknowledged that all organic beings have been formed on two great 
laws—Unity of Type, and the Conditions of Existence. By unity of type is meant that 
fundamental agreement in structure, which we see in organic beings of the same class, 
and which is quite independent of their habits of life. On my theory, unity of type is 
explained by unity of descent. The expression of conditions of existence, so often 
insisted on by the illustrious Cuvier, is fully embraced by the principle of natural 
selection.” 
Thus, when requiring a specific theoretical expression to counterpoise the structural internality 
of descent, it was Cuvier’s concept that was preferred, with “the law of the Conditions of 
Existence” being, in fact, “the higher law” given that “it includes, through the inheritance of 
former adaptations, that of Unity of Type.”36 The dermic distinctiveness of the organism—and 
hence the Spencerian environment—was quite beside the point. Darwin’s existential reference 
points were configured altogether differently. 
Famously, both Darwin and Wallace had formulated their crucial convictions 
concerning natural selection after reading the works of Malthus on the pressures of 
population—Darwin in 1838, Wallace in 1844.37 As per Spencer, theories of evolution under 
conditions of existential competition were hardly unheard of. Extinction, still a point of dispute 
for Cuvier and Lamarck, had become a fact of life. However, though Wallace invoked the 
paradigmatic steam engine to account for the regulatory effect of struggle upon population, this 
in no way entailed what, in Biology (1864), Spencer “sought to express in mechanical terms.”38 
While Spencer conceived such forces as externalities imposing upon an organismic internality 
that made the organism’s own boundaries the most meaningful line of differentiation for the 
entire evolutionary process, the distinguishing feature of Darwin and Wallace’s theory was the 
identification of a distinct mechanism that differentiated selection from direct causal “pressure.” 
That is, neither the heritability of effects upon a living being during its lifetime nor a unified 
environment were necessary to the theory—nor, evidently, to its popularisation (at least not 
initially). 
~~~~~~ 
                                               
36 Darwin 1859, 206. 
37 Young 1969; Bowler 1976; Moore 1997. 
38 Spencer 1864, vol. 1, 444–446. 
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On the occasion of Alexander von Humboldt’s death, also in 1859, Martineau wrote a 
biographical essay in which she commented that while his elder brother “William” (i.e. 
Wilhelm) had been a philosopher of Literature and Art, Alexander “devoted himself, not to the 
study of the human mind or its productions, but to the medium or environment in which it 
lives.”39 Thus, the equivalence of these terms remained notable. In a Commons debate in 1861, 
Henry John Temple (1784–1865), 3rd Viscount Palmerston, lamented the “treachery” of 
Chinese forces who had “contemplated the environment of the advanced guard of the army 
and the taking our Ambassadors prisoners.”40 This, the first recorded mention of 
“environment” in Parliamentary discourse, thus implied the Shakespearean “environ” rather 
than anything following Carlyle. When, in 1864, the diplomat, philologist, and conservationist 
George Perkins Marsh (1801–1882) published Man and Nature, he made no mention of 
environment, nor would conservationists until well into the twentieth century. 
 In 1866, in a review of Spencer’s First Principles (1860) titled Positivism in Theology, the 
theologian Francis Ellingwood Abbot (1836–1903) wrote, in a state of palpable discontent:  
“To be consistent, Empiricism must utterly sink the soul in its material surroundings. 
The profoundest question of philosophy turns on the relation of Thought to Being, 
Mind to Matter, Subject to Object, or (in empiricistic phrase) Organism to 
Environment.”41 
If the “Organism” is made “purely the product of the Environment” then the result us 
“Empiricism, Sensationalism, Materialism” in the style of Destutt-Tracy’s “motto”: “Penser c’est 
sentir [to think is to feel].” Reverse the terms and the result is “Transcendentalism, Egoism, 
Idealism” after the style of Berkeley. Presume an “underlying and active Unity,” then results 
“Identity or Pantheism” à la Spinoza. If the pair are placed in “ordination and correlation” 
then we have “Dualism, Natural Realism, Positivism,” typified by William Hamilton. Spencer, 
Abbot judges, though choosing Empiricism, “shrinks from” following through “its necessary 
implications,” failing to face the fact that the mind must be entirely dissolved into the organism, 
the notion of a “soul” as “completely exploded as the theory of ‘phlogiston.’”42 Thus, much like 
Carlyle’s disdain for Locke’s cognitive carpentry, environment was, for Abbot, associated with 
empiricism, and hence materialism, although its terms could be used to restate other modes of 
thought. 
 It was not until 1867, in an essay on Mimicry, and Other Protective Resemblances Among 
Animals, published in the Westminster Review, that Wallace wrote of “the adaptation of animals to 
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41 Abbot 1866, 249. 
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their environment,”43 with particular regard to insects, adopting this expression for the first time 
in his published works. In the same year, in a review of The Reign of Law by the George Campbell 
(1823–1900), 8th Duke of Argyll, Wallace argued against the Duke’s advocation of a perpetually 
interventive Deity, identifying six “laws or facts” that prove the truth of “Mr. Darwin’s work,” 
the sixth of which being: 
“The Equilibrium of Nature.—When a species is well adapted to the conditions which 
environ it,—it flourishes; when imperfectly adapted it decays; when ill-adapted it 
becomes extinct. If all the conditions which determine an organism’s well-being are 
taken into consideration, this statement can hardly be disputed.” 
Such principles were, in all probability, “mere statements of what is the condition of nature,” 
common to “organized and unorganized matter” alike. “Mr. Herbert Spencer,” Wallace added, 
in his First Principles and Biology, “made us able to understand how this may be.” However, the 
important question was whether these laws alone could account for “the variety, the harmony, 
the contrivance, and the beauty we perceive in organic beings” without “the incessant 
interference and direct action” of the Creator.44 Later in the essay, Wallace added that “no 
organism can continue to exist that is not adjusted to its environment,” though given the vastly 
varied “surface” and “climate” of the world, “the greatest possible variety of organisms have 
been produced adapted to the varied conditions of every part of the earth.”45 Thus, although 
he did not connect the term environment to Spencer’s philosophy, or to the stipulation 
concerning “all the conditions,” these statements appeared in the course of defending the 
general principles of natural selection in more broadly philosophical terms—a task for which 
Spencer was evidently creditable. 
In 1872, an anonymous reviewer of Hippolyte Taine’s Art in Greece (1871) remarked that 
the English translator46 had wisely left unaltered “[t]he author's favorite phrase ‘le milieu,’” 
which has “no precise English equivalent,” though it does, “in this sense, very nearly correspond 
with the Cosmist’s term ‘environment.’”47 In his Secularism the practical philosophy of the people of 
1854, George Jacob Holyoake (1817–1906), the British co-operator and newspaper editor who 
had coined term “secularism” in 1851,48 explained: 
“Cosmism is the Positive Side of Atheism. Bio-Cosmism (the doctrine of Life in the 
Universe) takes its stand by the side of Pantheism.”49 
                                               
43 Reprinted in: Wallace 1871, 56. 
44 Reprinted in: Ibid., 266–267. 
45 Ibid., 279. 
46 John Durand, translator and promoter of many of Taine’s works. 
47 Anonymous 1872, 133; Taine 1871. 
48 And would do the same for “jingoism” in 1878. 
49 Holyoake 1854, 8.  
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Thus, a Cosmist was someone committed, after the style of Vestiges, to pantheistic-atheistic 
cosmic evolution as a political, scientific, and quasi-spiritual principle. Environment made no 
appearance in Holyoake’s texts. However, in his essay The Progress from Brute to Man of 1873, 
John Fiske (1842–1901) examined, in part, the “growing correspondence between the human 
mind and its environment,” also describing “the development of the noblest human attributes” 
as being the “last term” in the vast “cosmic evolution.”50 This text did not mention “Cosmism”; 
however, it was incorporated into Fiske’s 1874 Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, which included a 
chapter on “Cosmism and Positivism,”51 decrying the trend for associating the latter with every 
philosophy that rejects “all ontological speculation,” and articulating only the former as offering 
a true development onwards from “Anthropomorphism.”52 Drawn particularly from Spencer, 
Outlines also utilised environment, particularly as that which faces the mind. 
 As seen in §5, in the second volume of her Present Religion, collected together in 1873,53 
Sara Sophia Hennell (1812–1899), sometime associate of the London Positivists, attempted to 
textually portray—“to paint air,” as she put it—the beginnings of a Religion of evolutionary 
“Developmentalism”54; a Religion inspired, methodologically if not substantively, by Spencer, 
and Vestiges.55 It was a radically individualistic Christianity based upon (a) the recognition of the 
necessity of religion to mental life, and (b) the conviction that Christianity was, in this regard, 
the highest and most developed of all world religions. As such, Hennell criticised Positivism for 
having “no sense of atmosphere”—for failing to be constructed in a properly religious mode. 
Moreover, she took particular exception to Comte’s “invented word of Altruism,” taken to be 
“that which destroys Egoism”56—this latter term being, for Hennell, the utmost virtue.57 
Indeed, “the ‘Love of Otherhood,’” as the Comtists had promoted it, was “no whit less 
dangerous an intrusion amongst our moral ideals, as dispersive of all genuine images, than was 
the very injunction to ‘Other worldliness’ itself.”58 Like Spencer, Hennell thus promoted an 
ascendential narrative of “a progressive Individuality, and a deepening Personality, ever coming 
to the proper beings who are the constitutors of Society.”59 
                                               
50 Fiske 1873, 261, 285. 
51 Fiske 1874, vol. 1, chap. 10. 
52 Fiske 1874, vol. 1, 255, 182. 
53 Hennell 1873, vol. 2. N.B. collected in this second volume in 1873 but consisted of texts published in four parts 
from 1869. 
54 Ibid., vol. 2, 29, 42, 51. 
55 Ibid., vol. 2, 349–350. Preferring Spencer but also looking to Comte, see Ibid., vol. 2, 71–73. 
56 Hennell 1873, vol. 2, 62. 
57 She acknowledged that this term “Egoism” could also had a bad side, but she even defended the stronger term 
“Selfism” against its rejection as being an “original sin” Ibid., vol. 2, 13. 
58 Ibid., vol. 2, 65. 
59 Ibid., vol. 2, 599. 
 
  283 
In another work of 1860, Hennell had approvingly quoted Spencer’s definition of life of 
1855, adding: 
“Wherever an internal correspondence with surrounding conditions is established for 
continuance,—that is, organized,—there is Life.”60 
In Present Religion, she wrote that while Spencer “gave me nothing of a religion in itself,” he did 
provide “the means of working out one.” Specifically, he afforded the working principle of 
examining “the nature of ‘externally-received impression,’” which Hennell believed essential to 
“religious sustenance.”61 Thus oriented and equipped, one could discern, throughout human 
history, a single, continuous “striving” to gain “Thought-reconciliation” with mortality, all the 
way “from the crudest kinds of fetishism of barbarians, up to dogmas of St. Paul, and thence 
onwards.”62 This progressive religious experience was itself explained through sufficient 
numbers of persons “receiving kindred impressions,” imparting “a world-effect” with “a 
correspondent character.”63 The task consequent from these premises was, thus, to trace this 
ascendential sequence of subjective experiences—cautiously setting aside, for the duration, what 
Hennell was sure to attest were the objective and true facts of both science and divinity64—from 
the “glimmering indications of Religion’s dawn” to the upper realms of the Christian present.65  
Among the most recurrent and crucial of such subjective impressions or “thought-
images”66 from early times was, Hennell identified, “star-imagery,” “the star-symbol,” and 
“star-like intuitions.”67 Such impressions took various forms in “the barbaric struggle of 
thought” among early peoples. For the Greeks, for example, it was articulated in personalised, 
mythological terms. Of particular importance was “Ouranos”: that “one phantom-sun” that 
can be taken as the “true ancestor in-line of our at-present named Ideal of Space.” That is, it 
was the Greek god of the sky—as seen in §6, the root of many later translations of “climate”—
that had, in that time, constituted the necessary “Death antagonist”; a counterpart to Hades, 
embodying and expressing Nature’s power to maintain Life: “thence naturally the broad 
firmament, holding man as well as earth in its all-embracing bosom.” As such, from “the 
thought of Ouranos as the Life-domain,” through “every degree” of the awakening of “scientific 
intelligence” for such people, there: 
                                               
60 Hennell 1860, 143. 
61 Hennell 1873, vol. 2, 71–72. In 1874, Hennell took rather stronger issue with Spencer’s views on women, after 
the publication of his Principles of Sociology. Hennell 1874. 
62 Hennell 1873, vol. 2, 284. 
63 Ibid., vol. 2, 72. 
64 This being “exclusively a subjective view.” Ibid., vol. 2, 277, 279. 
65 Ibid., vol. 2, 600. 
66 Ibid., vol. 2, 286. 
67 Ibid., vol. 2, 267, 281. 
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“must at once have been a diffusing of the idea of Environment represented by 
Ouranos; and a tending of this straightway towards the modern-felt conception of the 
Cosmos,—which again is the metaphysically-turned expression of what in full 
Metaphysics comes out perfectly as the abstraction of Space.”68 
Thus, against but in symmetry with Comte, and against but alongside the atheistic, Spencerian 
Cosmists, Hennell identified skyey Ouranos as the mythologic precursor of the then-modern 
cosmos being availed to both scientific and religious understanding. 
 However, the firmamental “Environment” was not the only environment in Hennell’s 
text. The effect “of crude physical ‘Nature,’ or material environment,” she wrote, was what “all 
national constitutions of early times had to go through the ordeal of making terms with.” 
However, not every nation fared equally. While “due mastery over Nature” was indeed “the 
human birthright to possess,” there was a “special class of human beings” that had proved “the 
teleologically-‘elect’ of such”—that is, “our own stock.” By contrast, the “Hindoo people,” who 
could be taken as representative of “all others than our own combined race-stock,” had been 
shown “by the vague testimony of general History” to have lost out to “Nature herself,” who 
had “gained the balance” over them.69 Thus, while Carlyle’s Environment had been a glittering 
adornment of great men, with climate the facile destitution of freed slaves, Hennell’s 
environment could perform both roles. 
In 1875, in the second, revised edition of The Variation of Animals and Plants Under 
Domestication, Darwin used the term “environment” for the first time in his published writings: 
“If it profited a plant to inhabit a humid instead of an arid station, a fitting change in 
its constitution might possibly result from the direct action of the environment, though 
we have no grounds for believing that variations of the right kind would occur more 
frequently with plants inhabiting a station a little more humid than usual, than with 
other plants.”70 
By “direct action,” Darwin implied the Lamarckian-Spencerian doctrine. Thus, he now 
admitted the theoretical possibility of acquired characters being inherited, though the empirical 
question was regarded sceptically. However, the next year, in a letter to the geographer Moritz 
Wagner (1813–1887), whose work particularly concerned species distribution, and speciation 
by isolation, Darwin conceded: 
“In my opinion the greatest error which I have committed, has been not allowing 
sufficient weight to the direct action of the environment, i.e. food, climate, &c., 
independently of natural selection.” 
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At the time of writing Origin, he added, he “could find little good evidence of the direct action 
of the environment” but, these years later, there was “a large body of evidence,” with Wagner’s 
own study of the Saturnia moth counting among “the most remarkable.”71 
 Thus, in matters naturalistic, philosophical, theological, and anthropological, by the 
mid-1870s, environment had been accorded a significant conceptual role due to its invocation 
of both an aesthetic and a causal unity of exterior physical forces. It remained a specialised 
expression, though in wide, conventional, and increasing usage within relevant areas of 
speciality. Matters of conceptual definition and disputation were generally related to Spencerian 
philosophy, which provided the association with which the legitimacy of the concept was 
established. However, over the next two decades, this would come to change. 
9.2: From specialism to commonplace: A ground of spatial relation 
In 1879, the evolutionary biologist George John Romanes (1848–1894), on the subject of the 
many influences upon species evolution, declared: 
“But, lastly, and most important of all, it is a huge blunder to imagine that an 
‘environment’ consists merely in the physical conditions as to medium, climate, etc., to 
which an organism is exposed.” 
“Of far more importance,” he added, was “the innumerably complex relations of the organism 
to its neighboring organisms,” of its own species or otherwise, as well as hereditary endowments 
from “a long line of ancestors occupying other and changing environments,” to which all such 
ancestors necessarily became “structurally adapted.” 
The word ‘environment’ is a term of the most comprehensive kind, embodying, in every 
case that it is used, an assemblage of conditions presenting an amount of complexity 
that is not only inconceivable but wholly unnamable.” 
Romanes was responding to a triple review of works by A.R. Wallace, Ernst Haeckel (1834–
1819), and Armand de Quatrefages (1810–1892), published in a recent edition of The Edinburgh 
Review. The anonymous—and, for Romanes, inept—reviewer was quoted as claiming that “[i]f 
the environment be taken to be the cause of the specific characters of the animals, similar 
environments ought to be productive of similar species”—a circumstance noted to not be the 
case. This “idea of what constitutes an ‘environment,’” Romanes exclaimed, “is about as 
adequate as the idea of space that a baby shows when it tries to grasp the moon.”72 
While, famously, it was Thomas Henry Huxley (1825–1895) who had declared himself 
“Darwin’s bulldog,” Romanes was another of Darwin’s younger associates who pursued 
detractors about the public sphere, here utilising the comprehensiveness of environment to 
assuage a stock objection to natural selection deriving from a simplified understanding of the 
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“direct” Spencerian environment that made the inner a mere impression of the outer, regardless 
of the intransigences of morphological structure, and inheritance. 
 In 1880, James gave his aforementioned address on Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the 
Environment. From the early 1880s, attempts to define, specify, and contest this concept become 
far more common—and not only in biological or sociological terms. In 1883 alone, for example: 
The Scottish biologist and evangelist Henry Drummond (1851–1897) wrote that in “the 
more accurate terminology of Science” (as opposed to lay language), “the action of external 
circumstances and surroundings”—the second principal factor in the generation of life (the 
other being Heredity)—was collected by the naturalist “under the single term Environment.”73  
 The Plymouth dental surgeon F.H. Balkwill (1837–1921), in a lecture titled “Habitation” 
or Environment: A Chapter in the Theory of Evolution, criticised “environment” for its “haziness and 
inflexibility,” which “reduces us to the region of abstract ideas at once,” preferring instead “the 
word habitation,” with its implication of the “habits” that form the organs and characters of 
animals. Spencer himself, Balkwill claimed, had expressed some reservations with this term in 
his Biology.74 
 The clergyman Theodore Thornton Munger (1830–1910), in a chapter of his book The 
Freedom of Faith on “Moral Environment,” complained that, while in matters of education, 
health, social habits, and so on, “there is a disposition to make much of environment,” matters 
of “[f]aith and spiritual condition” are considered “so wholly interior” as to be excluded from 
the conversation altogether. 
“Strange inconsistency of an age that imagines itself logical! It has taught us the great 
word and truth of environment; we ask it to be consistent in its application of it.  
This word environment has become a sort of keyword in modern thought. It would 
not have so fastened itself on common speech were there not a fresh and intense sense 
of some truth for which it stands.” 
“It is,” Munger added, “an old word, as old as the language”; however, “the fact or force that 
it represents” had become “far more plainly recognized” in the current age. However, there is, 
he insisted, a “double environment”—moral as well as physical—that is necessary to life.75 A 
healthful spiritual life, no less than a bodily one, presupposes such rigours and maintenances. 
 Still in 1883, Lester Frank Ward (1841–1913)—the botanist, palaeontologist, first 
president of the American Sociological Association, and foremost promoter of this still-novel 
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science in the United States—wrote in the second chapter of the first volume of his Dynamic 
Sociology,76 regarding “the mutual influence of the organism and its medium (‘milieu’)”:  
“There is no distinction whatever between the notion conveyed by this term milieu and 
that of ‘environment’ employed by Herbert Spencer. The latter may be regarded as a 
simple translation of the former.” 
The “doctrine of the reciprocal influence of organism and environment” had, therefore, not 
originated with this author but, rather, with Comte. Indeed, this “word milieu, so constantly 
employed by Comte,” could be traced back to Lamarck. However, Ward notes, Comte can 
have been “only imperfectly acquainted” with Lamarck’s works “since he imagines the term to 
be new in this sense,” and even offers “an apology for the neologism.” 
“Upon a careful comparison I am unable to perceive any distinction between the 
application he makes of the term and that made by Lamarck, while, as already stated, 
Herbert Spencer’s ‘environment’ can only be regarded as a simple translation of this 
word into expressive English.”77 
From Lamarck to Comte; Comte, and Carlyle, to Martineau; Martineau to Spencer, and so 
on—by this time, still some years before Eugénie Dutoit would construct the first monograph 
on the subject,78 the aetherial-elemental milieu could apparently be forgotten, overlaid by the 
positive milieu. 
Whether attributed to Comte or Spencer, by 1883, “environment” frequently remained 
‘stamped’ by some proper name or another. However, this was decreasingly the case, as the 
concept became ever more quotidian. 
In 1886, the jurist, historian, and liberal MP James Bryce (1838–1922), in an address to 
the Royal Geographical Society on Geography and its Relations to History, divided “environment-
influences” into three classes:  
“1. The configuration of the earth’s surface; i.e. the distribution of land and sea, the 
arrangement of mountain chains, tablelands, and valleys, the existence of rivers and the 
basins which they drain. 2. Meteorological influences, i.e. climate, including heat and 
drought and winds. 3. The products which a country offers to human industry—
mineral, vegetable, and animal.”79 
The next year, before the same institution, the twenty-six-year-old Halford Mackinder (1861–
1947)—subsequently known as a founder of English “geopolitics,” and Unionist MP from 
1910–1922—in an address titled On the Scope and Methods of Geography, declared that “[t]he 
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function of political geography is to trace the interaction between man and his environment.”80 
This latter “technical” term was adopted, Mackinder acknowledged, “because Mr. Bryce has 
made that term a received one in geography.”81 
Also in 1887, the Liberal MP, and then-former Liberal Prime Minister, William Gladstone 
(1809–1898) remarked, on the subject of criminal reform in Ireland, that: 
“trial by jury means trial by our Peers—trial by those who are as nearly as possible in 
the same circumstances—according to the favourite language of modern science, in the 
same environment […].”82 
By this time, the use of the word in such fora was still infrequent; however, it was becoming 
more common year-on-year, and self-evidently carried a weight of scientific sagacity. However, 
it was not only at the epicentres of colonial power that this concept, and others like it, were 
adopted. 
The next year, the Liberian intellectual, journalist, and politician Edward Wilmot 
Blyden (1832–1912) wrote in his Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race: 
“No one will undertake to dispute at this day that the moral and intellectual character 
of a people is very largely dependent upon their physical environments. No great man, 
physically or mentally, has ever been developed in the inhospitable regions of 
Greenland or Tierra del Fuego.” 
Indeed, the authority of “Mr. Buckle” informs us of the developmentally intransigent regions of 
Brazil, where “impassable forests” and “innumerable insects” preclude “the progress of 
agriculture”—never mind the mountains, “too high to scale”; the rivers, “too wide to bridge.” 
Buckle (1821–1862), incidentally, did not use the word “environment,” though he wrote widely 
of “climate,” the “unhealthiness” of which Blyden, too, designates as “[t]he first and most 
generally admitted cause” as regards restrictions on development.83 
Born in the West Indies to Free Black parents, Blyden emigrated to Liberia in 1850. His 
professed Pan-Africanist doctrine of Ethiopianism, modelled on Zionism, was that Black 
Americans could return to Africa imbued with an ethos of redemption. Initially understood in 
Christian terms, Blyden later considered Islam a more fitting African religion.84 However, in 
either case, as missionaries, they would face the same problems White colonists faced: the 
difficulty of surviving the notoriously deleterious climates of the interior. Thus, Blyden’s 
adoption of such scientific concepts entailed an attempt to reconcile this mission with 
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sociological and biological practicalities, using the concepts of European colonialism against 
European colonialism. 
 In 1889, the aforementioned Grant Allen wrote of the “deep biological joy in the term 
‘environment,’” so nearly rivalling “that sweet word ‘Mesopotamia.’”85 In 1891, in an address 
issued as President of the Biological Society of Washington titled Neo-Darwinism and Neo-
Lamarckism, Ward had come to recognise differences between Lamarck, Comte, and Spencer’s 
conceptual vocabularies. The latter had indeed introduced “clear and precise terminology,” 
which Lamarck had “floundered about in straining after”: 
“As I have shown he [Lamarck] generally used the word circumstances for Spencer’s 
environment, but in many cases he employed the word medium (milieu) and he 
occasionally approached the Spencerian expression so nearly as to speak of the 
environing medium (milieu environnant).” 
However, Lamarck’s “idea,” Ward continued, “was undoubtedly the same,” its author only 
lacking “the literary training and the philosophic power” to properly articulate it.86 
 In 1892, the biologist August Weismann (1834–1914) published Das Keimplasma: eine 
Theorie der Vererbung.87 Weismann’s titular “Germ-Plasm” gave a microbiological basis to the 
rejection of what was now known as Neo-Lamarckism, writing in the chapter “Supposed 
Transmission of Acquired Characters”: 
“At the present day I can therefore state my conviction still more decidedly than 
formerly, that all permanent—i.e., hereditary [vererbbaren]—variations of the body proceed from 
primary modifications of the primary constituents of the germ [Keimesanlagen]; and that neither 
injuries, functional hypertrophy and atrophy, structural variations due to the effect of 
temperature or nutrition, nor any other influence of environment [Mediums-Einflüsse] 
on the body, can be communicated to the germ-cells, and so become transmissible.”88 
Thus, where Spencer had made the membrane of the organism the relevant point of 
contradistinction as regards its environment, the Keimplasma provided a point compatible with, 
indeed profoundly reinforcing, the Darwinian conception. It was not until 1900 that the 
experiments performed by Gregor Mendel (1822–1884) in the 1860s were ‘rediscovered’ (in 
three separate papers published in the same year), leading to the science of genetics. However, 
neither the germ-plasm nor gene provided a decisive refutation of Neo-Lamarckism, which 
prospered well into the new century.89 
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Through the 1890s, definitions and disputations of environment proliferated rapidly, 
though political usage lagged considerably behind the scientific. In the Parliamentary records 
of 1893, the expression is found three times: Joseph Edward Kenny (1845–1900), Irish National 
League MP for Dublin College Green, is paraphrased as declaring certain colleagues “creatures 
of their environment.”90 Gladstone, now again Prime Minister, once more remarked upon “the 
essential equality of the Members of this House” as forming “a part—a fundamental part—of 
the environment in which we live,” and being what “enters into and makes us what we are.” 
Then, George Wyndham (1863–1913), Conservative MP for Dover, on the subject of Home 
Rule for Ireland, was paraphrased as saying that the proposed Bill “would create an 
environment in which these opinions [for full independence] would develop and propagate.”91  
In 1894, the Haverford College law professor William Draper Lewis (1867–1949), in 
the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science wrote: 
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“The term ‘environment’ is in these days popular, and there is, therefore, all the greater 
need that we should be definite and exact in its use. It is the sum of the conditions which effect 
a society.” 
These conditions were of two kinds: the “physical environment” consisting of soil, climate, 
machinery; and the “mental environment” consisting of persons and their preferences, 
capacities, and so on.92 Such declarations were made not exclusively within sociological, 
geographical, or political-scientific expositions. To take one (literal) textbook example,93 in 
1897, Emmett Stull Goff (1852–1902) defined the term as expressing “all the outside influences, 
taken as a whole, that affect a given object in any way.”94 
However, it was not only that the concept became more commonly used but, in certain 
usages, its apparent significance was also augmented, becoming not only a useful or functional 
concept but one endowed with profundity. In 1896, the ethnologist and Smithsonian curator 
Otis Tufton Mason (1838–1908) declared, in a lecture titled Influence of environment upon human 
industries or arts:95 
“In closing, I desire to call your special attention to the ever increasing size and variety 
and comprehensiveness of the term environment as culture has advanced.” 
In the early days, “the centrifugal condition of human evolution” had pushed human beings 
into various “limited environments,” producing races and languages, with the “overstepping” 
of such boundaries leading to the greatest of changes. Then, in the final stage, feeding upon 
these lower achievements, “these irresistible tendencies seized the whole earth, and henceforth 
it was one oikoumenē, one enclave, one environment.”96  
Featuring in records of Parliamentary discourse five times in 1897, six in 1898, and 
eleven in 1899, two decades later, the instances would be beyond reviewing. However, at this 
time, the term was particularly used in association with imperial affairs, naval hygiene, and 
industrial working conditions. In particular, the trade unionist and Liberal MP John Burns 
(1858–1943) regularly used the expression. As he put it in 1899: 
“The hon. Member will find that it is the industrial environment, the low wages, and 
the bad sanitary conditions that are responsible for the state of affairs disclosed in this 
Report. We find that 1,085 persons were suffering from lead poisoning out of a 
population of 4,703 working in lead, or just over 30 per cent. If that were the condition 
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of our soldiers in India, in regard to another disease; if it were the condition of our 
garrisons at home, Parliament would be alarmed, and would pretty soon take action.”97 
Thus, Burns leveraged, at this time, not only the language of rational science, the provenance 
of which was no longer worth commenting upon, but also the language of governance, imperial 
and otherwise, in order to make his political claims. 
9.3: Satire and possibility: Environment circa 1900 
In 1905, Gulielma Zollinger (1856–1917) of Newton, Iowa, author of such novels as The Widow 
O’Callaghan’s Boys (1898), and Maggie McLanehan (1901) wrote in New England Magazine: 
“BABETTA had been Mrs. Zindel for four years and had reached the age of twenty-two 
when she discovered that she had an environment.” 
Sandwiched between a short story titled Aunt Foster’s Cranberries, and a report regarding Boston 
public schools from the World’s Fair in St. Louis, Babetta’s Environment told of a naïf but well-
meaning young housewife who heads off to a mother’s meeting, encountering “a moon-eyed 
lady, with a plaintive tone” who undertakes to inform the assembled “about environments.” 
“‘Take the richest woman in the world to-day and put her in your environment, and 
what would she be?’ demanded the moon-eyed lady solemnly. ‘That is the question I 
invariably propound in defending the extremely poor.[’]” 
With consistently unsubtle satirical strokes, Zollinger’s “lady” professes the solace to be found 
in blaming one’s sorrows always on “somebody else.” 
“[‘]So you, my sisters, may put all the blame of your wretchedness on your 
environment. The word environment will cover it all.’ ‘And no wonder,’ thought 
Babetta. ‘It is a big word. Big enough to cover much.’” 
And yet, having never heard the like before, Babetta rose at once to ask, respectfully, as to the 
meaning of this word. 
“The moon-eyed lady appeared embarrassed. Definition was not her strong point. 
Then she smiled and spread her hands in a sweeping gesture that took in all the four 
walls of the little room. ‘Ah!’ exclaimed Babetta. ‘I think I see. It is all the outside of you 
round about.’”98 
Taking this “big word” altogether too much to heart, Babetta soon sees “environments” 
everywhere. A woman’s shame—her bread sour, her steak overdone; what else could be to 
blame but the environments? She sets about fixing the “environments” of her yard; but there 
are always more environments, and never does her bread-making improve. 
But Babetta is not merely to be a figure of fun. In the five-page parable’s conclusion, she 
meets her moment: 
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“And now all the women were staring. 
‘It is a true thing,’ continued Babetta, ‘what the mothers’ meeting lady say about the 
environments, only she did not say all. She should say when the environments are very 
bad, and you cannot go away from them, then you must make the environments 
different. And it is the women must do it because the men work all day long already. I 
ask you here to see a place where two months ago there was only two good 
environments already, and that was the ground outside the fence, and the environments 
of the top of the house, which is the blue sky. And I say now there is nobody with two 
hands and two feet that need to—what you call it? waste your breath, a-talking about 
environments. The environments are outside of you but the inside of you can make 
them different. And so you can see for yourselves. I do not like to make a speech, and I 
ask you that you excuse me that I have done so. Only this I will say, when you see the 
very good environments you do not see how the peoples work to make them good 
environments. And now, my dear friends, I will pass again the cake and the coffee.’”99 
This gentle mockery of a white, middle class New England housewife, apparently for white, 
middle class New England housewives, could hardly have been conceived in its effect were 
“environment” not already something of a cliché, or commonplace—a feigned profundity 
levelled at such women so as to coax them into self-improvement, and stop their dillydallying 
about blaming others for what, in the end, was a matter of elbow grease and self-respect. 
~~~~~~ 
In the third volume of the first edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, published in 1897, 
“environment” was given two principal definitions, the second with two variants. First: “The 
action of environing; the state of being environed”—this being attributed to Holland in 1603. 
Second, 2a, noted as a concrete noun: “That which environs; the objects or the region 
surrounding anything.” Several examples given included quotations from Carlyle in 1830 and 
1831. Finally, 2b: “The conditions under which any person or thing lives or is developed; the 
sum-total of influences which modify and determine the development of life or character.” 
Among the examples here included Carlyle’s “environment of circumstances” (stated 1827 
rather than 1828, an error that remains to the present edition), as well as Spencer’s Psychology of 
1855, and Romanes’ review of 1881. Moreover, two rather more obscure equivalents were 
given: First, Environage (noted “rare”): “The assemblage of surrounding objects or 
circumstances; surroundings,” the first example given being from 1836. Second: Environy 
“(Obs[olete].)”: defined, cursorily, as “= ENVIRONMENT,” and dated (as per §8) from 1600.100 
Environmental—“of or pertaining to environments”—was first found in 1887. Indeed, 
the adjectival form was still rare when William James, in his Varieties of Religious Experience of 
1902, wrote of “[u]topian dreams of social justice” being, “in spite of their impracticability and 
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non-adaptation to present environmental conditions, analogous to the saint’s belief in an 
existent kingdom of heaven.”101 Indeed, it only appeared in recorded Parliamentary 
proceedings as of 1920, pertaining to “the environmental and other Public Health services.”102 
~~~~~~ 
The speech delivered by James in 1882 regarding “great men” prompted two replies, published 
in the same periodical a few months later—the first by John Fiske, and the second by Grant 
Allen. In turn, James wrote a follow-up titled The Importance of Individuals (though this was rejected 
by the editors and published only in 1890). 
 Speaking in defence of hero-worship, and particularly against Allen’s “contempt” for 
the concept, James refers to an “unlearned carpenter of my acquaintance” who is quoted as 
commenting: “There is very little difference between one man and another; but what little there 
is, is very important.”103 Indeed, this “zone of insecurity in human affairs” was surely the locus of 
all “dramatic interest,” the rest belonging to “the dead machinery of the stage.” All interest in 
evolution, and all interest in conversation. This was “the formative zone, the part not yet 
ingrained into the race’s average”—“the soft layer beneath the bark of the tree” within which 
all new growth occurs. As such, James writes: “Layer after layer of human perfection separates 
me from the central Africans who pursued Stanley104 with cries of ‘meat, meat!’” Moreover, to 
the eyes of a “Veddah” (an indigenous people of Sri Lanka), would not the differences between 
these “two white literary men”—James and Allen themselves—seem imperceptible? This, 
James argued, was the fundamental fallacy of the Spencer-Allen philosophy: the reduction of 
the individual, the ferment, to “the race’s average”—the ignorance, then, of “race-differences 
in the making.” 
And so, Allen and Fiske, both, were counselled, rather than the “general laws and 
averages” of “sociologists,” it was to “individual variations” with their “ups and downs and hair-
breadth escapes and twists and turns” that one should look: 
“picking out from history our heroes, and communing with their kindred spirits—in 
imagining as strongly as possible what differences their individualities brought about in 
this world, whilst its surface was still plastic in their hands, and what whilom [erstwhile] 
feasibilities they made impossible—each one of us may best fortify and inspire what 
creative energy may lie in his own soul.” 
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To this rhetorical crescendo, James later added105 a footnote acclaiming Gabriel Tarde’s Les 
Lois de l’imitation106 “(itself a work of genius)” as offering “the best possible commentary” on the 
difference between “invention” and “imitation”—these being “the two sole factors of social 
change.”107 
 Between 1888 and 1890, William Edward Burghardt Du Bois (1868–1963) enrolled at 
Harvard, studying with James. Sometime around his graduation in 1890, he wrote a speech 
titled “Carlyle,” which exhorted his young, educated, black peers: “We are the architects and 
builders of a new nation—the hesitating blacksmiths of a unique and burning Idea.” Thomas 
Carlyle, he continued, was not a soul belonging to any “petty day or year” but, rather, to a spirit 
“whose life is not measured by years.”108 In 1895, Du Bois became the first Black American to 
earn a Ph.D. In 1899, he published The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study, investigating “The Negro 
Problems of Philadelphia”—a complete account of which, Du Bois cautioned: 
“must not confine itself to the group, but must specially notice the environment; the 
physical environment of city, sections and houses, the far mightier social environment 
the surrounding world of custom, wish, whim, and thought which envelops this group 
and powerfully influences its social development.”109 
In 1903, he published an essay titled The Talented Tenth, which argued: “The Negro race, like all 
races, is going to be saved by its exceptional men.”110 Thus, although his views would change 
considerably during the subsequent years of his long life, in the early years of Du Bois’ career, 
individual-romantic and social-environmental distributions of agency coexisted and were 
utilised relative to the problem at hand. 
 Having become the first female student at MIT in 1870, in 1904 Ellen Henrietta 
Swallow Richards (1842–1911) concluded her short book The Art of Right Living by writing:  
“Adaptation to the environment is the great need of the American today; and shall we, 
who boast that we outdo the world with our mechanical devices, stop short of at least a 
long step towards the production of a better race?” 
In this work, Richards identified herself as a follower of the likes of Edwin Chadwick (1800–
1890), “father of sanitation.”111 Moreover, she took her text’s epigraph from “that prophet of 
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the new republic, Mr. H.G. Wells”112 (1866–1946) and his Mankind in the Making of 1903: “It is  
not birth rates that want raising but Ideals.”113 A chemist and sanitary engineer, Richards was 
also, by the early twentieth century, a leading figure in the Home Economics movement, both 
founding and funding the Journal of Home Economics, the first issue of which was published in 
Figure 25—Advertisement for Environment, directed by James Kirkwood (1875–1963), 1917 
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1909 (and continued to be published until 1994 when it was renamed the Journal of Family and 
Consumer Sciences). In 1910, the year before her death, Richards published her manifesto, 
Euthenics: the science of controllable environment. “Eugenics,” she declared programmatically, “deals 
with race improvement through heredity” while, “Euthenics,” rounds out the equation by 
dealing “with race improvement through environment.”114 
Whether or not Zollinger’s “moon-eyed lady” of 1905 was an allusion to Richards or 
her colleagues, her satire identified the movement. “Dirt and disease threaten us with 
deterioration,”115 Richards had declared only the year before. Thus, by the early twentieth 
century, environment had unambiguously become a matter of significance. It was closely 
associated with issues of hygiene, health, and the biopolitical imperative to maximise the power 
potential of the population—or, rather, of the race.116 Issues relating to nonhuman living beings 
remained, however, in another register. 
While opening a “Conference on the Conservation of Natural Resources” at the White 
House in 1908, Theodore Roosevelt bemoaned the inability of “the average man” to realise his 
“dependence upon nature,” while so-called “savages” were said to concern themselves only with 
that which “they obtain from the actual surface of the ground.”117 The conservation movement 
in the United States was indeed concerned with what surrounded the rapidly expanding 
metropolises but these relations were not articulated as environmental as such, nor did they 
have the progressive political associations that they would come to be typified by half a century 
later.118 
Likewise, while, in recent years, Humboldt’s terrestrial physics of circulation, balance, 
and natural unity has earned him such soubriquets as “The Forgotten Father of 
Environmentalism,” and “The Man Who Made Nature Modern,”119 the significance of such 
conceptions in earlier years was quite different. While such natural unification is today widely 
interpreted in the register of overcoming modern dualisms—Cartesian, Kantian, and 
otherwise120—in the nineteenth century, such romanticisms could have rather other resonances. 
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The American poets, Walt Whitman (1819–1892) wrote around 1855, “shall be 
kosmos.”121 A fervent enthusiast of the westward expansion, around 1868, inspired by the 
completion of the Suez Canal, the American transcontinental railroad, and the transatlantic 
Atlantic cable,122 Whitman wrote: 
“Passage to India! 
  Lo, soul! seest thou not God’s purpose from the first? 
  The earth to be spann’d, connected by network, 
  The races, neighbors, to marry and be given in marriage, 
  The oceans to be cross’d, the distant brought near, 
  The lands to be welded together.”123 
The unity of nature and the unity of economy were, for mid-nineteenth-century romantics, by 
no means incommensurable.  
Though having little time for Germanic poetics, in 1895, after praising Humboldt’s 
scientifically foundational example, Mackinder advised that a young geographer must become 
practiced in the analysis of “environment,” this term signifying “the local resultant of world-
wide systems.”124 Being essentially localised, there could, therefore, be no “world-wide” 
environment as such. Nevertheless, the sense of connective totality was crucial. In 1904, with 
consummately Victorian-Edwardian dourness, he wrote, further, that, with the “political 
appropriation” of the world “virtually complete,” and the age of “geographical exploration” 
thus being commonly regarded as over, worldly unity brought fresh dangers. 
“Every explosion of social forces, instead of being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of 
unknown space and barbaric chaos, will be sharply re-echoed from the far side of the 
globe, and weak elements in the political and economic organism of the world will be 
shattered in consequence.” 
It was therefore necessary for the geographer “to exhibit human history as part of the life of the 
world organism”—not just to describe local environments but to illustratively bring into patency 
the torsive, tight-packed territorial tinderbox.125 
 Fundamental to this world-effect was its sense of providence. Geography was fate. “Man 
and not nature initiates, but nature in large measure controls.”126 On occasion, “human genius” 
may seemingly defy such limitations; however, “in the long-run Nature asserts her 
supremacy.”127 Such a distribution of agencies, later known as environmental determinism, 
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could always be tempered in ascendential terms. As Mackinder later wrote in Democratic Ideals 
and Reality (1919), formerly “the power of nature over man was still great” but, today, “[i]n no 
small measure man now controls the forces of nature,” giving rise to the expectation that “a 
fairer division of wealth” should be in attained (a prospect for which Mackinder, by now a 
Unionist MP, was distinctly frosty).128 
 However, such apologistic determinisms by no means went uncontested.129 In France, 
by the 1920s, the tradition of human geography that had become firmly institutionally 
ensconced—a tradition more securely established, and frequently at odds with, Durkheimian 
sociology—was that centring around Paul Vidal de la Blache (1845–1918).130 Published 
posthumously in 1922, Vidal’s Principes de la géographie humaine131 took as its two core principles 
“terrestrial unity” and “the notion of milieu,” paying paid tribute, first, to Ratzel and, then, to 
Humboldt. The notion of milieu had emerged from the latter’s study of all the varied conditions 
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Figure 26—“Biological Milieus: Materials taken from the vegetal kingdom”; Vidal de la Blache, 1922 
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of plant distribution. However, with particular regard to the ecology of Ernst Haeckel (1834–
1919), Vidal added: 
“if we reflect on all that is implied in this word milieu, or environnement following the 
English expression, on all the unsuspected threads of which the fabric that enfolds us is 
woven [tissée la trame qui nous enlace], what living organism could escape [soustraire]?”132 
The value of milieu, or environment, was thus that it encapsulated such untranscendable 
entanglement. 
However, the ontonomy of Vidalian human geography was not especially concerned 
with the global determinants of human being. Rather, it was the regional influences of “man” 
on the milieu itself that was of interest—an influence that had been ongoing “longer and more 
generally than has been supposed.”133 Climate, it was now understood, “oscillates about a 
mean” rather than demonstrating consistency. Nevertheless, such oscillations, as per Buffon et 
al. a century and a half previously, were distinctly susceptible to human “intervention.” The 
powers of peoples were particularly augmented through “the allies [auxiliaires] they mobilise in 
the living world—cultivated plants and domestic animals,” and man had been a geographic 
agent since at least “the Pliocene period,”134 when a great number of species went extinct.135 
Nevertheless, the depth of such anthropogenic effects could not suggest parity. 
“Today all parts of the earth are interrelated [en rapport]. Isolation is an anomaly which 
seems like a challenge [un défi].”136 
Indeed, the “present and future undertakings of man” were far out of proportion with anything 
that distant ancestors could have envisaged. 
“Let us congratulate ourselves, because the task [l’entreprise] of colonisation which 
constitutes the glory of our age [époque] would be only a sham if nature set definite, rigid 
boundaries [cadres], instead of leaving a margin for the work of transformation or 
reparation [restauration] which it is within man’s power to perform.”137 
Thus, whatever the events of then-recent years, the Vidalian school remained ontodesically 
committed to the contemporaneous neo-Kantian repudiation of determinism, and to the re-
emboldened mission civilisatrice.138 Also in 1922, Lucien Febvre dubbed this school of thought 
“possibilist,” writing: 
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“There are no necessities, but everywhere possibilities; and man, as master of the 
possibilities, is the judge of their use.”139 
~~~~~~ 
Whether romantic or utilitarian, liberal or conservative, socialist or individualist, imperialist or 
anti-imperialist, determinist or possibilist, by the early decades of the twentieth century, milieu, 
climate, and environment had, in different ways and on different timelines, become 
commonplaces of political and intellectual discourse in the Euro-American world. Moreover, 
causal-circumambient conceptions of milieu and environment had become conceptually 
foundational to the sciences of sociology and, later, human geography. While such conceptions 
had not been formative of Darwinian-Wallacean evolutionary biology, they had been 
prominently enrolled in its defence and propagation.  
Environmental expressions provided a conceptual means of coordinating and contesting 
varied issues existing across the lines of the very disciplinary and institutional divisions that had 
been established over these decades. As such, their use was by no means wedded to any 
particular political disposition. However, as a conceptual means of comparatively relating 
problematic spatial differences, environmental concepts were of particular relevance to matters 
of colonial administration, and its contestation. Thus, while, Mackinder and Vidal may have 
disagreed as regards the distribution of human and natural agency, they were as one in taking 
the spatial relation of local environments as being the proper means of understanding “the glory 
of our age [époque].” 
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Excursus F: Ontochronic: The complication of condemnation 
As seen in §3, for Lucien Febvre, “the sin that cannot be forgiven,” for a historian, is that of 
“anachronism.”1 To be in the wrong time, to mistake one epoch for another, is a 
characteristically “modern” paranoia—a fear closely related to the loudly clunking chains of 
those “implicit systems in which we find ourselves prisoners,”2 as Michel Foucault had it (§2). 
 Not all collectives figure time in this fashion.3 Thus, if one accepts that “no single 
common-place can inflate its borders” so as to become a “universal tradition,” and if one thus 
wishes to maintain the possibility that a “cross-roads qua commonplace presupposes ancestral 
relations to places elsewhere” (§E)—roads once taken, or not taken, that might yet be taken—
then certain conceits must be confronted. 
 In particular, what Dipesh Chakrabarty characterised (§3) as that “desire to be free of 
the past”—to “reduce the past to a nullity”4—must be considered as regards both the possibility 
of historical writing, and the powerfully political operation that is declaring anything to be “a 
thing of the past.” 
~~~~~~ 
However ‘revelatory’ Comte’s Damascene moment, early one morning in 1822, may have been 
(§5.1), his delineation of historical-theoretical states or stages—“the theological or fictional”; 
“the metaphysical or abstract”; “the scientific or positive”5—was far from original. Amongst 
Scottish historians and political economists of the previous century, such as William Robertson 
(1721–1793), Adam Smith (1723–1790), Adam Ferguson (1723–1816), and John Millar (1735–
1801), it was a commonplace that all peoples will pass through four stages, from hunter-
gatherer, to pastoral-nomadic, to agricultural, and then commercial. Such schemas were a 
staple of nineteenth-century thought, with Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), Lewis 
Henry Morgan (1818–1881), Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), and Karl Marx (1818–1883), 
among many others, formulating their own accounts. 
When a specifically stage-based theory was not employed, history remained 
conventionally directional. Humboldt, for one, had written, around 1844, of “the mysterious 
course of ideas” that yielded “the first glimmering perception” of nature’s cosmic unity.6 Later, 
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in 1910 the lecturer and journalist Norman Angell (1872–1967) wrote in his popular book The 
Great Illusion of: 
“man’s irresistible drift away from conflict and towards co-operation is but the 
completer adaptation of the organism (man) to its environment (the planet, wild nature), 
resulting in a more intense vitality.”7 
Similarly, in his presidential manifesto of 1913, the former academic historian Woodrow Wilson 
(1856–1924) propounded that existing political institutions had been put together under the 
influence of the Newtonian age, while the state of today must be reconstructed for the 
Darwinian: 
“[Government] is modified by its environment, necessitated by its tasks, shaped to its 
functions by the sheer pressure of life.”8 
Between pacification and pressure, the commonplace of this moment, among white, patriarchal 
Euro-American elites, was found in a heady tension between fears of racial degeneration, and 
an irresistible forward-upward civilisational momentum. Both Mackinderesque apprehension 
as to the “explosion of social forces” possible on a politically unruly and yet unified terrestrial 
sphere,9 and Vidalian self-congratulation as to what was “within man’s power to perform,”10 
were pervasive amongst the governing classes. The new century exuded both problem and 
promise. 
~~~~~~ 
The sense of history wafting from a page is never more acute than when said page was penned 
immediately before what the reader knows to be an event. The more epochal the event, the 
more dramatic the irony. 
The outbreak of war between the European empires and the conceptual tendencies 
identified as “the birth of geopolitics” (§1) are surely inseparable. The generalisation of 
competition, domination, civilisational hierarchy, universal propriety, and territorial 
acquisitivity in popular Euro-American parlance was, by this time, well-established. In the late 
1890s, Eugénie Dutoit, in her pathbreaking history of milieu, wrote of “drive and ferment 
[Drängen und Gähren]” of the era of Hippolyte Taine (1828–1893).11 The moment of “race, milieu, 
et moment” would prove enduring. While Ratzel’s lebensraum (living-space) found its significance 
only in Hitlerian Nazidom, the spectre of abutting national organisms set against implacably 
hostile environments was commonplace by the 1910s. 
                                               
7 Angell [1910] 1911, 179. Expanding upon a pamphlet published the previous year: Angell 1909. 
8 Wilson 1913, 43. 
9 Mackinder 1904, 422; Kearns 2009; Parker 1982. 
10 Vidal de La Blache 1926, 23–24; Vidal de La Blache 1922, 15. 
11 Dutoit 1899, 5–6. 
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Once again, environmental concepts cannot, at this time or any other, be 
straightforwardly aligned with any particular intellectual disposition or political agenda. 
However, it is certainly no coincidence that these physical, biological, sociological and, later, 
geographical, concepts came to be so imbued with a sense of moment amongst the elites of 
Euro-American empires, around the time of this, their apotheosis of self-celebration. 
Environment, in the sense common to biologists and sociologists after Comte, can be 
understood as structure plus ambience. As Durkheim put it, one may know the relation of 
phenomena to milieu “without knowing by what, or how, it is connected [tient].”12 This 
explanatory power was fundamental to making ontodesic claims upon the basis of aggregate 
statistical information. However, environmental concepts also afforded means of ontoturgic 
encapsulation more generally. Environment as “the local resultant of world-wide systems”13—
a sense still in formation at this time—allowed the indefinite ontographic complexity of 
                                               
12 Durkheim 1982, 106; Durkheim 1919, 93. Translation modified. 
13 Mackinder 1895, 376. 
Figure 28—Comparison of environments, from Our Environment: How We Use and Control It, 1927 
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planetary being to be articulated in interrelated, describable portions. Environment, inasmuch 
as it still carried connotations of the physical milieu, bore the sense of serious concreteness, and 
indefinite relatability. Yet, as an intrinsically aesthetically, subjectively, or organismically 
relative concept, it was both intuitive and positive. It could even be exciting, glorious, joyous.  
Environment was structural in that it put entities into more or less stable relations of 
explanation. Yet this was an ambient structure in that the specificities of such relations need not 
be specified. It granted the conceptualiser the power, for any given being, to set the “solid 
ground” and to institute “the experiment,” as Zola put it.14 However, its further power was that 
it could not only reduce but also, at the same time, bring into patency—to make experientially 
manifest. 
With particular consideration to its involvement in the development of geopolitical 
thinking, it can then be said that the invention of environment amounted to the invention the 
means of perceiving empire as world. 
 It is this moment just prior to the war of empires—amidst the clamour but before the 
crisis—that this text takes as its moment of departure. Considered ontologically, this returns us 
to questions of epochal decision (§3). 
~~~~~~ 
In 1996, reflecting on Febvre’s 1942 statement regarding anachronism as the “sin of all sins,”15 
Jacques Rancière wrote that the claim that something is anachronistic entails that “something 
could not have existed at this date.”16 For Febvre, the non-existent in question was atheism in the 
sixteenth century. However, the significance of this historiographical ethic goes well beyond any 
particular histoire-problème.17 
 A fundamental commonplace of modern ontology has been the understanding of 
historical time as consisting of periodic ruptures that either sweep away that which does not 
belong to each new era or else subordinate what remains to that which has ascended to the 
higher existential level. Not unlike Cuvier’s terrestrial “revolutions,”18 through this recurrent 
process of supersedence, the past is reduced “to a nullity”19—to ancestral disavowal; freedom 
from the responsibility for the present that this past has produced. 
 History is made by making things history; by making things “a thing of the past.” Of 
course, this process involves vastly more than narration alone. Nevertheless, as seen with 
d’Alembert’s Discours préliminaire or Cuvier’s éloge for Lamarck, to take but two, rather prosaic, 
                                               
14 Zola 1902, 7–8. 
15 Febvre 1982, 5; Febvre 1942, 8. 
16 Rancière 2016, 28; Rancière 1996. 
17 Tournier 1981. 
18 Cuvier 1825; Cuvier 1831. 
19 Chakrabarty 2008, 244. 
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examples, narrative may well lay claim to the power of self-fulfilment—though such claims are 
readily refuted by the agents upon which they claim to bind. For instance, the refrain of 
Indigenous peoples throughout Euro-American empires, today: “We are still here.”20 
Epochal decision—that is, the situated determination of which aspects of the past are 
still able to have a hold on the present (and in what way)—is, therefore, an inescapable aspect 
of what it is to write history. This practice always carries the risk of misanachronisation—of 
presuming to be past what will not acquiesce to being so. Thus, it may be that precisely what 
you set out to leave behind reaches back to grasp you, despite your every effort. 
How, then, are we to decide? 
“The master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.” 
Thus wrote the poet, feminist, and activist Audre Lorde in 1979.21 This is the final resounding 
“cry” that I wish to dramatise. 
                                               
20 Harjo et al. 1997, 30–31. 
21 Lorde [1984] 2012, 110–113. Comments delivered at the Second Sex Conference, New York, September 29, 
1979. 
 
Figure 29—The Slave Ship; or, Slavers throwing overboard the Dead and Dying—Typhoon coming on; JMW Turner (1775–
1851), 1840 
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 In writing these words, Lorde was preparing to speak at a conference celebrating the 
thirtieth anniversary of Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex,22 having been specifically invited 
to respond to the question of “the role of difference within the lives of american women: 
difference of race, sexuality, class, and age.” Her response was scathing, noting the 
preponderant absence of precisely those women—poor, Black, lesbian, non-Western—whose 
experiences were supposed to be under discussion. 
“What does it mean when the tools of a racist patriarchy are used to examine the fruits 
of that same patriarchy? It means that only the most narrow perimeters of change are 
possible and allowable.”23 
This cry must be heard not because this thesis has attempted to answer it—clearly it has not—
but, rather, because it brings into sharp relief necessary ontochronic questions of inheritance 
and responsibility. 
The preceding history of environmental concepts has, in a sense, been a survey of “the 
master’s house”—or, at least, some small facet of it. In undertaking such a survey—and then 
attempting to “learn from” it—I am, it must be said, making a claim that it is imperative to 
appreciate: I am recognising myself as an inheritor of this house. To be sure, there is no 
irrefusable obligation whatsoever for any reader of this text to accept this positioning 
themselves. However, the important question, upon this recognition, becomes that of whether 
this inheritance has been taken on responsibly—that is, whether it has adequately negotiated 
the conflicted confluence of reclamation, condemnation, and nullification. 
From Kant’s snide dismissal of the cosmopolitan purpose of the Tahitians, to Spencer’s 
pathologically callous rationalisation of an Gorta Mór, this is has been a history with no shortage 
of brutality or apologism. Yes, we share with Spencer more than his terminology. Doubtless, 
there are many, still today, who would find in his spiteful prose a refreshingly unencumbered 
lilt against political correctness. Such things are assuredly not “a thing of the past.” But this is 
not all that we share. The processes of unquenchable capitalist acquisitivity that Spencer’s 
doctrine deigned to rationalise remain contemporary, however radically reconfigured. His 
“pressures” remain ours—though we do not by any means experience them in the same way. 
In §3, I distinguished between the historical author, the philosophical persona, and the 
political symptom. The vast majority of proper-names invoked herein have been of the former 
sort—the authors of statements to be situated and interpreted in terms of what they say about 
the past world of which they were part. Certain statements have been identified explicitly as 
symptomatic. Others doubtless could be. 
                                               
22 de Beauvoir [1949] 1953. 
23 Lorde 2012, 110–111. 
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However, as necessary as the register of condemnation demonstrably is, we must be 
wary of the nullification that would result from the generalisation of such a judgemental 
disposition. Condemnation—in the sense that one would condemn a house—cannot suffice to 
its own ends. To make something “a thing of the past” requires not just demolition but counter-
construction. Moreover, to be positioned as an inheritor of a history is to be made responsible—
in however partial or minor a manner—for the impositions of the resultant present. Thus, to 
avoid the indulgence of nullification—‘it’s all a sham; let it burn, let it burn’—condemnation 
cannot exclude the possibility of reclamation.  
However grotesque its filiations, if a past remains active in a present—and, more 
precisely, if needful courses of action continue to depend upon some derivation of it—then it 
must be possible to reclaim from that history. The environmental concepts investigated herein 
remain active—they continue to tell us “what’s what, and where’s where,” as James put it.24 
The question of their reclamation thus remains likewise. 
This text has, therefore, undertaken two quite different tasks: First, and predominantly, 
to reconstruct the principal contours of the evidentiary record of the history in question, while 
beginning to piece together a sense of the past world that a fuller historiography might realise. 
However, and second, it has also attempted to articulate a series of ontological recompositions, 
in the manner of speculative philosophy, that would, in turn, do two things simultaneously: 
First, provide analytical means of better understanding the relevant events. Second, maintain 
the conviction that what was ever valuable in this history never required the violence that came 
with it. In other words, these speculative reconceptions have attempted to make sense of the 
history without accepting its inevitability. More specifically, they attempt to articulate a mode 
of existence for environmental conceptions that would admit of the possibility of reclamation 
without acquiescence to, or apologism for, that which must be condemned. This must be 
emphasised as speculative and propositional. However, it is also purposeful.  
When, in 1620, Francis Bacon propounded the agenda of his Instauratio Magna—that is, 
Great Instauration, or Restoration—this was, as he put it, “to begin the whole labor of the mind 
again.”25 While all precisely defined moments of origin are undoubtedly spurious, this statement 
can be taken to typify the modern imperative to transcend the past, vaulting forever into a future 
of ever more intensified mastery. To be sure, this disposition can readily be complicated. As 
seen in §6, spurred by that modernist Revolution par excellence (the French), there was a 
concerted effort to reclaim precisely those ancients (in particular, Hippocrates) who Bacon could 
so sweepingly dismiss.26 Nevertheless, while the exact orientation of such ancestral claims and 
                                               
24 James 1987, 1012–1016. 
25 Bacon 1902, 7. 
26 E.g. Volney 1799, 172–173. 
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counterclaims may wax and wane, and often be reversed, the question of ontochronic 
responsibility has rarely been made explicit. This is not true of every tradition. 
As the Potawatomi philosopher Kyle Powys Whyte writes: 
“Detaching one’s self from one’s ancestral fantasies is a problematic activity because we 
cease to acknowledge the counterfactual space of unfolding dialogue with our ancestors 
and descendants from particular generations.” 
Here, Whyte is particularly concerned with the manner in which Indigenous peoples are made, 
by would-be settler allies, into “resources that can be used for better or worse purposes for the 
advancement of humanity.” In so doing, would-be allies permit themselves to be fashioned as 
“protagonists for Indigenous peoples”—a detachment of ancestral relations that, in the terms 
developed herein, erases the particularity of each common-place, claiming each product of 
human ingenuity as a universal inheritance. However well-meaning this appropriative 
condescension may be, it “erases the fact that Indigenous peoples everywhere have been 
through repeated apocalypses”—multiple dystopian disasters to which would-be allies indeed 
bear, however indirectly, a relation of ancestral accomplicity (and, quite often, present 
ignorance).27 
 It is not, of course, Whyte admits, that settler peoples are unique in their heritage of 
violence, although colonists are wont to “strategically misrepresent” the misdeeds of the 
colonised so as to relativise their own crimes. 
“We are always in dialogue with our ancestors as dystopianists and fantasizers. Would 
the hidden interests of our descendants really involve their finding out that our current 
generation tried to cover up the errors of our ancestors?”28 
It is with respect to something like this problem of collective significance that I take Stengers to 
have defined “humour” as “the capacity to recognize oneself as a product of the history whose 
construction one is trying to follow.”29 Irony in history is unavoidable. We are appraised of the 
future of those whose present we retrospect. However, operating in a mode of sympathy and 
discovery is also possible.  
It is not that we should have any sympathy for the letter, or even the spirit, of Comte’s 
supercilious dogmas, or Montesquieu’s magisterial decrees. Nor, to reaffirm, am I requiring that 
any reader of this text recognise such figures as ancestors in any meaningful sense—this is as 
much a methodological relation as any. However, if such filiation is accepted, intellectually if 
nothing else, then we may admit that if we wish to share nothing of such doctrines, we should 
at least recognise ourselves in the problems that they addressed. 
                                               
27 Whyte 2018, 15. 
28 Ibid.; cf. Simpson 2017, 192–193. 
29 Stengers 2000, 66; Stengers 1993. 
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Thus understood, conceptual history is not the history of how things came to be the way 
they are. Such a mode of articulation cannot elicit the “drive and ferment” of a historical 
process, in Dutoit’s words. It can, however, elicit the story of how past presents were acted with, 
and against—how agents acted amidst worlds relevant to them, and how they could have done 
otherwise. 
If conception, as James put it, “tells us what’s what, and where’s where,” adapting us “to 
an immense environment,” then reception is the concept that acknowledges this immensity to be 
not taken but given. This is the arkhḗ pertaining to historical ontology, as now reconceived: the 
commitment to reception that conditions the possibility of coexistence (§E). 
It is not, then, “to begin the whole labor of the mind again” that another great 
instauration is called for.30 Rather, it is to begin the whole labour of the world, as worlds—
perhaps, for some, for the first time. To construct “a world in which many worlds fit,” as per 
the much-quoted declaration of the Zapatistas.31 A situation of “contrast” without 
“contradiction,” as Stengers might put it.32 To be sure, this is not our world—not yet. 
 This thesis has attempted to formulate an empirical and conceptual apparatus for the 
realisation of such a situation with regard to the case of environmental concepts up to around 
the start of the twentieth century. 
                                               
30 Stengers and Latour 2015, 87. 
31 Translated and quoted in: de la Cadena and Blaser 2018b, 1. 
32 Stengers 2005a, 193. 
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10: Conclusion 
Where are we? What time are we in? What is our shared reality? 
 Substantively, this thesis has traced the distinct but interrelated histories of milieu, 
climate, and environment up to the start of the twentieth century. Analytically, it has 
differentiated between specific instances of conception, emphasising their contemporaneous 
significance. Diagnostically, it has understood these conceptions to be formative of ontological 
relations. Conceptually, it has de-amalgamated “ontology” into six distinct but interdependent 
dimensions. Speculatively, even somewhat mythologically, it has begun to reformulate certain 
strands of this inherited history with a view to what they might mean in the present. Thus, 
integrally, this thesis has been concerned with matters of spatial relation, epochal differentiation, 
and ontological association. 
 The history previously explicated may now, therefore, be recapitulated. 
 In the Ancient world, sky and earth were intimately entwined. Concern with the medical 
consequences of airs, waters, and places was established long before klíma entered any 
vocabulary. Later, variations on this expression could designate regions. Systems of climatic 
bands, often numbering seven, related astral bodies to earthly fates. Inhabitation of the 
middlemost was particularly desired, for reasons of humoral health, balanced temperament, 
and prophetic aptitude. 
 The geocentric cosmos came to a close in the arena of expanding empires, emboldening 
capital, enclosures, and witch-hunts. Climes became displaced by climates, which, in turn, came 
to stand for then-archaic, skyey expressions of spatial being. Around the same time, questions 
of physical media, resistance, and dynamics were becoming imperative for the slowly 
formalising institutions of royal patronage, private wealth, state governance, and gentlemanly 
curiosity. 
 Newtonian physics came to displace Cartesian in the equations and affections of 
European elites. Achievements of mechanical prediction were supplemented by speculations as 
to cosmic causation, leading to the widespread suffusion of mechanical and immaterial media. 
These acted as principles of universal connection, suggestive of illimitable power. Meanwhile, 
the sundry fermentations and occult excretions of the earth were the subject of both medical 
rumination and aesthetic reflexion. From skies down to bodies—localities were, then, composed 
and rendered distinct by chains of extensive, complex mechanical causation. 
 Climates, too, became related to mechanical, fibral conceptions of physique. While the 
tension of such forces with the rights and proprieties of individual agency was oft-acknowledged, 
for the purposes of governance, the far-seeing facilities of “tendency” and “inclination,” with 
regard to forces incumbent upon entire collectives, proved powerful. Here, climate became a 
commonplace and contested concept. It was increasingly recognised to be irreducible to mere 
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latitude, incorporating a complex range of factors, many of which were quantifiable. Soon after, 
climate was crucial to neo-Hippocratic demands for post-Revolutionary rational holism, 
lending conceptual weight to the expanded empirical range of increasingly state-integrated 
analysts. 
 As the salience of surroundings to being and well-being became increasingly formalised 
and fêted, the environed individual was shielded from materialistic determination by History—
that is, by the maintaining of developmental stages that progressively emancipate the more 
highly civilised from the indignities of attachment to nature. Indeed, now-abstract and 
“positive” milieus and environments themselves came to be principles of individuation—the 
more expansive the environment, the more exalted the individual. 
 While not initially integral to Darwinian–Wallacean evolutionary theory, the abstract-
positive concepts were enrolled in their justification and popularisation. As they were 
propagated, common grounds were established for the still-emergent disciplines of Western 
scientific knowledge, as well as moral, theological, philosophical, and political claimants to such 
dignity. However, environments and milieus remained “shadows with substance.” Environed 
beings—man, organism, race, state, etc.—were affirmed in their individuality, even as they were 
encircled by certified causal incursions into their being. However, echoes of the elemental milieu 
remained detectable, and, from the stage to the debating chamber, the significance of the 
surrounding was widely avowed. 
 From the “sympathies” of the Scottish Enlightenment, to the “visualities” of Carlylean 
Great Men, to the “phantoms” and metaphysics of Tardean–Durkheimian disciplinary 
manoeuvring, the dynamic of subject-and-surroundings was integral to the development of 
sociological thinking. Such concepts as the social milieu provided a means of conceiving the 
actual existence of the probabilistic—of giving conceptual flesh to the increasingly abundant 
flows of statistics and calculations. 
And so, as it became delineable into climates, milieus, and environments, the planet 
itself became a panorama for those who sought empire, duskless—a world on which the sun 
would never set, even though, down below, storm clouds gathered over a state of geopolitical 
connection, impression, and fracture. 
 This, in nuce, then, is the historical contribution of this thesis—an account of these three 
concepts, up until around the start of the twentieth century. However, as well as being a 
historical text, it has also been a philosophical one—with the difference between historical and 
philosophical practice, itself, given a distinct articulation. The principal philosophical 
contribution of this thesis concerns the concept of ontology. Beginning from a dissatisfaction 
with the presumption that lógos be taken as the lodestone of questions concerning the real, the 
preceding has instead undertaken to de-amalgamate the ontological, reconceptualising it as 
consisting of six dimensions. 
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 The ontonomic maintains that the fundamental relation in question is that of the 
committed reception of things as real through practices of collective cultivation. This section 
also introduced an alternative founding mythos for collectivity, based not in the earth, taken as 
a pre-given totality, but in the trivium, crossroads, or common-place, formed in earth over time. 
 The ontoturgic maintains that the reception of such realities as a “world” requires 
work—world-making labours that can be understood through, though certainly not reduced to, 
the workings of fiction. In particular, it was shown how sociological conceptions may be 
productive of such world-effects, even as they deny the validity of “ontology” as such. 
 The ontodesic maintains that, while received realities must be performed into patency, 
this should not be confused with a reduction of such realities to their reception. Indeed, a 
renewed ethos of “realism” recognises that assumed agential distributions may be refuted by 
the agents in question, as per the case of the Haitian Revolution, or contemporary climate crisis. 
 The ontographic maintains that the traditional, exclusive, and hierarchical opposition 
between the ontic and the ontological may be replaced by consideration of “paradigmatically 
existing things.” While the ontoturgic renders constituents into worlds through exemplary 
existential patterns, the ontographic concerns the full range of those things that exist, without 
foreclosing the necessary heterogeneity of this constitution. 
 The ontomesic maintains that if collectives, and hence worlds, are conceived as 
“manifold” then this multiplicity should not—or, at least, not necessarily—entail a fundamental 
alienation that would amount to incommunicability, or the impossibility of liaison, relation, or 
alliance. On the contrary, the very concept of the trivium qua common-place suggests the 
ancestrally received fact of coexistence and coordination. 
 The ontochronic, finally, maintains that the diverse manners by which time might be 
divided must not be foreclosed or hastily generalised. It is with respect to this admission that the 
ontological can be reconnected back to the historical, since historiography, such as it is practiced 
herein, requires a careful understanding of what it means to make something “a thing of the 
past.” 
The limitations to which the preceding history has been subject have already been 
acknowledged (§1.2). However, it is now possible to recognise several constraints more exactly.  
First, various offshoots of a more comprehensive history have been elicited without 
being developed. For example, the analysis of the “ambient” was curtailed at Newton (§4.1), 
without showing its further development as ambiente or medi ambiente in other Romance 
languages. Second, in adhering closely to the history of “concepts” (as defined in §3), more 
general conditions of possibility for the emergence of the issues and ideas in question have not 
been investigated. For example, conceptions of “the state of nature” in seventeenth and 
eighteenth century political philosophy would be informative in this respect, particularly as 
regards establishing the mythic earth-relation that is addressed by what I have called the trivium 
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qua common-place. Third, the restricted timeframe, though necessary, and meaningful in its 
end-point, has precluded analysis of, for example, the popularisation of Umwelt in the early 
twentieth century, and the historical analysis of “world” that would be attendant to that. The 
philosophical reconception of “manifold worlds” therefore remains relatively underdeveloped, 
requiring, as it does, more cohesive and extensive consideration of the significance of “world,” 
in comparison with other environmental concepts, particularly as regards the legacy of 
phenomenology in contemporary social and political theory. Finally, the limited engagement 
with the significance of environment after the 1960s, and through to the “Earth system” era 
since the 1980s, has constrained the degree to which this history of environmental concepts has 
been able to address what are, no doubt, some of the more straightforward relations of 
significance with regard to these concepts in the present. Both the preceding narrative and 
concept of historical ontology therefore stand to be variously expanded and re-problematised, 
if and when this study is taken further. 
From the geocentric to the egographic, egocentric, geographic, geopolitical, but not yet, 
not fully, to the geomoral—this thesis is not, then, a comprehensive account of the task it set 
itself, either empirically or creatively. However, it provides the basis for a more far-reaching 
account, in both respects. 
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Figure 23—Galapagos finches; sketched by John 
Gould (1804–1881), 1845 
278 Journal of researches…, 1845 (2nd 
edition)24 
Figure 24—Composition of the germ-plasm in 
hybrids, Weismann, 1893 
290 The germ-plasm; a theory of heredity25 
                                               
13 Halley 1686c; Halley 1686b. 
14 Halley 1702. 
15 Humboldt and Bonpland 1807a. 
16 Humboldt 1817, between pages 122 and 123. 
17 Whipple 1852. 
18 Humboldt 1797, vol. 1, Annex. 
19 Anon 1908a. 
20 Molena 1912, 341. 
21 Church 1859. 
22 Carlyle 1898, 285. 
23 Darwin 1839, Annex. 
24 Darwin 1845, 379. 
25 Weismann 1893, 303. 
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Figure 25—Advertisement for Environment, 
directed by James Kirkwood (1875–1963), 1917 
296 Moving Picture World, 21 April 
191726 
Figure 26—“Biological Milieus: Materials taken 
from the vegetal kingdom”; Vidal de la Blache, 
1922 
299 Principes de géographie humaine, 
192227 
Figure 27—Incidence of “environment” in 
Google Ngram corpus, 1800–2000 
301 Data from: 
https://books.google.com/ngrams 
Figure 28—Comparison of environments, from 
Our Environment: How We Use and Control It, 1927 
304 Our Environment…, 192728 
Figure 29—The Slave Ship; or, Slavers throwing 
overboard the Dead and Dying—Typhoon coming on; 
JMW Turner (1775–1851), 1840 
306 Wikimedia Commons/Museum of 
Fine Arts29 
 
  
                                               
26 Chalmers Publishing Company 1917; Kirkwood 1917; see also: Cummings 1922. 
27 Vidal de La Blache 1922, Annex. 
28 Wood and Carpenter 1927, 15. 
29 Turner 1840. 
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